AJL16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AJL16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 255

Appeal from: AJL16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 1680
File number: VID 880 of 2018
Judge: MORTIMER J
Date of judgment: 5 March 2019
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court affirming decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal to refuse protection visa – whether Tribunal failed to perform statutory review function by failing to consider risk that appellant would be subject to sexual violence – where appellant did not directly raise claim of risk of sexual violence before Tribunal – no error in Tribunal reasoning – appeal dismissed

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to amend notice of appeal – where ground not pressed before Federal Circuit court – leave granted

Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 36(2B)(c), Div 4, Pt 7
Cases cited:

AJL16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCCA 1680

AOJ18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCAFC 220

AVQ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 133

Beezley v Repatriation Commission [2015] FCAFC 165; 150 ALD 11

BKQ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 40

BPF15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection  [2018] FCA 964

DFE16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 177

Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 26; 197 ALR 389

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS [2013] FCAFC 114; 230 FCR 431

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRMA [2013] FCAFC 161; 219 FCR 287

NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263; 144 FCR 1

NAVK v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1695

SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34; 347 ALR 405

Date of hearing: 18 February 2019
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 81
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr J Bayly
Solicitor for the Appellant: Axis Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms J A Lucas
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

VID 880 of 2018
BETWEEN:

AJL16

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MORTIMER J

DATE OF ORDER:

5 MARCH 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appellant have leave to file and serve an amended notice of appeal in the form of the notice of appeal filed on 1 November 2018.

2.The appeal be dismissed.

3.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of and incidental to this appeal, fixed in the lump sum of $6,200.70.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MORTIMER J:

Introduction and summary

  1. This is an appeal from…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 255
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, a Sri Lankan national of Tamil ethnicity and Roman Catholic faith, challenged the Federal Circuit Court’s affirmation of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal's (AAT) refusal to grant him a protection visa. The appellant claimed that he would face persecution and serious harm if returned to Sri Lanka due to his past association with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and fears of an imputed association. The AAT rejected most of the appellant's claims, particularly those involving his alleged association with the LTTE. The appellant argued that the AAT failed to consider the risk of sexual violence, a claim he did not explicitly raise before the Tribunal.

The central legal issue was whether the AAT erred in its statutory review function by not considering the risk of sexual violence, which the appellant did not directly raise before the Tribunal. The appellant cited the reasoning in BPF15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, asserting that the Tribunal should have identified and assessed potential claims of sexual violence. The Minister argued that the Tribunal's role was to assess the claims based on the material presented, not to identify and evaluate unraised claims.

The court found that while the Refugee Immigration Law Centre (RILC) did make submissions regarding sexual violence, the focus was on the appellant's direct claims related to his association with the LTTE. The court concluded that the Tribunal did not err in its assessment since the appellant's statutory declaration did not specifically raise sexual violence as a distinct claim. The court referenced NAVK v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, which held that the Tribunal's task is to assess the claims presented, not to discover and evaluate potential unraised claims. The court granted the appellant leave to amend the notice of appeal but ultimately dismissed the appeal.

The final orders were that the appellant be granted leave to amend the notice of appeal, the appeal be dismissed, and the appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal, amounting to $6,200.70.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appellant have leave to file and serve an amended notice of appeal in the form of the notice of appeal filed on 1 November 2018.

