Basra v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Basra v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 422

Appeal from: Basra v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 322 FLR 228; [2017] FCCA 1302
File number: VID 748 of 2017
Judge: MOSHINSKY J
Date of judgment: 29 March 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – partner visa – where applicant applied in a single application for both a temporary partner visa (Subclass 820 visa) and a residence partner visa (Subclass 801 visa) – where a delegate (the first delegate) refused the application – where the Tribunal (the first Tribunal) affirmed the decision – where the Department then identified an error in decision to refuse the Subclass 801 visa and sought to remake the decision – where another delegate (the second delegate) refused the Subclass 801 visa – where the Tribunal (the second Tribunal) affirmed the decision of the second delegate – whether the second Tribunal had jurisdiction to consider the application for both the Subclass 820 visa and the Subclass 801 visa – where second Tribunal decided that it did not have jurisdiction to consider the Subclass 820 visa – where the primary judge held that the second Tribunal was correct in so deciding – whether primary judge erred in so holding – appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 30, 31, 45, 46, 65, 67, 348, 474

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Sch 2, cl 801.221, 820.211, 820.221; Sch 3

Cases cited:

Commissioner of Taxation v Hornibrook (2006) 156 FCR 313

Manga v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 320 FLR 99

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597

Plaintiff M79/2012 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 252 CLR 336

Plaintiff S4/2014 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 253 CLR 219

Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476

Public Service Association of South Australia Inc v Industrial Relations Commission (SA) (2012) 249 CLR 398

R v War Pensions Entitlement Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Bott (1933) 50 CLR 228

Re Jarman; Ex parte Cook (1997) 188 CLR 595

Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82

Secretary, Department of Social Security v Hodgson (1992) 37 FCR 32

Wingfoot Australia Partners Pty Ltd v Kocak (2013) 252 CLR 480

Date of hearing: 10 November 2017
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 43
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr A Solomon-Bridge
Solicitor for the Appellant: Carina Ford Immigration Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms J Lucas
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

VID 748 of 2017
BETWEEN:

KARAN BASRA

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 422
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Basra v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection concerned the appeal of a decision by the Federal Circuit Court regarding a partner visa application. The applicant, Basra, had applied for both a temporary partner visa (Subclass 820) and a residence partner visa (Subclass 801) in a single application. The initial delegate of the Department of Immigration and Citizenship refused both visas, and this decision was affirmed by the first Migration Review Tribunal. Subsequently, the Department identified an error in the refusal of the Subclass 801 visa and sought to remake the decision. A second delegate then refused the Subclass 801 visa, and the second Tribunal affirmed this decision. The central legal issue in this case was whether the second Tribunal had jurisdiction to consider the application for both visas, particularly the Subclass 820 visa, given that the second delegate had only revisited the Subclass 801 visa.

The court examined the principles established in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj, which provide that an administrative decision-maker may revisit and remake a decision affected by jurisdictional error. The court held that once the initial decision was found to be affected by jurisdictional error, the second delegate was obliged to revisit and remake the entire composite decision, including both visas. The second Tribunal, standing in the shoes of the second delegate, was thus also required to review both aspects of the initial decision. The court found that the second Tribunal was correct in deciding it did not have jurisdiction to consider the Subclass 820 visa, as the decision to refuse it had already been finally determined. The primary judge's judgment was upheld as there was no error in finding that the second Tribunal did not engage in jurisdictional error by limiting its review to the Subclass 801 visa.

