ADU18 v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

ADU18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 366

Appeal from: ADU18 v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor [2018] FCCA 3958
File number: QUD 922 of 2018
Judge: DERRINGTON J
Date of judgment: 18 March 2020
Catchwords: MIGRATION – review by Immigration Assessment Authority – omission to mention integer of claim in reasons – whether failure to consider claim or integer of claim – failure to comply with statutory duty
Legislation:

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 236 FCR 593

AYY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 261 FCR 503

BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 261 FCR 35

BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 93 ALJR 1091

Carrascalao v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 252 FCR 352

CNY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 94 ALJR 140

CQO15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 2948

CRG16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 374

FMM17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCCA 1500

Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 123

Kumar v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] FCAFC 16

Minister for Immigration and Border Protect v MZYTS (2013) 230 FCR 431

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 (2017) 257 FCR 111

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS (2013) 230 FCR 431

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA (2019) 264 CLR 421

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSRS (2014) 309 ALR 67

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507

NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10

Salahuddin v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2013) 229 FCR 290

Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 266 FCR 459

SZURJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 312 FLR 345

SZVWF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 313 FCR 90

Tickner v Chapman (1995) 57 FCR 451

Date of hearing: 26 February 2020
Date of last submissions: 26 February 2020
Registry: Queensland
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 87
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr L Karp
Solicitor for the Appellant: Fisher Dore Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr B McGlade
Solicitor for the Respondents: MinterEllison

ORDERS

QUD 922 of 2018
BETWEEN:

ADU18

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

DERRINGTON J

DATE OF ORDER:

18 MARCH 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is allowed.

2.The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 366
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, a citizen of Afghanistan, appealed against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCC) which dismissed his application for review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (the Authority). The Authority had affirmed the Minister’s delegate’s decision not to grant the appellant a protection visa. The appellant’s application for a Temporary Protection (Subclass 785) Visa was refused, and he sought review by the Authority under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act). The Authority considered the appellant’s background, accepting that he was an Afghani national who had lived in the Muqur district all his life, and that he was of the Hazara ethnic group and a Shia Muslim. However, the Authority found the appellant’s evidence concerning various events in his past, including the circumstances of his parents’ death and his inability to contact his siblings, to be inconsistent, vague, and not credible. The Authority also concluded that the appellant and his family were not targeted or harmed because of their ethnicity or faith.

The legal issues before the court were whether the Authority had failed to consider the appellant’s claims or integers of claims, and whether this constituted a failure to comply with the statutory duty under the Act. The appellant argued that the Authority had not considered certain claims which were clearly and squarely raised on the material, while the Minister contended that there existed a distinction between matters which required consideration, being claims or integers of claims, and mere pieces of evidence in respect of which the same active intellectual engagement was not required. The court considered the principles governing the conduct of a review by the Authority under Part 7AA of the Act, particularly those relating to allegations that a decision maker failed to consider an important matter.

The court found that the Authority had failed to consider the appellant’s claims that the rockets which had killed his parents had been fired by the Taliban and that such attacks occurred regularly. The court also found that the Authority had not considered a claim that clearly arose on the information before it, and on its finding that the applicant would return to work in his family business, that claim being that he would have to travel on the roads around Muqur District and elsewhere to procure supplies for that business. Additionally, the court found that the Authority had failed to consider information that it was required to consider pursuant to s 473DB of the Migration Act, and that it had not considered the risk to the applicant in the future, as opposed to merely having considered the past and the present. As a result, the appeal was allowed, and the first respondent was ordered to pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is allowed.

2. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCC) delivered on 29 November 2018 which dismissed the appellant’s application for review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (the Authority) dated 14 December 2017 in which a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection not to grant the appellant a protection visa was affirmed. Background The appellant is a citizen and national of Afghanistan. He arrived in Australia on 3 February 2013 as an unauthorised maritime arrival. He was born in the Muqur District of the Province of Ghazni in Afghanistan. Prior to leaving Afghanistan he had lived in the same village all his life. He claims to be of the Hazara ethnic group and a Shia Muslim. He speaks Hazaragi as well as Pashto, another local language. Since being released from detention in February 2013 he has resided in Brisbane. On 18 April 2016 he applied for a Temporary Protection (Subclass 785) Visa. His application was refused by a delegate of the Minister on 28 February 2017 and, as the delegate’s decision was a fast track reviewable decision, it was referred to the Authority for review pursuant to s 473CA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act). Decision of the Authority In the course of its lengthy consideration of the decision under review the Authority first made a number of findings concerning the appellant’s background. It accepted that he was an Afghani national (at [12]), and had lived in the Muqur district all his life (at [16]). Although he was generally uneducated he was nevertheless intelligent and articulate (at [14]). Whilst the Authority expressed concern as to various inconsistencies in his evidence as to his employment over the years, it generally accepted that whilst he worked casually as a labourer from time to time, he usually worked in his parent’s store which specialised in the sale and distribution of agricultural product (at [21]). The Authority also accepted that whilst he was Hazara and a Shia Muslim he was not a practising Shia (at [25]). Whilst he spoke Hazaragi, amongst other languages, it concluded that he did not have the appearance of an ethic Hazara (at [28]). It further accepted that his parents were killed in a rocket attack in 2010 (at [50]). The attack was apparently indiscriminate and had been instigated by the Taliban. The appellant’s evidence given to the delegate concerning the events after the rocket attack, including whether he attended his father’s funeral or not, was identified by the Authority as being inconsistent, vague and not credible. Similarly, the Authority did not accept as being credible his assertions as to his inability to contact his siblings after an alleged further rocket attack (at [44]). The appellant was also questioned about sending money to Indonesia (he having passed through Indonesia on his way to Australia) and the Authority found his evidence as to whom he was sending money and the reasons for it to be deliberately misleading and obfuscatory, and that this undermined his credibility (at [45]–[46]).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Mr Karp also referred to Minister for Immigration and Border Protect v MZYTS (2013) 230 FCR 431. It is not necessary to identify the particular circumstances of the protection visa application in that case. The point sought to be made was one of general application to the consideration of issues in such matters and, in particular, the Full Court’s observation (at 444 [37]) that, given the prospective nature of the claims which are made by protection visa applicants, a decision maker was required to assess and determine what might happen to the applicant if they were compelled to return to their country of nationality at the time of the decision or in the near future thereafter. In the circumstances of that case, (at 444 [38]) the Court observed of the scope of the Tribunal’s obligations: (1) it was required to undertake its task with a consciousness and consideration of the submissions, evidence and material advanced by the applicant most likely to give it an accurate picture of the ongoing circumstances in the applicant’s home country were the applicant to return there; (2) whilst it is for the applicant to advance whatever argument and evidence they wish to advance in support of their claim of a well-founded fear of persecution, it must determine whether the claim is made out; and (3) although evidence about the situation of persons in the applicant’s circumstances in the country of origin in the past might provide the most accurate picture of the ongoing circumstances, that conclusion could only be made after an evaluation of pertinent material advanced by the applicant “including the most recent material and a decision about whether or not things had changed, were changing, were likely to change or had stayed”. The evidence vs claim distinction In reliance on this authority Mr Karp submitted that each of the evidence, claims and submissions relevant to the circumstances of the particular country of reference or particular area of that country had to be considered in the manner referred to in Tickner v Chapman. Mr McGlade for the Minister submitted that the obligation to consider the merits of a claim did not require the Tribunal to engage in the same active intellectual process in relation to every piece of evidence advanced by the visa applicant. He submitted there existed a distinction between matters which required consideration, being claims or integers of claims, and mere pieces of evidence in respect of which the same active intellectual engagement was not required. In response Mr Karp submitted that no such distinction exists. He relied upon the observations of Robertson J in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99 (SZRKT) at 130–131 [111]–[112] to the effect that there is no clear distinction between claims and evidence and that the essential question must be the importance of the material to the exercise of the Tribunal’s functions and thus the seriousness of any error. His Honour considered that the distinction between claims and evidence provided a tool of analysis but not a discrimen itself. Whether a Tribunal is required to consider a document or documents will depend on the circumstances of the case and the nature of the document including the cogency of the evidentiary material and its place in the assessment of the claims advanced.