FIP17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FIP17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 99

Appeal from: FIP17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 1239
File number(s): NSD 946 of 2018
Judge(s): WHEELAHAN J
Date of judgment: 12 February 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from the Federal Circuit Court – application for extension of time – appeal from interlocutory orders – application to rely upon amended grounds of appeal – new information – Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 473DD – whether failure to give consideration to a material component of the applicant’s claim – appeal allowed.
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A), s 25(1A), s 28(1)(b).

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 473CA, s 473CB, s 473DB, s 473DD, s 476.

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) r 35.13, r 44.12.

Cases cited:

AAM15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 231 FCR 452
AQU17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 111
AUH17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 388
BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 114
BVZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 254 FCR 221
CHF16 v Minister for Immigration [2017] FCAFC 192
CIH16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1317
Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1
CVS16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 951
Decor Corp Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397
Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 359 ALR 1
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 (2017) 257 FCR 111
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CQW17 [2018] FCAFC 110
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332
Minister far Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Minister for Immigration v CRY16 [2017] FCAFC 210
O’Brien v Komesaroff (1982) 150 CLR 310

Phoenix Institute of Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2017] FCAFC 155

Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 353 ALR 600

Plaintiff M64/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 258 CLR 173
Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v Apple Inc [2013] FCAFC 138
SZTOX v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 77
Teoh v Minister for Immigration (1994) 49 FCR 409
VAAW v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 259
VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 238 FCR 588

Date of hearing: 21 November 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 65
Counsel for the Applicant: Ms U Okereke-Fisher
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr J Kay Hoyle
Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting appearance.

ORDERS

NSD 946 of 2018
BETWEEN:

FIP17

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 99
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of FIP17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the applicant, a citizen of Sri Lanka of Tamil ethnicity, sought judicial review of the decision of the Migration Review Authority to affirm the delegate’s decision to refuse his application for a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa. The applicant claimed that he had left Sri Lanka due to persecution by the Sri Lankan authorities, who suspected his involvement with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The Authority accepted many factual elements of the applicant’s claims, including his displacement, interrogation, threats, and torture by the Sri Lankan Army and Navy. However, the Authority did not consider it plausible that the authorities would wait four years after the applicant left Sri Lanka to ask his family where he was and to seize a photo, and then make no further enquiries about him after June 2014.

The legal issues in the case included whether the Authority fell into jurisdictional error in determining not to consider new information submitted on behalf of the applicant, and whether the Federal Circuit Court was in error in dismissing the applicant’s application to that Court. The court found that the Authority had failed to give consideration to a material component of the applicant’s claim, namely that he had been employed in a hardware shop and had supplied timber, paint and hardware to LTTE educational, sporting and cultural organisations in the area. The court also found that the Federal Circuit Court was in error in dismissing the applicant’s application to that Court.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the Federal Circuit Court, quashed the decision of the Authority, and issued a writ of mandamus requiring the Authority to undertake a review of the applicant’s referred application for a protection visa according to law. The Minister was ordered to pay the applicant’s costs of the appeal, to be assessed in default of agreement, and there was no order as to the costs of the proceeding before the Federal Circuit Court.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The time within which the applicant may bring the application for leave to appeal is extended to 5 June 2018.

2. The applicant have leave to rely upon the amended ground of appeal in the draft amended notice of appeal annexed to the applicant’s submissions dated 9 November 2018 to the extent that it concerns the Authority’s consideration of the LTTE Intelligence Information.

3. The appeal is allowed.

4. The orders of the Federal Circuit Court made 16 May 2018 are set aside.

5. A writ of certiorari issue quashing the decision of the second respondent dated 1 November 2017.

6. A writ of mandamus issue requiring the second respondent to undertake a review of the appellant’s referred application for a protection visa according to law.

7. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal, to be assessed in default of agreement.

