CYM16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CYM16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1230

Appeal from: CYM16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2019] FCCA 369
File number(s): NSD 331 of 2019
Judge(s): THAWLEY J
Date of judgment: 7 August 2019
Legislation: Migration Act 1956 (Cth) ss 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 473DD
Cases cited:

BVG15 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2019] FCCA 290

DCP16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 91

ENE17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 942

SZSFS v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 534

Date of hearing: 7 August 2019
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: No Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 32
Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr T Reilly
Solicitor for the Respondents: The Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

NSD 331 of 2019
BETWEEN:

CYM16

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

THAWLEY J

DATE OF ORDER:

7 AUGUST 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Revised from transcript)

THAWLEY J:

  1. This an appeal from orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 19 February 2019, dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority made on 14 September 2016: CYM16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2019] FCCA 369.

  2. The Authority had affirmed a decision of the delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (now Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs) not to grant the appellant a Safe Haven Enterprise (Class XE Subclass 790) visa.

    BACKGROUND

  3. The appellant is a Tamil citizen of Sri Lanka who arrived in Australia as an unauthorised maritime arrival on 28 September 2012.  He applied for a protection visa on 1 December 2015.

  4. The appellant claimed that if he returned to Sri Lanka he would face serious harm from the Sri Lankan Army (SLA), the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and other Sri Lankan authorities.  He was afraid of harm because of his Tamil ethnicity, his imputed political opinion as a supporter of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and former member of the LTTE and his imputed political opinion against the Sri Lankan government.

  5. The appellant made the following claims in support of his application:

    (1)The appellant returned to Sri Lanka in around 1991 from Saudi Arabia.  About four or five months after his return, he was stopped by the SLA.  The SLA interrogated the appellant, questioned where he was going, and accused him of being an LTTE member.  The appellant was taken to the SLA camp and was beaten, blindfolded and handcuffed.  He was subsequently detained for…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 1230
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of CYM16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellant, a Sri Lankan national, sought to appeal the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) to affirm the delegate's refusal to grant him a protection visa. The appellant contended that he met the refugee criterion under section 36(2)(a) and the complementary protection criterion under section 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The legal issues before the court were whether the IAA properly considered the appellant's claims under the relevant sections of the Act and if the IAA correctly applied section 473DD of the Act in the treatment of the appellant's statement dated 26 August 2016, sent by the Refugee Advice and Casework Service on behalf of the appellant.

The court found that the IAA had adequately considered the appellant's claims under the relevant sections of the Act, taking into account the country information available at the time of the decision. The court held that the IAA did not err in concluding that the legal argument and country information were not new information and would be considered. Furthermore, the court found that the IAA had correctly applied section 473DD of the Act by determining that the appellant's statement did not satisfy the requirements of that section and, therefore, could not be considered. The appellant's argument that the IAA failed to adequately distinguish between what aspects of the IAA statement it could consider and those that failed to comply with section 473DD was dismissed.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs. The decision of the court confirms the importance of ensuring that all relevant information is properly considered in refugee visa applications, while also highlighting the need for compliance with statutory requirements when submitting new information during the review process.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

CYM16, a Sri Lankan national, applied for a protection visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). He claimed to have originated from an area previously controlled by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and operated a grocery store in that area. During Sri Lanka's civil conflict, he may have been forced to contribute money and groceries from his store to the LTTE. In May 2012, he was involved in an incident that caused him to fear for his safety if he returned to Sri Lanka. A delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection did not grant the appellant a protection visa, finding he did not meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a) of the Act or the complementary protection criterion in s 36(2)(aa). The Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) affirmed the delegate's decision, accepting some of the appellant's claims but finding that the LTTE were a spent force by May 2009 and that the appellant did not have an LTTE profile. The IAA also found that the appellant would not face serious harm upon return to Sri Lanka.

