CQE19 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs
[2025] FedCFamC2G 419
•27 March 2025
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
CQE19 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 419
File number(s): SYG 1657 of 2019 Judgment of: JUDGE KAUR-BAINS Date of judgment: 27 March 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION – judicial review – protection visa – whether the Tribunal’s state of non-satisfaction that the applicant faces a real chance of suffering serious or significant harm on return to Sri Lanka because of her status as a Tamil widow was formed without probative evidence – whether an error in the process by which a state of mind is reached – no jurisdictional error established Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 476, 477 Cases cited: Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21
EHF17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 272 FCR 409
Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v Viane (2021) 274 CLR 398
Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v Mukiza (2022) 291 FCR 568
NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10
XRZG v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (2024) 305 FCR 349
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 47 Date of hearing: 25 February 2025 Place: Sydney Counsel for the Applicants: Mr A Aleksov Solicitor for the Applicants: Carina Ford Immigration Lawyers Counsel for the Respondents: Mr M Cleary Solicitor for the Respondents: Mills Oakley ORDERS
SYG 1657 of 2019 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: CQE19
First Applicant
CQF19
Second Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE KAUR-BAINS
DATE OF ORDER:
27 MARCH 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application is dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Judge Kaur-Bains
The applicants seek judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal dated 11 June 2019. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister to refuse the applicants protection visas (visas). This Court has jurisdiction to determine this matter pursuant to s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act). The application for review has been brought within the time set out in s 477 of the Act.
The issue that arises for determination is whether the Tribunal, at [265] of the reasons, reached a state of non-satisfaction as to the real chance of the applicant suffering serious or significant harm on return to Sri Lanka without probative evidence. For the reasons set out below, I find the applicants have not demonstrated jurisdictional error.
Before dealing with the Tribunal’s decision, I note the Tribunal gave a direction under s 440(1) of the Act, that the Tribunal’s decision was not to be published by the Tribunal because there was a significant amount of information regarding the first applicant’s background which would make it likely that she would be identified despite removal of personal identifiers. For this reason, I have limited in this judgment the first applicant’s evidence and claims referred to in the Tribunal’s decision to the ground for review. Further, I have redacted personal and sensitive information and inserted [X]. For convenience, I will refer to the first applicant as the applicant in this judgment.
GROUNDS IN THE APPLICATION
The applicants’ amended application filed on 23 January 2025 contained the following ground for judicial review (as per original):
1. The Tribunal made findings at [266]-[270] without probative evidence, in that there was no probative evidence to indicate these matters took the applicant outside of the need for protection.
APPLICANT’S CONTENTIONS
In support of the ground for judicial review, the applicant without objection, relied on the affidavit of Carina Ford affirmed on 23 January 2025, omitting the annexure marked ‘CF-1’ titled ‘Detention Guidelines’, and only relying on the DFAT country information report for Sri Lanka (2018) marked annexure ‘CF-2’ (DFAT Report). The applicant also tendered, without objection, the document titled ‘UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Sri Lanka’ (UNHCR Guidelines), which was marked exhibit ‘A1’. I note the applicant filed several other affidavits, containing transcripts, however, the applicant did not seek to rely on those affidavits.
The applicant accepted the Tribunal’s findings at [266] to [270] of the reasons were made on probative evidence. The applicant’s complaint was the Tribunal’s state of mind at [265] of the reasons, in not being satisfied the applicant faced a real chance of suffering serious or significant harm on her return to Sri Lanka because of her status as a Tamil war widow, was a state of mind reached without probative evidence. Further, the applicant submitted the findings made at [266] to [270] of the reasons were not probative evidence to support the Tribunal’s state of non-satisfaction because the matters at [266] to [270] were not matters that took the applicant outside the need for protection.
To understand the applicant’s argument, it is helpful to set out the relevant parts of the Tribunal’s reasons.
TRIBUNAL DECISION
The Tribunal noted the applicant’s far-ranging claims at [23] and [24] of its reasons and at [26] of its reasons found the applicant was not an honest or credible witness. These credibility findings are not challenged by the applicant in this judicial review application.
Although the Tribunal accepted the applicant worked with the LTTE from 2002 to 2004, the Tribunal did not accept her account of the nature of her work with the group (at [36] of the reasons). The Tribunal found it likely the applicant worked in one of the LTTE’s Civilian Auxiliary Units, receiving basic military training, but engaging in non-combat activities (at [44] of the reasons). The Tribunal accepted the applicant’s husband worked for the LTTE for several years (at [49] of the reasons).
