Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Mohammed

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Mohammed [2019] FCAFC 49

Appeal from: Mohammed v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 2893
File number: VID 1405 of 2018
Judges: MIDDLETON, BROMBERG AND KERR JJ
Date of judgment: 27 March 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether primary judge erred in finding that a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) refusing appellant a Permanent Partner visa was affected by jurisdictional error – where Tribunal did not and could not have known of the error – where a criterion for the grant of a Permanent Partner visa is that the applicant holds or has held a Temporary Partner visa – where primary judge in the same proceeding had set aside an earlier decision of the MRT affirming a decision of the Minister to refuse the appellant a Temporary Partner visa – whether it was legally unreasonable for the Tribunal to determine its review in circumstances where its review of a decision refusing a Temporary Partner visa had not yet been made as a matter of law – appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Pt 8, s 474(1)

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 2.12F, Sch 2

Cases cited:

BBS15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 61; 248 FCR 159

Boakye-Danquah v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 438; 116 FCR 557

Daily Telegraph Newspaper Co Ltd v McLaughlin (1904) 1 CLR 479; [1904] AC 776

HFM043 v Republic of Nauru [2018] HCA 37; 92 ALJR 817

Jadwan Pty Ltd v Secretary, Department of Health and Aged Care [2003] FCAFC 288; 145 FCR 1

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11; 237 FCR 1

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; 92 ALJR 713

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; 249 CLR 332

Muin v Refugee Review Tribunal [2002] HCA 30; 76 ALJR 966

Park Oh Ho v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1989] HCA 54; 167 CLR 637

Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia [2003] HCA 2; 211 CLR 476

R v Governor of Brockhill Prison; Ex parte Evans (No 2) [2001] 2 AC 19

Secretary of State for Education and Science v Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council [1977] AC 1014

SZFDE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 35; 232 CLR 189

Waensila v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection[2016] FCAFC 32; 241 FCR 121

Date of hearing: 8 February 2019
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 95
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr R Knowles
Solicitor for the Appellant: Sparke Helmore
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr M L L Albert with Mr J A Barrington (pro bono)
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent did…
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Details
Case
[2019] FCAFC 49
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Mohammed involves an appeal against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, which had set aside a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) regarding the applicant's application for a Permanent Partner visa. The Tribunal had refused the applicant's visa application on the basis that he did not hold, nor had held, a Temporary Partner visa, which is a criterion for the grant of a Permanent Partner visa. The primary judge found that the Tribunal's decision was affected by jurisdictional error due to legal unreasonableness.

The legal issues the court needed to decide included whether the Tribunal's decision was indeed affected by jurisdictional error and, if so, whether it was legally unreasonable for the Tribunal to determine the Permanent Partner visa application without first validly determining the Temporary Partner visa application. The court found that the Tribunal's decision was legally unreasonable as it had not validly determined the Temporary Partner visa application at the time of making its decision on the Permanent Partner visa application. Consequently, the court held that the Tribunal's decision should be set aside and the matter should be remitted to the Tribunal for redetermination according to law.

The Federal Court, in dismissing the appeal, noted that the principles governing legal unreasonableness require statutory powers to be exercised reasonably and that any decision-making must be within the boundaries of reasonableness framed by the relevant statute and common law principles. The court concluded that the Tribunal's failure to validly determine the Temporary Partner visa application before deciding the Permanent Partner visa application amounted to a jurisdictional error.