The appeal was dismissed, and Basra was ordered to pay the Minister's costs. This outcome underscores the importance of treating composite visa decisions as a single decision for the purposes of judicial review, particularly when revisiting decisions affected by jurisdictional error.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs, to be taxed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow, no error is shown in the judgment of the primary judge. It follows that the appeal is to be dismissed.Background facts On 4 February 2013, the appellant applied for a Subclass 820 visa and a Subclass 801 visa. The form was headed “Application for migration to Australia by a partner”. On the first page, there was a single box available to be ticked in respect of both the Subclass 820 visa and the Subclass 801 visa. This box was ticked by the appellant. On 4 March 2013, the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (the Department), as it was then known, wrote to the appellant. The letter referred to his “application for the Partner visa (subclass 820/801)”. At the end of the letter, the Department referred to the option to withdraw the appellant’s “application”, again using singular language. On 4 September 2013, the first delegate decided to refuse the appellant’s application. The decision record, on the first page, in the section headed “Details of visa application”, referred to both the Subclass 820 visa and the Subclass 801 visa. In the first paragraph of the decision record, the delegate stated that various matters had been considered “[i]n reaching my decision” (thus adopting singular language). The delegate noted that the appellant had applied for two visas, namely the Subclass 820 visa and the Subclass 801 visa. She noted that, at the time of the application, the appellant had provided evidence that he was in a marital relationship with an Australian permanent resident (namely, Ms Y). The delegate was therefore satisfied that the appellant met cl 820.211(2) in Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) at the time of his application. The delegate then referred to the criteria to be satisfied at the time of the decision, being the criteria set out in cl 820.221, and stated that the Department’s records indicated that Ms Y’s permanent residency visa had been cancelled on 26 July 2013. It followed that the appellant did not satisfy the criteria that needed to be satisfied at the time of the decision. The delegate concluded (under the heading “Decision”) that, as the appellant did not meet the criteria in cl 820.221, he did not meet the prescribed criteria for the grant of a Subclass 820 visa and a Subclass 801 visa. The appellant’s application lodged on 4 February 2013 was therefore refused. The appellant applied to the Migration Review Tribunal for review of the decision of the first delegate. On 9 April 2014, the first Tribunal decided to “[affirm] the decision not to grant the [appellant] a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) visa”, that is, the Subclass 820 visa. The Tribunal set out its reasons in a statement of decision and reasons. This commenced by stating that the application was for review of a decision of a delegate to refuse to grant “a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) visa”, that is, the Subclass 820 visa. The Tribunal noted that: Ms Y’s visa had been cancelled on 26 July 2013 (on the basis that she had failed to notify the Department of changes in her circumstances); she had sought review of that decision by the Migration Review Tribunal; and the Tribunal had set aside the decision under review and substituted a decision not to cancel her visa. The first Tribunal stated that Ms Y currently held a permanent residency visa. The Tribunal then considered whether the appellant met the criteria in Sch 3 to the Migration Regulations or whether those criteria should be waived. The Tribunal explained that an applicant who was not the holder of a substantive visa at the time of the application was required to meet certain criteria in Sch 3. The Tribunal stated that it was not in dispute that the appellant did not have a substantive visa at the time of his application. It was therefore necessary for him to satisfy the Sch 3 criteria unless there were compelling reasons for not applying those criteria. One of the criteria was that the application for the visa had been lodged within 28 days of the “relevant day”, being (relevantly) the last day the applicant held a substantive visa. In the appellant’s case, the “relevant day” was found to be 5 December 2012. As the appellant’s application (lodged 4 February 2013) had not been made within 28 days of the relevant day, the Tribunal found that the applicant did not satisfy this criterion. The Tribunal was not satisfied that there were compelling reasons to not apply the Sch 3 criteria. Accordingly, the Tribunal found that the appellant did not satisfy the applicable criteria in relation to the Subclass 820 visa.