The Tribunal did not accept that after the applicant’s husband’s death she was of special interest due to her and her husband’s past involvement with the LTTE or the Karuna group or otherwise (at [197] of the reasons). The Tribunal did not accept the applicant ‘was sexually assaulted by members of the Sri Lankan security [forces] or by men who befriended and then assaulted her’ (at [197] of the reasons). The Tribunal did not accept the applicant was excluded from her family or the Tamil community or she hardly saw her family because they were fearful of associating with her (at [197] of the reasons).
The Tribunal was not satisfied the applicant faced a ‘real chance’ of experiencing significant harm in Sri Lanka due to her or her husband’s past involvement with the LTTE or the Karuna group (at [251] to [252], [255] to [258] of the reasons).
The applicant’s claims as a Tamil widow
The Tribunal accepted the applicant is a widow of Tamil ethnicity who belonged to the LTTE for a relatively brief period and her late husband was a member of the LTTE and later the Karuna Group ([264] of the reasons). The Tribunal acknowledged that single women in areas such as the applicant’s area may face a range of problems ([264] of the reasons). The Tribunal accepted the applicant may have experienced some difficulties following the death of her husband, but did not accept that she was repeatedly raped and found ‘much of her evidence regarding the problems she claims to have experienced to be lacking in credibility or exaggerated’ ([264] of the reasons).
The Tribunal had regard to the contents of two documents being the UNHCR Guidelines and the DFAT Report. At [263], the Tribunal also noted it raised with the applicant it ‘was aware’ some widows without family support may be at risk in the applicant’s area, but noted in the applicant’s case, she had received family support in the past and it appeared she would receive family support if she returned to Sri Lanka, and would not be at risk of harm. The Tribunal noted the applicant’s response that she would have stayed with her family, if possible, but due to her own and her husband’s past association with the LTTE, this was not possible.
At [264] of the reasons, the Tribunal found there was no credible evidence which suggested the applicant had experienced serious or significant harm prior to leaving Sri Lanka for any reason linked to her status as a Tamil widow. However, the Tribunal acknowledged the fact the applicant had not experienced serious harm in the past did not mean if she returned to Sri Lanka, she would not now face serious harm. Therefore, the Tribunal considered whether she would face harm if she returned to Sri Lanka by reason of her status as a Tamil widow who is the head of her household.
At [265] of the reasons, the Tribunal recorded it was ‘not satisfied that [the applicant] faces a real chance of suffering serious or significant harm on return to Sri Lanka because of her status as a Tamil widow’. The Tribunal expressly states at [265] it reached that state of mind, of not being so satisfied, for the reasons set out at [266] to [270] of the reasons, which were as follows:
266. First and most significantly, I do not accept that the applicant was isolated or lacked family support prior to leaving Sri Lanka or that she would lack family support if she returned. According to her evidence she stayed with her parents and later with a friend in [X] following the birth of her [child] in [XXXX]. She lived with her parents and one of her [siblings] some months after her husband’s death in [XXXX] and they provided her with financial support following this.
267. I note that according to the applicant’s evidence at the hearing, she would have continued to live with her parents if she had not been fearful that her LTTE background would cause them problems. This does not sit well with the fact that she lived with them for a number of months immediately after her husband was killed. Nor is there any credible evidence before me which suggests that the applicant or other members of her family were harassed or harmed following [her husband’s death] because of her past association with the LTTE. I do not accept that the applicant was forced to live apart from her family because of her past association with the LTTE. If she lived alone it appears to have been by choice.
268. I also note that according to the applicant’s entry interview [X] lived with her in [X] and also stayed with a school friend on occasion. According to her August 2014 statement, [X] and her mother lived with her for some time in 2012. She told the delegate that her [sibling] came to stay with her in 2012. At the hearing she said that she had never lived with [X], but in light of her earlier statements I have great difficulty accepting this. These statements suggest that she was not without support and perhaps not living alone prior to leaving Sri Lanka.
