Essjay Engineering Pty Ltd v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

Essjay Engineering Pty Ltd v Minister for Immigration [2025] FedCFamC2G 1181

File number(s): SYG 2442 of 2020; SYG 2549 of 2020
Judgment of: JUDGE DOUST
Date of judgment: 25 July 2025
Catchwords: MIGRATION - Employer Nomination Scheme - respective applicants are employer and employee - grant of employee subclass 186 visa conditioned upon approval of employer nomination - whether Tribunal gave an unreasonably narrow interpretation of its discretion in sub-para 5.19(3)(f)(ii) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) - the Tribunal did not err - the applications must be dismissed
Legislation:

Australian Constitution para 75(v)

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) s 140

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 474, 476, 476(1), 476(2), 499

Migration Legislation Amendment (Temporary Skill Shortage Visa and Complementary Reforms) Regulations 2018 (Cth) Item 6705(1) of pt 1 of sch 1

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) regs 2.87B, 5.19(3), 5.19(3)(f), 5.19(3)(f)(i), 5.19(3)(f)(i)(A), 5.19(3)(f)(ii), 5.19(4), cl 186.223 of sch 2

Cases cited:

LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2024) 280 CLR 321; [2024] HCA 12

Manebona v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 116

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Le [2007] FCA 1318 at [60]

Re Drake & Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 635

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 88
Date of hearing: 14 May 2025
Place: Sydney
Solicitor for the Applicant: Mr M Jones, Migrant Law
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr S Knuckey, HWL Ebsworth Lawyers
The Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs

ORDERS

SYG 2442 of 2020

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

ESSJAY ENGINEERING PTY LTD

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE DOUST

DATE OF ORDER:

25 JULY 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application is dismissed.

2.The applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

ORDERS

SYG 2549 of 2020

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

JAGTAR SINGH

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE DOUST

DATE OF ORDER:

25 JULY 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application is dismissed.

2.The applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set…

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Details
Case
[2025] FedCFamC2G 1181
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Essjay Engineering Pty Ltd and Mr Singh were the applicants who sought review of decisions made by the Minister for Immigration, concerning the refusal of an Employer Nomination for a Permanent Appointment and the refusal of a visa under the Temporary Residence Transition scheme. The applicants contended that the Tribunal had erred in its interpretation of its discretion under regulation 5.19(3)(f)(ii) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth). The central issue before the court was whether the Tribunal had given an unreasonably narrow interpretation of its discretion in deciding not to disregard the failure to meet training requirements under regulation 5.19(3)(f)(i). The applicants argued that the Tribunal should have considered the discretion more broadly and exercised it in their favour.

The court examined the Tribunal's reasoning and found that it had not erred in its interpretation of the discretion. The Tribunal had considered the relevant policy, but had not slavishly applied it in disregard of the broader discretion available. The Tribunal had also considered the evidence and submissions made by the applicants but found no compelling reasons to exercise the discretion in their favour. The court noted that the Tribunal's decision was not unreasonable, given the significant shortfalls in Essjay's evidence across the sponsorship period and the lack of any particular merit or compassionate considerations that would warrant the exercise of the discretion. The court concluded that the Tribunal had properly exercised its discretion and dismissed the applications.

The final orders of the court were that the applications be dismissed, with each party to bear their own costs. The court found no merit in the applicants' arguments and affirmed the decisions of the Tribunal. The court emphasized that the Tribunal had properly considered the relevant policy, the evidence, and the submissions before it in exercising its discretion under regulation 5.19(3)(f)(ii).

