FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Mohammed [2019] FCAFC 49
Appeal from: Mohammed v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 2893 File number: VID 1405 of 2018 Judges: MIDDLETON, BROMBERG AND KERR JJ Date of judgment: 27 March 2019 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether primary judge erred in finding that a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) refusing appellant a Permanent Partner visa was affected by jurisdictional error – where Tribunal did not and could not have known of the error – where a criterion for the grant of a Permanent Partner visa is that the applicant holds or has held a Temporary Partner visa – where primary judge in the same proceeding had set aside an earlier decision of the MRT affirming a decision of the Minister to refuse the appellant a Temporary Partner visa – whether it was legally unreasonable for the Tribunal to determine its review in circumstances where its review of a decision refusing a Temporary Partner visa had not yet been made as a matter of law – appeal dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Pt 8, s 474(1)
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 2.12F, Sch 2
Cases cited: BBS15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 61; 248 FCR 159
Boakye-Danquah v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 438; 116 FCR 557
Daily Telegraph Newspaper Co Ltd v McLaughlin (1904) 1 CLR 479; [1904] AC 776
HFM043 v Republic of Nauru [2018] HCA 37; 92 ALJR 817
Jadwan Pty Ltd v Secretary, Department of Health and Aged Care [2003] FCAFC 288; 145 FCR 1
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11; 237 FCR 1
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; 92 ALJR 713
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; 249 CLR 332
Muin v Refugee Review Tribunal [2002] HCA 30; 76 ALJR 966
Park Oh Ho v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1989] HCA 54; 167 CLR 637
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia [2003] HCA 2; 211 CLR 476
R v Governor of Brockhill Prison; Ex parte Evans (No 2) [2001] 2 AC 19
Secretary of State for Education and Science v Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council [1977] AC 1014
SZFDE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 35; 232 CLR 189
Waensila v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection[2016] FCAFC 32; 241 FCR 121
Date of hearing: 8 February 2019 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 95 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr R Knowles Solicitor for the Appellant: Sparke Helmore Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr M L L Albert with Mr J A Barrington (pro bono) Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent did…
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- Case
- [2019] FCAFC 49
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues the court needed to decide included whether the Tribunal's decision was indeed affected by jurisdictional error and, if so, whether it was legally unreasonable for the Tribunal to determine the Permanent Partner visa application without first validly determining the Temporary Partner visa application. The court found that the Tribunal's decision was legally unreasonable as it had not validly determined the Temporary Partner visa application at the time of making its decision on the Permanent Partner visa application. Consequently, the court held that the Tribunal's decision should be set aside and the matter should be remitted to the Tribunal for redetermination according to law.
The Federal Court, in dismissing the appeal, noted that the principles governing legal unreasonableness require statutory powers to be exercised reasonably and that any decision-making must be within the boundaries of reasonableness framed by the relevant statute and common law principles. The court concluded that the Tribunal's failure to validly determine the Temporary Partner visa application before deciding the Permanent Partner visa application amounted to a jurisdictional error.
