BIQ18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs
[2023] FCA 1084
•21 August 2023
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BIQ18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 1084
Appeal from: BIQ18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 607 File number: VID 477 of 2022 Judgment of: RARES J Date of judgment: 21 August 2023 Catchwords: MIGRATION – claim for protection visa under s 36(2)(a) or (aa) of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where visa application required to provide written one‑sentence response to written question in biodata interview asking reason for seeking protection – where Tribunal raised concerns with visa applicant about one‑sentence response – where Tribunal characterised translation of response to written question as “glib” – whether Tribunal failed to consider important evidence regarding biodata interview – Held: appeal dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2)(a), (aa) Cases cited: Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 236 FCR 593
AVQ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 266 FCR 83
Corporation of the City of Enfield v Development Assessment Commission (2000) 199 CLR 135
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Plaintiff M64/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 258 CLR 173
Division: General Division Registry: Victoria National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 33 Date of hearing: 21 August 2023 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr A Aleksov Solicitor for the Appellant: Carina Ford Immigration Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms M Jackson Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz
ORDERS
VID 477 of 2022 BETWEEN: BIQ18
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
RARES J
DATE OF ORDER:
21 AUGUST 2023
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Revised from the transcript)RARES J:
INTRODUCTION
This is an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) refusing the appellant constitutional writ relief in respect of the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal given on 20 June 2013 to affirm a decision of a delegate of the Minister to refuse the appellant a protection visa: BIQ18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 607.
The appellant was a citizen of Iran who came to Australia in 2012. He claimed to fear persecution in Iran because he had pushed Mr Ali, a son of a senior religious figure, in the course of challenging Mr Ali’s actions in taking goods from an institution’s kitchen in which the appellant was the cook and responsible for those items. Mr Ali was in charge of the institution at which the appellant worked and the appellant’s immediate superior was responsible to Mr Ali in respect of the operations and conduct of the kitchen.
The sole ground of appeal is that the trial judge erred in failing to find that the Tribunal had failed to consider important evidence in relation to the appellant’s biodata interview conducted with the assistance of a Farsi interpreter, which the Tribunal characterised as his, supposedly, “glib” response in relation to the written questions in the biodata form set out below:
20. Are you seeking Australia’s protection?
Yes
21.Why? (1 Sentence)
I want to live comfortably here, I want to have some peace.
(emphasis added)
BACKGROUND
Subsequently, the appellant provided more detailed information about the events that he claimed had led him to leave Iran and seek protection here. He gave an interview to the delegate who summarised his claims in detail, then considered and rejected them. The delegate found that Mr Ali’s father held a high official post within the Iranian Government structure. The delegate found that the appellant gave inconsistent accounts about whether Mr Ali was accompanied by two or three bodyguards at the time of the incident in the kitchen. The appellant claimed that, when Mr Ali sought to remove goods from the kitchen, he challenged him, at which point, depending on which of three different accounts the appellant gave of the incident, Mr Ali either used a stick, a spoon or a mop handle to attack the appellant. The appellant also gave differing accounts as to the way in which the altercation proceeded and how he asserted that he had escaped from the kitchen, despite there being two or three bodyguards, while Mr Ali was on the floor, having been pushed there by the appellant. The delegate did not accept the appellant’s account of those events and was therefore not satisfied that Australia owed him any protection obligations.
THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIBUNAL
The appellant attended a hearing with the Tribunal. During the hearing, the appellant asked for a break and thereafter his migration advisor suggested to the Tribunal that it put any concerns to him in writing.
As a result, the Tribunal wrote to the appellant on 2 May 2013. It raised, among others, concerns about apparent inconsistencies in the appellant’s written accounts at his entry interview with the Department in May 2012 and what he told the Tribunal during his evidence about the number of bodyguards accompanying Mr Ali, the way in which Mr Ali used the different implements which the appellant described and the manner in which he claimed to have interacted with the bodyguards, including whether or not they kicked him during the events in the kitchen.
