BKQ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BKQ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 40

Appeal from: BKQ16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 137
File number: VID 166 of 2018
Judge: MORTIMER J
Date of judgment: 29 January 2019
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court affirming decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal to refuse protection visa application – whether decision of Tribunal to refuse appellant’s application for adjournment of hearing unreasonable – where adjournment concerned second hearing following reconstitution of Tribunal – where appellant unrepresented at second hearing – failure to grant adjournment unreasonable in the circumstances – appeal allowed

MIGRATION – appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court affirming decision of Tribunal to refuse protection visa application – whether Tribunal failed to exercise jurisdiction due to error in factual findings relevant to assessment of credibility– appeal allowed

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to amend notice of appeal – where ground not pressed before Federal Circuit Court – consideration of principles concerning leave to amend notice of appeal – leave granted

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 48B, 363(1)(b), 415(2)(a), 425, 426A(1), 427(1)(b)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 37M

Cases cited:

ARK16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 825

AVQ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 133

BKQ16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 137

CKC16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1260

Coulton v Holcombe [1986] HCA 33; 162 CLR 1

CPE15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 591

Haritos v Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCAFC 92; 233 FCR 315

Maharjan v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 213; 258 FCR 1

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Aulakh [2018] FCAFC 91

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; 92 ALJR 713

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; 249 CLR 332

Murad v Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 73

MZZJO v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 80; 239 FCR 436

WAGO of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 437; 194 ALR 676

Date of hearing: 13 November 2018
Date of last submissions: 27 November 2018
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 94
Counsel for the Appellant: Ms G A Costello
Solicitor for the Appellant: Victoria Legal Aid
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr C M McDermott
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

ORDERS

VID 166 of 2018
BETWEEN:

BKQ16

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MORTIMER J

DATE OF ORDER:

29 JANUARY 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Leave is granted to…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 40
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, a Sri Lankan national, appealed the Federal Circuit Court's decision to affirm the Administrative Appeals Tribunal's refusal of his protection visa application. The Tribunal had denied the appellant's request for an adjournment of the hearing following the Tribunal's reconstitution, which led to the appellant attending the hearing without representation. The appellant also argued that the Tribunal had failed to exercise its jurisdiction due to errors in the factual findings relevant to the credibility assessment. Additionally, the appellant sought leave to amend his notice of appeal to include a new ground of appeal that was not raised before the Federal Circuit Court.

The court was required to determine whether the Tribunal's refusal to grant an adjournment was unreasonable, and if the Tribunal had exercised its jurisdiction properly by making the relevant factual findings. The court also had to consider the principles governing the amendment of a notice of appeal when a ground was not initially raised in the Federal Circuit Court.

The court found that the refusal of the adjournment was unreasonable given the appellant's efforts to secure representation and the fact that the hearing was the second one following the Tribunal's reconstitution. The court further held that the Tribunal had failed to exercise its jurisdiction due to errors in the factual findings, leading to an incorrect assessment of the appellant's credibility. The court granted the appellant leave to amend his notice of appeal to include the new ground concerning the adjournment, as the principles governing such amendments allowed for flexibility in exceptional circumstances.

The appeal was allowed. The Federal Circuit Court's orders were set aside, and the matter was remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, differently constituted, for redetermination. The parties were directed to agree on appropriate costs orders for the appeal and the hearing before the Federal Circuit Court. If no agreement was reached by a specified date, the matter of an appropriate lump sum for the appellant's costs would be referred to a Registrar for determination.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave is granted to the appellant to rely, in addition to ground 1 in his notice of appeal filed on 19 February 2018, on the proposed ground of appeal set out in paragraph 1A of his interlocutory application dated 18 July 2018.

2. The appeal be allowed.

3. The orders of the Federal Circuit Court made on 29 January 2018 be set aside, and in lieu thereof, order that:

(a) The decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal made on 26 May 2016 be set aside.

(b) The matter be remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, differently constituted, for determination according to law.

4. The parties are to agree on appropriate costs orders for the appeal and for the hearing before the Federal Circuit Court by way of a lump sum and file a joint minute of proposed orders on or before 4 pm on 12 February 2019.

5. In the absence of any joint minute of proposed order being filed pursuant to paragraph 4 of these orders:

(a) on or before 4 pm on 19 February 2019, the appellant file and serve submissions (in accordance with paragraphs 4.10 to 4.12 of the Court’s Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS) dated 25 October 2016).

(b) on or before 4 pm on 26 February 2019, the first respondent file and serve submissions (in accordance with paragraphs 4.13 to 4.14 of the Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS).

