BLR17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BLR17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 2167

Appeal from: BLR17 & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2019] FCCA 1352
File number: VID 676 of 2019
Judge: MURPHY J
Date of judgment: 14 November 2019
Date of publication of reasons: 20 December 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court dismissing application for review of Immigration Assessment Authority’s decision not to grant appellants a protection visa – whether the Authority erred in considering whether there was a real chance that the first appellant would face persecution in the future as a result of his political opinion – where the Authority only considered the first appellant’s past political activities and not political activities in which he may engage in the future – whether the Authority correctly applied section 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) in refusing to consider new information – whether the Authority adopted an unduly narrow definition of exceptional circumstances – appeal allowed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Cases cited:

AQU17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 111; (2018) 162 ALD 442

BVZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 958; (2017) 254 FCR 221

BYA17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 44;(2019) 163 ALD 483

CAQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 203

CVS16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 951

ETA067 v The Republic of Nauru [2018] HCA 46; (2018) 360 ALR 228

Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 34

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 [2017] FCAFC 176; (2017) 257 FCR 111

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; 185 CLR 259

Minister for Immigration v CQW17 [2018] FCAFC 110; (2018) 162 ALD 427

NABE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263; (2004) 144 FCR 1

NAHI v Minister for Immigrationand Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10

S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 71; (2003) 216 CLR 473

Taulahi v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 177; (2016) 246 FCR 146

Tickner v Chapman [1995] FCA 1726; (1995) 57 FCR 451

Date of hearing: 14 November 2019
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 66
Counsel for the Appellants: Mr M Kenneally
Solicitor for the Appellants: Victoria Legal Aid
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms N Campbell
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice

ORDERS

VID 676 of 2019
BETWEEN:

BLR17

First Appellant

BMD17

Second Appellant

BME17 (and another named in the Schedule)

Third Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MURPHY J

DATE OF ORDER:

14 NOVEMBER…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 2167
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in BLR17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved a challenge by the appellants against the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) not to grant them protection visas. The first appellant, an Iranian citizen, claimed that if returned to Iran, he faced persecution due to his anti-Iranian government political beliefs. The appeal focused on whether the IAA erred in its assessment of the risk of future persecution by only considering the first appellant's past political activities, and not any future political expression. The appellants also argued that the IAA incorrectly applied section 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and adopted an unduly narrow definition of exceptional circumstances in refusing to consider new information.

The court considered whether the IAA correctly assessed the risk of future persecution based on the first appellant's political beliefs. The appellants contended that the IAA's focus on past political activities limited its assessment and failed to consider potential future risks. The court examined the IAA's reasons and concluded that the IAA had indeed considered the first appellant's political opinion but did not sufficiently address the risk of future persecution. The court also assessed whether the IAA's refusal to consider new information was justified and whether its definition of exceptional circumstances was too narrow.

The court found that the IAA had erred in its assessment by not considering the first appellant's potential future political activities. The court held that the IAA's decision was flawed because it did not adequately address the risk of future persecution based on the first appellant's political beliefs. The court also found that the IAA had incorrectly applied section 473DD and adopted an unduly narrow definition of exceptional circumstances. Consequently, the court allowed the appeal, quashed the IAA's decision, and remitted the matter to the IAA for reconsideration according to law. The court further ordered the Minister to pay the appellants' costs of the appeal and the proceeding below.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The Appellant be granted leave to file an amended notice of appeal.

2. The appeal be allowed.

3. The orders of the Federal Circuit Court made on 24 May 2019 be set aside and in lieu thereof:

(a) a writ of certiorari issue quashing the decision of the Second Respondent; and

(b) a writ of mandamus issue, remitting the matter to the Second Respondent and requiring it to determine the matter according to law.

