CRG16 v Minister for Immigration - [2018] FCCA 2842

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CRG16 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR

[2018] FCCA 2842

Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Immigration Assessment Authority – application for a Safe Haven Enterprise visa – whether the Authority failed to have a real and genuine engagement with the applicant’s submissions – whether the Authority’s findings where procedurally unfair – whether the Authority failed to exercise its power under s.473DC of the Act – whether the Authority misapplied the test for complementary protection – whether the Authority failed to give proper consideration to the applicant’s circumstances – no jurisdictional error made out – further amended application dismissed.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.5H, 5J, 36, 473CB, 473DC, 473DD, 473DE, 476

Cases cited:

BOS15 v Minister for Immigration [2017] FCCA 745

Applicant:

CRG16

First Respondent:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

Second Respondent:

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

File Number:

PEG 423 of 2016

Judgment of:

Judge Street

Hearing date:

1 August 2018

Date of Last Submission:

1 August 2018

Delivered at:

Perth

Delivered on:

1 August 2018

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant:

Mr R Lindsey

Solicitors for the Applicant:

Cathal Smith Legal Pty Ltd

Counsel for the Respondents:

Mr P Hannan

Solicitors for the Respondents:

Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

Grant leave to the applicant to rely upon further amended application filed on 29 June 2017.
The reference to the name of the applicant by counsel on behalf of the applicant is one which is not to be recorded and there is not to be any publication of the applicant’s name.
The further amended application is dismissed.
The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the amount of $7,328.00.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT PERTH

PEG 423 of 2016

CRG16

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Background

This is an application for a Constitutional writ within the Court’s jurisdiction under s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) in respect of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (“the Authority”) under Part 7AA of the Act made on 23 August 2016 affirming a decision of the delegate not to grant the applicant a Safe Haven Enterprise visa.
The applicant was found to be a citizen of Afghanistan and his claims were assessed against that country. The applicant was found to be a Hazara and a Shia Muslim from a particular province.
On 13 July 2016, the delegate found the applicant failed to meet the criteria for the grant of a Safe Haven Enterprise visa. The delegate found that it was reasonable for the applicant to relocate to Kabul and did not accept the applicant’s claimed fear of harm by the Taliban, Kuchis, Sunni militant groups and/or Daesh if he returns to Afghanistan because he is Hazara, because he is a Shia, because his family lost their land, and/or he lived in Australia and would be considered an infidel or have a pro-western political opinion.

