FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Basra v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 422
Appeal from: Basra v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 322 FLR 228; [2017] FCCA 1302 File number: VID 748 of 2017 Judge: MOSHINSKY J Date of judgment: 29 March 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – partner visa – where applicant applied in a single application for both a temporary partner visa (Subclass 820 visa) and a residence partner visa (Subclass 801 visa) – where a delegate (the first delegate) refused the application – where the Tribunal (the first Tribunal) affirmed the decision – where the Department then identified an error in decision to refuse the Subclass 801 visa and sought to remake the decision – where another delegate (the second delegate) refused the Subclass 801 visa – where the Tribunal (the second Tribunal) affirmed the decision of the second delegate – whether the second Tribunal had jurisdiction to consider the application for both the Subclass 820 visa and the Subclass 801 visa – where second Tribunal decided that it did not have jurisdiction to consider the Subclass 820 visa – where the primary judge held that the second Tribunal was correct in so deciding – whether primary judge erred in so holding – appeal dismissed Legislation: Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 30, 31, 45, 46, 65, 67, 348, 474
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Sch 2, cl 801.221, 820.211, 820.221; Sch 3
Cases cited: Commissioner of Taxation v Hornibrook (2006) 156 FCR 313
Manga v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 320 FLR 99
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597
Plaintiff M79/2012 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 252 CLR 336
Plaintiff S4/2014 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 253 CLR 219
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476
R v War Pensions Entitlement Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Bott (1933) 50 CLR 228
Re Jarman; Ex parte Cook (1997) 188 CLR 595
Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82
Secretary, Department of Social Security v Hodgson (1992) 37 FCR 32
Wingfoot Australia Partners Pty Ltd v Kocak (2013) 252 CLR 480
Date of hearing: 10 November 2017 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 43 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr A Solomon-Bridge Solicitor for the Appellant: Carina Ford Immigration Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms J Lucas Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs ORDERS
VID 748 of 2017 BETWEEN: KARAN BASRA
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 422
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the principles established in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj, which provide that an administrative decision-maker may revisit and remake a decision affected by jurisdictional error. The court held that once the initial decision was found to be affected by jurisdictional error, the second delegate was obliged to revisit and remake the entire composite decision, including both visas. The second Tribunal, standing in the shoes of the second delegate, was thus also required to review both aspects of the initial decision. The court found that the second Tribunal was correct in deciding it did not have jurisdiction to consider the Subclass 820 visa, as the decision to refuse it had already been finally determined. The primary judge's judgment was upheld as there was no error in finding that the second Tribunal did not engage in jurisdictional error by limiting its review to the Subclass 801 visa.
The appeal was dismissed, and Basra was ordered to pay the Minister's costs. This outcome underscores the importance of treating composite visa decisions as a single decision for the purposes of judicial review, particularly when revisiting decisions affected by jurisdictional error.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs, to be taxed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The appellant appeals to this Court from the judgment of the Federal Circuit Court. The notice of appeal sets out three grounds. These grounds correspond to the three grounds of the amended application in the Federal Circuit Court, save that the first ground commences with the words: “The Federal Circuit Court erred in finding that the Tribunal did not engage in jurisdictional error …”. Thus the appellant’s contentions on appeal are, in effect, that the primary judge erred in not accepting the appellant’s contentions below.Consideration In his outline of submissions, the appellant submits that the appeal concerns the circumstances in which an administrative decision-maker may ‘revisit’ and remake a decision of its own motion, pursuant to the principles established in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597 (Bhardwaj). The appellant’s submissions are, in summary as follows:(a)The essential question for this Court’s determination is whether the second delegate, in revisiting the first delegate’s decision (which was found to be affected by jurisdictional error), was permitted to revisit only that part of the decision that concerned the Subclass 801 visa, or whether she was obliged to revisit the whole of the first delegate’s decision, including that part of it that purported to refuse the Subclass 820 visa.(b)If the second delegate was obliged to revisit both aspects of the first delegate’s decision then the second Tribunal was equally obliged to review both aspects, and was not limited by the second delegate’s having confined herself to the Subclass 801 visa question. After all, having all the powers and discretions available to it as were available to the second delegate (and thus standing in the shoes of the second delegate), the second Tribunal had the jurisdiction (and therefore the duty) to do again that which the second delegate had been entrusted to do: see Secretary, Department of Social Security v Hodgson (1992) 37 FCR 32; Commissioner of Taxation v Hornibrook (2006) 156 FCR 313 at [97]-[100]. Alternatively, as was submitted below, the second Tribunal should have recognised (as the Department had done) that there was a jurisdictional error affecting the earlier Subclass 801 visa refusal. Having identified jurisdictional error, the second Tribunal was obliged to revisit the first Tribunal decision, as the Immigration Review Tribunal had done in Bhardwaj. On any view, the Subclass 820 visa issue squarely arose in relation to the first Tribunal decision by reason of the terms of the first delegate’s decision. In that regard, the complaint in this Court is just as much that the second Tribunal failed to revisit the first Tribunal’s decision, as it is that there was a failure properly to review the second delegate’s decision.