FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BLR17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 2167
Appeal from: BLR17 & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2019] FCCA 1352 File number: VID 676 of 2019 Judge: MURPHY J Date of judgment: 14 November 2019 Date of publication of reasons: 20 December 2019 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court dismissing application for review of Immigration Assessment Authority’s decision not to grant appellants a protection visa – whether the Authority erred in considering whether there was a real chance that the first appellant would face persecution in the future as a result of his political opinion – where the Authority only considered the first appellant’s past political activities and not political activities in which he may engage in the future – whether the Authority correctly applied section 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) in refusing to consider new information – whether the Authority adopted an unduly narrow definition of exceptional circumstances – appeal allowed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Cases cited: AQU17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 111; (2018) 162 ALD 442
BVZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 958; (2017) 254 FCR 221
BYA17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 44;(2019) 163 ALD 483
CAQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 203
CVS16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 951
ETA067 v The Republic of Nauru [2018] HCA 46; (2018) 360 ALR 228
Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 34
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 [2017] FCAFC 176; (2017) 257 FCR 111
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; 185 CLR 259
Minister for Immigration v CQW17 [2018] FCAFC 110; (2018) 162 ALD 427
NABE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263; (2004) 144 FCR 1
NAHI v Minister for Immigrationand Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10
S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 71; (2003) 216 CLR 473
Taulahi v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 177; (2016) 246 FCR 146
Date of hearing: 14 November 2019 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 66 Counsel for the Appellants: Mr M Kenneally Solicitor for the Appellants: Victoria Legal Aid Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms N Campbell Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice ORDERS
VID 676 of 2019 BETWEEN: BLR17
First Appellant
BMD17
Second Appellant
BME17 (and another named in the Schedule)
Third Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
MURPHY J
DATE OF ORDER:
14 NOVEMBER…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 2167
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered whether the IAA correctly assessed the risk of future persecution based on the first appellant's political beliefs. The appellants contended that the IAA's focus on past political activities limited its assessment and failed to consider potential future risks. The court examined the IAA's reasons and concluded that the IAA had indeed considered the first appellant's political opinion but did not sufficiently address the risk of future persecution. The court also assessed whether the IAA's refusal to consider new information was justified and whether its definition of exceptional circumstances was too narrow.
The court found that the IAA had erred in its assessment by not considering the first appellant's potential future political activities. The court held that the IAA's decision was flawed because it did not adequately address the risk of future persecution based on the first appellant's political beliefs. The court also found that the IAA had incorrectly applied section 473DD and adopted an unduly narrow definition of exceptional circumstances. Consequently, the court allowed the appeal, quashed the IAA's decision, and remitted the matter to the IAA for reconsideration according to law. The court further ordered the Minister to pay the appellants' costs of the appeal and the proceeding below.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The Appellant be granted leave to file an amended notice of appeal.
2. The appeal be allowed.
3. The orders of the Federal Circuit Court made on 24 May 2019 be set aside and in lieu thereof:
(a) a writ of certiorari issue quashing the decision of the Second Respondent; and
(b) a writ of mandamus issue, remitting the matter to the Second Respondent and requiring it to determine the matter according to law.
4. The First Respondent pay the Appellants’ costs of the appeal and the proceeding below.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The primary judge did not accept that submission. Her Honour said the following (at [26]-[29]) and dismissed this ground:[26]After considering the applicant’s husband’s evidence throughout the protection visa process in relation to his claims, including inconsistencies in the applicant’s evidence and the circumstances in which the applicant’s wife was issued with her passport in 2012, the IAA concluded:For these reasons, I consider the applicant’s do not face a real chance of harm from Iranian authorities due to the applicant husband’s refusal to put Ahmadinejad pasters on his taxi, from any claimed links to Christian taxi passengers or purported Christian in Iran or perceived anti-Islamic behaviour. [27]A fair reading of the IAA’s reasons, when read in context and in their entirety in the sense required by the reasoning in Wu Shan Liang reveals that the IAA concluded that the applicant did not face a real chance of harm based on a prospective assessment of whether the applicant would face such harm in the foreseeable future. [28]I find that the IAA did give consideration to whether the first applicant faced a fear of harm based on his political opinion in the foreseeable future. It is not unreasonable for an assessment of foreseeable risk to be conducted against the background of what has occurred in the past.[29]For completeness, to the extent that the applicant seeks to draw a distinction between the applicant’s political conduct as distinct from his political views in this ground, this is, in my view, a distinction without a difference. It is clear that the IAA accepted that the first applicant refused to put up the poster in his taxi in 2009. That and any other claimed political action is a mere manifestation of an underlying political opinion which drives such action. To the extent that the IAA considered whether the first applicant faces a reasonable chance of harm in the future arising from his political actions, that in turn implicitly also covers his underlying political opinion. Consideration It is uncontentious that the Authority gave consideration to whether on return to Iran the first appellant will face a real chance of persecution because of his past political activities, including his refusal to carry posters of President Ahmadinejad in his taxi. It is plain from its reasons that the Authority found that the first appellant’s political activities in Iran were not such that he would be imputed by the Iranian authorities with having an anti-regime political opinion and there was therefore not a real chance that he would face persecution. The appellants accepted that it was open to the Tribunal to so find. The appellants submitted, however, that the Authority erred by failing to consider whether on return to Iran there was a real chance that the first appellant will face persecution as a result of any future public expression of his political beliefs. They submitted that the Authority’s reasons show that it focused only on whether the first appellant would have an adverse profile with the Iranian authorities because of his past political activities.