The Authority

On 15 July 2016, the Authority wrote to the applicant informing the applicant that the application for the visa had been referred to the Authority for review. The letter explained that there were limited circumstances in which the Authority could consider new information. The letter provided an attached fact sheet and practice direction giving the applicant an opportunity to provide new information and submissions. Submissions were provided to the Authority together with new information dated 30 July 2016, which were expressly referred to by the Authority in the Authority’s reasons.
The Authority referred to new country information in respect of an attack on Hazaras in Kabul in July 2016. The Authority identified the same as being new information and it was satisfied there were exceptional circumstances to justify having regard to that new information. The Authority identified the background to the visa and had regard to the material referred by the Secretary under s 473CB of the Act. The Authority summarised the applicant’s claims and evidence and set out the relevant law.
The Authority accepted the applicant’s claims that in 2012 his family farm and home were burnt down, and accepted that his family then relocated to Kabul where his parents and siblings still reside. The Authority found that the family sold their livestock and abandoned their family farm. The Authority found that the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution in his home region and, consistent with the statutory regime, turned to consider whether the applicant has a real chance of persecution throughout all areas of Afghanistan and in particular, Kabul.
The Authority referred to the applicant’s claim it was not safe to return to Kabul because of attacks by the Taliban. The Authority referred to the applicant’s claim that two friends from his neighbourhood were killed in a suicide attack in 2012 in a Mosque, together with three of their cousins. The Authority found that it was unable to locate any country information to support the bomb attack on a mosque in Kabul. The Authority found that the submission to the Authority did not address the inconsistency in the applicant’s claims or include any supporting country information. It was in those circumstances that the Authority found the applicant had fabricated the claim that he attended a mosque in 2012 at which there was a bomb blast. Accordingly, the Authority rejected the applicant’s claim that friends of his died in such an attack.
The Authority found that the applicant’s interview at the Safe Haven Enterprise interview contained multiple instances of exaggeration, such that he would be killed by the Taliban or Daesh fighters as soon as they see him, or that he would be considered a spy or an infidel because he has lived in Australia. The Authority also considered the applicant exaggerated the assertion that all police in Afghanistan are Pashtun and will not protect Hazaras.
The Authority referred to the submissions containing new information in respect of the suicide bomb attack in Kabul in July 2016 by Daesh on a protest by Hazaras against a government decision. The Authority referred to the death toll. The Authority found, as at the date of the Authority’s decision, the evidence before the Authority is that there are no reports of any additional targeting of Hazaras or Shias in Afghanistan by Daesh. The Authority referred to the applicant’s submission, including the reports of Daesh killing Hazaras in two incidents in November 2015. The Authority referred to an assertion that Daesh are opposed to Shias and target them for harm. The Authority concluded that these reports demonstrate Daesh has conducted one-off attacks. The Authority was not satisfied these attacks mean Hazaras or Shias face a real chance of serious harm from Daesh throughout Afghanistan or in Kabul.
The Authority further referred to and engaged with the country information provided in the submissions on behalf of the applicant. The Authority referred to the submission in relation to the proposition that the applicant will face a real chance of persecution in Kabul and that he has not lived in Kabul, and that he lacks a social network. The Authority was not persuaded by that submission.
The Authority found it overlooks that the applicant’s family are residing in Kabul and that he will have the benefit of their networks and knowledge acquired since they have lived there, commencing in July 2012. The Authority referred to the evidence that the applicant’s parents and siblings have been living in Kabul since July 2012. The Authority referred to the applicant informing the delegate that his father is working in a shop and that he thought his siblings were attending school. The Authority was not satisfied the loss of the family farm means the applicant will face a real chance of serious harm if the applicant is living in Kabul. The Authority was not satisfied on the evidence that the applicant would face a real chance of serious harm from Kuchis if the applicant is living in Kabul.
The Authority referred to country information. On the basis of the evidence before the Authority, the Authority was not satisfied the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution from the Taliban or Daesh or Sunni extremists for any of the reasons in s 5J(1)(a) of the Act now or in the reasonably foreseeable future if he returns to Kabul.
The Authority found the applicant does not meet the requirements of the definition of “refugee” in s 5H(1) of the Act. The Authority found the application does not meet the criteria under s 36(2)(a) of the Act.
The Authority then turned to the requirements of complementary protection and set out the relevant law. The Authority expressly referred in that regard to s 36(2B) of the Act as well as s 36(2A) of the Act. The Authority referred to the finding that the applicant did not face a real chance of serious harm in Kabul and said for the same reasons, the Authority was not satisfied the applicant faces a real chance of significant harm Kabul.
The Authority identified that the Authority had to then consider whether it would be reasonable for the applicant to relocate to Kabul, in considering whether there was a real risk of the applicant suffering significant harm. The Authority referred to the evidence in respect to the applicant’s family all living in Kabul in a home in a particular neighbourhood. The Authority referred to the father working and the applicant believing his siblings were attending school.
The Authority expressly referred to the delegate asking the applicant what had happened to his family since they relocated, and the applicant only referred to the death of his friends in the bomb blast, which the Authority had rejected as not being credible. The Authority referred to DFAT reports and UNHCR country information regarding the conditions in Kabul for returnees in relation to access to accommodation, essential services and employment opportunities. It was in that context that the Authority identified being mindful of the fact that the applicant had spent part of his childhood in Kabul and that he has a place to live in that city with his family members.
It was in those circumstances that the Authority took into account the applicant’s young age, that he had been receiving education in Australia and has shown himself to be resourceful in adapting to life here. The Authority also placed weight on the advice of UNHCR in relation to relocation, in respect of those without support networks where the returnee is a single male of working age. It was in those circumstances the Authority referred to having regard to the applicant’s personal circumstances and found it is reasonable for the applicant to relocate to Kabul for the purposes of s 36(2B) of the Act.
The Authority found there are not substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being returned from Australia to Afghanistan, there is a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm. The Authority found the applicant did not meet the criteria under s 36(2)(aa) of the Act and affirmed the decision under review.

