FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
FIP17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 99
ORDERS
NSD 946 of 2018 BETWEEN: FIP17
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 99
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues in the case included whether the Authority fell into jurisdictional error in determining not to consider new information submitted on behalf of the applicant, and whether the Federal Circuit Court was in error in dismissing the applicant’s application to that Court. The court found that the Authority had failed to give consideration to a material component of the applicant’s claim, namely that he had been employed in a hardware shop and had supplied timber, paint and hardware to LTTE educational, sporting and cultural organisations in the area. The court also found that the Federal Circuit Court was in error in dismissing the applicant’s application to that Court.
The court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the Federal Circuit Court, quashed the decision of the Authority, and issued a writ of mandamus requiring the Authority to undertake a review of the applicant’s referred application for a protection visa according to law. The Minister was ordered to pay the applicant’s costs of the appeal, to be assessed in default of agreement, and there was no order as to the costs of the proceeding before the Federal Circuit Court.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The time within which the applicant may bring the application for leave to appeal is extended to 5 June 2018.
2. The applicant have leave to rely upon the amended ground of appeal in the draft amended notice of appeal annexed to the applicant’s submissions dated 9 November 2018 to the extent that it concerns the Authority’s consideration of the LTTE Intelligence Information.
3. The appeal is allowed.
4. The orders of the Federal Circuit Court made 16 May 2018 are set aside.
5. A writ of certiorari issue quashing the decision of the second respondent dated 1 November 2017.
6. A writ of mandamus issue requiring the second respondent to undertake a review of the appellant’s referred application for a protection visa according to law.
7. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal, to be assessed in default of agreement.
8. There be no order as to the costs of the proceeding before the Federal Circuit Court.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Counsel for the Minister submitted that by extension, although the primary judge’s reasons were brief, His Honour did not fall into error in dismissing the application to the Federal Circuit Court.ConsiderationExtension of time In relation to the application for extension of time within which the applicant was required to file an application for leave to appeal, the delay in filing the application was less than a week, and I accept the applicant’s explanation for the delay. As I indicated in paragraph [2] above, the Minister did not oppose the application for an extension of time. I will therefore extend time for the applicant to file the application for leave to appeal.Leave to appeal In relation to the application for leave to appeal, there are two issues which attract overlapping considerations: (i) leave to rely on a new argument; and (ii) leave to appeal because the order of the Federal Circuit Court was interlocutory.Leave to rely on a new argument As I noted at [29] above, the Minister submitted that the proposed ground of appeal was a little different from the corresponding ground of review that was before the Federal Circuit Court. Counsel for the applicant submitted that the proposed ground of appeal was the second ground of review before the Federal Circuit Court “as slightly amended”. Leave is required to raise a new argument on appeal. The reasons for this practice include the distinct roles of a court exercising original jurisdiction, and a court exercising appellate jurisdiction: Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1 at 7. In relation to judicial review of migration decisions such as the decision the subject of this application, the different functions of the Federal Circuit Court and this Court are the product of the provisions of Part 8 of the Migration Act, as the following observations of Perram J in AAM15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 231 FCR 452 at [14] emphasise –One is confronted, then, with the situation that this Court is being called upon in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction to decide the entirety of the matters which were for trial, including two new grounds, in circumstances where none of the issues to be decided in this Court were ever decided in the Court below. Section 476A of the Act explicitly removes this Court’s original jurisdiction in cases of this kind. Of course, the ability of this Court to hear fresh grounds of appeal or to entertain a notice of contention is not circumscribed by s 476A as they are both aspects of the Court’s appellate jurisdiction. But s 476A is, I think, relevant to whether I should, by leave, permit fresh grounds and a notice of contention when to do so will mean that this Court performs the trial court’s entire function. As a matter of substance, that is what s 476A appears aimed at preventing. There is this further matter, too: Pt 8 of the Act, which regulates judicial review of refugee determinations, ensures that there is one substantive trial in the Federal Circuit Court followed by one substantive appeal to this Court followed by a more cursory review by the High Court. If this Court, in substance, determines a case at first instance by entertaining fresh grounds and a notice of contention this structure is thwarted because no appeal lies to the High Court other than by special leave which is rarely granted and then only on the grounds set out in s 35A of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). If the matter is effectively tried in this Court then the appellant is denied a layer of appellate scrutiny.