8. There be no order as to the costs of the proceeding before the Federal Circuit Court.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The application for leave to appeal raised an underlying issue concerning the application of s 473DD of the Migration Act, and whether the Authority fell into jurisdictional error in determining not to consider new information submitted on behalf of the applicant, and whether the Federal Circuit Court was in error in dismissing the applicant’s application to that Court.Background The applicant is a citizen of Sri Lanka of Tamil ethnicity who arrived in Australia in October 2012 after a boat on which he was travelling from Indonesia was intercepted. In August 2016 the applicant made an application for a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa. On 6 February 2017 a delegate of the Minister refused the application for the visa on the ground (inter alia) that the applicant was not a person in respect of whom Australia had protection obligations as outlined in s 36(2)(a) or s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act. As the delegate’s decision was a “fast track reviewable decision” for the purposes of Part 7AA of the Migration Act, the delegate’s decision was referred to the Authority as required by s 473CA of the Act. The Authority’s decision On 1 November 2017, the Authority determined to affirm the decision of the delegate not to grant the applicant a visa. It was this decision in respect of which the applicant sought judicial review in the Federal Circuit Court. In support of his application for a visa the applicant stated that he feared returning to Sri Lanka. The applicant stated that he had left Sri Lanka because he was being threatened, beaten and tortured by the Sri Lankan authorities because they suspected that he was involved with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Based on his generally consistent evidence of the incidents, the supporting documents, and the country information, the Authority accepted many factual elements of the applicant’s claims. The claims that the Authority accepted included the applicant’s displacement in Sri Lanka, his transfer between different camps, interrogations and beatings by the Sri Lankan Army (SLA), threats by the SLA that he would be killed, torture during questioning, and further questioning and harassment by the Sri Lankan Navy. These events occurred largely in 2009. The applicant claimed that the object of the interrogation, threats, and torture was to ascertain the applicant’s involvement with the LTTE. The Authority accepted that in 2010, the applicant was detained, taken to a camp, and beaten with a stick on suspicion that he had been involved with the LTTE. At this time he was also constantly harassed by SLA officials, interrogated, further threatened, and demands for money made. The applicant stated that in September 2010 he decided to leave Sri Lanka, because he feared he would be captured and interrogated again, and he was terrified that he would be subject to further violence or death at the hands of the SLA. In 2010, the applicant left Sri Lanka for Malaysia. The applicant claimed that while he was in Malaysia his friends told him that the SLA came and asked after his whereabouts in a village in Sri Lanka, and that his sister told him that in June 2014 the Criminal Investigation Department had visited his family home, enquired where he was, and forced his family to give them a photo of him. The Authority accepted that while he was in Malaysia, the SLA came and asked his friends in the village as to the applicant’s whereabouts. However, the Authority did not consider it plausible that the authorities would wait almost four years after the applicant left Sri Lanka to ask his family where he was and to seize a photo, and then make no further enquiries about him after June 2014.

