BFH16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BFH16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] FCAFC 54

Appeal from: BFH16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCCA 730 and BFI16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCCA 731
File numbers: VID 403 of 2019
VID 407 of 2019
Judges: MURPHY, O'BRYAN AND SNADEN JJ
Date of judgment: 31 March 2020
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – refugees – protection visa – refusal to grant protection visa under section 65 of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) - Administrative Appeals Tribunal – review by Tribunal under Pt 7 of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – applicants’ claim for protection grounded on claim to be member of particular social group, being homosexuals in Pakistan – appeals allowed – matters remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – administrative law – judicial review – jurisdictional error – whether decision by Tribunal unreasonable, irrational or illogical – whether certain factual findings made by the Tribunal lacked an evident and intelligible justification or the reasoning was not open on the evidence or lacked a logical connection between the evidence and the conclusions drawn – applicable principles – whether evidence of particular facts rationally probative of a fact in issue – materiality of reasoning in error – writ of certiorari issued – writ of mandamus issued

Legislation:

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act1977 (Cth)

Federal Court of Australia Act1976 (Cth)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Cases cited:

ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 250 FCR 109

Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321

BFH16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCCA 730

BFI16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCCA 731

BZD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 263 FCR 292

DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 258 FCR 175

DYS16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 260 FCR 260

EHF17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1681

Goldsmith v Sandilands (2002) 190 ALR 370

Guo v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1996) 64 FCR 151

Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (No 7) (2003) 130 FCR 424

Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 123

Kopalapillai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 86 FCR 547

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton (2016) 237 FCR 1

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA (2019) 264 CLR 421

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW (2018) 264 CLR 541

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611

Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476

Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 73…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCAFC 54
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

BFH16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved two appellants who sought a protection visa on the basis of their claim to be members of a particular social group, specifically homosexuals in Pakistan. The appellants' applications were initially refused by the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, and subsequently by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). They appealed the AAT's decisions to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, which were then further appealed to the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia.

The key legal issues before the court were whether the AAT's decision was unreasonable, irrational, or illogical, and whether certain factual findings lacked an evident and intelligible justification or were not open on the evidence. The court had to determine whether the AAT's reliance on specific evidence was legally sound and whether the AAT's reasoning was material to its conclusions. Specifically, the court examined the AAT's assessment of the appellants' claims of homosexuality based on their behaviours following their first sexual encounter, and whether this assessment was illogical and lacked a logical and probative basis.

The court found that the AAT's erroneous reasoning was material, as it was one of the few circumstantial matters from which the Tribunal concluded that the appellants were not homosexual as claimed. The court held that the Tribunal's findings on this matter were not supported by the evidence and lacked a logical connection to the conclusions drawn. The court concluded that the appeals should be allowed, and the matters should be remitted to the AAT for re-determination by a different member. The appellants were also awarded their costs of the appeals and in the Court below.

In summary, the court allowed the appeals, quashed the AAT's decisions, and remitted the matters to the AAT for re-determination according to law. The Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs was ordered to pay the appellants' costs of the Federal Circuit Court proceeding and the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. Paragraph 2 of the orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 29 March 2019 be set aside and, in lieu thereof, the following orders be made:

(a) A writ of certiorari issue directed to the second respondent quashing the decision of the second respondent dated 29 April 2016 (case number 1417175).

(b) A writ of mandamus issue directed to the second respondent requiring it to determine, according to law, the application made to it by the appellant for review of the decision of a delegate of the first respondent made on 1 October 2014 under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

3. Paragraph 2 of the orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 1 April 2019 be set aside and, in lieu thereof, the following order be made:

The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the Federal Circuit Court proceeding.

4. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.

