FES17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs

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Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia

(DIVISION 2)

FES17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 1003  

File number(s): SYG 3692 of 2017
Judgment of: JUDGE OBRADOVIC
Date of judgment: 7 December 2022
Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application for judicial review – whether the Immigration Assessment Authority failed to lawfully apply s.473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether the Authority failed to properly consider the claim – whether the Authority failed to consider relevant information – whether the Authority breached the no evidence rule – jurisdictional error established.
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss. 473CB, 473CC, 473DD

Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s. 55

Cases cited:

AQU17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 111
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond [1990] HCA 33
Australian Retailers Association v Reserve Bank of Australia [2005] FCA 1707

Azam v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 661
CD v Central Gippsland Health Service [2022] VSC 462
Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd [1993] FCA 456

Kostas v HIA Insurance Services Pty Ltd [2010] HCA 32

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 [2017] FCAFC 176

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSRS [2014] FCAFC 16
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6

NABE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263

NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10
Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 16

SZATV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 40

Wang v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2019] FCA 1178

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 56
Date of hearing: 3 August 2022
Place: Parramatta
Counsel for the Applicant:  Mr Chatterjee
Solicitors for the Applicant:  D’Ambra Murphy Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent:  Mr Johnson
Solicitors for the First Respondent: HWL Ebsworth Lawyers

ORDERS

SYG 3692 of 2017

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

FES17

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

order made by:

JUDGE OBRADOVIC

DATE OF ORDER:

7 December 2022

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.A writ of certiorari issue, quashing the decision of the second respondent (“Authority”) dated 1 November 2017 to affirm the decision of a delegate (“delegate’s decision”) of the first respondent (“Minister”) to refuse to grant the applicant a subclass XE-790 Safe Haven Enterprise Visa (“Authority decision”).

2.A writ of mandamus issue, remitting the matter to the Authority and requiring it to determine according to law the application referred to it by the Minister under s.473CC of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) for review of the delegate’s decision.

3.A writ of prohibition issue, prohibiting the Minister and his delegates, servants and agents from acting upon or giving effect to the Authority’s decision.

4.The Minister pay the applicant’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Note: The form of the order is subject to…

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Details
Case
[2022] FedCFamC2G 1003
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, a citizen of Afghanistan of Hazara-Sayed ethnicity and a Shia Muslim, sought judicial review of a decision by the Immigration Assessment Authority, affirming the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs’ delegate’s decision not to grant him a protection visa. The applicant argued that he faced significant harm due to his ethnicity and faith, and because of his father’s involvement in anti-Taliban campaigns. He claimed that he was unable to return to either Pakistan or Afghanistan due to the threats he faced.

The primary legal issue the court had to address was whether the Immigration Assessment Authority's decision was legally sound, particularly in terms of the findings about the applicant's risk of harm and the reasonableness of internal relocation within Afghanistan. The court needed to assess if the Authority's decision was supported by evidence and whether it complied with the relevant statutory provisions.

The court examined the evidence presented by the applicant, which included various reports and articles indicating threats to Hazara people in Afghanistan. It considered whether the Authority’s findings were supported by probative evidence. The court found that the Authority's determination that the applicant would not face a real risk of significant harm in Kabul was based on evidence and reasoned conclusions. The court also noted that the Authority was satisfied that it was reasonable for the applicant to relocate to Mazar-e-Sharif, where he would not face such harm. The court held that the Authority's findings were not irrational or unsupported by evidence.