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The second Tribunal then considered whether the appellant satisfied the criteria for a Subclass 801 visa. The Tribunal concluded that, as the appellant was not (and had not been) the holder of a Subclass 820 visa, he could not satisfy the requirements of cl 801.221 of Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations.The Federal Circuit Court decision The appellant applied to the Federal Circuit Court for judicial review of the decision of the second Tribunal. The grounds set out in his amended application (without the underlining) were as follows:1.The Tribunal engaged in jurisdictional error by misunderstanding the applicable law and, as a consequence, constructively failing to exercise its jurisdiction.Particularsa)The Tribunal erred by finding that the decision of the First Respondent’s delegate, dated 4 September 2013, and/or the decision of the previously constituted Tribunal, dated 9 April 2014, was not affected by jurisdictional error in relation to both the Subclass 820 and Subclass 801 visa.b)On 4 September 2013 the delegate of the First Respondent refused the Applicant’s application for a Subclass 820 and Subclass 801 visa.ba)On 9 April 2014, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision.c)On 12 August 2014, following advice from the Department’s Refugee Law, Framework and Training Section (Legal Framework Branch), a delegate of the First Respondent made a new decision in relation to the Subclass 801 visa, noting that the decision dated 4 September 2013 had been affected by jurisdictional error.d)The Tribunal erred in failing to find that the decision dated 4 September 2013 and/or that dated 9 April 2014 was affected by jurisdictional error and was therefore “a decision that lacks legal foundation and is properly regarded, in law, as no decision at all” (see Minister for Immigration [and] Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj [(2002) 209 CLR 597]).e)The Tribunal erred by finding that:i)The decision of the delegate dated 4 September 2013 and/or that dated 9 April 2014 was a validly made decision[.]ii)It was therefore unable to make a finding that the decision dated 4 September 2013 and/or that of 9 April 2014, in relation to both the Subclass 820 and Subclass 801 visas was void[.]iii)It did not therefore have jurisdiction to consider whether the Applicant met the criteria for the grant of the Subclass 820 visa.iv)That it did not have jurisdiction to set aside the Department’s and/or the Tribunal’s decision not to grant a Subclass 820 or Subclass 801 visa on 4 September 2013 and 9 April 2014 respectively or consider the Applicant’s applications for both the Subclass 820 and 801 visas.v)That the Department’s and/or Tribunal’s decision to refuse the Subclass 820 visa had been finally determined under s.5(9) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act).2.Further, the Tribunal erred in finding that the Applicant had only purported to apply for review of the Subclass 801 visa in circumstances where the Applicant indicated on the application form that he wanted review of a visa refusal for visa “Subclass 820” and where the Applicant required redetermination of the Subclass 820 visa to have any prospects of being granted a Subclass 801 visa.3.Alternatively, that finding of the Tribunal was unreasonable or irrational for those reasons.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellant appeals to this Court from the judgment of the Federal Circuit Court. The notice of appeal sets out three grounds. These grounds correspond to the three grounds of the amended application in the Federal Circuit Court, save that the first ground commences with the words: “The Federal Circuit Court erred in finding that the Tribunal did not engage in jurisdictional error …”. Thus the appellant’s contentions on appeal are, in effect, that the primary judge erred in not accepting the appellant’s contentions below.Consideration In his outline of submissions, the appellant submits that the appeal concerns the circumstances in which an administrative decision-maker may ‘revisit’ and remake a decision of its own motion, pursuant to the principles established in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597 (Bhardwaj). The appellant’s submissions are, in summary as follows:(a)The essential question for this Court’s determination is whether the second delegate, in revisiting the first delegate’s decision (which was found to be affected by jurisdictional error), was permitted to revisit only that part of the decision that concerned the Subclass 801 visa, or whether she was obliged to revisit the whole of the first delegate’s decision, including that part of it that purported to refuse the Subclass 820 visa.(b)If the second delegate was obliged to revisit both aspects of the first delegate’s decision then the second Tribunal was equally obliged to review both aspects, and was not limited by the second delegate’s having confined herself to the Subclass 801 visa question. After all, having all the powers and discretions available to it as were available to the second delegate (and thus standing in the shoes of the second delegate), the second Tribunal had the jurisdiction (and therefore the duty) to do again that which the second delegate had been entrusted to do: see Secretary, Department of Social Security v Hodgson (1992) 37 FCR 32; Commissioner of Taxation v Hornibrook (2006) 156 FCR 313 at [97]-[100]. Alternatively, as was submitted below, the second Tribunal should have recognised (as the Department had done) that there was a jurisdictional error affecting the earlier Subclass 801 visa refusal. Having identified jurisdictional error, the second Tribunal was obliged to revisit the first Tribunal decision, as the Immigration Review Tribunal had done in Bhardwaj. On any view, the Subclass 820 visa issue squarely arose in relation to the first Tribunal decision by reason of the terms of the first delegate’s decision. In that regard, the complaint in this Court is just as much that the second Tribunal failed to revisit the first Tribunal’s decision, as it is that there was a failure properly to review the second delegate’s decision.(c)The basis upon which the second delegate was able to revisit the first delegate’s decision was pursuant to the principles established in Bhardwaj. The appellant relies, in particular, on Bhardwaj at [51], [53], [142], [144], [147] and [152]. It follows from these passages that to consider the metes and bounds of an administrative decision-maker’s power to revisit a decision of the kind under consideration, it is proper (and, indeed, necessary) to look to the corresponding power that a judicial review court would have to interfere with such a decision.