269. Secondly, the applicant is not without financial resources. She told the delegate that she derived an income from a [block of land] which her father had given her. According to her statement dated 4 October 2018 still owns a block of land in [X] which was given to her by her mother. It is unclear whether this is the land referred to earlier, but in any event it is clear that she has some assets in Sri Lanka. I also note that she has experience as a [X] which would assist her to earn a livelihood if she returned to her homeland.
270. Third and finally a number of the risk factors set out in the UNHCR guidelines do not apply to her. She is not a displaced person, at least not in the sense that she had to relocate to another area or live in a camp. She lived in [X] where she had lived most of her life and from where her family also resides. None of her family members were or are detained so she would not be vulnerable to pressure from the security forces for that reason. And while she and her husband both belonged to the LTTE in the past they ceased to be members in 2004, her husband was a member of the pro-government Karuna group at the time of his death and there is no credible evidence before me which suggests that she faced problems with the security forces or anyone else because of this prior to leaving Sri Lanka.
CONSIDERATION
There was no issue between the parties, and it is clear from the Tribunal’s decision, the Tribunal accepted the applicant was a Tamil widow; who was formerly in the LTTE; her late husband was in the LTTE; she would be returning to [X]; and she is a single female who is the head of her household (Tp 10.12-40).
The Tribunal gave three reasons for its state of non-satisfaction that the applicant faced a real chance of serious or significant harm on return to Sri Lanka. The Tribunal’s non-satisfaction was in the context of it considering whether, for the purposes of ss 5J and 65 of the Act, it was satisfied ‘there is a real chance that, if the [applicant] returned to the receiving country, the [applicant] would be persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion’.
The first reason given by the Tribunal for its state of non-satisfaction at [266] was the applicant was not isolated and would have family support if she returned to Sri Lanka. The Tribunal based that finding on the applicant’s evidence she stayed with her parents and later with a friend in her area following the birth of her child and she lived with her parents for some months after her husband’s death and they financially supported her. The Tribunal did not accept the applicant’s evidence she was forced to live apart from her family because of her past association with the LTTE ([267] of the reasons).
The second reason given by the Tribunal for its state of non-satisfaction at [269] was the applicant had financial resources. This finding was based on the Tribunal’s findings the applicant still owned a block of land given to her by her mother and she derived an income from [X] given to her by her father. Further, the applicant had experience as a [X], which would assist her to earn a living if she returned to her homeland.
The third reason given by the Tribunal for its state of non-satisfaction at [270] involved several different reasons, referencing findings in relation to several risk factors set out in the UNHCR Guidelines as contributing to the vulnerability of women, not applying to the applicant. The first was the applicant was not a displaced person; in the sense she had to relocate to another area or live in a camp. The second was none of the applicant’s family members were or are detained so she would not be vulnerable to pressure from the security forces for that reason. Finally, the Tribunal, based on its earlier findings, found there was no credible evidence to suggest the applicant faced problems with the security forces or anyone else.
Therefore, the Tribunal at [265] and [271] stated after considering all the relevant evidence it was not satisfied there was a real chance the applicant would suffer serious or significant harm on return to Sri Lanka for any reason linked to her status as a Tamil woman.
The applicant submitted the Tribunal had accepted the UNHCR Guidelines and DFAT Report in full as probative country information (Tp 11.11-18). The applicant referred to item A.6 in the UNHCR Guidelines, which relevantly provided as follows:
Reports have documented high levels of sexual and gender-based violence against women and girls in the final phase of the armed conflict, as well as in the post-conflict phase, including in parts of the country not directly affected by the conflict. However, this type of violence remains under-reported and, if reported, inadequately investigated according to several sources.
…
A number of factors have been cited in various reports as contributing to increased insecurity and vulnerability of women in the north and east of Sri Lanka. The most relevant include the following: a) large numbers of female-headed households in the areas most affected by the armed conflict; b) women’s weak economic position; c) high militarization, including dependency on security forces for access to detained family members; d) impunity and weak administration of justice; e) prostitution and vulnerability to trafficking in displacement or post-relocation; and f) the vulnerable position of former female LTTE cadres and war widows.
The applicant contended a fair reading of the UNHCR Report indicates being a war widow simpliciter, even with family support and financial resources, is a relevant circumstance where women might need protection.
