MIGRATION – appeal from the Federal Circuit Court – where the primary judge dismissed the application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority – nature of the Pt 7AA regime – consideration of new information – where the Authority made adverse credibility findings – where the Authority made a finding open to it based on the country information
Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category:
Catchwords
Number of paragraphs:
58
Counsel for the Appellant:
Mr R Lindsay
Solicitor for the Appellant:
Cathal Smith Legal Pty Ltd
Counsel for the First Respondent:
Mr PJ Hannan
Solicitor for the First Respondent:
Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent:
The Second Respondent submits to any order of the Court, save as to the question of costs
ORDERS
WAD 374 of 2018
BETWEEN:
CRG16
Appellant
AND:
MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
MCKERRACHER J
DATE OF ORDER:
19 MARCH 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent, to be assessed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MCKERRACHER J:
INTRODUCTION
The appellant is a citizen of Afghanistan. He is an Hazara of Shia Muslim faith. On 13 July 2016, a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (as it then was) found that the appellant failed to meet the criteria for the grant of a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa (
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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The case of CRG16 v Minister for Home Affairs involved an appeal against a decision by the Immigration Assessment Authority to dismiss an application for judicial review. The appellant, CRG16, sought review of the Authority's decision which rejected his claims for protection under Australian law. The primary issues before the court involved the Authority's handling of new information, its credibility findings, and its application of the complementary protection test, among others.
The court was required to decide whether the Authority had erred in its interpretation and application of the Migration Act, particularly in relation to the consideration of new information, the assessment of the appellant's credibility, the application of the complementary protection test, and the evaluation of the legal criteria for internal relocation. The appellant argued that the Authority had failed to properly consider the new evidence, had made erroneous credibility findings, had misapplied the complementary protection test, and had not adequately assessed the reasonableness of relocating him to Kabul.
The court found that the Authority had not committed jurisdictional error in its assessment. It held that the Authority had correctly interpreted the new evidence and had properly applied the relevant legal standards. The court found that the Authority's credibility findings were supported by the evidence and that it had correctly applied the complementary protection test. Additionally, the court determined that the Authority had appropriately considered the legal criteria for internal relocation, taking into account the appellant's personal circumstances and the conditions in Kabul.
Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the first respondent. The court's decision underscores the importance of properly interpreting and applying the law in protection visa cases, particularly when considering new information and assessing claims for complementary protection.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent, to be assessed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
In his reasons, the primary judge listed the extensive review grounds before him as follows (at [20]):Ground Four – misunderstanding import of new evidence accepted4.1 The [Authority] … correctly stated the [appellant’s] submission contained new information about a suicide bomb attack in Kabul in July 2016 that targeted Hazaras, resulting in 80 deaths and 230 injuries, and that this new information constituted exceptional circumstances unknown to the Delegate thus allowing the [Authority] to consider it;4.2 The Delegate of the Minister (the Delegate) had acknowledged that the security situation in Kabul had “clearly deteriorated” but that nonetheless he considered, based on September 2015 DFAT and February 2016 DFAT thematic reports, the [appellant] as a Hazara did not fall within the risk profile of an ethnic and religious minority who would be at risk if relocated to the relative safety of Kabul (Delegate Reasons: paragraph 86, 89 and 90);4.3 The July 2016 attack specifically targeted ordinary Hazaras in Kabul, such as the [appellant], and made unsustainable the Delegate’s earlier reliance upon the DFAT reports that the deteriorating security situation in Kabul did not show insurgent attacks were targeted specifically against ordinary Hazaras;4.4 The [Authority] ignored and failed to recognise that this new evidence showed that the July 2016 attack on Hazaras completely undermined the earlier finding of the Delegate based on the DFAT reports that Hazaras, such as the [appellant], would not be at risk of serious harm in Kabul from Daesh. Having ignored the centrality of this additional evidence to the Delegate’s adverse finding the [Authority] merely concluded this new evidence demonstrated Daesh have conducted “one off” attacks and that there was no evidence Hazaras or Shias such as the [appellant] face a real chance of serious harm in Kabul (paragraph 17 of the [Authority’s] Reasons).4.5 The [Authority] committed jurisdictional error in that:a) he did not ask himself the correct legal question in the light of the new evidence presented to him which was whether the July 2016 attack undermined the earlier DFAT reports and basis of the Delegate’s earlier adverse finding;b) he did not address the specific nature of the claim and therefore failed to discharge his statutory duty. Notwithstanding the July 2016 bomb blast targeted specifically ordinary Hazaras, and the acknowledged level of