Telstra Corporation Ltd v Hurstville City Council

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Telstra Corporation Ltd v
Hurstville City Council [2000] FCA 1887

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - local government charges and rates imposed on broadband cables owned by telecommunication carriers - validity of enabling State legislation - whether charges and rates are duties of excise - whether the imposts are “taxes” - whether they are a levy on “goods” - Commonwealth statutory provision that law of a State has no effect “to the extent to which the law discriminates or would have the effect of discriminating” against telecommunication carriers - whether this provision is effective to exclude State laws authorising imposition of rates and charges - validity of provision - role of explanatory memorandum for Bill - meaning of “discriminates” - whether the State laws discriminate -  whether Commonwealth provision effects an acquisition of property other than on just terms.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS - Carriers’ cables installed pursuant to 1991 Telecommunications Act - Extent of immunity to State law provided by transitional provisions in 1997 Act - Whether State laws authorising imposition of rates and charges are laws relating to the occupancy or use of a facility whose construction was authorised under the 1991 Act.

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - Jurisdiction of Federal Court to determine State law administrative issues. 

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - Decisions to make charges and declare rates - whether decisions invalidated by extraneous purposes.

Mutual Pools & Staff Pty Limited v Federal  Commissioner of Taxation (1992) 173 CLR 450 and Adams v Rau (1931) 46 CLR 572 applied.

Hematite Petroleum Pty Limited v Victoria (1983) 151 CLR 599 and Capital Duplicators Pty Limited v Australian Capital Territory [No.2] (1993) 178 CLR 561 distinguished.
ASX Operations Pty Ltd v Pont Data Australia Pty Ltd (1990) 27 FCR 460 referred to.
CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384 and Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 considered.
Australian Coastal Shipping Commission v O’Reilly (1962) 107 CLR 46 and
Botany Municipal Council v Federal Airports Authority (1992) 175 CLR 453 distinguished.

Western Australia v The Commonwealth (1995) 183 CLR 373, and Mabo v Queensland [No.1] (1988) 166 CLR 186 discussed.
Warringah Shire Council v Pittwater Provisional Council (1992) 26 NSWLR 491 referred to.

Constitution - ss51(v) and (xxxi), 90, 109
Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) s591, Schedule 3 cll. 44, 60
Local Government Act 1989 (Vic) Part 8
Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) s611
Telecommunications Act 1991 (Cth) s116
Telecommunications (Exempt Activities) Regulations 1991- regs 5, 6
Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s15AB
Land and Environment Court Act 1979 (NSW) ss16, 19, 20, 58, 71

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TELSTRA CORPORATION LIMITED and TELSTRA MULTIMEDIA PTY LIMITED v HURSTVILLE CITY COUNCIL, KOGARAH MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, LEICHHARDT MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, PARRAMATTA CITY COUNCIL, PENRITH CITY COUNCIL, RANDWICK CITY COUNCIL, HORNSBY SHIRE COUNCIL, DRUMMOYNE COUNCIL, BURWOOD COUNCIL, CONCORD COUNCIL, STRATHFIELD MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, BAYSIDE CITY COUNCIL, MORELAND CITY COUNCIL, FRANKSTON CITY COUNCIL and YARRA CITY COUNCIL
NG 1158 of 1998

And

OPTUS VISION PTY LIMITED and OPTUS…

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Details
Case
[2000] FCA 1887
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Telstra Corporation Ltd v Hurstville City Council, the plaintiffs sought to challenge the imposition of rates and charges by the Hurstville City Council under the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW). The plaintiffs argued that these charges were unconstitutional as they amounted to taxes on goods, which is prohibited by section 90 of the Australian Constitution. The defendants, Hurstville City Council, along with other respondents and interveners, argued that the charges were not taxes on goods but rather were compensation for the use of public space. The legal issues before the court were whether the charges imposed by the council constituted a tax on goods and, if so, whether this tax was constitutionally valid. The court found that the charges imposed by the council were not taxes on goods but were instead compensation for the use of public space. The court reasoned that the charges were based on the nature and extent of the benefit enjoyed by the person concerned and were not calculated by reference to the value of the rated land. Therefore, the court held that the charges did not amount to a tax on goods and were constitutionally valid. The court dismissed the proceedings and ordered the plaintiffs to pay the costs of the proceeding.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The proceeding be dismissed.

2. The applicants, Telstra Corporation Limited and Telstra Multimedia Pty Limited, pay to the respondents their costs of the proceeding.

1. The proceeding be dismissed.

2. The applicants, Optus Vision Pty Limited and Optus Networks Pty Limited, pay to the respondents their costs of the proceeding.