The appellant appealed the IAA's decision to the Federal Court of Australia. The appellant argued that the IAA failed to properly consider his claims under s 36(2)(a) and s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The appellant also sought to rely on principles developed in SZSFS v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 534. Additionally, the appellant claimed that the IAA incorrectly applied s 473DD of the Act in the treatment of his statement dated 26 August 2016 sent by RACS on his behalf. The appellant argued that the IAA failed to adequately distinguish between what aspects of his statement it could consider and those which failed to comply with s 473DD. The High Court dismissed the appellant's application for special leave to appeal the decision of the Federal Court.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The delegate was not satisfied that the appellant met the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The delegate also concluded that the appellant did not meet the complementary protection criterion in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act.THE AUTHORITY’S DECISION The Authority affirmed the decision of the delegate not to grant the appellant a protection visa. The Authority accepted that:(1)the appellant originated from an area previously controlled by the LTTE;(2)as the owner and operator of a grocery store in his particular area of Sri Lanka, the appellant would have encountered the LTTE and, during Sri Lanka’s civil conflict, may have been forced to contribute money and groceries from his store; (3)the behaviour reported by the appellant, including CID officers taking goods from the appellant’s grocery store and retaliating with threats if the appellant asked for payment, was behaviour which may have been part of the general harassment of Tamils by Sri Lankan authorities in the aftermath of civil conflict; and(4)the incident in May 2012 occurred and the incident caused the appellant to have a subjective fear that such incidents might continue to occur should he return to Sri Lanka. The Authority did not accept that:(1)the conduct referred to at (2) above continued to occur in 2010 and 2012 as stated at the PV interview because the LTTE were a “spent force by May 2009”; or(2)the appellant had an LTTE profile arising from these low level contributions made under duress. The Authority considered then current country information to the effect that, under the Sirisena government elected in 2015, monitoring and detention of Tamils had decreased, fewer people were detained and day to day life for Tamils had improved. Given the appellant had no LTTE profile, it did not accept that the CID would have any interest in him. Although not expressly the subject of any claim by the appellant, the Authority then considered whether the appellant faced a real chance of serious harm by reason of having departed illegally, in breach of Sri Lankan departure law. It found that, on return, the appellant would be processed and charged and that in the course of this the appellant might be held in detention for a short time in poor conditions, but that a short detention did not amount to serious harm. This aspect of the Authority’s decision will be discussed in further detail when considering the grounds of appeal.GROUNDS OF APPEAL The appellant’s grounds of appeal to this Court are as follows:1.The Court below erred in finding that the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) had failed to properly consider the Applicant’s claims under s 36(2)(a) and s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 ...2.The Applicant seeks leave to rely on the principles developed in SZSFS v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 534.3.The Court below erred in not finding that the IAA incorrectly applied s 473DD of the Act in the treatment of the Applicant’s statement dated 26 August 2016 send [sic] by RACS [the Refugee Advice and Casework Service] on behalf of the applicant (CB Page 126-129).ParticularsA.At [3] [4] of its reasons for decision, the IAA concluded that the legal argument and country information already available to the Delegate were not new information and would be considered. However, it was considered that the IAA Statement also contained new information but would not be considered as the requirements of s 473DD had not been satisfied.B.The IAA failed to adequately distinguish between what aspects of the IAA statement it could consider and those which failed to comply with s 473DD.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Court considered the first issue regarding the consideration of the Applicant's claims under s 36(2)(a) and s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The Court found that the IAA had indeed considered these claims and that the Court below was correct in its assessment that the IAA had properly evaluated the evidence presented. The Court noted that the IAA had acknowledged the Appellant's experiences and the relevant country information, and had appropriately weighed these factors in its decision-making process.

On the second issue, while the Applicant sought to rely on the principles from SZSFS v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 534, the Court did not make a specific ruling on this request. The focus of the appeal was on the other issues raised, and as such, the applicability of the SZSFS principles was not explicitly addressed or decided in the judgment.

Regarding the third issue, the Court found that the Court below erred in not recognising that the IAA had incorrectly applied s 473DD of the Act in its treatment of the Applicant's statement dated 26 August 2016. The Court explained that the IAA had failed to adequately distinguish between the aspects of the statement it could consider and those which did not comply with s 473DD. However, the Court determined that this error did not materially affect the outcome of the case and, therefore, the appeal was dismissed. The binding legal principle established here is that while it is crucial for the IAA to correctly apply s 473DD, any errors in its application must materially affect the outcome to be considered significant.