The applicant referred to [3.84] to [3.96] of the DFAT Report and said the DFAT Report relevantly states that female headed households, which expression includes war widows, ‘are vulnerable’ to, relevantly for the applicant’s case, gender-based violence. The applicant also said there is nothing in the DFAT Report to indicate family support or financial resources, or any of the matters mentioned in the Tribunal’s three reasons at [266] to [270] (summarised at [18] to [20] of this judgment) would operate as ‘protective factors’ (which was the label used by the applicant) against the risk of gender-based violence.
As said, the applicant accepted there was probative evidence on which the Tribunal could make the findings contained in the three reasons. However, the applicant’s central argument turned on a contention there was no probative evidence to support the Tribunal’s state of mind, being the non-satisfaction there was a real chance the applicant would face serious or significant harm if returned to Sri Lanka.
The applicant further said whilst the protective factors might take the applicant out of the ‘very highest risk’ category for single females or female household heads, there is nothing in the material before the Tribunal to indicate those matters would take her outside of the ‘real chance’ threshold for gender-based violence.
Before I consider the ground for judicial review, it is helpful to set out the relevant legal principles when considering on what jurisdictional grounds a state of satisfaction reached by a Tribunal can be challenged. This is because the Tribunal’s finding in this case, which is challenged at [265] and [271], was a finding for the purposes of ss 5J and 65 of the Act, that the Tribunal was not satisfied the applicant faces a real chance of suffering serious or significant harm on return to Sri Lanka because of her status as a Tamil widow.
State of Satisfaction and Non-Satisfaction
In EHF17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 272 FCR 409 (EHF17) Derrington J at [97] said:
The structure of the provisions for the granting of protection visas is one which involves two elements: the satisfaction or non-satisfaction of the Minister that the applicant meets the visa criteria and, consequent upon that, the granting or refusal of it. The power to grant is exercisable on the jurisdictional fact of the Minister reaching the requisite state of mind. Any challenge to the refusal to grant a visa can only be that the Minister’s asserted non-satisfaction that the relevant criteria were met was a conclusion not formed in accordance with the implicit requirements of the Act. In other words, that the subjective jurisdictional fact for refusing the grant of a visa did not exist. … That being so, the essential question is whether the claimed state of mind was vitiated by the existence of any one of the above identified defects. If so, the purported exercise of power is absent its foundational authority and suffers from jurisdictional error: Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW) (2010) 239 CLR 531; 262 ALR 569; 113 ALD 1; [2010] HCA 1 at [72]; Craig v SouthAustralia (1995) 184 CLR 163; 131 ALR 595; 39 ALD 193; S20/2002 at [59] per McHugh and Gummow JJ. In that respect, the existence or otherwise of jurisdictional error is not relevant to the review of the process by which the alleged state of mind was reached. (emphasis added)
At [55] his Honour noted the ‘prescription of a state of mind as the pre-condition to the enlivening of power will be referred to as subjective jurisdictional fact’.
At [70] his Honour also said:
Thus, in conformity with the manner in which the legislature has granted power, any review by the Court, as to the existence of a subjective jurisdictional fact must be limited to determining whether the state of mind actually reached is one within the range which the legislature intended to be formed as a pre-requisite to the exercise of power. If there are errors in the process by which a state of mind is reached, such as by considering extraneous or irrelevant considerations or by excluding relevant considerations, the state of mind will not be that which the legislature impliedly requires. Similarly, if, in reaching the state of mind, the repository of power has asked themselves the wrong question as a consequence of a mistake of law, the state of mind is not that on which the exercise of power is conditioned. It might also be noted that the Parliament implicitly intends the requisite state of mind should be one which has been formed logically and rationally upon findings of fact which are logically formed upon probative evidence. (emphasis added)
Further, as the Full Federal Court said more recently in Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21 at [21]:
The satisfaction of the Minister is not an unreviewable personal state of mind. The law is clear as to what is required. If, upon review by a court, the satisfaction is found to have been reached unreasonably or was not capable of having been reached on proper material or lawful grounds, it will be taken not to be a lawful satisfaction for the purpose of the statute. In such a case the precondition for the exercise of the power will not exist and the decision will be unlawful and will be set aside. That is, the lawful satisfaction is a jurisdictional precondition, a form of jurisdictional fact, for the exercise of the power or discretion: Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu [1999] HCA 21; 197 CLR 611 at 651 [131] and the cases cited at footnote 109.
