Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia
(DIVISION 2)
DEE17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 989
File number: SYG 2226 of 2017 Judgment of: JUDGE KENDALL Date of judgment: 29 November 2022 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Safe Haven Enterprise visa – decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority – whether the IAA’s decision was affected by legal unreasonableness – whether the IAA overlooked a claim made by the applicant in his arrival interview – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed. Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5H, 5J, 46A, 476 Cases cited: CRU18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 129
Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSRS [2014] FCAFC 16
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3
MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2021] HCA 17
NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 82 Date of hearing: 24 August 2022 Place: Perth Counsel for the Applicant: Mr D Godwin Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T Reilly Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs Solicitor for the Respondents: Mills Oakley
Table of Corrections 30 November 2022 In paragraphs 2 and 76, the name referenced in line 2 of the paragraph extracted from the applicant’s arrival interview record has been redacted pursuant to s 91X of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). ORDERS
SYG 2226 of 2017 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: DEE17
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
order made by:
JUDGE KENDALL
DATE OF ORDER:
29 NOVEMBER 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application (as amended on 10 August 2022) be dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(AS CORRECTED)JUDGE KENDALL:
Background
The applicant is a citizen of Iraq (Court Book (“CB”) 4). He arrived in Australia in June 2013 as an unauthorised maritime arrival (CB 53).
On 13 July 2013, the applicant took part in an “arrival interview” with an officer from the then Department of Immigration (the “Department”) (CB 2-26). During that interview,…
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- Case
- [2022] FedCFamC2G 989
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the arguments made by both parties. The applicant contended that the IAA's reliance on the UK Upper Tribunal decision was legally unreasonable because it pertained to a different location and did not consider security personnel. The Minister argued that the decision was not legally unreasonable as reasonable minds could differ on the relevance of the UK Upper Tribunal decision to the applicant's situation. The court found that the IAA's conclusion that the applicant did not face harm from Shia militia groups in Basra was supported by the country information it cited. The court held that the IAA's comments about the UK Upper Tribunal decision were of little relevance to this conclusion and that even if they were legally unreasonable, it would not be enough to show that the IAA's ultimate decision was legally unreasonable.
The court dismissed the application for judicial review, finding that the IAA's decision was not legally unreasonable. The court noted that the applicant had to prove legal unreasonableness on the balance of probabilities, which the applicant had not done. The court concluded that the IAA's decision was supported by the country information it cited and that reasonable minds could differ on the relevance of the UK Upper Tribunal decision to the applicant's situation. The court found no error in the IAA's decision and dismissed the application for judicial review.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The material before the Court thus includes an amended application and written submissions filed on behalf of the applicant on 10 August 2022, a Court Book numbering 194 pages (marked as Exhibit 1), the UK Upper Tribunal decision (marked as Exhibit 2) and written submissions filed on behalf of the Minister on 22 August 2022.ConsiderationGround 1 As noted above, ground 1 provides:1. The decision of the second respondent was affected by legal unreasonableness.ParticularsThe second respondent’s reliance upon the conclusions in the United Kingdom: Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) “BA (Returns to Baghdad) Iraq CG” 23 January 2017 was perverse as that decision was specifically confined to non- security personnel employed by foreign companies in Baghdad – whereas the applicant was a security guard in Basra.Applicant’s submissions In written submissions (filed in this Court on 10 August 2022 at [12]-[14]), the following submissions were made on behalf of the applicant in relation to ground 1:(a)the choice of country information and the weight given to that information is a matter for the IAA. However, the weight given to country information is subject to the principles of legal unreasonableness: NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 (“NAHI”) at [11];(b)the IAA’s reliance on the UK Upper Tribunal decision over the DFAT assessment (which indicated that there was a moderate risk) on the basis that it was “more detailed and specific” was “perverse” because the UK Upper Tribunal decision related to Baghdad only and persons working in non-security roles (thus excluding the applicant);(c)it is “perverse” to use a country report where the “personal attributes and location being assessed are explicitly excluded from being assessed by that report; and(d)the applicant’s advisor made reference to the report to support the proposition that security personnel were considered to be in a different category to other workers linked to foreign companies. In oral submissions before the Court, Mr Godwin essentially reiterated the submissions above and took the Court through various passages from the IAA’s written reasons and from the UK Upper Tribunal decision.Minister’s submissions In written submissions (filed in this Court on 22 August 2022), the following submissions were made on behalf of the Minister (at [20]-[21]):(a)the IAA acknowledged that the decision did not consider evidence about persons who had worked in a security setting. Having done so, it was not legally unreasonable for it to nevertheless consider the decision of some relevance as indicating that persons perceived as having collaborated with foreign organisations were most at risk in areas controlled by Sunni insurgent groups (which did not include the southern provinces);(b)reasonable minds could differ about whether country information expressly not considering evidence about persons who worked in a security setting, but containing statements about persons perceived as having collaborated with foreign coalition forces, could be relevant to the applicant’s situation, so no legal unreasonableness in the IAA referring to the UK Upper Tribunal decision is demonstrated: Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 (“SZMDS”) at [130]-[131].(c)the IAA’s conclusion that the applicant did not face harm from Shia militia groups in Basra (set out at [24]) is not legally unreasonable because it is supported by the country information that the IAA cites (at [19] of its reason);(d)the IAA’s comments about the UK Upper Tribunal decision (at [23] in its reasons) are of little relevance to this conclusion, and even if they were considered legally unreasonable, this would not be enough to show that the IAA’s conclusion (at [24] in its written reasons) was legally unreasonable given it is supported by the country information the IAA cites (at [19] in its reasons): CRU18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 129 (“CRU18”) at [36]; and(e)it cannot be said that the IAA’s ultimate decision is legally unreasonable as the applicant must prove: Tsvetnenko v USA (2019) 269 FCR 225 at [85]; MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2021] HCA 17 at [33].