FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Essjay Engineering Pty Ltd v Minister for Immigration [2025] FedCFamC2G 1181
File number(s): SYG 2442 of 2020; SYG 2549 of 2020 Judgment of: JUDGE DOUST Date of judgment: 25 July 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION - Employer Nomination Scheme - respective applicants are employer and employee - grant of employee subclass 186 visa conditioned upon approval of employer nomination - whether Tribunal gave an unreasonably narrow interpretation of its discretion in sub-para 5.19(3)(f)(ii) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) - the Tribunal did not err - the applications must be dismissed Legislation: Australian Constitution para 75(v)
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) s 140
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 474, 476, 476(1), 476(2), 499
Migration Legislation Amendment (Temporary Skill Shortage Visa and Complementary Reforms) Regulations 2018 (Cth) Item 6705(1) of pt 1 of sch 1
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) regs 2.87B, 5.19(3), 5.19(3)(f), 5.19(3)(f)(i), 5.19(3)(f)(i)(A), 5.19(3)(f)(ii), 5.19(4), cl 186.223 of sch 2
Cases cited: LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2024) 280 CLR 321; [2024] HCA 12
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Le [2007] FCA 1318 at [60]
Re Drake & Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 635
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 88 Date of hearing: 14 May 2025 Place: Sydney Solicitor for the Applicant: Mr M Jones, Migrant Law Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr S Knuckey, HWL Ebsworth Lawyers The Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs ORDERS
SYG 2442 of 2020 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: ESSJAY ENGINEERING PTY LTD
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE DOUST
DATE OF ORDER:
25 JULY 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application is dismissed.
2.The applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
ORDERS
SYG 2549 of 2020 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: JAGTAR SINGH
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE DOUST
DATE OF ORDER:
25 JULY 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application is dismissed.
2.The applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set…
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- Case
- [2025] FedCFamC2G 1181
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the Tribunal's reasoning and found that it had not erred in its interpretation of the discretion. The Tribunal had considered the relevant policy, but had not slavishly applied it in disregard of the broader discretion available. The Tribunal had also considered the evidence and submissions made by the applicants but found no compelling reasons to exercise the discretion in their favour. The court noted that the Tribunal's decision was not unreasonable, given the significant shortfalls in Essjay's evidence across the sponsorship period and the lack of any particular merit or compassionate considerations that would warrant the exercise of the discretion. The court concluded that the Tribunal had properly exercised its discretion and dismissed the applications.
The final orders of the court were that the applications be dismissed, with each party to bear their own costs. The court found no merit in the applicants' arguments and affirmed the decisions of the Tribunal. The court emphasized that the Tribunal had properly considered the relevant policy, the evidence, and the submissions before it in exercising its discretion under regulation 5.19(3)(f)(ii).
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
No issue arises in the present proceeding in respect of Mr Singh’s family members.CONSIDERATION The applicant submitted that whilst the language of reg 5.19(3)(f)(ii) – “it is reasonable to disregard subparagraph (i)” imports a broad discretion, the language of the policy from which the Tribunal quoted was highly restrictive. In support of that proposition, the applicant pointed to the instruction in the policy that the exercise of the discretion “should only be considered” where “the nominator has not, at any stage of the most recently approved standard business sponsorship, failed to maintain their commitment to the ongoing training”. The applicant pointed to Manebona v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 116, where the Full Federal Court said (at [93]), that a direction given under s 499 of the Act may not fetter a discretion that arises under the legislation, and submitted that a policy could not fetter a discretion in such a manner. There was no resistance to that proposition from the Minister. It does not follow from that proposition, however, that a decision-maker should not have regard to policy, or that any reference to policy necessarily involves error. A decision-maker may, and ordinarily should, at least have regard to any relevant policy. Provided such consideration is undertaken without disregarding the circumstances of the particular case, the consideration and application of policy is desirable as it promotes consistency of decision-making where numerous decision-makers exercise the same statutory power. Inconsistency suggests an arbitrariness not compatible with commonly accepted notions of justice: Re Drake & Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 635 at 639 (Drake). The Tribunal’s reasons do not reveal that the Tribunal slavishly applied the policy in disregard of the breadth of its discretion. Nor did it proceed in disregard of the circumstances of the particular matter before it. At [54], the Tribunal stated that it had regard to the Departmental policy, which it described as “not determinative”. It referenced Drake at that point, noting that the Tribunal was not bound to follow policy. It then went on to decline to exercise the discretion, having considered the submissions and all the evidence before it. Although the Tribunal’s reasoning in respect of the exercise of its discretion is brief, and expressed in general terms, the applicants’ case before the Tribunal was that it did not advance for consideration any factor that might be said to militate in favour of disregarding the requirements of reg 5.19(3)(f)(i). Essjay did not submit, either at the hearing, or in its later written submission, that the Tribunal should exercise the discretion in reg 5.19(3)(f)(ii). Nor did Essjay identify any reasons that might have supported such exercise. Nor did the evidence before the Tribunal throw up any reason or factor that stood out as militating in favour of the exercise of the discretion to disregard the training requirements. For example, the evidence did not indicate that Essjay’s non-compliance was only minor or trifling. The Tribunal observed significant shortfalls in Essjay’s evidence across the sponsorship period. Nor did Essjay demonstrate any particular merit in some other respect that might warrant the exercise of the discretion in its favour. No particular compassionate considerations emerged from the evidence, even though the Tribunal member had invited the identification of such circumstances when it enquired during the hearing about the impact of the COVID pandemic on the business. Essjay pointed in its submissions before this Court to the fact that in the period subsequent to its sponsorship period it had expended some monies on training. The Tribunal set those payments out at [36] of its reasons, so it should be inferred that the Tribunal took those into account when it considered the exercise of its discretion.