FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
ADU18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 366
ORDERS
QUD 922 of 2018 BETWEEN: ADU18
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
DERRINGTON J
DATE OF ORDER:
18 MARCH 2020
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal is allowed.
2.The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court…
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- Case
- [2020] FCA 366
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the Authority had failed to consider the appellant’s claims or integers of claims, and whether this constituted a failure to comply with the statutory duty under the Act. The appellant argued that the Authority had not considered certain claims which were clearly and squarely raised on the material, while the Minister contended that there existed a distinction between matters which required consideration, being claims or integers of claims, and mere pieces of evidence in respect of which the same active intellectual engagement was not required. The court considered the principles governing the conduct of a review by the Authority under Part 7AA of the Act, particularly those relating to allegations that a decision maker failed to consider an important matter.
The court found that the Authority had failed to consider the appellant’s claims that the rockets which had killed his parents had been fired by the Taliban and that such attacks occurred regularly. The court also found that the Authority had not considered a claim that clearly arose on the information before it, and on its finding that the applicant would return to work in his family business, that claim being that he would have to travel on the roads around Muqur District and elsewhere to procure supplies for that business. Additionally, the court found that the Authority had failed to consider information that it was required to consider pursuant to s 473DB of the Migration Act, and that it had not considered the risk to the applicant in the future, as opposed to merely having considered the past and the present. As a result, the appeal was allowed, and the first respondent was ordered to pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is allowed.
2. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The grounds of appeal to this Court, extracted below, reflect grounds one to four of the application for review before the FCC.1.The court below erred in finding that the second respondent (the IAA) had considered the appellant’s claims that;(a) the rockets which had killed his parents had been fired by the Taliban; and(b) such attacks occurred regularly.2.The court below erred in finding that the IAA had considered a claim that clearly arose on the information before IAA and on its finding that the applicant would return to work in his family business, that claim being that he would have to travel on the roads around Muqur District and elsewhere to procure supplies [for] that business.3.The court below erred in finding that it cannot be inferred that the IAA failed to consider information that it was required to consider pursuant to s 473DB of the Migration Act, that, (a)Pashtun majority districts which would correspond to the applicant’s home district of Muqur were not safe due to the presence of the Taliban, and(b)Pajwok Afghan news reported in January 2016 that Maqur District was under direct threat from the Taliban.4.The court below erred in finding that the IAA had considered the risk to the applicant in the future, as opposed to merely having considered the past and the present.Consideration Prior to considering the specific grounds of appeal it is appropriate to identify some of the principles governing the conduct of a review by the Authority under Part 7AA of the Act and particularly those relating to allegations that a decision maker failed to consider an important matter. Mr Karp of Counsel for the appellant relied on the observations of the Full Court in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 (2017) 257 FCR 111 at 138–139 [79] per Kenny, Tracey and Griffiths JJ, where their Honours observed that the scope of the inquisitorial process to be undertaken when considering a protection visa application requires the court to consider and determine the case as articulated and any unarticulated claim which is nevertheless clearly and squarely raised on the material. Reference was also made to the observations in AYY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 261 FCR 503 (AYY17) where a Full Court (Collier, McKerracher and Banks-Smith JJ) observed (at 509–510 [18]) that in exercising the power under s 65 of the Act in relation to a protection visa, the decision maker is “only required to consider claims that are the subject of substantial clearly articulated argument which rely upon established facts, or which clearly emerge from the materials”. Their Honours accepted that a conclusion that a claim “clearly emerges” is not one to be made lightly and it is not sufficient if it might emerge. They further accepted that a claim can only emerge from established facts in the sense that a claim will not emerge from mere hypothetical scenarios. On the other hand, a claim may well emerge from the findings made by the arbiter of fact as well as from the primary materials. At 512–513 [26] it was said:We can accept the appellant’s contention that the NABE principle in relation to claims or issues clearly arising from materials before the Tribunal or IAA would extend to materials which are actually the Tribunal or IAA’s own findings. An unarticulated claim might “clearly emerge” before a decision maker, having regard to his or her own findings and the material before the decision-maker upon which those findings are reached. This proposition was also accepted by Bromberg J in ACE15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1054 (at [27]) where his Honour said:While I respectfully agree that a Tribunal’s obligation to determine a claim extends only to those claims which arise squarely from the materials before the Tribunal, and would also agree that those materials ought to include the Tribunal’s own findings of fact, I consider that the debate misses the point in this case.