Before this Court

Mr Lindsry of counsel on behalf of the applicant seeks to read an affidavit annexing country information that was not before the Authority. The country information is sought to be admitted for the purpose of establishing jurisdictional error. Jurisdictional error cannot be established in relation to material that was not before the Authority in relation to the merits of the matter. The affidavit, on its face, is irrelevant. For that reason the affidavit is rejected.
The grounds in the further amended application are as follows:
Ground Four – misunderstanding import of new evidence accepted
4.1 The IAA Assessor (the Assessor) correctly stated the IAA’s submission contained new information about a suicide bomb attack in Kabul in July 2016 that targeted Hazaras, resulting in 80 deaths and 230 injuries, and that this new information constituted exceptional circumstances unknown to the Delegate thus allowing the assessor to consider it;
4.2 The Delegate of the Minister (the Delegate) had acknowledged that the security situation in Kabul had “clearly deteriorated” but that nonetheless he considered, based on September 2015 DFAT and February 2016 DFAT thematic reports, the Applicant as a Hazara did not fall within the risk profile of an ethnic and religious minority who would be at risk if relocated to the relative safety of Kabul (Delegate Reasons: paragraph 86, 89 and 90);
4.3 The July 2016 attack specifically targeted ordinary Hazaras in Kabul, such as the Applicant, and made unsustainable the Delegate’s earlier reliance upon the DFAT reports that the deteriorating security situation in Kabul did not show insurgent attacks were targeted specifically against ordinary Hazaras;
4.4 The Assessor ignored and failed to recognise that this new evidence showed that the July 2016 attack on Hazaras completely undermined the earlier finding of the Delegate based on the DFAT reports that Hazaras, such as the Applicant, would not be at risk of serious harm in Kabul from Daesh. Having ignored the centrality of this additional evidence to the Delegate’s adverse finding the Assessor merely concluded this new evidence demonstrated Daesh have conducted “one off” attacks and that there was no evidence Hazaras or Shias such as the Applicant face a real chance of serious harm in Kabul (paragraph 17 of the Assessor’s Reasons).
4.5 The Assessor committed jurisdictional error in that:
a) he did not ask himself the correct legal question in the light of the new evidence presented to him which was whether the July 2016 attack undermined the earlier DFAT reports and basis of the Delegate’s earlier adverse finding;
b) he did not address the specific nature of the claim and therefore failed to discharge his statutory duty. Notwithstanding the July 2016 bomb blast targeted specifically ordinary Hazaras, and the acknowledged level of insecurity caused by attacks from anti-Government entities, he wrongly attributes these attaches as non-discriminatory as only faced by the population at large (paragraph 20 of the Assessor’s Reasons);
Ground Five – Erroneous finding that this was a “one-off” attack
5.1 The Assessor concluded that the DFAT reports demonstrated Daesh have conducted “one-off” attacks and that at the date of his decision there was no evidence of additional targeting of Hazaras or Shias such that they would face a chance of serious harm in Kabul (paragraph 17 of the Assessor’s Reasons).
5.2 The attack upon Hazaras in July 2016 occurred within one month of the Delegate’s decision and in the context of a Kabul security setting that the Delegate had found “was deteriorating”. Further, there was no evidence to support a conclusion that based on the reports available to the Assessor this would be a “one-off” attack against Hazaras such as the Applicant.
5.3 The Applicant seeks leave to adduce evidence contained in the Affidavit of Daniela Anne Marie Ion that since the decision made by the Assessor on 23 August 2016, that there have been further reliable reports which show that this was not a “one-off” attack and the Assessor was wrong to decide therefore that there was not a real chance of serious harm to the Applicant.
5.4 The Assessor committed jurisdictional error in that:
(a) the country information did not support a conclusion that there was not a real chance of serious harm against Hazaras such as the Applicant by Daesch;
(b) the reports referred to in the Affidavit of Daniela Anne Maria Ion relating to country information subsequent to the decision proves that this was not an isolated “one-off” attack;
(c) there was no intelligible justification, even on the information then available to the delegate and Assessor, for the Assessor to conclude this would be a “one off” attack. The delegate had correctly referred to “numerous incidents” and to a “deteriorating situation” in Kabul.
