DPE16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DPE16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 61

Appeal from: DPE16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 1824
File number: NSD 1433 of 2017
Judge: FARRELL J
Date of judgment: 8 February 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court of Australia – where delegate of respondent refused appellant Safe Haven Enterprise visa – where Immigration Assessment Authority affirmed decision of delegate – where Immigration Assessment Authority placed no weight on some corroborative documents based on adverse credibility findings and country information – whether Immigration Assessment Authority properly considered corroborative documents – appeal dismissed  
Cases cited:

BGZ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1095

Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336; HCA 34

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNSP (2010) 184 FCR 485; FCAFC 50

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Appellant S20/2002 (2003) 77 ALJR 1165; HCA 30

SZDGC v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 105 ALD 25; FCA 1638

SZVHO v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1499

WAGU v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 912

WAIJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 80 ALD 568; FCAFC 74

Date of hearing: 31 January 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 29
Solicitor for the Appellant: Mr S Hodges of Hodges Legal 
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T Reilly
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submitted save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 1433 of 2017
BETWEEN: DPE16
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

FARRELL J

DATE OF ORDER:

8 FEBRUARY 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed.

2.The appellant must pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

FARRELL J:

  1. This is an appeal of a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA).  The primary judge dismissed the appellant’s application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) to affirm a decision of a delegate of the Minister of Immigration and Border Protection to refuse the appellant’s application for a Safe Haven Enterprise visa (often abbreviated as “SHEV” in the IAA’s reasons).

    BACKGROUND

  2. The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka.  He arrived at Christmas Island as an unauthorised maritime arrival on 21 September 2012.  On 22 February 2016, the Department of Immigration and Border Protection received the appellant’s application for a Safe Haven Enterprise visa, which his migration agent lodged on his behalf.  He claimed to be ethnically Tamil and a Hindu who came from a village in the Batticaloa district…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 61
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of DPE16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellant challenged the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) which affirmed a delegate's refusal to grant him a Safe Haven Enterprise visa. The appellant argued that the IAA failed to properly consider certain corroborative documents that supported his claims. The Federal Circuit Court of Australia was asked to review the decision and determine whether the IAA properly considered the corroborative documents.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the IAA appropriately evaluated the corroborative evidence provided by the appellant. The appellant contended that the IAA should have considered the police report, a parliamentarian's letter, and character references that corroborated his claims. The Minister for Immigration and Border Protection argued that the IAA was correct in not giving weight to these documents, particularly in light of the adverse credibility findings and the country information indicating a prevalence of documentary fraud in the appellant's country of origin.

The court held that the IAA did not commit an error warranting appeal. The IAA had considered the content of the documents and, after finding the appellant's evidence implausible and taking into account the country information about document fraud, decided not to give the documents any weight. This approach was consistent with the principles established in MIC v SZSNP and Applicant S20/2002, which allow a decision-maker to assess the credibility of an applicant before considering corroborative evidence. The court found that the IAA's decision was rational and did not fall into jurisdictional error by disregarding the documents. The appeal was therefore dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The appellant must pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant, DPE16, is seeking a Safe Haven Enterprise visa which was refused by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. The refusal was affirmed by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA). The appellant's case is based on an incident that occurred on 20 August 2012, and he provided various documents to support his claims, including a police report, a letter from a parliamentarian, and several character references. The IAA found the appellant's evidence concerning the claimed events implausible and placed no weight on some corroborative documents due to adverse credibility findings and country information indicating the prevalence of fraudulent documents in Sri Lanka.