insecurity caused by attacks from anti-Government entities, he wrongly attributes these attaches as non-discriminatory as only faced by the population at large (paragraph 20 of the [Authority’s] Reasons);Ground Five – Erroneous finding that this was a “one-off” attack5.1 The [Authority] concluded that the DFAT reports demonstrated Daesh have conducted “one-off” attacks and that at the date of his decision there was no evidence of additional targeting of Hazaras or Shias such that they would face a chance of serious harm in Kabul (paragraph 17 of the [Authority’s] Reasons).5.2 The attack upon Hazaras in July 2016 occurred within one month of the Delegate’s decision and in the context of a Kabul security setting that the Delegate had found “was deteriorating”. Further, there was no evidence to support a conclusion that based on the reports available to the [Authority] this would be a “one-off” attack against Hazaras such as the [appellant].5.3 The [appellant] seeks leave to adduce evidence contained in the Affidavit of […] that since the decision made by the [Authority] on 23 August 2016, that there have been further reliable reports which show that this was not a “one-off” attack and the [Authority] was wrong to decide therefore that there was not a real chance of serious harm to the [appellant].5.4 The [Authority] committed jurisdictional error in that:(a) the country information did not support a conclusion that there was not a real chance of serious harm against Hazaras such as the [appellant] by Daesh [sic];(b) the reports referred to in the Affidavit of […] Ion relating to country information subsequent to the decision proves that this was not an isolated “one-off” attack;(c) there was no intelligible justification, even on the information then available to the delegate and [Authority], for the [Authority] to conclude this would be a “one off” attack. The delegate had correctly referred to “numerous incidents” and to a “deteriorating situation” in Kabul.(d) that it was procedurally unfair for the [Authority] to conclude that the July 2016 attack was likely to be a “one-off” attack without giving the [appellant] an opportunity to refute what comprised a reason for making the adverse determination.Ground Six – not putting credibility finding to [appellant]6.1 The [Authority] said that the [appellant], when asked by the Delegate whether anything had happened to his family since they relocated to Kabul, the [appellant] referred only to the death of friends in a Muharram bomb blast “which I rejected the above as not being credible” ([Authority]: paragraph 27). The [Authority] considered the [appellant] “fabricated the claim” that during Muharram in 2012 that he attended a Mosque when friends were killed (paragraph 16). The [appellant] did say he believed it was during Muharram in 2012 the friends were killed, but did not say he was present and attended the Mosque where this occurred.6.2 The Delegate found that “when [the [appellant]] was living in Kabul in October 2012, some of his friends experienced an explosion in a mosque, however I have been unable to locate any country information that supports this claim… in light of this lack of supporting information as to the scale of any such attack, I give more weight to the DFAT information which states there is no evidence that Hazaras have been systematically targeted…” (paragraph 91). No adverse finding as to credibility was made by the Delegate against the [appellant].6.3 Conversely, the [Authority] found the evidence given by the [appellant] to the Delegate was not credible and was “fabricated” without first inviting the [appellant] to give any evidence about the matters in 3.1 and 3.2.6.4 Had the [Authority] invited the [appellant] to give evidence, the [appellant] would have explained:(a) as stated in the Affidavit of […] that his calculated dates were based on the Persian calendar; that he could name the two friends killed; that he has checked on line and there was in fact a Mosque bombing in December 2011 which covered the Muharram period;(b) he had told the Delegate that ordinary people get attacked here, not the Government authorities, and also there is a lot of suicide bomb attacks against Shia people in mosques and that sort of thing” (page 16, transcript line 510-530). That this is now supported by verifiable recent events.6.5 The [Authority] therefore failed to extend procedural fairness to the [appellant] and thereby committed jurisdictional error.Ground Seven - Misapplication of test for complementary protection7.1 The [Authority] fell into jurisdictional error by misconstruing or misapplying the test for complementary protection and or failing to ask himself the correct legal question.7.2 The [appellant] claimed to be at real risk of suffering significant harm throughout Afghanistan and thus to be a person to whom Australia owes complementary protection obligations (CB 205, [22]). The [appellant] also claimed to be owed protection obligations as a refugee (CB 205, [21]).7.3 The [Authority] found that the [appellant], as a Hazara did not have a well-founded fear of serious harm and for a Convention reason in Kabul, and thus was not a person to whom Australia owed protection obligations as a refugee, even though there is a level of general insecurity in Kabul due to attacks “but consider these threats are faced by the population at large” (CB 217-8, [20]-[21]).7.4 In coming to his conclusion about the [appellant’s] refugee status, the [Authority] cited country information detailing a suicide bomb attack in Kabul (CB 217, [17]) and threats to the population generally from anti-government elements such as the Taliban and Daesh (CB 217, [20]).7.5 The [Authority] then found that the [appellant] was not owed complementary protection obligations and stated “again for the same reasons and applying the authority in MIAC v SZQRB I am not satisfied that the [appellant] faces a real risk of significant harm in Kabul” (CB 218, [26]).7.6 The [Authority] thus fell into jurisdictional