The court concluded that the Authority's decision was lawful and that the application for judicial review should be dismissed. The decision was upheld, and the applicant's application for a protection visa was denied.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (“Authority”), made on 1 November 2017, which affirmed the decision of the delegate of the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (“delegate”) not to grant the applicant a protection visa, subclass XE-790 Safe Haven Enterprise Visa (“visa”).Background The applicant is a citizen of Afghanistan of Hazara-Sayed ethnicity and is a Shia Muslim. On 26 March 2016, the applicant applied for a visa on the basis that he feared harm from the Taliban and Daesh due to his ethnicity and faith, and by reason of his connection with his father’s involvement with anti-Taliban campaigns. The applicant also claimed to fear harm on the basis that he would be a returnee from a Western Country. In support of his application, the applicant raised the following: (a)That in or around 1998, his father was killed by a roadside bomb which had been planted by the Taliban, following his father’s participation in a village council meeting which determined that the village would fight against the Taliban; (b)That his family received threats from the Taliban and as a result the applicant, his siblings, and his mother fled to Quetta, Pakistan; (c)That living in Pakistan was difficult. They had no legal documents and they had no proper access to medical services, education, and work, and constantly feared being deported from Pakistan;(d)That Pakistani extremist militant groups were responsible for the deaths of at least 2000 Hazara people (not including those that have been injured) in Quetta;(e)That he returned to Kabul, Afghanistan in May 2012 to see whether he could return his family back home, noting that at that point there had been the presence of Western and Afghan security forces for some time;(f)That he then began volunteer work in Afghanistan with a UK registered international non-profitable organisation aimed at providing humanitarian efforts, which involved him travelling to camps to distribute food and water;(g)That he was told by co-workers that people working for such organisations, such as him, were never safe from the Taliban by reason of their involvement with Western funded organisations. Particularly, at that time the Taliban controlled the majority of the roads across Afghanistan and were killing tens of people every week, and that it was especially dangerous for those associated with international organisations and the Afghan Government;(h)That he returned to Pakistan after approximately two months in Afghanistan. The situation in Pakistan for Hazara people had worsened by this time and everyone was afraid to go out;(i)That he is unable to now return to Pakistan because he has no right to residency and that he fears harm from Pakistani extremist groups by reason of his Hazara ethnicity; (j)That he is unable to return to Afghanistan as he fears that he will be persecuted because of his father’s involvement in an anti-Taliban campaign, and that he will be subjected to serious harm by reason of his ethnicity and Shia faith from not only the Taliban but also groups who have recently gained power; and(k)That he fears serious harm from the Taliban and other anti-government groups, as returning failed asylum seeker from a Western Country.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Ground 3 is not made out. Ground 4 – No Evidence It is well established that a “no evidence” ground will fail if there was any evidence to support a particular factual finding or inference.[16] However, as held by Bromwich J in Wang v Australian Securities and Investments Commission[17]The “no evidence” ground is not restricted to circumstances where there is, quite literally, no evidence at all. That is because a finding may constitute an error of law if there was no probative evidence to support it, so as to be no evidence in law at all: see Bruce v Cole (1998) 45 NSWLR 163 at 188-189 per Spigelman CJ (Mason P, Sheller and Powell JJA agreeing). It follows that the no evidence ground of review will not always be defeated by identifying a mere “skerrick” of evidence if it can be shown by the party asserting the “no evidence” ground not to have been also legally probative in making the finding in question.[16] Australian Retailers Association v Reserve Bank of Australia [2005] FCA 1707 at [575]; Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond [1990] HCA 33at [94]; Kostas v HIA Insurance Services Pty Ltd [2010] HCA 32 at [16], [91].[17] Wang v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2019] FCA 1178 at [68] Furthermore, in CD v Central Gippsland Health Service[18] it was held that The principle that evidence must be “probative” or “rationally probative” has been said to have the consequence that it is inaccurate to say that the “no evidence” ground is “restricted to circumstances where there is quite literally, no evidence at all”. It might be said that the better view is that material that is not probative is not evidence. As Basten JA said in Amaba Ltd (under New South Wales administered winding up) v Booth: Implicit in the statement that there is no evidence to “support” a particular finding, is the characterisation of a relationship between the evidence and the finding. It is the same relationship inherent in the concept of “relevance”, on which the laws of evidence depend. That relationship depends on a process of reasoning which must be logical or rational. Thus, evidence is relevant which, if accepted, “could rationally affect (directly or indirectly) the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue in the proceeding”: Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 55(1).(citations omitted)[18] CD v Central Gippsland Health Service [2022] VSC 462 at [274] As already noted, notwithstanding that the Tribunal found that the applicant faces a real risk of significant harm in Kabul, it was not satisfied that the applicant faces a real risk of significant harm in Mazar-e-Sharif “which he can safely access by air”.[19] [19] CB: 462 It further found that it was reasonably for the applicant to relocate to Mazar-e-Sharif where he does not face a real risk of significant harm “and which he can safely access by air”.[20][20] CB: 464 The finding that the applicant could safely access Mazar-e-Sharif by air, is part of the overall finding that it was reasonable for the applicant to internally relocate to that city. It is well recognised that Internal relocation will not be a reasonable option if there are logistical or safety impediments to gaining access to the separate part of national territory that is suggested as a safe haven… [21][21] SZATV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 40 at [80]-[81]

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 23 February 2017, the delegate’s decision was referred to the Authority for fast track review under Part 7AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”).The Authority’s Decision On 1 November 2017, the Authority determined the applicant’s case. It affirmed the decision of the delegate not to grant a visa. It is noted that the applicant (through his legal representatives) provided a number of documents to the Authority for consideration consisting of articles, reports and submissions. The Authority in their reasons[1] have provided reasons as to whether these documents have been considered particularly as new information pursuant to section 473DD of the Act. [1] At [4]-[7] of the IAA’s Decisions and Reasons dated 1 November 2017. The Authority largely accepted the applicant’s account regarding his identity, that is, he is an Afghan national with no right of return to Pakistan. They also accepted the applicant’s account that his father was killed by a roadside bomb and that his family were forced to leave the Jaghori district due to threats from the Taliban prior to their departure for Pakistan. However and more relevantly, the Authority was ultimately satisfied that (amongst others): (a)After 18 years of absence the applicant no longer had ties to Jaghori and that Kabul would be the area that he would return to, and as such he would not need to relocate;(b)That the local Taliban was not aware of the applicant’s voluntary work with an international humanitarian organisation in or about May 2012, or that he was consequently imputed as a government collaborator; (c)That the applicant would not be considered to have an adverse profile arising from incidents that occurred in approximately 1999 or by reason of his previous employment;(d)That the applicant did not face a real chance of harm on return to Kabul from the Taliban, Islamic State or other insurgent groups in the foreseeable future; (e)That the applicant would be targeted by the Taliban in Kabul due to his ethnicity or religion; (f)That the applicant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution in Mazar-e-Sharif; (g)That there is not a real chance that the applicant would be denied the capacity to earn a livelihood or that he would be the subject of economic hardship such that it would cause him serious harm within the meaning of the Act; and (h)That the applicant in his circumstances would not be targeted as a returnee by reason of his ethnicity/religion, or imputed pro-Western political opinion, or as a failed asylum seeker, or due to generalised violence. However, the Authority came to the view that there was a risk that the applicant would significant suffer harm in Kabul as a Shia Hazara noting that country information showed a number of recent attacks on Shias in Kabul when assembling in large and identifiable groups. In its assessment of the applicant’s complimentary claim for protection, the Authority was satisfied that the applicant would not face a real risk of harm as it would be reasonable for the applicant to relocate to an area (not Kabul) where there would not be a real risk that the applicant would suffer significant harm.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established