FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Dobie v Commonwealth of Australia [2013] FCA 1224
Citation: Dobie v Commonwealth of Australia [2013] FCA 1224 Parties: KEITH WILLIAM DOBIE v COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA File number: QUD 194 of 2013 Judge: RANGIAH J Date of judgment: 19 November 2013 Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – warrant issued by prescribed authority under s 19AW Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) – parole orders made by Attorney General’s delegate under s 19AL Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) – application for judicial review of the making of the parole orders – whether the Attorney General’s delegate fixed the end date of the applicant’s sentence and supervision period – whether the delegate failed to take into account a relevant consideration – whether the delegate denied the applicant natural justice Legislation: Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act1977 (Cth) ss 5 and 6
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) ss 16(1), 19AA, 19AL, 19AN, 19AW and 19AZC
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B(1A)
Corrective Services Act1988 (Qld) s 212
Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) ss 271.2(2B) and 400.7(2)Cases cited: Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321
Griffith University v Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99
Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24Date of hearing: 17 September 2013 Place: Brisbane Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 79 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr D Campbell QC with Mr A Newman (Pro Bono) Counsel for the Respondent: Ms M Brennan
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
QUD 194 of 2013
BETWEEN: KEITH WILLIAM DOBIE
ApplicantAND: COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent
JUDGE:
RANGIAH J
DATE OF ORDER:
19 NOVEMBER 2013
WHERE MADE:
BRISBANE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application is dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs to be assessed if not agreed.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
QUD 194 of 2013
BETWEEN: KEITH WILLIAM DOBIE
ApplicantAND: COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent
JUDGE:
RANGIAH J
DATE:
19 NOVEMBER 2013
PLACE:
BRISBANE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
On 18 December 2008, the applicant pleaded guilty in the District Court of Queensland to human trafficking and other offences. He was sentenced to terms of imprisonment totalling five years, with a non-parole period of 22 months.
The applicant was later released on parole, but his parole was revoked on two occasions for non-compliance with the conditions of his parole order.
In this Court, the applicant seeks review of what he asserts are decisions made by two delegates of the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of Australia. The decisions are said to be:
(a)a decision made on 29 September 2011 purporting to fix the end date of the applicant’s sentence as 8 January 2014;
(b)another decision made on 13 September 2012 purporting to fix the end date of the applicant’s sentence as 12 May 2014.
The applicant claims, in the alternative, review of the conduct of…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Dobie v Commonwealth of Australia and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2013] FCA 1224
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the delegate did not fix the end date of the applicant’s sentence and supervision period, but rather, the court that imposed the sentence fixed the end date. The court also found that the delegate had taken into account relevant considerations when making the parole orders and that the delegate had not denied the applicant natural justice. The court concluded that the parole orders were valid and dismissed the application. The applicant was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application is dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs to be assessed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
It is uncontroversial that prior to 4 October 2012, the provisions of Divisions 4 and 5 were, relevantly, to the following effect:(a)When a court imposes a federal sentence that exceeds three years imprisonment, the court must fix a non-parole period in respect of that sentence: s 19AB(1). (b)The non-parole period must end not later than the end of the sentence as reduced by any remissions or reductions under State law: s 19AF(1). (c)Where the person is serving a sentence of more than 3 years but less than 10 years and a non-parole period has been fixed in relation to the sentence Attorney-General must, by order in writing, direct that the person be released from prison on parole at the end of the non-parole period or up to 30 days before the end of the non-parole period: s 19AL(1).(d)A parole order that a person be released from prison is sufficient authority for the release if, and only if, the person indicates in writing his or her acceptance of the conditions to which the order is subject: s 19AL(5).(e)A parole order is subject to the conditions that the offender must, during the parole period, be of good behaviour and not violate any law and be subject to such other conditions as the Attorney-General specifies in the order: s 19AN(1).(f)Where a person is serving a federal sentence (whether or not a non-parole period has been fixed or a recognizance release order made), the Attorney-General may grant a licence for the person to be released from prison if satisfied that exceptional circumstances exist which justify the grant of the licence: s 19AP(1), (4).(g)The Attorney-General may revoke a parole order before the end of the parole period if the offender has, during that period, failed to comply with a condition of the parole order or there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the offender has so failed to comply: s 19AU(1).(h)The Attorney-General may apply to a prescribed authority for a warrant for the arrest of the person whose parole order has been revoked, or a constable may arrest such a person without warrant: ss 19AV(1) and (2).(i)A person who is so arrested must as soon as practicable be brought before a prescribed authority: s 19AV(3).(j)Where the prescribed authority is satisfied of certain matters, the prescribed authority must issue a warrant authorising any constable to take that person to a specified prison, directing that the person be detained in prison for the unserved part of a sentence and fixing a non-parole period in respect of the outstanding sentence: s 19AW(1).(k)The prescribed authority is not required to fix a parole period in specified circumstances: s 19AW(3).(l)Where the prescribed authority issues a warrant, it must specify on the warrant the particulars of the unserved part of each outstanding sentence and, if a non-parole period is fixed, particulars of that period: s 19AW(4).(m)A non‑parole period fixed under s 19AW has effect as if it had been fixed by a court in respect of the outstanding sentence, and s 19AL applies in relation to that non‑parole period: s 19AW(5).(n)Where a prescribed authority issues a warrant under s 19AW(1), the person may appeal to the Supreme Court of the State in which the person was arrested against the issue of the warrant or the calculation of the unserved part of the sentence or the fixing of a non-parole period or refusal to fix such a period: s 19AY(1).(o)The expression “non-parole period” is defined to mean that part of a period of imprisonment during which the person is not to be released on parole: s 16(1).(p)The expression “parole-period” is defined to mean, relevantly, the period commencing on the day of release on parole and ending on the last day of the federal sentence (“federal sentence” refers to a sentence of imprisonment for an offence against a law of the Commonwealth): s 16(1).(q)The expression “supervision period” is defined to mean, relevantly, the period commencing on the day of release on parole and ending at the end of the day specified in the parole order as the day on which the supervision period ends, being a day not later than the last day of any federal sentence: s 16(1).ConsiderationValidity of the parole orders