The letter recorded that the Tribunal might also find that the appellant could give no plausible explanation as to why he would question the actions of his manager’s manager (Mr Ali) or how he could escape from Mr Ali and his escorts, one of whom, in the account he gave to the Tribunal, was allegedly behind him when he pushed Mr Ali. The Tribunal suggested that this might lead it to find that he was not recalling an event that had, in fact, occurred and that, therefore, it might not accept the balance of his claims as to what occurred afterwards. The letter then stated (referring to questions 20 and 21 and his answers) (set out at [3] above):
In an earlier interview with the department dated 14 April 2012 the department has stated in writing that the following conversation occurred:
Q. Are you seeking Australia’s protection
A. Yes
Q. Why
A. I want to live comfortably here, I want to have some peace.
This is relevant because the tribunal may find that your answer may not be consistent with your subsequent statements which were that you feared returning to Iran and you feared being imprisoned and killed by Iranian authorities including [Mr Ali] and [another person].
If the tribunal relies on this information in making its decision, it may affirm the decision under review.
The appellant’s advisor responded on his behalf to the matters raised during the course of the Tribunal hearing and in its letter of 2 May 2013. The advisor had provided a National Accreditation Authority for Translators and Interpreters (NAATI) 2 interpreter’s translation of the appellant’s Farsi handwritten response which he had given to question 21 that a Departmental interpreter had translated into the answer in English set out above. In the statutory declaration, the NAATI interpreter said that the appellant’s Farsi answer to question 21 was “I want to live. I want to have peace.” The NAATI interpreter’s statutory declaration also made some observations about the quality of the translation during the entry interview after listening to a tape recording of it. Those included that the recording quality was extremely poor and it was unclear from it whether the Persian speaker (whom I infer was the appellant) had said that there were three others or three of them, in respect to the number of people who had entered the kitchen on the occasion the subject of the appellant’s substantive claim.
The advisor observed that the Departmental interpreter’s English translation of question 21 could not have been accurate for a number of reasons. The advisor emphasised that the appellant had been asked in question 21 to respond in one sentence and that he had been told by the Departmental interpreter not to say anything about his case at that stage, but just to write something simple.
THE TRIBUNAL’S REASONS
In 13 pages comprising attachment 2 to its reasons, the Tribunal set out the appellant’s evidence and claims. This material, although attached to the reasons, reads as the Tribunal’s summary of the appellant’s claims for protection and what he had said and put to the Department and the Tribunal in the course of pursuing those claims.
Under the heading in attachment 2 ‘Information found in biodata’, being a quotation from the advisor’s submissions, the Tribunal extracted the issue that it had raised in relation to the appellant’s answer to question 21 as recorded in his biodata form.
In the main body of its reasons, the Tribunal found that the appellant’s version of events was, essentially, that Mr Ali, as the boss of his own boss, had attacked him and that he, the appellant, had simply fought back. It assessed that evidence as follows:
6. The Tribunal finds the applicant’s overall telling of his alleged altercation with Ali to be unconvincing. In reaching this conclusion, the Tribunal has considered the agent’s submissions regarding credibility and plausibility. Whilst the Tribunal is mindful of the complexity of these issues and the need to approach them diligently, it has significant concerns about the nature of the applicant’s evidence which are set out as follows:
7. In his initial Biodata interview dated 14 April 2012, it is recorded in writing that when asked ‘why are you seeking Australia’s protection’, the applicant answered ‘I want to live comfortably here, I want to have some peace’. The adviser has stated Ms Maryam Shahi who states she is a migration agent with the same firm as the adviser and that she is NAATI 2 accredited in the Persian language, has stated the correct translation is ‘I want to live. I want to have peace’. Even if that is accepted, the Tribunal has some difficulty accepting that someone who feared being imprisoned and killed by the Iranian authorities including [Mr Ali and another person] as stated in his written statement on 13 July 2012 would answer the question ‘Why are you seeking Australia’s protection’? on 14 April 2012 in such a glib way. Whilst the adviser has stated it is a very reasonable summary of his situation and suggested he had numerous complaints against the Iranian regime, not all of which were serious enough by themselves until the final incident with the son of the Friday prayer leader, the Tribunal remains unconvinced by this submission given the applicant’s subsequent claims in his statement.