6. In the absence of any agreement having been reached on or before 5 March 2019, the matter of an appropriate lump sum figure for the appellant’s costs be referred to a Registrar for determination.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons set out below, the appeal will be allowed.RELEVANT BACKGROUND The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka. Some considerable time after his arrival, and after he had spent more than six months in immigration detention, on 1 February 2013 he was permitted to apply for a protection visa, presumably through an exercise of the Minister’s personal discretion under s 48B of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). In the statement accompanying that application the details of the countries to which he had travelled, prior to arriving in Australia, were set out. These details identified that for the period 1 October 2009 through to June 2012, he had been in Malaysia. At Question 6 of his application form 866B he answered “no” to a question about whether he had previously lived in a refugee camp, centre for refugees, or detention centre outside Australia. On 29 October 2013, the appellant’s then representative, from the firm Craddock Murray Neumann, emailed the delegate providing additional information in support of the appellant’s claims for protection and amendments to his protection visa application. In particular the appellant modified his answer to Question 6 to state:Between October 2009 and March 2010 resided in a centre run by IOM in Marak Boat Harbour, Indonesia. Our client cannot recall the name of the Centre and further instructs that question 6 of Form 866B in his application should be amended to include this information After an interview, and his representatives having made submissions to the delegate, the delegate refused to grant the appellant a protection visa. On 10 January 2014, the appellant sought merits review in the Tribunal. Craddock Murray Neumann were listed on the Tribunal application form as the representatives of the appellant. Completion of the review was delayed because of the reconstitution of the Tribunal. The reconstitution is also of relevance to the appellant’s grounds of appeal.The appellant’s claims and how the Tribunal dealt with them The appellant’s claims centred on the treatment initially experienced by his family, rather than him, at the hands of the Sri Lankan Army, with the first significant incident in his narrative being the detention of his brother in 1999 for a period of three days, by the army, along with other young Tamil men. The appellant stated his brother and the other young men were accused of association with the LTTE. It is not necessary to set out in detail the narrative given by the appellant of what happened to his family from there on – but it involved his parents securing his brother’s release, his brother being detained again, and then disappearing for good, his father being beaten and sliding into ill health and dying prematurely, army harassment and intimidation of the family at their house (including the appellant being beaten by army officers). The appellant states that he went into hiding in 2007 with a relative in another part of Sri Lanka and then in 2009, his mother mortgaged the family land to pay a people smuggler to get the appellant, as the last remaining male in his family, out of Sri Lanka. He claimed the army continued to come looking for him at his mother’s house, up until 2010, after he fled Sri Lanka. He claimed to fear harm at the hands of the Sri Lankan Army, on the Convention grounds of race (Tamil) and imputed political opinion (imputed LTTE association). He also made claims relating to his fear of harm if returned to Sri Lanka as an unsuccessful asylum seeker.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appellant confirmed he would attend without a representative. The reality was he had little choice but to do so. He said (in an email):Ok I happy to attend this hearing because it’s about my future and life matter. Slightly feel sad and worried that I couldn’t get a lawyer as representer in short time period. The second Tribunal’s decision The Tribunal’s decision was made on 26 May 2016, and affirmed the refusal of a protection visa to the appellant. There is only one aspect of the Tribunal’s decision which is in issue on the appeal, and it is appropriate to focus on the Tribunal’s reasoning about that issue. Aside from this issue, in summary the Tribunal found there were a number of discrepancies in the appellant’s accounts of the various events giving rise to his claims and this led to the Tribunal rejecting several key aspects of the appellant’s claims (eg that his father was beaten by the Sri Lankan Army). The rejection of many aspects of the appellant’s factual narrative led the Tribunal to find (at [45] of its reasons) that the appellant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution for the reasons he claimed, because of what had happened to him in the past. It went on to reject his claims associated with being returned to Sri Lanka as a failed asylum seeker. The Tribunal’s reasoning on why it rejected the factual narrative of the appellant could be open to criticism at several points, but no ground of appeal is raised about that reasoning. In relation to the claim about being on the Merak ship, it is appropriate to reproduce the two paragraphs of the Tribunal’s reasons which deal with this issue:46.The applicant also claimed that he fears harm on his return to Sri Lanka because he was on the Merak ship and enquiries had been made by the authorities, particularly army intelligence, after they had allegedly seen him in media footage of this ship. The Tribunal notes the applicant only raised his alleged presence on this ship during the first hearing with the previous Member. There was nothing in the applicant’s protection visa application to suggest he had spent six months in Indonesia at the end of 2009 and early 