Del16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DEL16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1401

Appeal from: DEL16 v Minister For Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 1062
File number(s): QUD 271 of 2017
Judge(s): DERRINGTON J
Date of judgment: 30 November 2017
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – application for judicial review of application for a Protection (Class XA) Visa –  jurisdictional error – whether Tribunal erred in refusing to grant an adjournment – whether ‘evident and intelligible justification’ for adjournment considered

MIGRATION – application for judicial review of application for a Protection (Class XA) Visa –  jurisdictional error – failure to consider ‘new’ issues arising out of provision of additional information to tribunal – whether additional information raised ‘new issue’ considered

MIGRATION – application for judicial review of application for a Protection (Class XA) Visa –  jurisdictional error – failure to take into account relevant considerations – whether tribunal overlooked material in report considered

Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 425(1)
Cases cited:

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden (2016) 240 FCR 158

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v MZYZA [2013] FCA 572

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v SBAA [2002] FCAFC 195

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323

Minster for Immigration & Citizenship v SZKTI (2009) 238 CLR 489

SZBEL v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152

SZHKA v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship (2008) 172 FCR 1

Date of hearing: 6 November 2017
Registry: Queensland
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 65
Counsel for the Appellant: Ms N Kidson and Mr M Black
Solicitor for the Appellant: Stolar Law Pty Ltd
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr B McGlade
Solicitor for the Respondents: Minter Ellison

ORDERS

QUD 271 of 2017
BETWEEN:

DEL16

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

DERRINGTON J

DATE OF ORDER:

30 NOVEMBER 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the respondents’ costs of the appeal.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

DERRINGTON J:

  1. The appellant appeals from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia which declined to grant judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.  The Tribunal had upheld a decision by the Minister’s delegate to refuse the appellant’s application for a Protection (Class XA) Visa (protection visa).

  2. For the reasons which follow the appeal from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia must be dismissed. 

    Background

  3. On 22 November 2013, the appellant, who is a national of Papua New Guinea (PNG), applied to the Minister for a protection visa.  The substantive ground advanced in support of the application was that if she were returned…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 1401
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Del16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellant, a national of Papua New Guinea, sought judicial review of the Federal Circuit Court's dismissal of her appeal against the Tribunal's decision not to grant a protection visa. The appellant argued that if returned to PNG, she would be at risk of harm due to her ex-husband’s relatives blaming her for his death and accusing her of sorcery. The Tribunal had found her claims to be fabricated and the Federal Circuit Court upheld this decision. The appeal focused on whether the Tribunal erred in refusing to grant an adjournment, failing to consider new issues raised by additional information, and not taking into account relevant considerations.

The court considered whether the Tribunal erred in not granting an adjournment to allow for the submission of a supplementary psychological report. The appellant argued that the additional information raised new issues that necessitated a further hearing. The court noted that the new evidence pertained to issues already before the Tribunal, specifically the nature of harm she would face and her credibility. Thus, the evidence did not raise any new issues and the Tribunal's refusal to grant the adjournment was not a jurisdictional error.

Furthermore, the court examined whether the Tribunal failed to consider relevant information from the psychologist’s and general practitioner’s reports. The Tribunal had considered the appellant's claims of sexual assault and the associated knife wound, finding that these were not mentioned in her initial declarations and were not disclosed to the psychologist. The Tribunal concluded that this undermined the credibility of her claims. The court held that the Tribunal had considered the relevant material and thus, there was no failure to take into account relevant considerations.