Background

Background to the litigation

The question whether the Tribunal decisions involved jurisdictional error is considered below, following a recitation of the history of the matters.BACKGROUND Essjay is a corporation that operates a business in the transport, postal and warehousing industry. On 30 June 2017, Essjay lodged with the then Department of Immigration and Border Protection (Department) an ‘Application for Employer Nomination for a Permanent Appointment’ nominating Mr Singh in the position of Facilities Manager (a position with ANZSCO code 149913) in relation to a subclass 186 visa (the visa) under the ‘Temporary Residence Transition’ scheme. On 30 June 2017 Mr Singh lodged an application for the visa. Clause 186.223 of sch 2 of the Regulations incorporated, as a condition for the grant of that visa, that the Minister had approved the associated business nomination application.The decisions of the Minister’s delegate On 6 December 2017, the Department wrote to Essjay advising that its application for approval of its nomination had been refused. The letter attached a decision record of the Minister’s delegate, which stated that the nomination was refused as it did not meet the requirements of regs 5.19(3) or 5.19(4). The delegate of the Minister who made the decision stated that:…it has not been demonstrated that the nominator has fulfilled the commitments made relating to meeting the training requirements during the period of the nominator's most recent approval as a standard business sponsor. That was a reference to the criterion in reg 5.19(3)(f)(i)(A), namely:(i) the nominator:(A)fulfilled any commitments the nominator made relating to meeting the nominator’s training requirements during the period of the nominator’s most recent approval as a standard business sponsor; and… The delegate noted that Departmental records showed Essjay was approved as a standard business sponsor from 5 September 2013 until 5 September 2016 on the basis of providing evidence of paying contributions to an industry training fund in support of meeting Training Benchmark A, but had not provided complete and consistent records of its payroll and staff training expenditure for that period. The delegate noted that Essjay had provided receipts in March 2014, March 2015 and March 2017 from a registered training organisation. Those receipts concerned two persons, in respect of whom the delegate had no evidence of their being employed by Essjay. There was no evidence of any expenditure on staff training in the last year of the standard business sponsorship. The delegate concluded:Therefore, regulation 5.19(3)(f)(i)(A) is not met, and the nominator does not meet regulation 5.19(3)(f)(i).In addition, there has been no reason identified to disregard subparagraph 5.19(3)(f)(i).…Therefore, the nominator does not meet regulation 5.19(3)(f).Therefore, regulation 5.19(3) does not apply to the nomination. The delegate concluded that Essjay had only provided evidence directed to satisfying reg 5.19(3) and insufficient claims or evidence to demonstrate satisfaction of reg 5.19(4).

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 30 June 2017 Mr Singh lodged an application for the visa. Clause 186.223 of sch 2 of the Regulations incorporated, as a condition for the grant of that visa, that the Minister had approved the associated business nomination application.The decisions of the Minister’s delegate On 6 December 2017, the Department wrote to Essjay advising that its application for approval of its nomination had been refused. The letter attached a decision record of the Minister’s delegate, which stated that the nomination was refused as it did not meet the requirements of regs 5.19(3) or 5.19(4). The delegate of the Minister who made the decision stated that:…it has not been demonstrated that the nominator has fulfilled the commitments made relating to meeting the training requirements during the period of the nominator's most recent approval as a standard business sponsor. That was a reference to the criterion in reg 5.19(3)(f)(i)(A), namely:(i) the nominator:(A)fulfilled any commitments the nominator made relating to meeting the nominator’s training requirements during the period of the nominator’s most recent approval as a standard business sponsor; and… The delegate noted that Departmental records showed Essjay was approved as a standard business sponsor from 5 September 2013 until 5 September 2016 on the basis of providing evidence of paying contributions to an industry training fund in support of meeting Training Benchmark A, but had not provided complete and consistent records of its payroll and staff training expenditure for that period. The delegate noted that Essjay had provided receipts in March 2014, March 2015 and March 2017 from a registered training organisation. Those receipts concerned two persons, in respect of whom the delegate had no evidence of their being employed by Essjay. There was no evidence of any expenditure on staff training in the last year of the standard business sponsorship. The delegate concluded:Therefore, regulation 5.19(3)(f)(i)(A) is not met, and the nominator does not meet regulation 5.19(3)(f)(i).In addition, there has been no reason identified to disregard subparagraph 5.19(3)(f)(i).…Therefore, the nominator does not meet regulation 5.19(3)(f).Therefore, regulation 5.19(3) does not apply to the nomination. The delegate concluded that Essjay had only provided evidence directed to satisfying reg 5.19(3) and insufficient claims or evidence to demonstrate satisfaction of reg 5.19(4). The delegate refused the nomination. On 6 December 2017, the Department also wrote to Mr Singh advising that Essjay’s nomination had been refused. Mr Singh was given the option of withdrawing his application. In the event he did not do so within 28 days, his application for the visa would be refused. On 17 January 2018, the Department wrote to Mr Singh advising that his application for the visa was refused. The attached decision record recited that the delegate was not satisfied that cl 186.223 of sch 2 of the Regulations was satisfied. That clause provided that:186.223(1) The position to which the application relates is the position:(a)nominated in an application for approval that seeks to meet the requirements of subregulation 5.19(3); and(b)in relation to which the applicant is identified as the holder of a Subclass 457 (Temporary Work (Skilled)) visa; and(c)in relation to which the declaration mentioned in paragraph 1114B(3)(d) of Schedule 1 was made in the application for the grant of the visa.(2) The Minister has approved the nomination.(3) The nomination has not subsequently been withdrawn.(4) The position is still available to the applicant.(5)The application for the visa is made no more than 6 months after the Minister approved the nomination.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