(emphasis added)
The Tribunal then gave the following, more detailed, explanation as to why it found the appellant’s account to be unpersuasive:
8. More importantly, in the entry interview with the Department of Immigration dated 14 May 2012 it is recorded in writing the applicant stated that in February 2012 the son of the Imam [Mr Ali] and three other men (escorts) came to the kitchen and wanted to take cooking oil and other kitchen supplies without asking the applicant’s permission and that when the applicant refused, they pushed him around and started kicking and hitting him and abusing him and that when [Mr Ali] picked up a kitchen object and hit him with it on the wrist, he defended himself and pushed him. The Tribunal finds this is not consistent with what the applicant initially described at hearing on 30 April 2013, which was that Ali and two of his bodyguards came into the kitchen, that one of the bodyguards went behind him and as he thought he was going to be attacked, the applicant looked at him and as he turned he noticed Seyed Ali had grabbed a big ladle to attack him and the applicant raised his arm and the ladle hit his arm and then he pushed Seyed Ali back. Whilst the applicant subsequently stated that one of the bodyguards had hit him in the back, this was in response to the Tribunal’s later question about whether the bodyguards had touched him and is difficult to reconcile given the applicant's initial and follow up answer which was that he thought he was going to be attacked by this bodyguard. ·
9. The Tribunal finds the applicant’s evidence has continued to change in relation to how many escorts there were and how events unfolded. The adviser has stated she has listened to the entry interview and that the interpreting was neither precise nor accurate and that the interpreter did not interpret exactly what the applicant had said and that at no stage did the applicant state he was kicked. She has also stated it is not completely clear that the applicant said that three people accompanied Ali and that there is sufficient doubt about the words used to justify giving the applicant the benefit of the doubt in regards to whether he said Ali was accompanied by three people, or three people came, including Ali. In support of this submission, the adviser has relied upon a statutory declaration from Ms Maryam Shahi who states she is a migration agent with the same firm as the adviser and that she is NAATI 2 accredited in the Persian language. It is a cursory translation that states the applicant never said he was kicked and that the quality of the recording was extremely poor and it was unclear whether the speaker said ‘3 others’ or ‘3 of them’. The Tribunal has some difficulty relying upon this cursory translation in preference to the written record of interview given its brevity and that it is not in a question/answer format. It may have also been more professional to outsource that work. Even if it accepts the applicant never said he was kicked, the Tribunal cannot draw the conclusion from Ms Shahi’s statutory declaration that the applicant did not say that Ali was accompanied by three people because Ms Shahi has stated the recording is unclear so the only conclusion the Tribunal can draw is that Ms Shahi does not know what the applicant said. Given this, the Tribunal prefers the written record of interview because it is a contemporaneous record of that interview.
10. The Tribunal also formed the impression that at hearing, the applicant had not turned his mind to what had actually happened in the kitchen and that when asked, he was not recalling an event which had in fact occurred but was making up evidence as he went along. Whilst the adviser has stated the applicant was accountable for the goods taken and that is why he questioned Ali, the Tribunal has trouble understanding why he would question the actions of his manager’s manager who could presumably sack the applicant and who would not need to attack him with any implement especially when he was accompanied by escorts. In addition, the Tribunal remains unconvinced that the applicant could escape as easily as claimed after having pushed Ali because he was effectively surrounded by Ali and his escorts. Whilst the applicant has subsequently drawn a diagram that suggests he ran out a side door and jumped over a wall, the Tribunal does not accept he could escape given the number of escorts in the kitchen and the supposed outrage of Ali and the applicant’s own statement that insulting an Islamic leader in any way would be seriously punished.