In conclusion, the court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the first respondent's costs as agreed or assessed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The primary judge held that the Tribunal’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error on the ground of legal unreasonableness. The principles governing the duty of a court when a conclusion is asserted to be vitiated by legal unreasonableness is discussed in more detail later in our reasons but it is uncontentious that whether a particular circumstance will amount to legal unreasonableness is invariably context and fact dependent. It is thus convenient to begin our reasons by providing a short precis of the circumstances in which this matter came before the primary judge. The facts are not in dispute.BACKGROUND Mr Mohammed is an Indian citizen. He arrived in Australia on 26 February 2009 on a Vocational Education and Training Sector (subclass 572) visa. While in Australia he met Ms Kayleen Anne Mayer, an Australian citizen. The applicant and Ms Mayer were married on 12 September 2012. Ms Mayer thereafter sponsored his migration to Australia. On 11 January 2013, on the basis of his marriage to Ms Mayer, the applicant lodged a combined application for a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) (subclass 820) visa (Temporary Partner visa) and a Permanent Partner visa. Mr Mohammed’s application for a Temporary Partner visa was refused by a delegate of the Minister on 5 August 2013. The delegate of the Minister also found that because Mr Mohammed “failed” to satisfy the prescribed criteria for the grant of a Temporary Partner visa, he was “therefore unable to satisfy the criteria for the grant of a [Permanent Partner visa]”. Mr Mohammed sought merits review of that decision in the then Migration Review Tribunal (the MRT). On 18 December 2014, the MRT affirmed the decision of the Minister. The MRT’s decision to affirm the decision was made on the basis that the decision in Boakye-Danquah v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 438; 116 FCR 557 (Boakye-Danquah) was binding on it, such that it was restricted to applying certain discretionary criteria potentially relevant to the grant of a Temporary Partner visa to the circumstances existing as at the time of Mr Mohammed’s original application. Mr Mohammed did not seek judicial review of the MRT’s decision. Subsequently, on 23 April 2015 Mr Mohammed was renotified in relation to his Permanent Partner visa application after the “Department … identified an error” in the earlier decision dated 5 August 2013 and a new decision was made. In that new decision, a different delegate of the Minister also refused Mr Mohammed’s application for a Permanent Partner visa but this time on the grounds that he neither held, nor had held, a Temporary Partner visa. It is common ground between the parties that a criterion for the grant of a Permanent Partner visa is that, at the time of a decision on the visa application, the applicant holds, or has held, a Temporary Partner visa: see cl 801.221 of Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations). Mr Mohammed nonetheless sought review of that decision in the Tribunal. On 12 February 2016, following a hearing, the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the Minister’s delegate dated 23 April 2015 on the same basis.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Unsurprisingly, Mr Mohammed agreed to that course being taken. The FCCA stated it would make consent orders in those terms. It did so at the conclusion of its hearing of the proceeding which gives rise to this appeal.The primary judge’s decision subject to appeal It was in the above circumstances that the primary judge had to decide what to do about Mr Mohammed’s extant application for constitutional writs seeking to set aside the Tribunal’s decision of 12 February 2016. The court first addressed the three grounds of appeal as had been advanced on Mr Mohammed’s behalf. The primary judge held that there was no merit in any of those grounds. No issue arises on the appeal as to the correctness of those conclusions. If it needs to be said, in our view her Honour was plainly correct. However, her Honour thereafter proceeded to address what she referred to as “Additional matters” as follows: Additional matters22.There is a question in this case as to whether it was legally unreasonable for the second Tribunal to refuse the applicant a subclass 801 permanent partner visa on the grounds that the applicant did not have a subclass 820 temporary partner visa in circumstances where the Tribunal’s decision in relation to the subclass 820 temporary partner visa is now acknowledged to have been affected by jurisdictional error.23.The consequence of a Tribunal decision being affected by jurisdictional error is that it is no decision at all. Therefore, when the Tribunal made its decision on the subclass 801 permanent partner visa application, there had not been a valid decision on the applicant’s subclass 820 temporary visa application. In effect, although unbeknownst to the Tribunal, the applicant’s