Background

Background to the litigation

Issues (iii), (iv) and (v) require reference to documents concerning the reaction of councils to the overhead cable rollout, including correspondence between various parties and many reports and resolutions. That material is voluminous. If the applicants succeed in relation to either para [A] or para [B] of issue (i), or para [C] of issue (i) read with issue (ii), or if the respondents make good their arguments under (vi) or (vii), it will not be necessary to go to that evidence.B. The facts(i) The Telstra network Telstra Multimedia is the holder of a carrier licence under the 1997 Telco Act. That licence enables it to use a network unit to supply carriage services to the public: see Part 3 of the 1997 Telco Act. The term “carriage service” is defined by s7 of that Act as “a service for carrying communications by means of guided and/or unguided electromagnetic energy”. Evidence about the Telstra network was given by Martin Ince, until recently General Manager – Infrastructure Planning of Telstra Corporation. Mr Ince deposed that the network used a variety of delivery mechanisms including cable, radio and satellite transmission. The cable network includes exchange buildings that house the equipment needed for connection of one telephony service to another. Cables emanate from those buildings and connect to other exchanges (“the interexchange network”) or to service customers in the local area (“customer access network”). The interexchange network is now largely comprised of optical fibre cable, nearly all of which is located underground. The customer access network is constituted by cables containing large numbers of twisted pairs, in which copper is the dominant conductor, with associated electronics. The local exchanges in the relevant local government areas were originally constructed for the purpose of telephony but they have been adapted for use in a broader range of communications, including Telstra’s broadband network. Mr Ince explained that a broadband cable network uses a much wider frequency band than that necessary to transmit ordinary speech telephonically. It comprises links between exchanges, links between exchanges and the customer’s tap off point and links between the customer’s tap off point and the equipment at the customers’ premises. It permits the flow of information for a variety of purposes, including information services and cable television. Mr Ince said Telstra’s broadband network “was designed to make effective use of existing infrastructure, including the existing exchanges, existing underground ducts (originally installed for the telephony network) and existing electricity poles”. He described the factors that led to a detailed design of Telstra’s broadband network and said the network comprised:“(a) one headend in each capital city;(b)the installation of nodes in each local exchange;(c)the use, in the vast majority of cases, of existing optical fibre cables to carry signals from the headend to the local exchanges and from the local exchanges to each hub;(d)the installation of a number of hubs each servicing approximately 500 dwellings; and(e)the reticulation of new coaxial cable from the hubs (either underground or aerially) to form the network to which customers may link.”

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

WILCOX J
Finally, counsel submits it is irrelevant that the information transmitted through the cables may be the subject of intellectual property; the concept of “property” is wider than “goods”. Counsel comments this is doubtless why the guarantees in s51(xxxi) and s114 of the Constitution protect “property”, not merely “goods”. However, s90 refers only to “goods”.(v) Conclusions On this aspect of the case, the submissions made on behalf of the respondents and the intervener are to be preferred to those of the applicants. On the question whether the imposts constitute a tax, there may be a distinction between the New South Wales situation and that applying under the Victorian legislation. Counsel for the Victorian respondents concede that Part 8 of the Victorian Act authorises the imposition by councils of rates and charges that may properly be called a “tax”. No such concession is made by counsel for the New South Wales respondents in relation to charges under s611 of the New South Wales Act. This is understandable. Rates declared and recovered under Part 8 of the Victorian Act are calculated by reference to the value of the rated land. The value of land primarily depends on market factors. The value may have little or no relationship to the practical benefit (if any) enjoyed by the owner or occupier of the land; perhaps this is particularly true of an occupier of a cable or pipeline. So it is natural to regard rates declared under the Victorian Act as a tax on the land itself. Moreover, Part 8 of the Victorian Act applies to all land, other than public land that is either unoccupied or used exclusively for public purposes. Importantly, it applies to private “land”, including a privately owned pipe or cable laid even through a privately held parcel of freehold or leasehold land. There is no element of compensation for the use of publicly owned land. By contrast, s611 of the New South Wales Act applies only to specified types of installations “erected, suspended, constructed or placed on, under or over a public place”; it does not apply to installations in or over privately owned land. So it is possible to see the section as one designed to obtain public compensation for the use, by a particular occupier, of public space. That view of the section is consistent with its history, recalling that the earliest ancestor of the section referred to a “fair rental charge”. It is also consistent with the command of subs (3) that the charge “is to be based on the nature and extent of the benefit enjoyed by the person concerned”. That command is reinforced by subs (4) which enables an independent authority, the Land and Environment Court, to resolve any dispute about the appropriate amount of the charge. Having regard to all these features, I do not think a charge made under s611 of the New South Wales Act may properly be described as a tax. However, whether or not that view is correct, and accepting that rates declared under the Victorian legislation constitute a tax, it seems to me that, in neither case, is there a tax on “goods”. I accept the submissions on that matter made by counsel for the respondents and the intervener.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: WILCOX J