Decision

Reasons for decision

As the delegate’s decision was a “fast track reviewable decision” for the purposes of Part 7AA of the Migration Act, the delegate’s decision was referred to the Authority as required by s 473CA of the Act. The Authority’s decision On 1 November 2017, the Authority determined to affirm the decision of the delegate not to grant the applicant a visa. It was this decision in respect of which the applicant sought judicial review in the Federal Circuit Court. In support of his application for a visa the applicant stated that he feared returning to Sri Lanka. The applicant stated that he had left Sri Lanka because he was being threatened, beaten and tortured by the Sri Lankan authorities because they suspected that he was involved with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Based on his generally consistent evidence of the incidents, the supporting documents, and the country information, the Authority accepted many factual elements of the applicant’s claims. The claims that the Authority accepted included the applicant’s displacement in Sri Lanka, his transfer between different camps, interrogations and beatings by the Sri Lankan Army (SLA), threats by the SLA that he would be killed, torture during questioning, and further questioning and harassment by the Sri Lankan Navy. These events occurred largely in 2009. The applicant claimed that the object of the interrogation, threats, and torture was to ascertain the applicant’s involvement with the LTTE. The Authority accepted that in 2010, the applicant was detained, taken to a camp, and beaten with a stick on suspicion that he had been involved with the LTTE. At this time he was also constantly harassed by SLA officials, interrogated, further threatened, and demands for money made. The applicant stated that in September 2010 he decided to leave Sri Lanka, because he feared he would be captured and interrogated again, and he was terrified that he would be subject to further violence or death at the hands of the SLA. In 2010, the applicant left Sri Lanka for Malaysia. The applicant claimed that while he was in Malaysia his friends told him that the SLA came and asked after his whereabouts in a village in Sri Lanka, and that his sister told him that in June 2014 the Criminal Investigation Department had visited his family home, enquired where he was, and forced his family to give them a photo of him. The Authority accepted that while he was in Malaysia, the SLA came and asked his friends in the village as to the applicant’s whereabouts. However, the Authority did not consider it plausible that the authorities would wait almost four years after the applicant left Sri Lanka to ask his family where he was and to seize a photo, and then make no further enquiries about him after June 2014. A material element of the applicant’s claim in relation to his involvement with the LTTE was that he was employed in a hardware shop from 1996 to 2002, and then between 2002 and 2008 he ran his own hardware shop in an area that was controlled by the LTTE. The Authority accepted that the majority of the applicant’s customers were officials from the LTTE, and that he supplied timber, paint and hardware to LTTE educational, sporting and cultural organisations in the area. The Authority also accepted that during interrogation the applicant told the SLA that when he had his hardware shop he sold most of his goods to the LTTE.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Counsel for the Minister submitted that by extension, although the primary judge’s reasons were brief, His Honour did not fall into error in dismissing the application to the Federal Circuit Court.ConsiderationExtension of time In relation to the application for extension of time within which the applicant was required to file an application for leave to appeal, the delay in filing the application was less than a week, and I accept the applicant’s explanation for the delay. As I indicated in paragraph [2] above, the Minister did not oppose the application for an extension of time. I will therefore extend time for the applicant to file the application for leave to appeal.Leave to appeal In relation to the application for leave to appeal, there are two issues which attract overlapping considerations: (i) leave to rely on a new argument; and (ii) leave to appeal because the order of the Federal Circuit Court was interlocutory.Leave to rely on a new argument As I noted at [29] above, the Minister submitted that the proposed ground of appeal was a little different from the corresponding ground of review that was before the Federal Circuit Court. Counsel for the applicant submitted that the proposed ground of appeal was the second ground of review before the Federal Circuit Court “as slightly amended”. Leave is required to raise a new argument on appeal. The reasons for this practice include the distinct roles of a court exercising original jurisdiction, and a court exercising appellate jurisdiction: Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1 at 7. In relation to judicial review of migration decisions such as the decision the subject of this application, the different functions of the Federal Circuit Court and this Court are the product of the provisions of Part 8 of the Migration Act, as the following observations of Perram J in AAM15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 231 FCR 452 at [14] emphasise –One is confronted, then, with the situation that this Court is being called upon in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction to decide the entirety of the matters which were for trial, including two new grounds, in circumstances where none of the issues to be decided in this Court were ever decided in the Court below. Section 476A of the Act explicitly removes this Court’s original jurisdiction in cases of this kind. Of course, the ability of this Court to hear fresh grounds of appeal or to entertain a notice of contention is not circumscribed by s 476A as they are both aspects of the Court’s appellate jurisdiction. But s 476A is, I think, relevant to whether I should, by leave, permit fresh grounds and a notice of contention when to do so will mean that this Court performs the trial court’s entire function. As a matter of substance, that is what s 476A appears aimed at preventing. There is this further matter, too: Pt 8 of the Act, which regulates judicial review of refugee determinations, ensures that there is one substantive trial in the Federal Circuit Court followed by one substantive appeal to this Court followed by a more cursory review by the High Court. If this Court, in substance, determines a case at first instance by entertaining fresh grounds and a notice of contention this structure is thwarted because no appeal lies to the High Court other than by special leave which is rarely granted and then only on the grounds set out in s 35A of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). If the matter is effectively tried in this Court then the appellant is denied a layer of appellate scrutiny.