Duxerty v Minister for Justice and Customs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Duxerty v Minister for Justice and Customs [2002] FCA 1518

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – parole – review of decision of Minister to refuse to grant parole application – whether the Minister was the authorised decision-maker – whether the Minister’s decision was an improper exercise of power – natural justice – whether applicant denied procedural fairness

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s 5
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 19AL(2), (3)

Customs Act 1901 (Cth) s 233B

Crimes Legislation Amendment Act (No 2) 1990 (Cth) s 28(1)
Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 18C, 19A(1)

Attorney-General (Cth) v Foster (1999) 84 FCR 582 referred to
Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Kurtovic (1990) 21 FCR 193 applied
Todd v Parole Board (1986) 6 NSWLR 71 referred to
McEncroe v Queensland Community Corrections Supreme Court of Queensland, 8 September 1997, unreported) referred to
Butler v Queensland Community Corrections Board (Supreme Court of Queensland Court of Appeal, 10 August 2001, unreported) considered
Commissioner for ACT Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576 referred to

JOE DUXERTY (ALSO KNOWN AS DAVID JOHN KELLEHER) v MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND CUSTOMS

N 777 OF 2002

HELY J
11 DECEMBER 2002
SYDNEY

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 777 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

JOE DUXERTY (ALSO KNOWN AS DAVID JOHN KELLEHER)
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND CUSTOMS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

HELY J

DATE OF ORDER:

11 DECEMBER 2002

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The application be dismissed with costs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 777 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

JOE DUXERTY (ALSO KNOWN AS DAVID JOHN KELLEHER)
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND CUSTOMS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

HELY J

DATE:

11 DECEMBER 2002

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The applicant seeks review pursuant to s 5 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (“the ADJR Act”) of a decision made by the respondent on 3 July 2002 not to grant the applicant release on parole. It is common ground that this decision is a decision of an administrative character made under an enactment, viz s 19AL of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) (“the Crimes Act”), and that the applicant is a person who is aggrieved by that decision.

    Background

  2. On 21 September 1988 the applicant was sentenced to life imprisonment by a judge of the Supreme Court of NSW having been found guilty of conspiring to import a commercial quantity of heroin into Australia contrary to the provisions of s 233B of the Customs Act 1901 (Cth). The Court declined to set a minimum term.

  3. The applicant subsequently made an application to the Supreme Court under s 28(1) of the Crimes Legislation Amendment Act (No 2) 1990 (Cth) to have a non-parole period fixed in respect of the sentence of life imprisonment. On 18 July 1996…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCA 1518
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Duxerty sought judicial review of the Minister for Justice and Customs' decision not to grant him parole release, a decision made under the Crimes Act 1914. The applicant argued that the Minister was not authorised to make the decision as it was the responsibility of the Attorney-General. The court examined whether the Minister was an authorised decision-maker and if the Minister had the authority to make the decision not to grant parole release on 3 July 2002. The court found that the Minister did not defer making a decision on the question of the applicant's release on parole; rather, he made an adverse decision. The Minister had considered the parole reports, the judge's remarks, and the applicant's letter in making the decision. The delegate's decision to reconsider the matter on 8 July 2002 did not limit the Attorney-General's reconsideration of the question.

The court concluded that the Minister was an authorised decision-maker under a Ministerial arrangement of the type contemplated by s 18C of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901. The Minister had the authority to make the decision not to grant parole release on 3 July 2002. The applicant's case that the Minister simply deferred making a decision on the question of release on parole was incorrect, as the Minister made a decision adverse to the applicant. The court found that the application for judicial review was without merit, and the application was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicant seeks review pursuant to s 5 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (“the ADJR Act”) of a decision made by the respondent on 3 July 2002 not to grant the applicant release on parole. It is common ground that this decision is a decision of an administrative character made under an enactment, viz s 19AL of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) (“the Crimes Act”), and that the applicant is a person who is aggrieved by that decision.Background On 21 September 1988 the applicant was sentenced to life imprisonment by a judge of the Supreme Court of NSW having been found guilty of conspiring to import a commercial quantity of heroin into Australia contrary to the provisions of s 233B of the Customs Act 1901 (Cth). The Court declined to set a minimum term. The applicant subsequently made an application to the Supreme Court under s 28(1) of the Crimes Legislation Amendment Act (No 2) 1990 (Cth) to have a non-parole period fixed in respect of the sentence of life imprisonment. On 18 July 1996 Newman J fixed a non-parole period of 13 years commencing on 21 September 1988 and expiring on 20 September 2001. In his reasons for decision, Newman J noted that the provisions of s 19AL of the Crimes Act make it clear that there is no guarantee that at the expiration of the non-parole period that parole will in fact be granted, and that at that time, the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth must consider, pursuant to s 19AL(2), (3) and (4) of the Crimes Act, whether in fact the applicant is to be released on parole. On 9 January 2001 the applicant was arrested whilst he was on work release and charged with an offence under State law of supplying the drug commonly known as Ecstasy. He pleaded guilty to that charge, and on 15 June 2001 Moore DCJ sentenced the applicant to 4 years imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 18 months. The non-parole period expired on 8 July 2002. Sections 19AL(2) and (3) of the Crimes Act provide as follows:“(2)Subject to section 19AM, where there has been imposed on a person a federal life sentence or a federal sentence of, or federal sentences aggregating, 10 years or more and a non-parole period has been fixed in relation to the person in respect of the sentence or sentences, the Attorney-General must, by order in writing:(a) direct that the person be released from prison on parole:(i) at the end of the non-parole period; or(ii)if the Attorney-General considers that in all the circumstances it would be appropriate to do so, on a specified day, not being earlier than 30 days before the end of the non-parole period; or(b)direct that the person is not to be released on parole at, or at any time before, the end of the non-parole period.(3)An order directing that a person not be released at, or at any time before, the end of the non-parole period:(a)must not be made later than 3 months before the end of the non-parole period; and(b)must include a statement of reasons why the order was made; and(c)if the Attorney-General proposes to reconsider, at a later time, the question of the release of the person on parole – must indicate when the Attorney-General proposes to reconsider the question;and a copy of the order must be given to the person within 14 days after it was made.”The date by which any order directing that the applicant not be released at the end of his non-parole period was required to be made by s 19AL(3)(a) was 20 June 2001.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