(emphasis added)
The Tribunal found those accounts inconsistent and unpersuasive. The Tribunal was not satisfied that the appellant had pushed Mr Ali or that any of the alleged subsequent events, including raids on his house and the finding of a dissident letter, had occurred. It was not satisfied that any further claimed consequences happened to the appellant or members of his family in Iran. It also was unpersuaded that the appellant’s other claims were sufficient to warrant the grant of a protection visa under either s 36(2)(a) or (aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
THE TRIAL JUDGE
The trial judge recited that the appellant had relied on the argument, which he repeated on appeal, that the Tribunal’s reasons were affected by a jurisdictional error of the kind that Kenny, Griffiths and Mortimer JJ identified in AVQ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 266 FCR 83, namely, the Tribunal had overlooked important evidence, being his actual words (in answer to question 21), when characterising the appellant’s answer as “glib”.
Her Honour rejected the argument that the use of the word “glib” was pejorative and that this bespoke error because the biodata form question 21 restricted the appellant to a one-sentence response. Her Honour rejected the appellant’s argument that, if not so restricted, he could have answered more clearly, for example, that he feared being imprisoned and killed by the Iranian authorities, including Mr Ali and the Iranian intelligence agency. The trial judge referred to the Google dictionary definition of ‘glib’, of “fluent but insincere or shallow”, as a possible meaning that could support the appellant’s argument. But, she rejected that characterisation and found that its use of that expression was an instance of the Tribunal not expressing itself well and misusing the word ‘glib’, rather than demonstrating that it had made a jurisdictional error.
Her Honour found that attachment 2 formed part of the Tribunal’s reasons in which it recorded the appellant’s submission that question 21 demanded a one-sentence response. She found that this demonstrated that the Tribunal had considered the submission without needing to repeat it in its other findings of fact and reasons. The trial judge found that, because the Tribunal had set out the submission, it could be inferred that the Tribunal was aware that question 21 required a one-sentence response and that, in any event, as a body that engaged in numerous claims for refugee status, it would be aware of what the biodata form required. She also found that, since the Tribunal had asked the appellant to comment on questions 20 and 21 and his answers to them, it could be expected that the Tribunal would have read his responses, which, she found, par 7 of its reasons confirmed.
Her Honour found that it was not plausible that the Tribunal could not have considered the advisor’s submission that it set out in attachment 2 as follows:
Accordingly, when asked to give one sentence why he was seeking Australia’s protection, he has summed up all his concerns by saying, ‘I want to live. I want to have peace.’ We submit this is a very reasonable summary of the situation and is in no way inconsistent with [the applicant’s] claims as to why he fears returning to Iran.
(emphasis added)
The trial judge found that this showed that the Tribunal had considered that very response. Her Honour also applied Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 236 FCR 593, and other authorities, in concluding that the Tribunal was not obliged to refer to every piece of evidence but could deal with the evidence that mattered to it. Her Honour found that the requirement to give a one-sentence response to question 21 could not affect the outcome because the Tribunal had found the appellant could have easily expressed the essence of his case in one sentence.
Accordingly, the trial judge found that the Tribunal had not overlooked that question 21 required a one-sentence response but that it had not referred to this in the determinative part of its reasons because that requirement was immaterial to its findings that the appellant could easily have said, in one sentence, what his fears were, had that been what he actually felt at the time of the biodata interview.
THE APPELLANT’S SUBMISSIONS
The appellant repeated, pithily, the same submissions on appeal. He argued, as he had made to the trial judge, that a significant matter in the Tribunal’s mind, and the first that it addressed in its operative reasons for rejecting his claim, was that he had given a “glib” response at the biodata interview to a question as to why he had come to Australia. He contended that the word ‘glib’ suggested that the Tribunal inferred that he was lying. He submitted that the biodata interview was the appellant’s first interaction with Australian officialdom and that ordinary human experience suggested that a person who gave a false or improbable account at the beginning of his or her narrative would face a harder task in persuading authorities at a later stage in decision-making about the substance of his claims. He asserted that the Tribunal had not assessed the answer to question 21 in its true context of requiring a one-sentence response and that it followed that this failure was a jurisdictional error. The appellant argued that a failure to consider important evidence, namely, the restriction to a one-sentence response, entailed that the Tribunal had not performed its statutory task of conducting a review of the delegate’s decision in accordance with the Act. He contended that the Tribunal’s characterisation of the answer to question 21 as “glib” focused on a small point that was peripheral to its major task and that this answer was not important until the Tribunal had made it so. He submitted that the way in which the Tribunal dealt with his answer to question 21 showed that it had not engaged in active intellectual consideration of the appellant’s claims. Rather, he argued, the Tribunal had used its characterisation of the glibness of his response as a starting point for its adverse credibility findings that continued thereafter while it ignored the fact that the question required him to respond only in one sentence. He contended that, had the Tribunal correctly applied itself to its statutory task, there was a realistic possibility of a different outcome, so that its error was material.
