Development Assessment Commission v 3GIS Pty Ltd & Anor

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court)

DEVELOPMENT ASSESSMENT COMMISSION v 3GIS PTY LTD & ANOR

[2007] SASC 216

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Chief Justice Doyle, The Honourable Justice Bleby and The Honourable Justice Sulan)

18 June 2007

ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING - ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING - DEVELOPMENT CONTROL - MATTERS FOR CONSIDERATION OF CONSENT AUTHORITY - CONSIDERATION OF PARTICULAR PLANNING MATTERS

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - OPERATION AND EFFECT OF THE COMMONWEALTH CONSTITUTION - INCONSISTENCY OF LAWS (CONSTITUTION, S 109) - PARTICULAR CASES - DISCRIMINATION

Appeal from a decision of the Environment, Resources and Development Court granting an application for development approval for a telecommunications facility – Consideration of the proposed development and the nature of the technology involved – West Torrens (City) Development Plan – Whether assessment of the application requires consideration of the level of demand for the services – Whether demand properly to be balanced against environmental considerations – Proper construction of Development Plan against background of Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) – Consideration of requirements to minimise visual impact and relevance of possible alternative sites.

Whether, if demand for services relevant, requirements of Development Plan were invalid – Whether inconsistent with Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) – Whether discriminatory contrary to that Act – Appeal dismissed.

Development Act 1993 (SA) ss 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 49, 49A; Environment, Resources and Development Court Act 1993 (SA) s 30; Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) s 3, s 7, s 41, s 61, s 484, Schedule 3; Life Insurance Act 1945 (Cth) s 78; Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW); Broadcasting and Television Act 1942 (Cth); Local Government Act 1993 (NSW); West Torrens (City) Development Plan; Constitution s 109, referred to.
City of Burnside v City Apartments Pty Ltd [2004] SASC 294, applied.
Hutchison 3G Australia Pty Ltd v City of Mitcham (2005) 141 LGERA 93; Hutchison 3G Australia Pty Ltd v City of Mitcham (2006) 80 ALJR 711; Australian Mutual Provident Society v Goulden & Ors (1986) 160 CLR 330; Commercial Radio Coffs Harbour Ltd v Fuller & Anor (1986) 161 CLR 47; Australian Broadcasting Commission v Industrial Court of South Australia & Anor (1977) 138 CLR 399; Bayside City Council & Ors v Telstra Corporation & Ors (2004) 216 CLR 595, discussed.
City of Mitcham v Hutchison 3G Australia Ltd & Ors (2005) 91 SASR 111, considered.

DEVELOPMENT ASSESSMENT COMMISSION v 3GIS PTY LTD & ANOR
[2007] SASC 216

Full Court:      Doyle CJ, Bleby and Sulan JJ

  1. DOYLE CJ:          I would dismiss the appeal against the decision of the Environment Resources and Development Court.  I agree with the reasons given by Bleby J for so deciding.

  2. BLEBY J:             An entity described as Hutchison 3G Australia applied pursuant to s 32 of the Development Act 1993 (SA) for development approval for the construction of a proposed telecommunications facility near the southern boundary of the Glenelg golf course adjacent to Bonython Avenue and opposite the northern end of Iluka Street, Novar…

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Details
Case
[2007] SASC 216
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Development Assessment Commission v 3GIS Pty Ltd & Anor involved an appeal against a decision of the Environment, Resources and Development Court which had granted approval for a telecommunications facility. The dispute centred on whether the assessment of the application required consideration of the level of demand for the services and whether demand should be balanced against environmental considerations. The proper construction of the Development Plan was also examined in light of the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth). Furthermore, the requirements to minimise visual impact and the relevance of possible alternative sites were considered.

The legal issues addressed by the court included the interpretation of the Development Plan in relation to the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth), the relevance of demand for services in the assessment of the development application, and the validity of the Development Plan provisions in light of the federal legislation. The court also considered whether the Development Plan was inconsistent with, or discriminatory against, the federal legislation.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Environment Court had not erred in law or fact. The court held that the Development Plan and the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) could operate concurrently without inconsistency, and that the paramountcy of federal law informed the proper interpretation of the Development Plan. The court noted that the Development Plan sought to co-operate with the federal law and did not intrude into the field covered by the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth). The court also found that there was no inconsistency between the Development Plan and the federal legislation, as the installation of the facility was not authorised by the federal act.