2. The appeal be dismissed.

3. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of and incidental to this appeal, fixed in the lump sum of $6,200.70.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons set out below, the appeal will be dismissed.Relevant background The appellant is a national of Sri Lanka, of Tamil ethnicity and a Roman Catholic. He arrived on Cocos Island by boat on 10 August 2012 and was first interviewed by an officer of the Department of Immigration and Border Protection on 13 August 2012. He was released into the community on a bridging visa on 8 November 2012. The appellant applied for a protection visa on 19 December 2012, supported by a statutory declaration dated 9 December 2012. He was interviewed by a delegate of the Minister on 27 September 2013 and his visa application was rejected in a decision made on 9 January 2014. He applied to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for a review of that decision on 17 January 2014. He was represented throughout the process before the delegate and the Tribunal by the Refugee Immigration Law Centre (“RILC”).The Tribunal’s reasoning On 18 January 2016, the Tribunal affirmed the decision to refuse the appellant a protection visa. What follows is a summary of the Tribunal’s reasoning for that decision. The appellant’s claims of what had occurred to him in Sri Lanka, and the reasons for his fears of persecution and serious harm, were put on many different factual bases, and he presented a complex factual narrative to the Tribunal, both through his own evidence and through lengthy submissions put on his behalf by his representatives. The Tribunal accepted the bare aspects of the appellant’s narrative of what had happened to him in Sri Lanka before he fled in 2012, and it accepted most of the appellant’s account of his personal and family circumstances. It rejected almost all elements of the appellant’s claims where they touched on any close association with the LTTE, or any previous harm from Sri Lankan authorities because of any perceived or imputed association with the LTTE. It also rejected the appellant’s claim that his cousin had been abducted by unidentified Army or Intelligence officers. Where the appellant’s accounts of further harm suffered by him flowed out of an event such as his cousin’s abduction, the Tribunal rejected those claims by adopting consequential reasoning: that is, because it did not accept the abduction occurred, it did not accept that part of the appellant’s narrative which was claimed to flow on from the abduction. The Tribunal also adopted this kind of consequential reasoning process in relation to other claims made by the appellant, such as that he was severely interrogated when he left Sri Lanka in 2011 to travel to India for work purposes, but managed to return without incident because his boss arranged for people to meet him at the airport and get him through. The Tribunal rejected these claims because of its earlier findings that, prior to this time, the appellant was not of any interest to the Sri Lankan authorities, and because he had previously travelled to India to study without experiencing any problems. There are several other examples where the Tribunal rejected a specific narrative put forward by the appellant (identified sometimes as having been put forward in earlier statements and sometimes only to the Tribunal) on the basis of earlier findings that he was of no interest to the Sri Lankan authorities.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appellant submits the Tribunal, having found the appellant was likely to be detained for up to several days, did not consider the “sexual violence claim” at all, and therefore “failed to perform its jurisdictional task”. He contends the Tribunal’s findings on the risk the appellant would face torture were insufficient because they were at too high a level of generality given the specific harm identified in the RILC submissions. The appellant relied on the kind of analysis undertaken by Beach J in BPF15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 964, see especially at [103]-[107] where his Honour’s conclusions on a similar argument are expressed.Findings and conclusions on the new ground In his statutory declaration, having outlined all his past experiences which led him to fear returning to Sri Lanka, and to fear that he would not be protected by the Sri Lankan authorities if he returned, the appellant said: I fear that they will know if I return to the airport and will arrest and detain me there. I left without a valid passport and would face punishment for this. Together with the parts of his evidence which I have quoted at [39] above, this is as specific as his claims were about what kind of mistreatment would occur if he were to return. Of course, those statements were made in the particular context of his narrative about previous association with the LTTE and the likelihood he would be imputed with an association with the LTTE. The Minister relied on the following observations by Allsop J (as his Honour then was) in NAVK v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1695 at [15]:… the statutory task of the Tribunal is to assess the claims by reference to all the material not to undertake an independent analytical exercise of the material for the discovery of potential claims which might be made, but have not been, and then subjecting them to further analysis to assess their legitimacy. These observations were cited with approval by a Full Court in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRMA [2013] FCAFC 161; 219 FCR 287 at [70], and more recently in the Full Court decisions of DFE16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 177 at [21] and AOJ18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCAFC 220 at [29]. I do not consider the present case falls easily within the circumstances described by Allsop J in NAVK, but on reflection, I have concluded the appellant’s arguments do have elements of this kind of approach. RILC made submissions which included submissions about sexual violence, so much is correct. However, it did so without a proportionately significant focus on that kind of harm as one likely to be experienced by this particular person on his return. The focus of the submissions was on country information supporting the appellant’s direct claims to fear harm because of a past association with the LTTE and the future risk of an imputed association with the LTTE. It was in this context that the country information referring to sexual violence was presented.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established