The matter is an appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The Federal Circuit Court dismissed the appellant's appeal against the decision of the IAA. The appeal now comes before the higher court, which must determine whether the IAA properly considered the corroborative documents submitted by the appellant.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The appellant’s representative relied in particular on the statements from MIC v SZNSP underlined below:35 Moreover, it was open to the RRT to conclude that, in view of all the evidence in the case, no reliance should be placed on the witness statement. The corroborative evidence was not corroborative evidence at all. It did not tend to prove that the first respondent’s evidence was true, nor does it act to strengthen that evidence. Corroborative evidence should be evidence independent of the person whose evidence is sought to be corroborated. It was evidence presented to the RRT by a person whom the RRT was of the opinion was fabricating her claims. The provenance of the witness statement was not established.It could easily have been created by the first respondent herself. It did not amount to corroborative evidence in the absence of proof of the provenance of the document and the reliability of the author, if in fact the author was Lu. If the first respondent was fabricating her claims, it would follow that she would fabricate the evidence upon which those claims are brought. That evidence would include the “corroborative” evidence of Lu. 36 When a decision maker has conducted a hearing of the kind which is conducted by the RRT and has heard the applicant, and has reached the tentative conclusion that the applicant’s claims have been fabricated, the decision-maker is entitled in our opinion to reject evidence which would, if accepted, have corroborated the applicant’s account. That does not mean that any evidence of corroboration could be rejected. It would depend upon the nature, content and quality of the corroborative evidence before a decision-maker could determine to reject it out of hand. In this case, as we have said, the document which is said to be the corroborative evidence is a document written in the Chinese language which has been interpreted, no doubt faithfully, into the English language and purports to be a statement of Lu. The applicant, whom the RRT believed was not a credible witness, proffered it as Lu’s statement, but there was no other evidence other than the applicant’s say so that it was. There is nothing irrational about the RRT in those circumstances rejecting the document by giving it no weight. In circumstances where the provenance of the document is unproved, but it is proffered by a witness whose credibility has been destroyed, the document has no more credit than the person proffering it. Consequently, the alternative argument relied upon by the appellants, outlined at [22] above, cannot be sustained. 37 Several further observations should be made concerning the type of situation addressed in Applicant S20/2002 77 ALJR 1165; 198 ALR 59. The case does not relieve the RRT from giving consideration to corroborative evidence. It concerns only the timing of that consideration. The case establishes that the RRT does not act irrationally, and thereby fall into jurisdictional error, by first making an assessment of the applicant’s credit and then giving attention to the corroborative evidence. 38 The RRT would fall into jurisdictional error if, after making an adverse credibility finding, it simply refused to consider the corroborative evidence. Applicant S20/2002 77 ALJR 1165; 198 ALR 59 does not sanction a practice of disregarding corroborative evidence. It still requires that the corroborative evidence be assessed and weighed in the balance with all the other evidence. Consequently, the observation concerning the dicta of McHugh and Gummow JJ at [49] in Applicant S20/2002 77 ALJR 1165; 198 ALR 59 made in SZDGC at [23] is probably misdirected. Those observations addressed the situation where the corroborative evidence was disregarded.

Decision

Reasons for decision

No appellable error by the primary judge has been established.CONCLUSION For these reasons, the appeal should be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Minister filed written submissions on which he relied. Counsel for the Minister made brief oral submissions. As I have generally accepted those submissions, they are reflected under the heading “Consideration”.CONSIDERATION The appellant’s central claim arises out of a single incident and the police report and parliamentarian’s letter went to aspects of that central claim. The character references were more general in nature. Once the IAA found that the central claim was not plausible (a finding not challenged by the appellant on the appeal), it was open to the IAA to take into account that fact and evidence of “country information” that documentary fraud was common in Sri Lanka to find that documents submitted by the appellant (through his representative) which went to the same issues as the central claim should be accorded no weight. Having regard to the authority of MIC v SZSNP at [33], [37]-[38], the appeal should be dismissed with costs. I address specific aspects of the appellant’s submissions below. This is not a case like WAIJ v MIMIA. There, at [52], the majority (Lee and Moore JJ) held that the Tribunal erred by considering that it could disregard documents it was otherwise bound to consider if it surmised that it was possible that the documents were fabricated. In MIC v SZNSP at [38], North and Lander JJ noted that Finkelstein J’s comments in SZDGC v MIMA at [23] concerning S20/2002 at [49] were “probably misdirected” as his comments dealt with a case where corroborative documents were disregarded. The IAA did not refuse to consider the documents submitted by the appellant, reject them out of hand or fail to have regard to their individual content. The appellant’s submissions take no account of paragraph [7] of the DR in which the IAA listed each of the documents on which the appellant relied to corroborate his claims about that day and briefly summarised their material content (see [5] above). The IAA then went on, at paragraph [8] of the DR, to decide that, having found the applicant’s evidence concerning the claimed events of 20 August 2012 implausible and in light of country information concerning the availability of fraudulent documents, it gave no weight to the police report, the parliamentarian’s letter and character references which addressed the matters found to be implausible. The IAA’s reasoning was consistent with the process of reasoning accepted by the Full Court in MIC v SZNSP at [33], which was: Thus, consistently with Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 77 ALJR 1165; 198 ALR 59 it was open to the RRT to assess the credit of the first respondent and then, in the light of that assessment, consider what weight should be given to the witness statement. This was the process followed by the RRT which it described in the sentence “Given the adverse credibility finding, the Tribunal does not give weight to the document”. Although expressed in the most cryptic terms, this statement shows that the RRT made an assessment of the value of the witness statement and then considered its effect in the light of the view it had formed to that point about the credibility of the first respondent.