review application in relation to his subclass 820 temporary visa application had not been validly determined. From a legal point of view, although not a factual point of view, the applicant’s review application in respect of his subclass 820 temporary partner visa application was an outstanding application.24.The Minister submitted that the Tribunal’s decision in respect of the subclass 801 permanent partner visa was free of jurisdictional error. The Minister noted that the Full Court decision in Waensila had not been handed down when the Tribunal made its decision on the subclass 801 permanent partner visa application. However, that is beside the point. Once it is accepted that the Tribunal’s decision on the subclass 820 temporary partner visa application was not a valid decision, it is immaterial whether the Tribunal was aware of that invalidity or not.25.The Minister also noted that even if the applicant were to be granted a subclass 820 temporary partner visa in the future, that could not have retrospective effect so as to mean that the Tribunal’s existing decision on the subclass 801 permanent partner visa contained jurisdictional error.26.However, that submission does not deal with the issue that, when the Tribunal decided that the applicant did not meet the criteria for a subclass 801 permanent partner visa because he did not hold and has never held a subclass 820 temporary partner visa, there was legally, although not factually, an outstanding application to review the delegate’s decision in relation to the applicant’s application for a subclass 820 temporary partner visa.27.The Minister also submitted that the applicant did not seek an adjournment from the Tribunal. That is so. Like the Tribunal, the applicant did not know that the Tribunal’s decision on the subclass 820 temporary partner visa application was Waensila affected. The realisation that the Tribunal’s decision on the subclass 820 temporary partner visa application was no decision at all changes everything. Presumably, with the benefit of what we now know, the applicant would have applied for an adjournment.28.The Minister also submitted, faintly, that if the Tribunal upheld the applicant’s application for review in respect of the subclass 820 temporary partner visa application, the applicant could apply onshore for another subclass 801 permanent partner visa and not be worse off. The reason that submission was put faintly was that there may be complications with that course that are not presently apparent. In any event, there would be, at a minimum, another application fee, which I understand to be not inconsequential. It seems to me to be immaterial, in determining whether the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error, that the applicant might have a right to make another application onshore for a subclass 801 permanent partner visa.29.The Minister referred to Basra v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 422. However, that case deals with a different point, namely, whether the Tribunal dealing with the subclass 801 permanent partner visa application had jurisdiction to also determine the subclass 820 temporary partner visa application. Moshinsky J held that the Tribunal did not have such jurisdiction. The question in the present case is whether it was reasonable for the Tribunal to decide the subclass 801 permanent partner visa application when the subclass 820 temporary partner visa application had not been validly determined by the Tribunal.30.It is true that the applicant did not, as a matter of fact, hold a subclass 820 temporary partner visa, and had never held such a visa, at the time of the Tribunal’s decision on the subclass 801 permanent partner visa application. However, legally, the applicant had an outstanding review application with the Tribunal in respect of his subclass 820 temporary partner visa application. The review application in respect of the subclass 820 temporary partner visa had to be validly determined before the Tribunal could decide the subclass 801 permanent partner visa review application on the grounds that the applicant did not hold, and had never held, a subclass 820 temporary partner visa.31.It seems to me that, in the circumstances, the only reasonable approach was for the Tribunal to adjourn the hearing in relation to the subclass 801 permanent partner visa application until after the Tribunal had validly determined the subclass 820 temporary partner visa application. That is so, even though the Tribunal did not know, and could not have known, that the existing Tribunal decision in relation to the subclass 820 temporary partner visa application was no decision at all. That is, the Tribunal’s decision on the subclass 801 permanent partner visa application was unreasonable in a legal sense and must be set aside.Conclusion32.For the reasons given, it seems to me that there has been jurisdictional error in this case. The decision of the Tribunal relating to the applicant’s subclass 801 permanent partner visa application should be set aside and the matter should be remitted to the Tribunal for determination according to law. …