Ultimately, the court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the respondents' costs. The Tribunal's decisions were found to be within its jurisdiction and the appellant's claims were appropriately assessed and rejected.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondents’ costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons which follow the appeal from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia must be dismissed. Background On 22 November 2013, the appellant, who is a national of Papua New Guinea (PNG), applied to the Minister for a protection visa. The substantive ground advanced in support of the application was that if she were returned to PNG she would be at risk of harm because, for various reasons, her ex-husband’s wives, children and tribespeople would attempt to kill her. The delegate refused to grant a visa and the appellant sought review by the Tribunal. Before the Tribunal she asserted that she would be harmed on her return to PNG because her ex-husband had died of a stroke in 2013 and her ex-husband’s wives, children and tribespeople considered that she had used sorcery to kill him such that they would seek to exact revenge upon her by killing her. She further asserted that the PNG authorities habitually failed to protect persons accused of sorcery. The Tribunal affirmed the decision of the Minister’s delegate not to grant the protection visa. In an extensive analysis of the facts before it, the Tribunal held that the appellant had fabricated her claims that the other wives of her ex-husband, his children and tribespeople had accused her of sorcery and intend to cause her harm if she were to return. It upheld the delegate’s decision. The Federal Circuit Court dismissed the application to it for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision and the appellant now appeals to this Court. First ground of appeal – refusal to grant an adjournment The appellant applied to the Tribunal for review of the Minister’s decision on 12 March 2015. For reasons which are not disclosed it took approximately one year before the matter came on for hearing. At the hearing on 10 March 2016 it appears that the appellant was unable to complete the hearing as a result of her emotional state with the result that it was adjourned to 30 March 2016. During the course of the hearing on 30 March 2016, it appears that the appellant’s representative considered that all necessary material had not been presented and, upon their request, the Tribunal agreed to receive what were identified as “post-hearing submissions and additional documents”. Some of this additional material was provided on 25 May 2016 and on 27 May 2016. It included a statutory declaration in which the appellant, for the first time, claimed to have been stabbed and raped in an incident in Port Moresby in 2012 which she asserted, was connected to her claim to protection. The material also included a psychological report dated 20 May 2016 as well as a letter from a general practitioner dated 24 May 2016. In submissions dated 27 May 2016, which were forwarded to the Tribunal, the appellant’s migration agent asserted that a supplementary psychological report was being sought in relation to the appellant and that it would be finalised by 3 June 2016. By those submissions the appellant requested that the Tribunal defer making its determination until that report was available. The report was not provided by 3 June 2016. On 8 June 2016 the appellant’s representative sought an additional extension of time for the provision of that supplementary report. The Tribunal was informed that the report “would only be available after 1 July 2016”. No explanation was given for the further delay and the Tribunal refused that request. On 10 June 2016 the appellant’s representative again sought from the Tribunal an extension of time in which to provide the supplementary psychological report. An explanation was provided as to why the psychologist was unable to provide the report prior to 1 July 2016.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The proposition thus advanced by the appellant is that her provision of the additional information gave rise to the above identified issues which, thereupon, imposed upon the Tribunal a requirement to conduct a further hearing in relation to them. It should be said that it was not identified during the course of the hearing what, if any, further material or information the appellant would wish to advance to the Tribunal in respect of those issues. It would seem implicit from the appellant’s submissions that she expected a further hearing so that, if the Tribunal were in doubt as to the information provided it might question her about it. Decision of the Tribunal The question of whether new issues were raised in this case requires a brief consideration of the reasons of the Tribunal. The Tribunal, in its reasons, set out the factual background of the matter and, in particular, identified the foundation of the claim for protection being that the appellant was accused of using sorcery to cause the illness and death of her late, ex-husband and that the authorities declined to provide protection for such persons. The Tribunal noted that the appellant had been in Australia on a number of occasions prior to 2013 when she applied for a protection visa. Her presence in Australia was for unrelated purposes. The Tribunal also noted (at paragraph [6]ff of its reasons) the procedural history of the matter including the adjournment of the hearing and the multiple submissions and additional material provided by the appellant’s migration agents after the second hearing. It also identified its reasons for refusing to grant a further adjournment to permit a further psychological report to be produced (see paragraphs [8] and [9]). It then recorded the migration agent’s submission on behalf of the appellant that the additional