The court concluded that the appeal should be dismissed, as the Environment Court had made no error of law or fact warranting the granting of leave to appeal. The court further observed that the relationship between the Development Act, the Development Plan, and the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) was not unlike that considered in City of Mitcham v Hutchison 3G Australia Pty Ltd & Ors and the subsequent appeal to the High Court.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

All those conclusions were open to the Court. It has not been demonstrated that the Court failed to take into account any relevant consideration or that it should have acted on other relevant considerations. There is no reason why those conclusions should be disturbed.Conclusion For these reasons the Environment Court made no error of law, and it made no error of fact which would justify the granting of leave to appeal. Accordingly, the appeal should be dismissed. SULAN J: I would dismiss the appeal. I agree with the reasons of Bleby J.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The relationship of the Development Act and the Development Plan with the Telco Act is not unlike that which confronted this Court in City of Mitcham v Hutchison 3G Australia Pty Ltd & Ors[29] and the High Court on Appeal from this Court.[30] In their joint judgment the High Court made an observation which is equally pertinent to this case:The present litigation concerns interaction between the Telco Act and legislation of South Australia. Whilst s 109 of the Constitution appears to have been invoked in the conduct of the case in the Supreme Court of South Australia, this was not decisive in the result reached there. In this Court, any reliance upon constitutional inconsistency was eschewed by the appellant and the appeal falls to be determined upon issues of construction of concurrently operating federal and State laws. However, the constitutional paramountcy of federal law is a contextual consideration that informs the resolution of the contested issues of interpretation argued in this appeal. Moreover, as will be shown, co-operation between the relevant federal and State instrumentalities is a policy mandated by both federal and State law.[31] [Emphasis added, footnote omitted][29] (2005) 91 SASR 111; [2005] SASC 78.[30] Hutchison 3G Australia Pty Ltd v City of Mitcham (2006) 80 ALJR 711; (2006) 225 ALR 615; [2006] HCA 12.[31] Ibid at [3]. As will be clear from what I have already said, the paramountcy or pre-eminence of the Telco Act is a contextual consideration that informs the proper interpretation of the Development Plan given effect by the State law. It is also evident from the Development Plan itself that it seeks to co-operate and to work in harmony with the Federal law, and that on the proper construction of the Development Plan there is no inconsistency by intrusion of the State law into the field covered by the Telco Act. Therefore, it is not necessary to address the respondent’s first alternative argument that, to the extent that the Development Act and the Development Plan required proof of demand need for 3G services, they are inconsistent with the Telco Act and, to the extent of the inconsistency, are invalid.[32] [32] Section 109, Constitution. For the same reason it is not necessary to consider the second alternative argument of the respondent based on clause 44 of the 3rd Schedule of the Telco Act. Nevertheless, it is desirable, in case I am wrong in my interpretation of the Development Plan, that some brief observations be made about these arguments. In relation to the first argument, I do not consider that there would be an inconsistency. The installation of this facility is not authorised by the Telco Act. Clause 36(1) of Schedule 3 specifically preserves the operation of State law in respect of operations not authorised by Divisions 2, 3 and 4 of Part 1 of the Schedule. Clause 37 only renders State planning law inoperative in respect of an activity which is authorised by one of those divisions. In my opinion it is insufficient to rely on the breadth of the stated objectives of the Telco Act, without more, in order to raise the necessary inconsistency. Something more in the operative provisions of the Act is required in order to do that. In Australian Mutual Provident Society v Goulden & Ors[33] the relevant provisions of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) were not rendered invalid in respect of their operation on discriminatory provisions in a life insurance policy merely because the Commonwealth had enacted the Life Insurance Act 1945 (Cth) which regulated the issue of life insurance policies. The provisions of the State Act were invalid because it was the policy of the Commonwealth Act, and in particular the provisions of s 78 of that Act, which gave expression to – … a legislative policy that the protection of the interests of policy holders is to be achieved by allowing a registered life insurance company to classify risks and fix rates of premium in its life insurance business in accordance with its own judgement founded upon the advice of actuaries and the practice of prudent insurers. In the words of Dixon J. in Victoria v. The Commonwealth (1937) 58 CLR 618, at p 630, it “would alter, impair or detract from” the Commonwealth scheme of regulation established by the Act if a registered life insurance company was effectively precluded by the legislation of a State from classifying different risks differently, from setting different premiums for different risks or from refusing to insure risks which were outside the class of risk in respect of which it wished to offer insurance. In particular, State legislation which, either absolutely or subject to qualifications and exceptions, made it generally unlawful for a life insurance company to take account of physical impairment in determining whether it would or would not accept a particular proposal or the terms upon which it would grant insurance cover would be inconsistent with the essential scheme of the provisions of the Act regulating the issue of policies and the fixing of premiums.[34][33] (1986) 160 CLR 330.[34] Ibid at 337.