error in that:a) Having recognised that the level of general insecurity in Kabul due to attacks from anti-government entities, including the Taliban and Daesh, is faced by the population generally, he did not then ask himself whether the [appellant] was owed complimentary [sic] protection because the threats from the Taliban and Daesh also puts him at personal risk so as to negate exclusion under s.36(2B)(c) of the Act (see BOS 15 v Minister for Immigration 2017 FCCA 745 at [29]).b) The [Authority] instead equated his finding that the [appellant] would not face a real chance of serious harm in Kabul for a Convention reason with his finding that the [appellant] would not face a real risk of significant harm under the complimentary [sic] protection head;c) The [Authority] did not make an assessment on the risk of generalised violence in relation to the refugee convention which would foreclose further consideration for the purposes of his assessment of the [appellant’s] complementary protection claim (see BOS15 v Min for Immigration [2017] FCCA 745 at [30]).d) The [Authority] had been provided with information of significant and deteriorating conditions in the country information relating to Kabul after the delegate decision. The [appellant] also referred to the risk of suicide explosions ‘every day’ in Kabul (p16 transcript of delegate interview). In addition the [appellant] himself, provided examples of risk of generalised violence to residents if returned to Kabul (CB- 19) and raised the issue of lack of security, (CB- 88 [20]) where he referred to attacks from Sunni militia, Taliban, ISIS, and stated that Kabul is too dangerous to return.e) Further the [appellant] referred to a ‘personal risk’ being that ‘they say you lived in an infidel country and you might be a spy’ (p17 transcript of interview) and that he would ‘get killed, it’s only a matter of me being seen by a Talib and they would kill me’. He further stated they would kill him because he came from ‘this country they will think I am a spy or something’ and that he feared ISIS as well (p17 transcript of interview). Therefore, the [appellant] in addition put forward material to support a real and personal risk to engage a non refoulement obligation against a backdrop of serious human rights violations. Although this material was considered as an ‘exaggeration’ it was only in the context of Convention Grounds or ‘Refugee Assessment’ (CB- 217 [16].Ground Eight: Failure to ascertain if legal criteria for internal relocation has been met8.1 The [Authority] found that the [appellant] had a well-founded fear of persecution from Kuchis for the combined reasons of his race and/or religion if returned to Wardak being his place of origin (paragraph 14 of the Reasons of the ITAA), but he was not satisfied the [appellant] had a well-founded fear of persecution for any of the reasons in s.5J(1)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act) if he returns to Kabul (paragraph 20) and he does not meet the definition of refugee in s.5(H)(1) and s.36(2)(a) of the Act.8.2 In determining the question of relocation to Kabul, the Delegate failed to consider, aside from the risk of serious harm, the appropriate legal criteria as to whether it was reasonable, in the sense of practicable, taking into account the [appellant’s] personal circumstances and the situation in Kabul and whether he could now reasonably subsist in Kabul, and instead limited assessment to the existence of a family network in Kabul, and some linguistic and computer skills attributed to the [appellant] as gained since his arrival in Australia (paragraphs 104 and 105 of the Delegate’s reasons).8.3 The [Authority] in considering reasonableness of internal relocation referred only to the limited factors set out at paragraphs 19, 27 and 28 of his Reasons.8.4 The [Authority] (and Delegate) erred in that;(a) country information was ignored which showed: that when the [appellant’s] family came to Kabul the city had expanded from 500,000 to nearly 5,000,000 and that large parts of the city are extremely poor and have no sanitation or basic services; the low capacity of government to absorb returned refugees; that the Government was encouraging migrants to Kabul to go back to their areas of origin; rents are high and persons are living in illegal housing; that the migrants had little or no protection against eviction; that it was very difficult for them to obtain a livelihood; and that public services such as water and sanitation were not available (Submission to Delegate of 30 July 2016);(b) failed to consider whether the [appellant] returning from a Western country after six years could gain employment in Kabul with the skills attributed to him by the [Authority];(c) failed to consider the prospects of the [appellant] being able to obtain employment restricted to employment in Kabul taking into account his inability to travel to his original homeland because of recognised unsafe areas, e.g. roadways to Hazarajat.8.5 The [Authority] committed jurisdictional error in that he:(a) erred in law in failing to consider relevant legal criteria relating to both the [appellant’s] personal circumstances and the conditions presently in Kabul (MIPB v SZSCA2014 HCA 45 adopting at [26] and [27] the principles in Januzi v Secretary of State 2006 2AC 426 (5));(b) ignored the submissions advanced pursuant to the claim as to why the [appellant] could not reasonably be relocated to Kabul taking into account the extent of likely economic hardship and the unlikelihood of finding employment in Kabul itself (s.5J(5)(d), (e),(f));(c) ignored or failed to consider relevant country information about Kabul conditions;(d) failed to consider how far it would be “reasonable” in the sense of practicable for the [appellant] on return to be confined to Kabul taking account of the risk of serious harm accepted as occurring outside Kabul.
Decision
Reasons for decision
This ground cannot succeed.CONCLUSION The appeal must be dismissed with costs.