material raised “new claims or issues” not discussed with the appellant at the hearing such that an additional hearing before the Tribunal should occur. It also records its rejection of that submission (paragraph [10]). At this point in its reasons the Tribunal records its concerns (paragraphs [12] – [13]) with the variations in the appellant’s claims and the sequential additions to those claims. In relation to this the Tribunal records (at paragraph [26]) that, at the hearing, the appellant’s credibility was in issue and that this was put to her. In particular, questions were raised as to apparent errors which the appellant had made as to when she was assaulted by her ex-husband’s other wives in Mt Hagen or Port Moresby. The Tribunal records the migration agent’s submissions that the appellant was generally consistent and that any inconsistencies can be explained by the psychological report showing that they were a consequence of her mental health. In this respect the Tribunal noted the content of the psychological report of 20 May 2016 (paragraph [28]). The substance of the appellant’s claim to a fear of harm was set out at length by the Tribunal (paragraph [30]ff). In general it was observed that the appellant had lived in a polygamist relationship with her ex-husband who had three other wives. She separated from her erstwhile husband in 2008 because he was violent to her and her children. She then relocated from Mt Hagen to live in Port Moresby. In 2010 her ex-husband had a stroke and was hospitalised. She claimed that when she returned to visit him, his other wives, children, family and tribespeople alleged that she had used sorcery to cause his stroke and they beat her. She claims that they beat her again when she went to visit her ex-husband after he was transferred to hospital in Port Moresby. Her ex-husband died in October 2013. At that time she was in Australia and she claims that she feared harm from her ex-husband’s other wives, children, family and tribespeople because they would blame her for his death.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The evidence submitted by the appellant after the Tribunal hearing went directly to the issues which had been agitated in the course of the hearing, being the nature and extent of the harm to which the appellant was, in fact, subject to from those associated with her ex-husband and the appellant’s lack of credibility. It was additional evidence about those extant issues and it did not, of itself, raise any new issue. Whilst the event in question was new, that is beside the point, the question is whether or not the Tribunal was turning its mind to any “new issue”? In this case there was no “new issue”. It follows that the second ground of appeal must also fail. The third ground of appeal: failure to take into account relevant considerations The foundational basis for this ground of appeal is not entirely clear. It was originally founded upon an allegation of a failure by the Tribunal to take into account relevant considerations or, alternatively, “ignoring relevant material”. When analysed, the gravamen of the complaint is that the Tribunal overlooked important material in the psychologist’s report and a GP’s report which allegedly supported the appellant’s claim to have been sexually assaulted in 2012. As the matter was argued, the jurisdictional foundation of the complaint became one of a constructive failure of the Tribunal to exercise its jurisdiction by reason of its failure to deal with a “claim” advanced by the appellant. Under the heading “Consideration of claims and evidence” in its reasons, and under the further heading “Well-founded fear of persecution”, the Tribunal considered, amongst other things, the alleged threats of harm to which the appellant claimed to be subject. They were identified as threats of harm from the wives, children, family and tribespeople of her ex-husband founded upon their accusations that she had engaged in sorcery to bring about his demise. The Tribunal then compared the assertions in the appellant’s first statutory declaration with those in her second. It noted that the claim that in 2012 the appellant was sexually assaulted and stabbed with a knife when she was living in Port Moresby was not mentioned in the first statutory declaration but was mentioned in the second. The Tribunal identified that the appellant had not spoken to the police about the incident and, prior to the giving of the second statutory declaration, had not told the Tribunal about this matter despite opportunity to do so. At paragraph [36] the Tribunal identified that the incident did not appear in the psychological report which had been submitted after the hearing. It is necessary to set that paragraph out in full. It reads as follows:36. In the psychological report, the psychologists set out the applicant's self-reported history of the violence she has suffered in the past. The report does not refer to the applicant stating she was a victim of sexual assault and that she suffered a knife wound in 2012. It does state the applicant reported one of Mr T's other wives attacked her with a knife, but does not give a reference date. The Tribunal notes the second statutory declaration is dated after the date of the psychological report. In her second statutory declaration the applicant states she has only told her mother and the migration agent about her being a victim of sexual assault. She does not state she told the psychologists about those claims. On the basis of the evidence before it, the Tribunal infers the applicant did not disclose her claims regarding being a victim of a sexual assault to her psychologists. In the view of the Tribunal, that weighs heavily against the credibility of the applicant's claims she was a victim of a sexual assault and suffered a stab wound during that assault in 2012. The Tribunal refers to this in more detail below.