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The effect of Pt 8 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the MigrationAct) is that only decisions affected by jurisdictional error are liable to be “called into question” in a court and “subject to prohibition, mandamus, injunction declaration or certiorari”: see s 474(1) and Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia [2003] HCA 2; 211 CLR 476. A decision authorised to be made pursuant to the Migration Act will be affected by jurisdictional error if it is vitiated by legal unreasonableness: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; 249 CLR 332 (Li). That is because Parliament is taken to intend that statutory power will be exercised reasonably: see Li at [26] and [29] per French CJ, [63] per Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ and [88] per Gageler J. In Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11; 237 FCR 1 (Stretton), Allsop CJ summarised the relevant case law and principles underpinning the reasoning in Li as follows (Griffiths J and Wigney J agreeing at [87] and [90] respectively):5[The] statements of general principle in the three judgments [in Li] (French CJ, and Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ, and Gageler J) variously drew upon and drew together a number of well-known expressions and bodies of principle including, and without repeating all citations: the Constitutional necessity for legal control of discretion (power): Shrimpton v The Commonwealth [1945] HCA 4; 69 CLR 613 at 629-630; the necessary confinement, explicit or implicit, of any statutory discretion or power by the subject matter, scope and purpose of the legislation: Water Conservation and Irrigation Commission (NSW) v Browning [1947] HCA 21; 74 CLR 492 at 505; the implied legislative intention to condition statutory discretionary power by a requirement that it be exercised reasonably: Kruger v The Commonwealth [1997] HCA 27; 190 CLR 1 at 36; Abebe v The Commonwealth [1999] HCA 14; 197 CLR 510 at 554 [116]; Shrimpton at 620; South Australian Commissioner for Prices and Consumer Affairs v Charles Moore (Aust) Limited [1977] HCA 38; 139 CLR 449 at 466; and Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Limited [1986] HCA 40; 162 CLR 24 at 41-42; the necessity that a discretion be exercised according to the rules of reason and justice, not private opinion, according to law, and not humour, and within the limits that an honest and competent person would confine herself that is “legal and regular, not arbitrary, vague and fanciful”: Sharp v Wakefield [1891] AC 173 at 179; Shrimpton at 620; R v Anderson; Ex parte Ipec-Air Pty Ltd [1965] HCA 27; 113 CLR 177 at 189; Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30; 198 ALR 59 at 62 [9]; the illegitimacy of the exercise of a discretion in reaching a conclusion that no reasonable person could ever come to: Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 at 229, or where no sensible decision-maker acting with due appreciation of his or her responsibilities would so decide: Secretary of State for Education and Science v Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council [1977] AC 1014 at 1064; the requirement that the satisfaction or opinion of a decision-maker about the existence of a matter, in particular a jurisdictional fact, be reasonably formed: Council of the Municipality of Bankstown v Fripp [1919] HCA 41; 26 CLR 385 at 403; R v Connell; Ex parte Hetton Bellbird Collieries Ltd [1944] HCA 42; 69 CLR 407 at 430; Buck v Bavone [1976] HCA 24; 135 CLR 110 at 118-119, (though not referred to in Li, Starke J in Boucaut Bay Company Limited (in liq) v The Commonwealth [1927] HCA 59; 40 CLR 98 at 101, approved by Windeyer J in Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia v Brian Hatch Timber Co (Sales) Pty Ltd [1972] HCA 73; 128 CLR 28 at 57, said that reasonableness here meant not dishonestly, capriciously or arbitrarily and upon a rational ground for the belief); the settled principles of appellate review of judicial discretion in House v The King [1936] HCA 40; 55 CLR 499, and the guidance found therein in the analogy with judicial review of administrative action: Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Limited 162 CLR at 42; the principle that it is open to infer legal error if the result of the decision appears unreasonable assuming the correct question was addressed and the law was followed in the making of the decision: Avon Downs Proprietary Limited v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1949] HCA 26; 78 CLR 353 at 360; the principle concerned with unreasonableness in the exercise of delegated law-making power – if such laws were partial and unequal or manifestly unjust, or by operation they involved oppressive or gratuitous interference with rights that could not be reasonably justified: Kruse v Johnson [1898] 2 QB 91 at 99-100; and the fact that the conditioning of a power to be exercised reasonably has an analogy with the conditioning of the power with the obligation to afford procedural fairness: Gageler J in Li at [92].6Each of the judgments in Li sought to give explanatory content to the concept of legal unreasonableness. As was discussed in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; 231 FCR 437, the judgments in Li identified two different contexts in which the concept of legal unreasonableness was employed: a conclusion after the identification of jurisdictional error for a recognised species of error, and an “outcome-focused” conclusion without any specific jurisdictional error being identified: Singh at [44].7It is in relation to the second context, the “outcome-focused” application of the concept, that precise definition, beyond explanation of the operative notion and of the legal technique by which to make the assessment, becomes productive of complexity and confusion. There is “an area of decisional freedom” of the decision-maker, within which minds might differ. The width and boundaries of that freedom are framed by the nature and character of the decision, the terms of the relevant statute operating in the factual and legal context of the decision, and the attendant principles and values of the common law, in particular, of reasonableness. The boundaries can be expressed by the descriptions and explanatory phrases of the kind set out in [5] above.