No issue arises in the present proceeding in respect of Mr Singh’s family members.CONSIDERATION The applicant submitted that whilst the language of reg 5.19(3)(f)(ii) – “it is reasonable to disregard subparagraph (i)” imports a broad discretion, the language of the policy from which the Tribunal quoted was highly restrictive. In support of that proposition, the applicant pointed to the instruction in the policy that the exercise of the discretion “should only be considered” where “the nominator has not, at any stage of the most recently approved standard business sponsorship, failed to maintain their commitment to the ongoing training”. The applicant pointed to Manebona v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 116, where the Full Federal Court said (at [93]), that a direction given under s 499 of the Act may not fetter a discretion that arises under the legislation, and submitted that a policy could not fetter a discretion in such a manner. There was no resistance to that proposition from the Minister. It does not follow from that proposition, however, that a decision-maker should not have regard to policy, or that any reference to policy necessarily involves error. A decision-maker may, and ordinarily should, at least have regard to any relevant policy. Provided such consideration is undertaken without disregarding the circumstances of the particular case, the consideration and application of policy is desirable as it promotes consistency of decision-making where numerous decision-makers exercise the same statutory power. Inconsistency suggests an arbitrariness not compatible with commonly accepted notions of justice: Re Drake & Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 635 at 639 (Drake). The Tribunal’s reasons do not reveal that the Tribunal slavishly applied the policy in disregard of the breadth of its discretion. Nor did it proceed in disregard of the circumstances of the particular matter before it. At [54], the Tribunal stated that it had regard to the Departmental policy, which it described as “not determinative”. It referenced Drake at that point, noting that the Tribunal was not bound to follow policy. It then went on to decline to exercise the discretion, having considered the submissions and all the evidence before it. Although the Tribunal’s reasoning in respect of the exercise of its discretion is brief, and expressed in general terms, the applicants’ case before the Tribunal was that it did not advance for consideration any factor that might be said to militate in favour of disregarding the requirements of reg 5.19(3)(f)(i). Essjay did not submit, either at the hearing, or in its later written submission, that the Tribunal should exercise the discretion in reg 5.19(3)(f)(ii). Nor did Essjay identify any reasons that might have supported such exercise. Nor did the evidence before the Tribunal throw up any reason or factor that stood out as militating in favour of the exercise of the discretion to disregard the training requirements. For example, the evidence did not indicate that Essjay’s non-compliance was only minor or trifling. The Tribunal observed significant shortfalls in Essjay’s evidence across the sponsorship period. Nor did Essjay demonstrate any particular merit in some other respect that might warrant the exercise of the discretion in its favour. No particular compassionate considerations emerged from the evidence, even though the Tribunal member had invited the identification of such circumstances when it enquired during the hearing about the impact of the COVID pandemic on the business. Essjay pointed in its submissions before this Court to the fact that in the period subsequent to its sponsorship period it had expended some monies on training. The Tribunal set those payments out at [36] of its reasons, so it should be inferred that the Tribunal took those into account when it considered the exercise of its discretion.