FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
ENE17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 942
Appeal from: ENE17 V Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCCA 3453 File number(s): NSD 2347 of 2018 Judge(s): FARRELL J Date of judgment: 20 June 2019 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – where the primary judge dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority to affirm a decision of a delegate of the Minister to refuse the appellant a Safe Haven Enterprise (subclass 790) visa – whether Authority erred by failing to engage in an active intellectual process with the material referred to it by the Secretary and other country information – where leave granted to raise new ground alleging error by Authority in making assumptions as to grant of bail on appellant’s return to Sri Lanka – DCP16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 91 followed – appeal dismissed Cases cited: BVG15 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2019] FCCA 290
DCP16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 91
ENE17 V Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCCA 3453
SZSFS v Minster for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 534; 232 FCR 262
Date of hearing: 23 May 2019 Date of last submissions: 12 June 2019 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 62 Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms S Burnett of Clayton Utz Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submitted to any order of the Court, save as to costs ORDERS
NSD 2347 of 2018 BETWEEN: ENE17
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
FARRELL J
DATE OF ORDER:
20 JUNE 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Leave is granted to the appellant to rely on proposed ground 3 of the appeal.
2.Leave is refused to the appellant to rely on proposed ground 4 of the appeal.
3.The appeal is dismissed.
4.The appellant must pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
FARRELL J:
INTRODUCTION
The appellant (who may also be referred to as ENE17) is a citizen of Sri Lanka of Tamil ethnicity. He arrived in Australia in September 2012 as an unauthorised maritime arrival. On 27 September 2016, he applied for a Safe Haven Enterprise (subclass 790) visa (SHEV).
On 15 March 2017, ENE17’s representative sent to the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (as it then was) some country information on the basis of which it was submitted that it could not be said for certain that a Tamil was safe and free from persecution in Sri Lanka. One of the…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 942
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine whether the IAA erred in its consideration of the material provided by the Secretary and other country information, and whether it erred in making assumptions about the grant of bail on the appellant's return to Sri Lanka. The latter issue was raised for the first time on appeal, and the court considered whether leave should be granted to raise this new ground of appeal.
The Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia dismissed the appeal. The court found that the IAA had engaged in an active intellectual process with the material provided and had adequately addressed the appellant's claims. The court also noted that the primary judge had correctly found that there was no jurisdictional error in the IAA's consideration of the UK Home Office Report and the 2017 DFAT Report. The court granted leave to raise the new ground concerning the grant of bail, but found that this did not assist the appellant. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Leave is granted to the appellant to rely on proposed ground 3 of the appeal.
2. Leave is refused to the appellant to rely on proposed ground 4 of the appeal.
3. The appeal is dismissed.
4. The appellant must pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
At J[39], the primary judge found that the Authority dealt with each of ENE17’s claims in respect of which the information was relevant: abductions for ransom (at DR[25]) and mistreatment of Tamils returning from abroad (at DR[37]). In each case the Authority referred to information on which it based its conclusions. His Honour noted that that information included a DFAT report dated 24 January 2017 (that is, the 2017 DFAT Report), a far more recent report than the UK Home Office Report. The primary judge then said:40.The UK Home Office report was not, in the context of the applicant’s claims, such that I would infer that the Authority overlooked any aspect of it. The general tenor of it was that there were difficulties facing certain groups of Tamils although, generally speaking, the circumstances facing Tamils in Sri Lanka had greatly improved since the end of the war in 2009 and, more recently, since the election of the new government in 2015. Much of the information concerning risk to Tamils was premised on there being some link between those at risk and the Tamils in question: see for example 6.6.3. It will be recalled that the overall assessment of risk was that being a Tamil alone does not give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution or serious harm: 2.3.1.41.The applicant did not suggest that the information relied on by the Authority did not support its conclusions.42.In all of those circumstances, I am not satisfied that the Authority failed to consider any of the information in the UK Home Office report.Consideration Ground 1 of the appeal is not made out. The primary judge did not err in finding that there was no jurisdictional error on the claimed basis for the reasons that his Honour gave. The primary judge found that Part 6 of version 3.0 (on which the appellant relied) and version 2.0 of the UK Home Office Report (referred to by the Authority) are the same. There is no reason to doubt that finding. I accept the Minister’s submission that the one paragraph of the UK Home Office Report which changed between those versions (based on the information in version 3.0 (August 2016) concerning changes from version 2.0 (May 2016)) is 3.1.2 which would not have assisted the appellant as it provides as follows:A person being of Tamil ethnicity would not in itself warrant international protection. Neither in general would a person who evidences past membership or connection to the LTTE unless they have or are perceived to have a significant role in relation to post-conflict Tamil separatism or appear on a ‘stop’ list at the airport. There is no reason to doubt the Authority’s statement at DR[3] that it had regard to the material given to it. As submitted by the Minister, each of the appellant’s claims to which part 6 of version 3.0 of the UK Home Office Report was said to be relevant in the first ground was either addressed by reference to version 2.0 of that report or the 2017 DFAT Report, as noted by the primary judge at J[36] and [39] (with citation to relevant passages of the Authority’s decision record). Versions 2.0 and 3.0 of the UK Home Office Report are relevantly the same. The Authority’s decision making could not be impeached for relying on the 2017 DFAT Report in addition to or in preference over version 3.0 of the UK Home Office Report (which was dated August 2016) in relation to the matters raised by the appellant in the first ground of appeal. The primary judge did not err to conclude as his Honour did at J[40].