5. The name of the first respondent be changed to ‘Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs’.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In our view, the Tribunal’s erroneous reasoning was material. In context, the erroneous reasoning was one of a relatively small number of circumstantial matters from which the Tribunal concluded that the appellants were not homosexual as claimed. The second matter relied on by the Tribunal, the travel patterns of the appellants between February 2011 and April 2013, could only be regarded as having slight probative value on the ultimate fact in issue. The third matter, the appellants’ attendance at gay venues when they wished to keep their relationship secret, had only modest probative value. This is not a case in which the erroneous findings were trivial and the balance of the findings made by the Tribunal could be regarded as providing overwhelming support for the Tribunal’s ultimate conclusion. The opposite is the case.Conclusion For the reasons given above, the appeals should be allowed and the matters remitted to the Tribunal for re-determination according to law by a different member of the Tribunal. The appellants should be awarded their costs of the appeals and in the Court below. I have had the privilege of reading a draft of the majority’s judgment. I gratefully adopt their Honours’ recitation of the relevant background, and their thorough summary of relevant legal principle. I agree with the bulk of their Honours’ conclusions and the reasoning that underpins them. Respectfully and with some hesitation, however, I regret that I am unable to agree with their Honours as to the outcome of the appeals. For reasons that warrant only brief articulation, I do not accept that either of the Tribunal’s decisions was the product of (or was otherwise affected by) jurisdictional error. I would dismiss both appeals. Before the Tribunal, each of the appellants asserted that he should be afforded a protection visa on the basis of what he claimed was his well-founded fear that he would be subjected to relevant persecution if he returned to his native Pakistan. That persecution was said, in each case, to arise by reason of the appellant’s homosexuality. The Tribunal, like the Minister’s delegate before it, concluded that the appellants were not, in fact, homosexuals. En route to making that finding in each case, the Tribunal considered (amongst other things to which reference need not here be made) evidence that the appellants separately gave about the events that surrounded what they each claimed was their first sexual encounter together. That evidence was, in some respects, inconsistent. In another, the Tribunal found it implausible. I agree with—and, again, gratefully adopt—their Honours’ summary of the reasoning process upon which the Tribunal embarked prior to forming its conclusion as to the appellants’ sexual orientation (above, [46]). Thereafter, however, I respectfully depart from the reasoning of the majority on the aspects of the appeals concerning that evidence (aptly and conveniently described in the majority judgment as appeal items “a” and “b”).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

A fact is rationally probative of another fact (and thereby relevant at common law and under statute) if the fact, according to the ordinary course of events and either taken by itself or in connection with other facts, proves or renders probable the past, present or future existence or non-existence of the other fact: Goldsmith v Sandilands (2002) 190 ALR 370; 76 ALJR 1024; [2002] HCA 31 at [31] per McHugh J citing Stephen, Digest of the Law of Evidence (5th ed, 1887) Art 1. Two aspects of the foregoing definition should be highlighted. First, the assessment is based on the ordinary course of events. It is an “objective test grounded in human experience”: Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (No 7) 130 FCR 424 at [11] per Lindgren J. Second, while an individual fact taken by itself may not be probative of a fact in issue, it may be probative when considered with other facts and the assessment must be made in the context of all other evidence. Consideration of AppealsAppeal items “a” and “b” By items “a” and “b” of their amended notices of appeal, the appellants contend that the Tribunal's assessment of their claims to homosexuality was illogical insofar as the Tribunal relied on the evidence of the appellants concerning their behaviours following their first sexual encounter, specifically whether they discussed the implications for them of the sexual encounter or went about their normal routine and when they next had sexual intercourse. The appellants submitted that the basis for the Tribunal’s reasoning was not evident or intelligible from the reasons and there is no logical and probative basis for it. The Minister’s submissions focused on the Tribunal’s finding that the appellants had given different accounts of the immediate aftermath of their claimed first sexual experience. The Minister noted that:(a)When BFI16 was asked whether the appellants talked afterwards, he said “yes we did, we were very open to each other” and indicated that “they talked that night and the next day and for a few days as well” (BFH16 reasons at [36]), whereas BFH16 said that the appellants had not talked that night, and as for the next day “he was not sure as it was a long time ago” and “they went about their normal routine and had ‘Uni’ as well” (BFH16 reasons at [36]).(b)When BFI16 was asked when the appellants next had sex, BFI16 said he thought it was after 1-2 days or 2-3 days whereas BFH16 said it was later on “a couple of weeks later” (BFH16 reasons at [35]). The Minister submitted that there is nothing remarkable about the Tribunal’s assessment that BFH16’s evidence on the first point was “implausible”, in the sense that it did not have the appearance of truth or probability. It was open to the Tribunal not to be satisfied that it was probable that BFH16 would not recall whether he and BFI16 had discussed an event that presumably would have been of great significance to them. For similar reasons, it was open to the Tribunal to consider the significant discrepancy in the appellants’ evidence as to when they next had sex as bearing on the plausibility of their story.