(d) that it was procedurally unfair for the Assessor to conclude that the July 2016 attack was likely to be a “one-off” attack without giving the Applicant an opportunity to refute what comprised a reason for making the adverse determination.
Ground Six – not putting credibility finding to Applicant
6.1 The Assessor said that the Applicant, when asked by the Delegate whether anything had happened to his family since they relocated to Kabul, the Applicant referred only to the death of friends in a Muharram bomb blast “which I rejected the above as not being credible” (IAA: paragraph 27). The Assessor considered the Applicant “fabricated the claim” that during Muharram in 2012 that he attended a Mosque when friends were killed (paragraph 16). The Applicant did say he believed it was during Muharram in 2012 the friends were killed, but did not say he was present and attended the Mosque where this occurred.
6.2 The Delegate found that “when [the applicant] was living in Kabul in October 2012, some of his friends experienced an explosion in a mosque, however I have been unable to locate any country information that supports this claim… in light of this lack of supporting information as to the scale of any such attack, I give more weight to the DFAT information which states there is no evidence that Hazaras have been systematically targeted…” (paragraph 91). No adverse finding as to credibility was made by the Delegate against the Applicant.
6.3 Conversely, the Assessor found the evidence given by the Applicant to the Delegate was not credible and was “fabricated” without first inviting the Applicant to give any evidence about the matters in 3.1 and 3.2.
6.4 Had the Assessor invited the Applicant to give evidence, the Applicant would have explained:
(a) as stated in the Affidavit of Daniela Ion that his calculated dates were based on the Persian calendar; that he could name the two friends killed; that he has checked on line and there was in fact a Mosque bombing in December 2011 which covered the Muharram period;
(b) he had told the Delegate that ordinary people get attacked here, not the Government authorities, and also there is a lot of suicide bomb attacks against Shia people in mosques and that sort of thing” (page 16, transcript line 510-530). That this is now supported by verifiable recent events.
6.5 The Assessor therefore failed to extend procedural fairness to the Applicant and thereby committed jurisdictional error.
Ground Seven - Misapplication of test for complementary protection
7.1 The Assessor fell into jurisdictional error by misconstruing or misapplying the test for complementary protection and or failing to ask himself the correct legal question.
7.2 The Applicant claimed to be at real risk of suffering significant harm throughout Afghanistan and thus to be a person to whom Australia owes complementary protection obligations (CB 205, [22]). The Applicant also claimed to be owed protection obligations as a refugee (CB 205, [21]).
7.3 The Assessor found that the Applicant, as a Hazara did not have a well-founded fear of serious harm and for a Convention reason in Kabul, and thus was not a person to whom Australia owed protection obligations as a refugee, even though there is a level of general insecurity in Kabul due to attacks “but consider these threats are faced by the population at large” (CB 217-8, [20]-[21]).
7.4 In coming to his conclusion about the Applicant’s refugee status, the Assessor cited country information detailing a suicide bomb attack in Kabul (CB 217, [17]) and threats to the population generally from anti-government elements such as the Taliban and Daesh (CB 217, [20]).
7.5 The Assessor then found that the Applicant was not owed complementary protection obligations and stated “again for the same reasons and applying the authority in MIAC v SZQRB I am not satisfied that the Applicant faces a real risk of significant harm in Kabul” (CB 218, [26]).
7.6 The Assessor thus fell into jurisdictional error in that:
a) Having recognised that the level of general insecurity in Kabul due to attacks from anti-government entities, including the Taliban and Daesh, is faced by the population generally, he did not then ask himself whether the Applicant was owed complimentary protection because the threats from the Taliban and Daesh also puts him at personal risk so as to negate exclusion under s.36(2B)(c) of the Act (see BOS 15 v Minister for Immigration 2017 FCCA 745 at [29]).
b) The Assessor instead equated his finding that the Applicant would not face a real chance of serious harm in Kabul for a Convention reason with his finding that the Applicant would not face a real risk of significant harm under the complimentary protection head;
c) The Assessor did not make an assessment on the risk of generalised violence in relation to the refugee convention which would foreclose further consideration for the purposes of his assessment of the Applicant’s complementary protection claim (see BOS15 v Min for Immigration [2017] FCCA 745 at [30]).