(d)The effect of Part 8 of the Migration Act is that only decisions affected by jurisdictional error are liable to be “called in question in [the relevant] court” and “subject to prohibition, mandamus, injunction, declaration or certiorari”: see Migration Act, s 474(1); Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476.(e)A writ (or order in the nature) of certiorari is, of course, the usual remedy for quashing decisions which contain non-jurisdictional errors (which errors otherwise appear on the face of the record): see Wingfoot Australia Partners Pty Ltd v Kocak (2013) 252 CLR 480 at [26]. Certiorari may also be an available remedy in the case of decisions affected by jurisdictional errors – but in that case, the remedy is purely ancillary to the principal remedy of a writ (or order in the nature) of mandamus: see Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82 at [14], [142], [151]-[152], [218]; Re Jarman; Ex parte Cook (1997) 188 CLR 595 at 604. Indeed, mandamus can issue in such cases entirely unassisted by certiorari – on the basis that the “ostensible decision is not a real performance of the duty imposed by law upon the tribunal”, but in fact a nullity: see R v War Pensions Entitlement Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Bott (1933) 50 CLR 228 (Bott) at 242; Public Service Association of South Australia Inc v Industrial Relations Commission (SA) (2012) 249 CLR 398 at [57].(f)It follows that a court tasked with reviewing a decision of the kind in question, which is purported to have been made under the Migration Act, will look principally to whether the decision-maker is susceptible to a writ (or order in the nature) of mandamus. Whether or not the decision-maker is susceptible to such a writ (or order) was explained in Bott.(g)Where a decision-maker has professed to have performed the duty, a convenient point of departure for a court conducting judicial review will be the decision which is purported to have been made and any reasons given for that decision.(h)The relevant distinction, however, is that, in a case in which certiorari is the primary (and not ancillary) relief claimed, the start and end point of the analysis will be the decision and its record. On the other hand, in a case in which mandamus is the principal (or only) relief claimed, the ultimate analysis will centre, not on the decision made and its record, but on the “duty of a public nature which remains unperformed”.(i)Under the Migration Act, the relevant duty is sourced in s 65 of that Act (which contains an obligation on the Minister, after considering a valid application, to grant or refuse a visa). A corresponding obligation is sourced, relevantly, in s 348 of the Migration Act (which contains an obligation on the Tribunal to review a decision if an application is properly made to it).(j)In the instant case, the duty was first engaged by the appellant’s application. That application was a composite one: that is to say, it constituted an application for both the Subclass 820 visa and the Subclass 801 visa. Accordingly, once he accepted the application as valid, the Minister had a duty to grant or refuse the Subclass 820 visa, and to grant or refuse the Subclass 801 visa. The first delegate in this case purported to refuse both visas.(k)Therefore, once it was determined that the first delegate’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error, the nature of the duty which remained unperformed was that which had been engaged by the appellant’s pending and undisposed application. As that application was for two visas, the proper approach was to revisit and remake the decision as it concerned both visas.(l)Further and in any event, the first delegate’s decision to refuse both the Subclass 820 visa and Subclass 801 visa was a “composite decision” (Plaintiff S4/2014 at [55]; see also Plaintiff M79/2012 at [83] per Hayne J), which could not be disturbed by the second delegate without revisiting it in its entirety.(m)The singularity of the first delegate’s decision is evidenced by the fact that it was communicated in one instrument, and indeed stated (when alerting the appellant to his review rights) that “this decision [ie, singular] can be reviewed”. The decision is supported by a singular decision record. Thus, while the effect of the first delegate’s decision was to refuse to grant two visas, nonetheless it “was a single decision which cannot be severed and treated as if there had been two separate decisions” (Plaintiff S4/2014 at [8]).(n)In particular, the relevant “decision” is that which the general law identifies as the relevant exercise of power and, in turn, that which a judicial review court would fix upon as such. Where a decision-maker proposes to remake a decision according to Bhardwaj principles, the decision-maker is to be guided and controlled by what a court exercising powers of judicial review would do (as outlined above). A court would treat the first delegate’s decision as the first delegate herself did – as a single decision affecting rights in respect of two visa subclasses. Once that is recognised, it follows that the second delegate was not authorised to revisit only a part of that singular decision if the decision itself was considered to be affected by jurisdictional error.(o)The Federal Circuit Court below placed too much emphasis on how the Migration Act in form treated the making of visa decisions (Reasons, [32]-[34]), and failed to appreciate that the relevant “decision” was to be ascertained by reference to general law principles.