| SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA COURT OF APPEAL |
| S EAPCI 2022 0089 |
| MAPA PEARLS PTY LTD (ACN 604 308 821) | Applicant |
| v | |
| HALIOTIS FISHERIES PTY LTD (ACN 061 835 452) AND OTHERS ACCORDING TO THE SCHEDULE | Respondents |
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| JUDGES: | KYROU, McLEISH and NIALL JJA |
| WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
| DATE OF HEARING: | 7 March 2023 |
| DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 11 May 2023 |
| MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2023] VSCA 108 |
| JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: | [2022] VSC 517 (Cavanough J) |
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PROPERTY LAW – Crown leases granted to applicant over two areas of coastal waters and subjacent sea-bed – In application for leases, applicant stated it did not require exclusive use ‘as it is an area of commercial abalone use’ – Applicant did not advertise leases at least 14 days prior to their grant as required by s 137 of Land Act 1958 – Common ground that leases void pursuant to administrative law principles – Leases deprived first to sixth respondents of ability to fish for abalone and sea urchin in lease areas – Leases registered under Transfer of Land Act 1958 (TLA) prior to those respondents becoming aware of them – Whether lease titles indefeasible under s 41 of TLA – Whether judge erred in finding first to sixth respondents had in personam rights against applicant – Leave to appeal granted – Appeal allowed.
PROPERTY LAW – Indefeasibility of title under s 41 of TLA – Nature and sources of in personam rights enforceable against registered proprietor – Whether conduct of applicant in not advertising and stating it did not require exclusive use sufficient to satisfy equitable fraud basis for in personam rights – Whether right of first to sixth respondents to seek to restrain registration of leases on administrative law grounds sufficient basis for in personam rights irrespective of conduct of applicant – Circumstances in which mistake can give rise to in personam rights – No in personam rights established by first to sixth respondents.
PROPERTY LAW – Indefeasibility of title under s 41 of TLA – Circumstances in which a void instrument of grant or transfer can confer indefeasible title upon registration.
EQUITY – Equitable sources of in personam rights – Equitable fraud – Fourth category of equitable fraud in Earl of Chesterfield v Janssen (1751) 2 Ves Sen 125; 28 ER 82 – Unacceptable use of statute – Excess of jurisdiction.
CROWN LAND – Coastal waters – Whether pt I of Land Act 1958 applies only to ‘land in Victoria’ – Whether sea-bed beneath coastal waters is ‘land’ within Land Act 1958 pt I and ‘Crown land’ within s 134(1) – Coastal Waters (State Powers) Act 1980 (Cth) s 5 – Coastal Waters (State Title) Act 1980 (Cth) s 4(1) – Part I applies to coastal waters and sea-bed.
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – Whether inconsistency between Land Act 1958 and TLA – No inconsistency.
WORDS AND PHRASES – ‘Informality or irregularity’ – TLA s 41.
Transfer of Land Act 1958, ss 8, 28, 40–44, 103, 106; Land Act 1958, ss 4, 12, 134,…
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- Case
- [2023] VSCA 108
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to determine the nature and sources of in personam rights that could potentially be enforceable against the applicant, particularly in light of the void leases. The court also needed to assess whether the applicant's conduct, including not advertising the leases and stating it did not require exclusive use, constituted equitable fraud sufficient to establish in personam rights. Additionally, the court had to consider whether the respondents' right to seek to restrain the registration of the leases on administrative law grounds could be a basis for in personam rights, irrespective of the applicant's conduct. The court also needed to address the question of whether the void leases could confer indefeasible title upon registration and whether there was an inconsistency between the Land Act 1958 and the Transfer of Land Act 1958.
The court found that no in personam rights were established by the respondents. The court held that the applicant's conduct did not amount to equitable fraud sufficient to establish in personam rights. The court also determined that the respondents' right to seek to restrain the registration of the leases on administrative law grounds was not a sufficient basis for in personam rights. The court held that the void leases did not confer indefeasible title upon registration and that there was no inconsistency between the Land Act 1958 and the Transfer of Land Act 1958. The court concluded that the leases were void ab initio and that the applicants' titles were defeasible. However, the court found that no in personam rights were established by the respondents. The appeal was allowed, and the decision of the court below was set aside.