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 18 April 2016 he applied for a Temporary Protection (Subclass 785) Visa. His application was refused by a delegate of the Minister on 28 February 2017 and, as the delegate’s decision was a fast track reviewable decision, it was referred to the Authority for review pursuant to s 473CA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act). Decision of the Authority In the course of its lengthy consideration of the decision under review the Authority first made a number of findings concerning the appellant’s background. It accepted that he was an Afghani national (at [12]), and had lived in the Muqur district all his life (at [16]). Although he was generally uneducated he was nevertheless intelligent and articulate (at [14]). Whilst the Authority expressed concern as to various inconsistencies in his evidence as to his employment over the years, it generally accepted that whilst he worked casually as a labourer from time to time, he usually worked in his parent’s store which specialised in the sale and distribution of agricultural product (at [21]). The Authority also accepted that whilst he was Hazara and a Shia Muslim he was not a practising Shia (at [25]). Whilst he spoke Hazaragi, amongst other languages, it concluded that he did not have the appearance of an ethic Hazara (at [28]). It further accepted that his parents were killed in a rocket attack in 2010 (at [50]). The attack was apparently indiscriminate and had been instigated by the Taliban. The appellant’s evidence given to the delegate concerning the events after the rocket attack, including whether he attended his father’s funeral or not, was identified by the Authority as being inconsistent, vague and not credible. Similarly, the Authority did not accept as being credible his assertions as to his inability to contact his siblings after an alleged further rocket attack (at [44]). The appellant was also questioned about sending money to Indonesia (he having passed through Indonesia on his way to Australia) and the Authority found his evidence as to whom he was sending money and the reasons for it to be deliberately misleading and obfuscatory, and that this undermined his credibility (at [45]–[46]). He had given evidence to the delegate that he was forced to leave Afghanistan because he was a Shia and, as such, had been targeted by Sunnis. He also claimed to have been targeted by the Taliban for being Hazara. In the latter respect, he claimed that on six occasions the Taliban had visited his store and assaulted him. However, in the course of his visa interview he acknowledged that he had not personally faced difficulties and nor had anyone in his family encountered problems because he was a Shia Hazara living in Afghanistan. The Authority considered the appellant’s failure to mention in his visa interview what he said were threats against him or his family disclosed a lack of credibility. It determined that neither he nor his family were targeted or harmed because of their ethnicity or faith, nor were they prevented from practising their religion (at [48]).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The grounds of appeal to this Court, extracted below, reflect grounds one to four of the application for review before the FCC.1.The court below erred in finding that the second respondent (the IAA) had considered the appellant’s claims that;(a) the rockets which had killed his parents had been fired by the Taliban; and(b) such attacks occurred regularly.2.The court below erred in finding that the IAA had considered a claim that clearly arose on the information before IAA and on its finding that the applicant would return to work in his family business, that claim being that he would have to travel on the roads around Muqur District and elsewhere to procure supplies [for] that business.3.The court below erred in finding that it cannot be inferred that the IAA failed to consider information that it was required to consider pursuant to s 473DB of the Migration Act, that, (a)Pashtun majority districts which would correspond to the applicant’s home district of Muqur were not safe due to the presence of the Taliban, and(b)Pajwok Afghan news reported in January 2016 that Maqur District was under direct threat from the Taliban.4.The court below erred in finding that the IAA had considered the risk to the applicant in the future, as opposed to merely having considered the past and the present.Consideration Prior to considering the specific grounds of appeal it is appropriate to identify some of the principles governing the conduct of a review by the Authority under Part 7AA of the Act and particularly those relating to allegations that a decision maker failed to consider an important matter. Mr Karp of Counsel for the appellant relied on the observations of the Full Court in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 (2017) 257 FCR 111 at 138–139 [79] per Kenny, Tracey and Griffiths JJ, where their Honours observed that the scope of the inquisitorial process to be undertaken when considering a protection visa application requires the court to consider and determine the case as articulated and any unarticulated claim which is nevertheless clearly and squarely raised on the material. Reference was also made to the observations in AYY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 261 FCR 503 (AYY17) where a Full Court (Collier, McKerracher and Banks-Smith JJ) observed (at 509–510 [18]) that in exercising the power under s 65 of the Act in relation to a protection visa, the decision maker is “only required to consider claims that are the subject of substantial clearly articulated argument which rely upon established facts, or which clearly emerge from the materials”. Their Honours accepted that a conclusion that a claim “clearly emerges” is not one to be made lightly and it is not sufficient if it might emerge. They further accepted that a claim can only emerge from established facts in the sense that a claim will not emerge from mere hypothetical scenarios. On the other hand, a claim may well emerge from the findings made by the arbiter of fact as well as from the primary materials. At 512–513 [26] it was said:We can accept the appellant’s contention that the NABE principle in relation to claims or issues clearly arising from materials before the Tribunal or IAA would extend to materials which are actually the Tribunal or IAA’s own findings. An unarticulated claim might “clearly emerge” before a decision maker, having regard to his or her own findings and the material before the decision-maker upon which those findings are reached. This proposition was also accepted by Bromberg J in ACE15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1054 (at [27]) where his Honour said:While I respectfully agree that a Tribunal’s obligation to determine a claim extends only to those claims which arise squarely from the materials before the Tribunal, and would also agree that those materials ought to include the Tribunal’s own findings of fact, I consider that the debate misses the point in this case.