CONSIDERATION
In AVQ15 266 FCR at 96–97 [41], Kenny, Griffiths and Mortimer JJ set out some principles for evaluating whether a decision is affected by jurisdictional error as follows:
(a) The issue whether or not an administrative decision is affected by jurisdictional error requires a careful examination of the relevant statutory framework, with a particular emphasis on provisions which determine the decision-maker’s powers, procedures, functions and obligations.
(b) While findings as to credit are generally matters for the administrative decision-maker, they may be amenable to judicial review on several grounds including legal unreasonableness, reaching a finding without a logical, rational or probative basis, failure to perform the required statutory task of review, and failure to take into account material critical to the formation of the requisite state of satisfaction.
(c) Whether or not a credibility finding is affected by jurisdictional error is a case specific inquiry, and should not be assessed by reference to fixed categories or formulae. Merely because a decision-maker has ignored “relevant material” does not always give rise to jurisdictional error in the present context. The importance or cogency of the material, its place in an assessment of the appellant’s claim and in the performance of the statutory task are matters of fundamental importance in a protection visa case. Those matters inform an assessment of the seriousness or gravity of the error.
(d) Even if an aspect of reasoning, or a particular finding of fact, is shown to be irrational or illogical, jurisdictional error will generally not be established if that reasoning or finding of fact was immaterial, or not critical to, the ultimate conclusion or end result (such as, for example, where it is but one of several findings that independently may have led to the ultimate decision).
(e) Merely because there is no reference in the decision-maker’s reasons for decision to particular material does not necessarily give rise to an inference that the material was not considered. Nonetheless, in the case of the Tribunal, which is required by s 430 of the Act to make a written statement setting out its reason for decision and its findings on material questions of fact, and to refer to the evidence on which such findings were based, a failure to refer to evidence that on its face bears on a finding may indicate that that evidence has not in fact been considered and, in some cases at least, disclose jurisdictional error in the decision-making (see Minister for Immigration and MulticulturalAffairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 at [10] per Gleeson CJ).
(f) Considerable caution must be exercised before concluding that errors in an adverse credibility assessment result in the decision being affected by jurisdictional error, in order to avoid judicial review transgressing into the impermissible area of merits review.
(emphasis added)
In Plaintiff M64/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 258 CLR 173 at 185–186 [25], French CJ, Bell, Keane and Gordon JJ said that it is difficult to draw an inference that “the decision has been attended by an error of law from what has not been said by the Delegate” (original emphasis; footnote omitted) and that, while jurisdictional error might include ignoring relevant material in a way that affected the exercise of power, the fact that a delegate had not mentioned that material did not necessarily demonstrate error. Of course, that was a case in which the delegate was not obliged to give detailed reasons for a decision. But, their Honours went on to reaffirm what Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ had emphasised in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272, namely, that the reasons of an administrative decision-maker must not be construed minutely and finely with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error. Rather, the court’s task is to read the decision fairly and as a whole.
Here, the Tribunal set out in attachment 2 the appellant’s claims and submissions, albeit in a somewhat unconventional way, that included his advisor’s response to its letter of 2 May 2013 that indicated its concerns. Attachment 2 specifically set out most of the advisor’s response to the Tribunal’s express concerns, including the advisor’s reference to the requirement in question 21 that only one sentence be used in answer to it.