d) The Assessor had been provided with information of significant and deteriorating conditions in the country information relating to Kabul after the delegate decision. The Applicant also referred to the risk of suicide explosions ‘every day’ in Kabul (p16 transcript of delegate interview). In addition the Applicant himself, provided examples of risk of generalised violence to residents if returned to Kabul (CB- 19) and raised the issue of lack of security, (CB- 88 [20]) where he referred to attacks from Sunni militia, Taliban, ISIS, and stated that Kabul is too dangerous to return.
e) Further the Applicant referred to a ‘personal risk’ being that ‘they say you lived in an infidel country and you might be a spy’ (p17 transcript of interview) and that he would ‘get killed, it’s only a matter of me being seen by a Talib and they would kill me’. He further stated they would kill him because he came from ‘this country they will think I am a spy or something’ and that he feared ISIS as well (p17 transcript of interview). Therefore, the Applicant in addition put forward material to support a real and personal risk to engage a non refoulement obligation against a backdrop of serious human rights violations. Although this material was considered as an ‘exaggeration’ it was only in the context of Convention Grounds or ‘Refugee Assessment’ (CB- 217 [16].
Ground Eight: Failure to ascertain if legal criteria for internal relocation has been met
8.1 The Assessor found that the Applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution from Kuchis for the combined reasons of his race and/or religion if returned to Wardak being his place of origin (paragraph 14 of the Reasons of the ITAA), but he was not satisfied the Applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution for any of the reasons in s.5J(1)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act) if he returns to Kabul (paragraph 20) and he does not meet the definition of refugee in s.5(H)(1) and s.36(2)(a) of the Act.
8.2 In determining the question of relocation to Kabul, the Delegate failed to consider, aside from the risk of serious harm, the appropriate legal criteria as to whether it was reasonable, in the sense of practicable, taking into account the Applicant’s personal circumstances and the situation in Kabul and whether he could now reasonably subsist in Kabul, and instead limited assessment to the existence of a family network in Kabul, and some linguistic and computer skills attributed to the Applicant as gained since his arrival in Australia (paragraphs 104 and 105 of the Delegate’s reasons).
8.3 The Assessor in considering reasonableness of internal relocation referred only to the limited factors set out at paragraphs 19, 27 and 28 of his Reasons.
8.4 The Assessor (and Delegate) erred in that;
(a) country information was ignored which showed: that when the Applicant’s family came to Kabul the city had expanded from 500,000 to nearly 5,000,000 and that large parts of the city are extremely poor and have no sanitation or basic services; the low capacity of government to absorb returned refugees; that the Government was encouraging migrants to Kabul to go back to their areas of origin; rents are high and persons are living in illegal housing; that the migrants had little or no protection against eviction; that it was very difficult for them to obtain a livelihood; and that public services such as water and sanitation were not available (Submission to Delegate of 30 July 2016);
(b) failed to consider whether the Applicant returning from a Western country after six years could gain employment in Kabul with the skills attributed to him by the Assessor;
(c) failed to consider the prospects of the Applicant being able to obtain employment restricted to employment in Kabul taking into account his inability to travel to his original homeland because of recognised unsafe areas, e.g. roadways to Hazarajat.
8.5 The Assessor committed jurisdictional error in that he:
(a) erred in law in failing to consider relevant legal criteria relating to both the Applicant’s personal circumstances and the conditions presently in Kabul (MIPB v SZSCA2014 HCA 45 adopting at [26] and [27] the principles in Januzi v Secretary of State 2006 2AC 426 (5));
(b) ignored the submissions advanced pursuant to the claim as to why the Applicant could not reasonably be relocated to Kabul taking into account the extent of likely economic hardship and the unlikelihood of finding employment in Kabul itself (s.5J(5)(d), (e),(f));
(c) ignored or failed to consider relevant country information about Kabul conditions;
(d) failed to consider how far it would be “reasonable” in the sense of practicable for the Applicant on return to be confined to Kabul taking account of the risk of serious harm accepted as occurring outside Kabul.