HELY J
On 3 July 2002 the Minister for Justice and Customs endorsed the submission with a notation that the recommendations were “not agreed” or “rejected”. On 3 July 2002 the Minister forwarded a letter to the applicant notifying him of the decision not to grant release on parole. The letter provided as follows:“I refer to your letter of 4 March 2002 to Mrs Jackson of the Attorney-General’s Department in which you asked for certain matters to be taken into account when the matter of whether you are to be released on parole was again considered. As you were informed last year, the Delegate agreed to reconsider your release on Commonwealth parole prior to you becoming eligible for release on State parole on 8 July 2002. I have considered your case as the Minister responsible for matters involving federal prisoners.I have taken into account the following matters in making a decision on your case: the parole reports prepared in 2001 and 2002, the Judge’s remarks in sentencing you for the offence committed while you were on work release and your letter of 4 March.You were sentenced to a term of life imprisonment on 21 September 1988 for a serious offence, namely a sophisticated conspiracy involving the ongoing importation of commercial quantities of heroin. At that time the Court refused to set a minimum term. You were subsequently granted a non-parole period of 13 years by the Supreme Court in 1996, to commence on 21 September 1988.However, prior to the expiry of that non-parole period, you were arrested, charged and convicted of a further drug offence of supplying ecstasy, committed in January 2001, while you were on work release and serving a sentence for conspiracy to import a commercial quantity of heroin. You were convicted to a term of 4 years’ imprisonment on 9 January 2001, while already serving a life term.In these circumstances I do not consider that it would be appropriate to grant you the benefit of release on parole so soon after re-offending in custody while serving a life sentence. Therefore, after careful consideration, I have decided not to grant you release on parole.I am prepared to reconsider you for possible release on 8 July 2003. I have asked officers of my Department to arrange for me to be provided with further prison and parole reports by 8 May 2003 so that I will be in a position to review your case.”Whether the respondent was an authorised decision-maker? During the course of argument, I enquired of counsel for the respondent as to how it came about that the respondent purported to exercise the power, or to perform the duty imposed by s 19AL of the Crimes Act on the Attorney-General. I was informed that this came about as a result of a Ministerial arrangement of the type contemplated by s 18C of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) (“the Acts Interpretation Act”). That enquiry on my part provoked an application to further amend the Amended Application so as to assert that the decision of the respondent made on 3 July 2002 is void, as not being a decision of the Attorney-General who is the statutory decision-maker.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: HELY J

Counsel for the applicant expressly disavowed a case that the applicant was entitled to release on parole in July 2002 subject only to the receipt of satisfactory reports. Counsel also accepted that if the Minister had refused to grant the applicant release on parole in July 2002 it would nonetheless have been open to the Minister to indicate that he proposed to reconsider the question at a later time. The essential thrust of the applicant’s submissions is that in July 2002 the Minister simply deferred making a decision on the question of release on parole, and the Minister was not entitled to do so.Consideration In my view, the applicant’s case fails at the threshold. The Minister did not defer making a decision on the question of the applicant’s release on parole; rather he made a decision adverse to the applicant. A casework submission was put before the Minister recommending that he approve the release of the applicant on parole in accordance with subs 19AL(2) of the Crimes Act. The Minister did not agree with that recommendation; he rejected it. As the respondent’s letter of 3 July makes plain the Minister decided not to grant the applicant release on parole. He did not simply defer consideration of the question of possible release until 8 July 2003. Rather, the respondent decided not to grant the applicant release on parole, but indicated that he was prepared to consider the applicant for possible release on 8 July 2003. That is not to say that the result of that reconsideration would necessarily be favourable to the applicant. The Minister’s decision was that it was too soon for the applicant to be released on parole, not that it was too soon for the Minister to make a decision on the question of release. In the respondent’s letter of 3 July 2002, the respondent stated that the parole reports prepared in 2001 and 2002, the judge’s remarks in sentencing the applicant for the offence committed while he was on work release, and the applicant’s letter of 4 March 2002, were matters which the respondent had taken into account in making a decision on the case. The decision was one which was made “on the merits” inasmuch as factors favourable to the applicant’s release were taken into account. The delegate’s decision of 18 June 2001 notified the applicant that it was proposed to reconsider the question of the applicant’s release on parole on 8 July 2002. That may have engendered a hope on the applicant’s part that the result of that reconsideration would be favourable to him, but the notification did not in any sense purport to pre-empt the Attorney-General’s reconsideration of the question, or to truncate or limit the matters to which the Attorney-General might have regard as part of that process of reconsideration. Even if the delegate had purported to bind the decision-maker who would eventually conduct the reconsideration, that would have been legally ineffective : Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Kurtovic (1990) 21 FCR 193.