…
Thus, the Tribunal’s state of mind as to its non-satisfaction must be one which has been formed logically and rationally upon findings of fact which are logically formed upon probative evidence. The Tribunal’s state of mind is open to challenge on jurisdictional error grounds, if the non-satisfaction was arrived at where there was no probative evidence. In relation to what is required to make good a ‘no evidence’ ground, XRZG v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (2024) 305 FCR 349 at [63] is authority for the following (omitting citations):
… a finding of fact made without a “skerrick” of evidence will amount to an error of law. Whether such an error of law amounts to jurisdictional error will depend on the nature and significance of the finding of fact. On any view, in order to amount to jurisdictional error, the relevant finding must have been at least a “critical step” on which the ultimate decision was based, if not a precondition to the exercise of jurisdiction.
With those principles in mind, I now turn to this case.
The applicant’s counsel submitted that: ‘…The way I put it is that the premise of the Tribunal’s analysis is on an acceptance of the DFAT report and the UNHCR report, as the applicable country information. I then say that premise takes your Honour to that country information, for the identification of the risk factors. The structure of the Tribunal’s reasons was then to say, within that premise, the applicant falls outside of a recognised category, because of the reasons at [266] through to [270]. That’s the fair way to read these reasons.’ (Tp 19.17-24).
I do not accept the applicant’s reading of the Tribunal’s reasons is correct, that the Tribunal accepted the whole of what was said in the DFAT report and the UNHCR Guidelines. Rather, I find, for the following reasons, the Tribunal accepted parts of the country information, as follows:
(a)The Tribunal at [260] of its reasons referred to the UNHCR Guidelines and noted the parts of the country information it had regard to being as follows:
In support of this claim the October 2018 submission noted UNHCR’s guidelines issued in 2012 which observed that there had been high levels of sexual and gender based violence against women in the final phases of the civil war as well as in the post conflict stage. It noted a number of factors contributing to the vulnerability of women including the large number of female headed households in areas affected by conflict, the weak economic position of many of these women, high militarisation, impunity and weak administration of justice in former conflict areas, dependence on security forces to gain access to detained family members, the vulnerable position of displaced or relocated women and the vulnerable position of former LTTE cadres and war widows.
(b)It is clear from the preceding subparagraph the part of the country information in the UNHCR Guidelines the Tribunal accepted was ‘a number of factors contributed to the vulnerability of women’ to gender-based violence, which included the weak economic position of many female headed households; the vulnerable position of women who have detained family members; the vulnerable position of displaced women and the vulnerable position of war widows.
(c)Further, at [261] of its reasons, the Tribunal noted the parts of the DFAT Report the Tribunal considered relevant, being single women who are household heads are vulnerable, relevantly, to gender-based violence:
It is well established the choice of country information, that is, what parts to accept and reject, and the weight afforded to country information due to its accuracy is a matter for the decision maker: NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10. Therefore, there was no error in the Tribunal only accepting and giving weight to parts of the country information.
The Tribunal also importantly had regard to its own specialised knowledge as to conditions in the applicant’s area, as the Tribunal said at [263] of its reasons, ‘At the hearing I advised the applicant that I was aware that some widows without family support might be at risk of harm in [X]’ (emphasis added). There is no doubt the Tribunal is permitted to rely on its own personal or specialised knowledge for the purposes of determining whether there is a real chance of harm if the applicant were returned home. As the High Court said in Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v Viane (2021) 274 CLR 398 (Keane, Gordon, Edelman, Steward and Gleeson JJ) (Viane) at [27]:
Again, with respect, the four reasons relied upon by the majority below for concluding that each observation was not made using the Minister’s personal or specialised knowledge should not be accepted. Given the store of knowledge the Minister will have built up over many years, from dealing with individuals from so many countries and territories, the source of such specific observations about conditions in American Samoa and Samoa could only have been from the Minister’s experience. In that respect, to reiterate, it had not been shown that either observation was incorrect.
The High Court in Viane stated at [28]:
It follows that the majority’s observation that the Minister’s satisfaction or non-satisfaction for the purposes of s 501CA(4) of the Act must be formed on the basis of factual findings that are open to be made on the evidentiary materials is not, with great respect, entirely correct. First, and as already mentioned, the Minister is not prohibited from using the accumulated knowledge of the Department. Secondly, representations may be received which are no more than bare assertions about a course of future events. The Minister may simply not be persuaded that such assertions can constitute “another reason” for revocation. Such a conclusion does not require the Minister to make any factual findings. Finally, because of the applicable statutory regime, the respondent’s particular deployment of Eshetu was, with respect, misconceived.
In Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v Mukiza (2022) 291 FCR 568 (Markovic J, Thawley J and Cheeseman J), the Full Court of the Federal Court at [40] said:
The Rehabilitation Finding was not one which was only available to be made on the basis of direct evidence. As the High Court stated in Viane at [18], it can be assumed that the finding proceeded from the [Tribunal’s] personal or specialised knowledge. It is true that the Minister’s “personal or specialised knowledge” might be different as between the Minister and the Tribunal. However, like the Minister from time to time, or the Minister’s delegates from time to time, the Tribunal also has personal or specialised knowledge. This is not one of the extreme or rare cases where a particular or personal finding has been made “about an applicant, which could not have been the subject of any pre-existing personal or specialised knowledge (or common knowledge)”: Viane at [21].
A fair reading of the Tribunal’s reasons in [260] and [261] is that in relation to the country information, which is probative evidence, the Tribunal accepted there were certain factors that made single women more vulnerable to gender-based violence, being if they were in a weak economic position; they were displaced people; their family members were detained; they were war widows; or they were household heads. It logically follows that the absence of those factors reduced the vulnerability of women.
Further, as the High Court said in Viane, the Tribunal from its own specialist knowledge can make findings. The Tribunal noted at [263] of the reasons that it ‘was aware that some widows without family support might be at risk’ (emphasis added). It is apparent from these reasons that this information arose from its specialist knowledge. It logically follows that if widows had family support, then they would not be as vulnerable.
Therefore, given the matters in [40] and [41] of this judgment, I find there was probative evidence on which the Tribunal could reach the state of not being satisfied the applicant faced a real chance of suffering serious or significant harm. This was because there was country information which the Tribunal gave weight to and the Tribunal’s specialised knowledge, that various factors increased the vulnerability, and as said it logically follows the absence of those factors reduced the vulnerability of war widows in the [X] of Sri Lanka, being if they were not without family support; they were not in a weak economic position; they were not displaced people and their family members were not detained. The Tribunal at [266], [269] and [270] of its reasons found, on findings which are not challenged, the applicant had family support; she had financial resources; she was not a displaced person; and none of her family was detained. Therefore, the Tribunal at [265] was not satisfied the applicant faced a real chance of harm on return to Sri Lanka.
The applicants contended at the hearing before me the Tribunal’s finding the applicant had family support and financial resources, she was not a displaced person and had no family that was detained could not take the applicant ‘outside the accepted risk category’: Tp 19.45. The said contention amounts to a disagreement with the Tribunal’s assessment of the ‘risk category’ in the country information and disagreement with the Tribunal’s specialised knowledge. I find it was open to the Tribunal on the country information and its own specialised knowledge to reason the ‘risk category’, to use the applicant’s words, was women who were vulnerable where various factors were present. I do not accept the applicants’ argument that a fair reading of the Tribunal reasons is it accepted being a Tamil war widow, ipso facto, means the woman would face a real chance of suffering serious or significant harm on return to Sri Lanka.
The applicants acknowledged at the hearing before me the applicant was ‘forced into a position of trying to unpick what the Tribunal has done’ (Tp 24.12), because the Tribunal does not expressly say it accepted the country information that Tamil war widows would face a real chance of suffering harm on return to Sri Lanka. The applicant argued ‘the Tribunal must have made that finding mentally and it hasn’t been written down’ (Tp 24.21). I reject the applicant’s argument in that regard. The Tribunal has given reasons for its decision, which are comprehensive spanning to 323 paragraphs, and the Tribunal has not recorded an acceptance that Tamil war widows, ipso facto, face a real chance of harm. Rather, it is apparent from the Tribunal’s reasons, at [260], [261] and [263], the Tribunal has accepted part of what is set out in the country information, being that several factors contribute to the vulnerability of Tamil widows.
Accordingly, the applicant’s ground for judicial review fails.
CONCLUSION
As no jurisdictional error has been disclosed, the application must be dismissed.
COSTS
I will hear the parties as to costs.
I certify that the preceding forty-seven (47) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Kaur-Bains. Associate:
Dated: 27 March 2025
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