In conclusion, the court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the first respondent's costs as agreed or assessed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The effect of Pt 8 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the MigrationAct) is that only decisions affected by jurisdictional error are liable to be “called into question” in a court and “subject to prohibition, mandamus, injunction declaration or certiorari”: see s 474(1) and Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia [2003] HCA 2; 211 CLR 476. A decision authorised to be made pursuant to the Migration Act will be affected by jurisdictional error if it is vitiated by legal unreasonableness: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; 249 CLR 332 (Li). That is because Parliament is taken to intend that statutory power will be exercised reasonably: see Li at [26] and [29] per French CJ, [63] per Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ and [88] per Gageler J. In Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11; 237 FCR 1 (Stretton), Allsop CJ summarised the relevant case law and principles underpinning the reasoning in Li as follows (Griffiths J and Wigney J agreeing at [87] and [90] respectively):5[The] statements of general principle in the three judgments [in Li] (French CJ, and Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ, and Gageler J) variously drew upon and drew together a number of well-known expressions and bodies of principle including, and without repeating all citations: the Constitutional necessity for legal control of discretion (power): Shrimpton v The Commonwealth [1945] HCA 4; 69 CLR 613 at 629-630; the necessary confinement, explicit or implicit, of any statutory discretion or power by the subject matter, scope and purpose of the legislation: Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission (NSW) v Browning [1947] HCA 21; 74 CLR 492 at 505; the implied legislative intention to condition statutory discretionary power by a requirement that it be exercised reasonably: Kruger v The Commonwealth [1997] HCA 27; 190 CLR 1 at 36; Abebe v The Commonwealth [1999] HCA 14; 197 CLR 510 at 554 [116]; Shrimpton at 620; South Australian Commissioner for Prices and Consumer Affairs v Charles Moore (Aust) Limited [1977] HCA 38; 139 CLR 449 at 466; and Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Limited [1986] HCA 40; 162 CLR 24 at 41-42; the necessity that a discretion be exercised according to the rules of reason and justice, not private opinion, according to law, and not humour, and within the limits that an honest and competent person would confine herself that is “legal and regular, not arbitrary, vague and fanciful”: Sharp v Wakefield [1891] AC 173 at 179; Shrimpton at 620; R v Anderson; Ex parte Ipec-Air Pty Ltd [1965] HCA 27; 113 CLR 177 at 189; Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30; 198 ALR 59 at 62 [9]; the illegitimacy of the exercise of a discretion in reaching a conclusion that no reasonable person could ever come to: Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 at 229, or where no sensible decision-maker acting with due appreciation of his or her responsibilities would so decide: Secretary of State for Education and Science v Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council [1977] AC 1014 at 1064; the requirement that the satisfaction or opinion of a decision-maker about the existence of a matter, in particular a jurisdictional fact, be reasonably formed: Council of the Municipality of Bankstown v Fripp [1919] HCA 41; 26 CLR 385 at 403; R v Connell; Ex parte Hetton Bellbird Collieries Ltd [1944] HCA 42; 69 CLR 407 at 430; Buck v Bavone [1976] HCA 24; 135 CLR 110 at 118-119, (though not referred to in Li, Starke J in Boucaut Bay Company Limited (in liq) v The Commonwealth [1927] HCA 59; 40 CLR 98 at 101, approved by Windeyer J in Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia v Brian Hatch Timber Co (Sales) Pty Ltd [1972] HCA 73; 128 CLR 28 at 57, said that reasonableness here meant not dishonestly, capriciously or arbitrarily and upon a rational ground for the belief); the settled principles of appellate review of judicial discretion in House v The King [1936] HCA 40; 55 CLR 499, and the guidance found therein in the analogy with judicial review of administrative action: Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Limited 162 CLR at 42; the principle that it is open to infer legal error if the result of the decision appears unreasonable assuming the correct question was addressed and the law was followed in the making of the decision: Avon Downs Proprietary Limited v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1949] HCA 26; 78 CLR 353 at 360; the principle concerned with unreasonableness in the exercise of delegated law-making power – if such laws were partial and unequal or manifestly unjust, or by operation they involved oppressive or gratuitous interference with rights that could not be reasonably justified: Kruse v Johnson [1898] 2 QB 91 at 99-100; and the fact that the conditioning of a power to be exercised reasonably has an analogy with the conditioning of the power with the obligation to afford procedural fairness: Gageler J in Li at [92].6Each of the judgments in Li sought to give explanatory content to the concept of legal unreasonableness. As was discussed in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; 231 FCR 437, the judgments in Li identified two different contexts in which the concept of legal unreasonableness was employed: a conclusion after the identification of jurisdictional error for a recognised species of error, and an “outcome-focused” conclusion without any specific jurisdictional error being identified: Singh at [44].7It is in relation to the second context, the “outcome-focused” application of the concept, that precise definition, beyond explanation of the operative notion and of the legal technique by which to make the assessment, becomes productive of complexity and confusion. There is “an area of decisional freedom” of the decision-maker, within which minds might differ. The width and boundaries of that freedom are framed by the nature and character of the decision, the terms of the relevant statute operating in the factual and legal context of the decision, and the attendant principles and values of the common law, in particular, of reasonableness. The boundaries can be expressed by the descriptions and explanatory phrases of the kind set out in [5] above.