(c)The basis upon which the second delegate was able to revisit the first delegate’s decision was pursuant to the principles established in Bhardwaj. The appellant relies, in particular, on Bhardwaj at [51], [53], [142], [144], [147] and [152]. It follows from these passages that to consider the metes and bounds of an administrative decision-maker’s power to revisit a decision of the kind under consideration, it is proper (and, indeed, necessary) to look to the corresponding power that a judicial review court would have to interfere with such a decision.(d)The effect of Part 8 of the Migration Act is that only decisions affected by jurisdictional error are liable to be “called in question in [the relevant] court” and “subject to prohibition, mandamus, injunction, declaration or certiorari”: see Migration Act, s 474(1); Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476.(e)A writ (or order in the nature) of certiorari is, of course, the usual remedy for quashing decisions which contain non-jurisdictional errors (which errors otherwise appear on the face of the record): see Wingfoot Australia Partners Pty Ltd v Kocak (2013) 252 CLR 480 at [26]. Certiorari may also be an available remedy in the case of decisions affected by jurisdictional errors – but in that case, the remedy is purely ancillary to the principal remedy of a writ (or order in the nature) of mandamus: see Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82 at [14], [142], [151]-[152], [218]; Re Jarman; Ex parte Cook (1997) 188 CLR 595 at 604. Indeed, mandamus can issue in such cases entirely unassisted by certiorari – on the basis that the “ostensible decision is not a real performance of the duty imposed by law upon the tribunal”, but in fact a nullity: see R v War Pensions Entitlement Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Bott (1933) 50 CLR 228 (Bott) at 242; Public Service Association of South Australia Inc v Industrial Relations Commission (SA) (2012) 249 CLR 398 at [57].(f)It follows that a court tasked with reviewing a decision of the kind in question, which is purported to have been made under the Migration Act, will look principally to whether the decision-maker is susceptible to a writ (or order in the nature) of mandamus. Whether or not the decision-maker is susceptible to such a writ (or order) was explained in Bott.(g)Where a decision-maker has professed to have performed the duty, a convenient point of departure for a court conducting judicial review will be the decision which is purported to have been made and any reasons given for that decision.(h)The relevant distinction, however, is that, in a case in which certiorari is the primary (and not ancillary) relief claimed, the start and end point of the analysis will be the decision and its record. On the other hand, in a case in which mandamus is the principal (or only) relief claimed, the ultimate analysis will centre, not on the decision made and its record, but on the “duty of a public nature which remains unperformed”.(i)Under the Migration Act, the relevant duty is sourced in s 65 of that Act (which contains an obligation on the Minister, after considering a valid application, to grant or refuse a visa). A corresponding obligation is sourced, relevantly, in s 348 of the Migration Act (which contains an obligation on the Tribunal to review a decision if an application is properly made to it).(j)In the instant case, the duty was first engaged by the appellant’s application. That application was a composite one: that is to say, it constituted an application for both the Subclass 820 visa and the Subclass 801 visa. Accordingly, once he accepted the application as valid, the Minister had a duty to grant or refuse the Subclass 820 visa, and to grant or refuse the Subclass 801 visa. The first delegate in this case purported to refuse both visas.(k)Therefore, once it was determined that the first delegate’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error, the nature of the duty which remained unperformed was that which had been engaged by the appellant’s pending and undisposed application. As that application was for two visas, the proper approach was to revisit and remake the decision as it concerned both visas.(l)Further and in any event, the first delegate’s decision to refuse both the Subclass 820 visa and Subclass 801 visa was a “composite decision” (Plaintiff S4/2014 at [55]; see also Plaintiff M79/2012 at [83] per Hayne J), which could not be disturbed by the second delegate without revisiting it in its entirety.(m)The singularity of the first delegate’s decision is evidenced by the fact that it was communicated in one instrument, and indeed stated (when alerting the appellant to his review rights) that “this decision [ie, singular] can be reviewed”. The decision is supported by a singular decision record. Thus, while the effect of the first delegate’s decision was to refuse to grant two visas, nonetheless it “was a single decision which cannot be severed and treated as if there had been two separate decisions” (Plaintiff S4/2014 at [8]).(n)In particular, the relevant “decision” is that which the general law identifies as the relevant exercise of power and, in turn, that which a judicial review court would fix upon as such. Where a decision-maker proposes to remake a decision according to Bhardwaj principles, the decision-maker is to be guided and controlled by what a court exercising powers of judicial review would do (as outlined above). A court would treat the first delegate’s decision as the first delegate herself did – as a single decision affecting rights in respect of two visa subclasses. Once that is recognised, it follows that the second delegate was not authorised to revisit only a part of that singular decision if the decision itself was considered to be affected by jurisdictional error.(o)The Federal Circuit Court below placed too much emphasis on how the Migration Act in form treated the making of visa decisions (Reasons, [32]-[34]), and failed to appreciate that the relevant “decision” was to be ascertained by reference to general law principles.