4. The First Respondent pay the Appellants’ costs of the appeal and the proceeding below.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons I now explain, I made orders on the day of the hearing to allow the appeal and for the Minister to pay the appellants’ costs. THE FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The first appellant is an Iranian citizen who arrived in Australia by boat with his family, without visas, in November 2012. Each of the appellants was therefore an “unauthorised maritime arrival” under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act). On 13 July 2015 the Minister invited the appellants to apply for a Temporary Protection Visa or a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa (protection visa). The appellants applied for a protection visa on 7 August 2015, and the appellants set out their claims for protection in a statement by the first appellant and written submissions by their migration agent attached to the visa application. Relevantly to the appeal, the first appellant’s claims included that, if returned to Iran, there is a real chance that he will face persecution by the Iranian authorities because of his anti-Iranian government political beliefs. That claim can be seen in the first appellant’s statement and written submissions. In his statement the first appellant said: I was against [President Ahmadinejad’s] election and policies and refused to have his picture on my taxi. I was particularly against his regime as I believe they were corrupt and have destroyed Iran beyond repair. They were dictators who did not allow freedom of thought, speech or choice in Iran in any respect. The written submissions said:The applicant instructs that his opinions in this respect are seen as a betrayal of the Islamic regime and his occupation, in which is expected to be a supporter and advocate for the government and their policies.And also that:…the applicant’s views are of a kind likely to expose him to persecution if removed to Iran. The Department must have regard to the nature of the applicant’s views, not merely the ways in which he has expressed them. The applicant instructs that he opposes the oppression and corruption that is endemic in the Iranian government and their affiliated groups, and in particular, the way in which the Iranian regime restricts freedom of expression and religion.We contend that the risks faced by the applicant cannot be assessed upon the implicit premise that the applicant could remain silent or lie about his political views… A delegate of the Minister interviewed the first appellant on 22 and 28 September 2015. On 16 September 2016 the delegate decided to refuse to grant the first appellant a protection visa. The appellants were “fast track applicants” under the Act. Pursuant to Pt 7AA of the Act the delegate’s decision was a “fast track reviewable decision”, and it was therefore referred to the Authority for review. On 10 March 2017 the Authority decided to affirm the delegate’s decision not to grant the appellants protection visas. On 6 April 2017 the appellants filed an application for judicial review in the Federal Circuit Court. The Court made orders dismissing the application on 24 May 2019: BLR17 & Ors v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2019] FCCA 1352. THE APPEAL TO THIS COURT

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ground two is established.CONCLUSION I have made orders allowing the appeal and setting aside the orders of the Federal Circuit Court. In lieu thereof I made orders for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the decision of the Authority and a writ of mandamus issue to remit the application to the Authority to be determined according to law. I also made orders for the Minister to pay the appellants’ cost of the appeal and the proceeding below.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The primary judge did not accept that submission. Her Honour said the following (at [26]-[29]) and dismissed this ground:[26]After considering the applicant’s husband’s evidence throughout the protection visa process in relation to his claims, including inconsistencies in the applicant’s evidence and the circumstances in which the applicant’s wife was issued with her passport in 2012, the IAA concluded:For these reasons, I consider the applicant’s do not face a real chance of harm from Iranian authorities due to the applicant husband’s refusal to put Ahmadinejad pasters on his taxi, from any claimed links to Christian taxi passengers or purported Christian in Iran or perceived anti-Islamic behaviour. [27]A fair reading of the IAA’s reasons, when read in context and in their entirety in the sense required by the reasoning in Wu Shan Liang reveals that the IAA concluded that the applicant did not face a real chance of harm based on a prospective assessment of whether the applicant would face such harm in the foreseeable future. [28]I find that the IAA did give consideration to whether the first applicant faced a fear of harm based on his political opinion in the foreseeable future. It is not unreasonable for an assessment of foreseeable risk to be conducted against the background of what has occurred in the past.[29]For completeness, to the extent that the applicant seeks to draw a distinction between the applicant’s political conduct as distinct from his political views in this ground, this is, in my view, a distinction without a difference. It is clear that the IAA accepted that the first applicant refused to put up the poster in his taxi in 2009. That and any other claimed political action is a mere manifestation of an underlying political opinion which drives such action. To the extent that the IAA considered whether the first applicant faces a reasonable chance of harm in the future arising from his political actions, that in turn implicitly also covers his underlying political opinion. Consideration It is uncontentious that the Authority gave consideration to whether on return to Iran the first appellant will face a real chance of persecution because of his past political activities, including his refusal to carry posters of President Ahmadinejad in his taxi. It is plain from its reasons that the Authority found that the first appellant’s political activities in Iran were not such that he would be imputed by the Iranian authorities with having an anti-regime political opinion and there was therefore not a real chance that he would face persecution. The appellants accepted that it was open to the Tribunal to so find. The appellants submitted, however, that the Authority erred by failing to consider whether on return to Iran there was a real chance that the first appellant will face persecution as a result of any future public expression of his political beliefs. They submitted that the Authority’s reasons show that it focused only on whether the first appellant would have an adverse profile with the Iranian authorities because of his past political activities.