FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Duxerty v Minister for Justice and Customs [2002] FCA 1518
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – parole – review of decision of Minister to refuse to grant parole application – whether the Minister was the authorised decision-maker – whether the Minister’s decision was an improper exercise of power – natural justice – whether applicant denied procedural fairness
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s 5
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 19AL(2), (3)Customs Act 1901 (Cth) s 233B
Crimes Legislation Amendment Act (No 2) 1990 (Cth) s 28(1)
Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 18C, 19A(1)Attorney-General (Cth) v Foster (1999) 84 FCR 582 referred to
Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Kurtovic (1990) 21 FCR 193 applied
Todd v Parole Board (1986) 6 NSWLR 71 referred to
McEncroe v Queensland Community Corrections Supreme Court of Queensland, 8 September 1997, unreported) referred to
Butler v Queensland Community Corrections Board (Supreme Court of Queensland Court of Appeal, 10 August 2001, unreported) considered
Commissioner for ACT Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576 referred toJOE DUXERTY (ALSO KNOWN AS DAVID JOHN KELLEHER) v MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND CUSTOMS
N 777 OF 2002
HELY J
11 DECEMBER 2002
SYDNEY
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N 777 OF 2002
BETWEEN:
JOE DUXERTY (ALSO KNOWN AS DAVID JOHN KELLEHER)
APPLICANTAND:
MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND CUSTOMS
RESPONDENTJUDGE:
HELY J
DATE OF ORDER:
11 DECEMBER 2002
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The application be dismissed with costs.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N 777 OF 2002
BETWEEN:
JOE DUXERTY (ALSO KNOWN AS DAVID JOHN KELLEHER)
APPLICANTAND:
MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND CUSTOMS
RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
HELY J
DATE:
11 DECEMBER 2002
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The applicant seeks review pursuant to s 5 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (“the ADJR Act”) of a decision made by the respondent on 3 July 2002 not to grant the applicant release on parole. It is common ground that this decision is a decision of an administrative character made under an enactment, viz s 19AL of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) (“the Crimes Act”), and that the applicant is a person who is aggrieved by that decision.
Background
On 21 September 1988 the applicant was sentenced to life imprisonment by a judge of the Supreme Court of NSW having been found guilty of conspiring to import a commercial quantity of heroin into Australia contrary to the provisions of s 233B of the Customs Act 1901 (Cth). The Court declined to set a minimum term.
The applicant subsequently made an application to the Supreme Court under s 28(1) of the Crimes Legislation Amendment Act (No 2) 1990 (Cth) to have a non-parole period fixed in respect of the sentence of life imprisonment. On 18 July 1996…
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- Case
- [2002] FCA 1518
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court concluded that the Minister was an authorised decision-maker under a Ministerial arrangement of the type contemplated by s 18C of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901. The Minister had the authority to make the decision not to grant parole release on 3 July 2002. The applicant's case that the Minister simply deferred making a decision on the question of release on parole was incorrect, as the Minister made a decision adverse to the applicant. The court found that the application for judicial review was without merit, and the application was dismissed with costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be dismissed with costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: HELY J
Counsel for the applicant expressly disavowed a case that the applicant was entitled to release on parole in July 2002 subject only to the receipt of satisfactory reports. Counsel also accepted that if the Minister had refused to grant the applicant release on parole in July 2002 it would nonetheless have been open to the Minister to indicate that he proposed to reconsider the question at a later time. The essential thrust of the applicant’s submissions is that in July 2002 the Minister simply deferred making a decision on the question of release on parole, and the Minister was not entitled to do so.Consideration In my view, the applicant’s case fails at the threshold. The Minister did not defer making a decision on the question of the applicant’s release on parole; rather he made a decision adverse to the applicant. A casework submission was put before the Minister recommending that he approve the release of the applicant on parole in accordance with subs 19AL(2) of the Crimes Act. The Minister did not agree with that recommendation; he rejected it. As the respondent’s letter of 3 July makes plain the Minister decided not to grant the applicant release on parole. He did not simply defer consideration of the question of possible release until 8 July 2003. Rather, the respondent decided not to grant the applicant release on parole, but indicated that he was prepared to consider the applicant for possible release on 8 July 2003. That is not to say that the result of that reconsideration would necessarily be favourable to the applicant. The Minister’s decision was that it was too soon for the applicant to be released on parole, not that it was too soon for the Minister to make a decision on the question of release. In the respondent’s letter of 3 July 2002, the respondent stated that the parole reports prepared in 2001 and 2002, the judge’s remarks in sentencing the applicant for the offence committed while he was on work release, and the applicant’s letter of 4 March 2002, were matters which the respondent had taken into account in making a decision on the case. The decision was one which was made “on the merits” inasmuch as factors favourable to the applicant’s release were taken into account. The delegate’s decision of 18 June 2001 notified the applicant that it was proposed to reconsider the question of the applicant’s release on parole on 8 July 2002. That may have engendered a hope on the applicant’s part that the result of that reconsideration would be favourable to him, but the notification did not in any sense purport to pre-empt the Attorney-General’s reconsideration of the question, or to truncate or limit the matters to which the Attorney-General might have regard as part of that process of reconsideration. Even if the delegate had purported to bind the decision-maker who would eventually conduct the reconsideration, that would have been legally ineffective : Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Kurtovic (1990) 21 FCR 193.