As the trial judge pointed out, the Tribunal referred expressly in par 7 of its reasons to its summary, in attachment 2, of the appellant’s submission that it was addressing and found that, even accepting the appellant’s asserted translation, the advisor’s argument, that the one-sentence response was very reasonable, was unconvincing “given [the appellant’s] subsequent claims in his statement”. The Tribunal, in par 7, characterised the appellant’s answer as a “glib way” of expressing his reasons for seeking protection. However, that was one of a number of reasons for rejecting the appellant’s claims and, at the commencement of par 8, it said that its subsequent reasons were “more important”.
The Tribunal explained why it had not accepted that the sole substantive incident on which the appellant claimed to fear persecution were he returned to Iran was because of what had happened with Mr Ali in the kitchen. It was not satisfied that the appellant had pushed Mr Ali or that any of the subsequent claimed events had occurred.
In my opinion, those findings were open to the Tribunal on the material before it. This was not a case in which the Tribunal overlooked important evidence. It referred to the appellant’s submission that one sentence was required to answer question 21 but rejected his advisor’s submission on the topic of how he had responded. The Tribunal’s expression of its reasons for the rejection was a reasonable way of explaining why it found the appellant’s answer (on any version of its English translation) superficial and not the sort of answer which, in its role as the fact finder under the Act, the Tribunal expected from a person in his position.
Having asked the questions in its letter of 2 May 2013 about the appellant’s response to question 21, the Tribunal engaged specifically with his response and found adversely to him. While its use of the word ‘glib’ may be criticised in the way in which the appellant has, a reasonable person in the position of the Tribunal could have regarded the appellant’s answer and submissions as superficial or “glib”, including in the context of addressing the advisor’s submission and interpretation of the answer to question 21 because it was unpersuasive. As Kenny, Griffiths and Mortimer JJ said in AVQ15 266 FCR at 97 [41]:
Whether or not a credibility finding is affected by jurisdictional error is a case specific inquiry, and should not be assessed by reference to fixed categories or formulae.
I am not satisfied that the appellant has made out any jurisdictional error in the way in which the Tribunal reasoned. It is not an error of law for an administrative decision-maker to make a wrong finding of fact: Corporation of the City of Enfield v Development Assessment Commission (2000) 199 CLR 135 at 154 [44] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ. As Robertson J said in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99 at 127 [97]: “merely to ignore ‘relevant material’ does not establish jurisdictional error.” His Honour pointed out that, consistent with proper limits on judicial review, the court must respect the role of an administrative decision-maker, such as the Tribunal, in fact finding and avoid engaging in an assessment of the merits of the administrative decision‑making process.
The role of the court is to consider whether or not an administrative decision‑maker, in the position of the Tribunal, adhered to the statutory requirements for the performance of its task in arriving at its decision.
I am not satisfied that the Tribunal overlooked the requirement in the biodata form that the answer to question 21 be given in one sentence or that its failure to refer specifically to that requirement in par 7 of its reasons demonstrated that it had, in some way, overlooked this as an important matter in its decision-making. To the contrary, in my opinion, it set out in attachment 2 the very submission and the appellant’s evidence as to how he came to make that response before, or as part of how, it considered and rejected that submission in par 7 of its reasons. This demonstrated that the Tribunal took the evidence and submission into account in assessing the appellant’s answer to question 21 as “glib”.
It was not necessary for the Tribunal to mention again in par 7 that a one-sentence response was required. Rather, in the context of assessing the appellant’s claims to fear persecution were he returned to Iran, the Tribunal expressed its own reasoning as to why it found unconvincing his answer to question 21 and his explanation for it in response to the Tribunal’s letter of 2 May 2013. While I do not agree with her Honour’s characterisation of the use of the word ‘glib’ as not being pejorative, in my opinion, the Tribunal was entitled to come to the view that the answer was “glib” in the sense of the Oxford English Dictionary online definition: “implying lack of thought or of sincerity”.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for these reasons, I am of opinion the appeal must be dismissed with costs.
I certify that the preceding thirty-three (33) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Rares. Associate:
Dated: 11 September 2023
0
7
1