Ground 4

In relation to ground 4, Mr Lindsay of counsel took the Court to the Authority’s reasons accepting there were exceptional circumstances to have regard to new country information and to the Authority’s reasons in paragraph 17. Mr Lindsay submitted that the Authority had ignored the new evidence. The Authority’s reasons, as referred to above, clearly identify the Authority having a real and genuine engagement with the submissions advanced by the applicant and taking into account the new information.
Mr Lindsay submitted that the finding by the delegate was not one that was reasonably open in respect of characterising particular attacks as being one-off attacks. It was a matter for the Authority to make findings in relation to the applicant’s claims, taking into account the country information. There is no basis to find that the conclusion was not open to the Authority in respect of finding the attacks to be one-off. That was an inference open to the Authority on the material before the Authority. It cannot be said that no reasonable decision-maker could make such a finding.
Mr Lindsay submitted that the Authority had failed to ask itself the correct question and contended that the Authority, in light of the new evidence, had failed to discharge its duty. The new evidence was expressly referred to by the Authority and there is no basis to find that the Authority misapplied or misunderstood the relevant law. Ground 4 is, in substance, an invitation to this Court to engage in impermissible merits review. No jurisdictional error is made out by ground 4.

Ground 5

Ground 5 is one in respect of which Mr Lindsay sought to advance the argument of legal unreasonableness in respect of the findings concerning the “one-off” attack. For the reasons just given, those findings were open to the Authority and cannot be said to lack an evident and intelligible justification. Ground 5 also reflects, in substance, an invitation to this Court to engage in impermissible merits review. There is no substance in the contention that it was procedurally unfair to make the findings the Authority made. The requirements of procedural fairness, under Part 7AA of the Act, are excluded by the statutory provision, except to the extent that the exercise of the statutory powers must be exercised within the constraints of legal unreasonableness. No jurisdictional error as alleged in ground 5 is made out.

Ground 6

In relation to ground 6, Mr Lindsay contended that as the Authority had made a different factual finding in relation to the bomb blast on the mosque that the applicant alleged that he attended and that it was legally unreasonable for the Authority, as summarised above, to fail to consider exercising its power under s 473DC of the Act. Mr Lindsay also referred to s 473DD and s 473DE of the Act.
This is a case where the applicant was given an opportunity by the Authority to put on new information and submissions. Further, the Authority, in conducting the review, was not constrained by the factual findings made by the delegate. It was open to the Authority, for the reasons given by the Authority, to make a different finding in respect of the applicant’s claim concerning the mosque and the alleged attack on that mosque.
Taking into account the statutory regime under Part 7AA of the Act, the circumstances of the present case are not ones in respect of which it was legally unreasonable of the Authority not to expressly consider exercise of its power under s 473DC of the Act. Further, I take into account that in relation to the submissions, there was no request for the Authority to exercise any such power. The proposition advanced by Mr Lindsay in respect of an assertion of non‑compliance with the requirements of procedural fairness, for the reasons I have already given, has no substance. No jurisdictional error as alleged in ground 6 is made out.

Ground 7

In relation to ground 7, Mr Lindsay submitted that the Authority had failed to apply the correct test in respect of complementary protection. Mr Lindsay in that regard sought to place weight on the decision in BOS15 v Minister for Immigration [2017] FCCA 745. That is a decision that turned on the particular facts and the particular reasons of the ITOA assessment in that case. On the face of the Authority’s reasons as summarised above, the Authority did not misconstrue the criteria under s 36(2)(aa) of the Act.
Mr Lindsay submitted that the Authority had misapplied the test because of the requirements of s 36(2B)(c) of the Act. The Authority expressly referred to that provision. There is no substance in the assertion that the Authority erred by relying upon the findings in respect of the Refugees Convention considerations in relation to the adverse findings made under complementary protection. The Authority was entitled to take into account those findings in considering whether or not there was a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm. No jurisdictional error as alleged in ground 7 is made out.

Ground 8

In relation to ground 8, Mr Lindsay submitted that there had been a failure to consider properly whether it was reasonable for the applicant to relocate to Kabul. Mr Lindsay submitted that the Authority had confined itself to limited circumstances and that the Authority had ignored country information in determining whether it was reasonable for the applicant to relocate.
The Authority’s reasons expressly refer to the personal circumstances of the applicant, and expressly refer to considering country information in relation to accommodation, essential services, and employment opportunities in Kabul. The Authority expressly referred to the applicant’s young age and the applicant’s skills, as well as the applicant having family living in Kabul. The Authority did not confine itself to limited circumstances. The substance of ground 8 is, in substance, an invitation for this Court to engage in impermissible merits review. No jurisdictional error as alleged in ground 8 is made out.

Conclusion

Accordingly, as the further amended application fails to make out any jurisdictional error, the further amended application is dismissed.

I certify that the preceding thirty-two (32) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Street

Date: 5 October 2018