2010. Rather, in his protection visa application he claimed to have been in Malaysia from 1 October 2009 (2008 as he subsequently amended) to 22 June 2012. When asked in the second hearing why he did not mention anything in his statutory declaration about being on this ship or the authorities coming and asking his mother about him after allegedly seeing him on this ship, the applicant claimed that his lawyer had told him if he did not have any evidence this would not be accepted. The Tribunal does not accept that the applicant’s adviser would have advised the applicant that his alleged presence on the Merak ship could not be included in his claims unless he had evidence. The Tribunal notes that there are several aspects of the applicant’s claims, including the alleged visits to his home in 2006, which he has not submitted substantiating evidence. Further, the Tribunal notes when the first Tribunal queried why he had not raised this in his statutory declaration attached to his protection visa application, the applicant had stated he is now relaxed and can tell and he had told his lawyer he had made mistakes like this. There was nothing in the applicant’s earlier evidence to suggest that he had been advised by his lawyer that this information could not be included because he had no evidence to support this claim.47.The Tribunal has also taken into consideration the applicant’s evidence in his entry interview regarding where he lived before coming to Australia, his time since he left Sri Lanka and his travel route to Australia and the applicant did not mention anything about being on board the Merak boat for 6 months. As the Tribunal put to the applicant in the hearing, in accordance with the requirements in s.424AA of the Act, the relevance of this information is that his failure to raise this claim during the entry interview when providing detailed information about his travel since departing Sri Lanka raises serious doubts that he was on this boat or ship. While the applicant, in response; insisted he was on the Merak ship or boat, given the applicant’s delay in raising this claim regarding his presence on the Merak ship, the Tribunal does not accept that he was on this ship as he claimed or that there were any enquiries made by army intelligence, CID or any other authorities from his mother about him as a result of being seen in video footage of this ship. The Tribunal finds that the applicant has embellished this aspect of his claim in an effort to bolster his case. As such it does not accept his claim in the hearing that he jumped into the sea to show that they were trying to commit suicide or that he was the one who was informing the media about the fact they were refugees. The Tribunal therefore does not accept that the applicant faces a real chance of serious harm, now or in the reasonably foreseeable future for reasons of an imputed political opinion based on his alleged presence on the Merak ship.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Tribunal also referred to the appellant’s adjournment request, and explained why the Tribunal had refused to grant the adjournment:On 11 March 2016, the Tribunal wrote to the applicant inviting him to attend a further hearing on 22 April 2016. On 13 April 2016, the applicant wrote to the Tribunal requesting a postponement of the hearing to allow him time to obtain a new representative as his previous agent was no longer representing him. The applicant explained the efforts he had gone to in order to engage a new representative and requested time to collect the money required to pay for a new representative. The Tribunal considered the applicant’s request but decided to refuse to postpone the hearing on the basis that the applicant had the assistance of an adviser for the hearing with the previous Member and that the purpose of the second hearing was to discuss issues arising out of his evidence given during that hearing, as well as more recent country information, Further, the Tribunal took into consideration the fact that the previous hearing had been held nearly a year before and that there was nothing in the information provided by the applicant to indicate that he would be in a position to engage another representative in the near future. In light of these circumstances the Tribunal was of the view that the matter should not be delayed any further.The Immigration Advice and Application Assistance Scheme The evidence is clear that Craddock Murray Neumann were retained to act on behalf of the appellant under the IAAAS Scheme. In the appeal book were documents such as the appellant’s consent for information to be provided to Craddock Murray Neumann as his IAAAS provider. The apparently unilateral decision of Craddock Murray Neumann to cease to act for the appellant before his Tribunal review process was complete was a matter which the Court raised during argument on the appeal. The Court directed the parties to file a joint note about how the Scheme operates. The following information is taken from that note, which states it was prepared from publicly available sources. The joint note also confirmed that Craddock Murray Neumann were listed as providers of the IAAAS Scheme at the time the appellant was receiving assistance from that firm. The IAAAS is a Scheme administered by the Commonwealth government to provide free, independent, and professional migration advice and visa application assistance to “disadvantaged” non-citizens, meaning non-citizens who are financially disadvantaged or disadvantaged in another way, for example because they are from a non-English speaking background. Services under the IAAAS Scheme are provided by registered migration agents or legal aid officers working for contracted IAAAS Scheme providers. Providers were initially selected in an open tender process completed in 2011. Regulatory oversight of registered migration agents is conducted by the Office of the Migration Agents Registration Authority, a federal authority.