The court ordered that the leases granted to the applicant were void and that the applicant's titles to the leased areas were defeasible. The court further ordered that the respondents had no in personam rights against the applicant and that the leases could not confer indefeasible title upon registration. The court's decision clarified the nature and sources of in personam rights and the circumstances in which a void instrument of grant or transfer can confer indefeasible title upon registration.
Background
Background to the litigation
The first to sixth respondents argued that they had in personam rights against Mapa Pearls Pty Ltd, preventing the leases from being registered. They contended that the leases should be declared void and that they should be allowed to restrain the registration of the leases on administrative law grounds. The respondents claimed that their ability to fish in the lease areas constituted an interest in land under section 184 of the TLA, and that the leases were void for informality or irregularity under section 41 of the TLA.
The matter came before the Supreme Court of Victoria on appeal. The primary judge had dismissed the respondents' claims. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that Mapa Pearls Pty Ltd had not established any in personam rights against the respondents. The case involved the interpretation of the Land Act 1958, the Transfer of Land Act 1958, and the equitable principles of in personam rights. The appeal process included the examination of prior decisions and relevant statutory provisions, as well as the interpretation of the relevant legislation.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the lease titles are indefeasible under section 41 of the Transfer of Land Act 1958.
2. Whether the judge erred in finding that the first to sixth respondents had in personam rights against Mapa Pearls Pty Ltd.
3. Whether the conduct of Mapa Pearls Pty Ltd in not advertising and stating it did not require exclusive use was sufficient to satisfy the equitable fraud basis for in personam rights.
4. Whether the right of the first to sixth respondents to seek to restrain the registration of the leases on administrative law grounds is a sufficient basis for in personam rights, irrespective of the conduct of Mapa Pearls Pty Ltd.
5. In what circumstances can a mistake give rise to in personam rights.
6. Whether there is an inconsistency between the Land Act 1958 and the Transfer of Land Act 1958.
7. What constitutes 'informality or irregularity' under section 41 of the Transfer of Land Act 1958.
Held
1. The court concluded that the lease titles were not indefeasible under section 41 of the Transfer of Land Act 1958 because the leases were void pursuant to administrative law principles.
2. The court found no error in the judge's determination that the first to sixth respondents had in personam rights against Mapa Pearls Pty Ltd.
3. The court held that the conduct of Mapa Pearls Pty Ltd in not advertising and stating it did not require exclusive use was not sufficient to satisfy the equitable fraud basis for in personam rights.
4. The court ruled that the right of the first to sixth respondents to seek to restrain the registration of the leases on administrative law grounds was not a sufficient basis for in personam rights, irrespective of the conduct of Mapa Pearls Pty Ltd.
5. The court determined that a mistake can give rise to in personam rights in certain circumstances, but did not establish such rights in this case.
6. The court found no inconsistency between the Land Act 1958 and the Transfer of Land Act 1958.
7. The court clarified that 'informality or irregularity' under section 41 of the Transfer of Land Act 1958 includes procedural flaws that render a lease void.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court held that the leases were void under administrative law principles, rendering them not indefeasible under section 41 of the Transfer of Land Act 1958. It was determined that the first to sixth respondents had in personam rights against Mapa Pearls Pty Ltd due to the administrative law grounds that rendered the leases void. The court examined whether the conduct of Mapa Pearls Pty Ltd constituted equitable fraud, finding it did not meet the equitable fraud basis for in personam rights. It was established that the right to seek to restrain the registration of the leases on administrative law grounds was insufficient for in personam rights, irrespective of the applicant's conduct. The court found that a mistake could give rise to in personam rights in specific circumstances, but the respondents did not establish such rights in this instance. The court resolved the question of potential inconsistency between the Land Act 1958 and the Transfer of Land Act 1958, concluding there was no inconsistency. The court provided a clarification on the meaning of 'informality or irregularity' under section 41, identifying procedural flaws that render a lease void as part of this definition. The court applied legal principles from various precedents to arrive at these conclusions, distinguishing itself from prior authority where necessary. The binding legal principle established by this decision is that procedural flaws rendering a lease void can lead to the leases not being indefeasible under section 41 of the Transfer of Land Act 1958.