FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
DPE16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 61
Appeal from: DPE16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 1824 File number: NSD 1433 of 2017 Judge: FARRELL J Date of judgment: 8 February 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court of Australia – where delegate of respondent refused appellant Safe Haven Enterprise visa – where Immigration Assessment Authority affirmed decision of delegate – where Immigration Assessment Authority placed no weight on some corroborative documents based on adverse credibility findings and country information – whether Immigration Assessment Authority properly considered corroborative documents – appeal dismissed Cases cited: BGZ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1095
Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336; HCA 34
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNSP (2010) 184 FCR 485; FCAFC 50
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Appellant S20/2002 (2003) 77 ALJR 1165; HCA 30
SZDGC v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 105 ALD 25; FCA 1638
SZVHO v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1499
WAGU v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 912
WAIJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 80 ALD 568; FCAFC 74
Date of hearing: 31 January 2018 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 29 Solicitor for the Appellant: Mr S Hodges of Hodges Legal Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T Reilly Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submitted save as to costs ORDERS
NSD 1433 of 2017 BETWEEN: DPE16
AppellantAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentIMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
FARRELL J
DATE OF ORDER:
8 FEBRUARY 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal is dismissed.
2.The appellant must pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
FARRELL J:
This is an appeal of a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA). The primary judge dismissed the appellant’s application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) to affirm a decision of a delegate of the Minister of Immigration and Border Protection to refuse the appellant’s application for a Safe Haven Enterprise visa (often abbreviated as “SHEV” in the IAA’s reasons).
BACKGROUND
The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka. He arrived at Christmas Island as an unauthorised maritime arrival on 21 September 2012. On 22 February 2016, the Department of Immigration and Border Protection received the appellant’s application for a Safe Haven Enterprise visa, which his migration agent lodged on his behalf. He claimed to be ethnically Tamil and a Hindu who came from a village in the Batticaloa district…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 61
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the court was whether the IAA appropriately evaluated the corroborative evidence provided by the appellant. The appellant contended that the IAA should have considered the police report, a parliamentarian's letter, and character references that corroborated his claims. The Minister for Immigration and Border Protection argued that the IAA was correct in not giving weight to these documents, particularly in light of the adverse credibility findings and the country information indicating a prevalence of documentary fraud in the appellant's country of origin.
The court held that the IAA did not commit an error warranting appeal. The IAA had considered the content of the documents and, after finding the appellant's evidence implausible and taking into account the country information about document fraud, decided not to give the documents any weight. This approach was consistent with the principles established in MIC v SZSNP and Applicant S20/2002, which allow a decision-maker to assess the credibility of an applicant before considering corroborative evidence. The court found that the IAA's decision was rational and did not fall into jurisdictional error by disregarding the documents. The appeal was therefore dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. The appellant must pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter is an appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The Federal Circuit Court dismissed the appellant's appeal against the decision of the IAA. The appeal now comes before the higher court, which must determine whether the IAA properly considered the corroborative documents submitted by the appellant.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Minister filed written submissions on which he relied. Counsel for the Minister made brief oral submissions. As I have generally accepted those submissions, they are reflected under the heading “Consideration”.CONSIDERATION The appellant’s central claim arises out of a single incident and the police report and parliamentarian’s letter went to aspects of that central claim. The character references were more general in nature. Once the IAA found that the central claim was not plausible (a finding not challenged by the appellant on the appeal), it was open to the IAA to take into account that fact and evidence of “country information” that documentary fraud was common in Sri Lanka to find that documents submitted by the appellant (through his representative) which went to the same issues as the central claim should be accorded no weight. Having regard to the authority of MIC v SZSNP at [33], [37]-[38], the appeal should be dismissed with costs. I address specific aspects of the appellant’s submissions below. This is not a case like WAIJ v MIMIA. There, at [52], the majority (Lee and Moore JJ) held that the Tribunal erred by considering that it could disregard documents it was otherwise bound to consider if it surmised that it was possible that the documents were fabricated. In MIC v SZNSP at [38], North and Lander JJ noted that Finkelstein J’s comments in SZDGC v MIMA at [23] concerning S20/2002 at [49] were “probably misdirected” as his comments dealt with a case where corroborative documents were disregarded. The IAA did not refuse to consider the documents submitted by the appellant, reject them out of hand or fail to have regard to their individual content. The appellant’s submissions take no account of paragraph [7] of the DR in which the IAA listed each of the documents on which the appellant relied to corroborate his claims about that day and briefly summarised their material content (see [5] above). The IAA then went on, at paragraph [8] of the DR, to decide that, having found the applicant’s evidence concerning the claimed events of 20 August 2012 implausible and in light of country information concerning the availability of fraudulent documents, it gave no weight to the police report, the parliamentarian’s letter and character references which addressed the matters found to be implausible. The IAA’s reasoning was consistent with the process of reasoning accepted by the Full Court in MIC v SZNSP at [33], which was: Thus, consistently with Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 77 ALJR 1165; 198 ALR 59 it was open to the RRT to assess the credit of the first respondent and then, in the light of that assessment, consider what weight should be given to the witness statement. This was the process followed by the RRT which it described in the sentence “Given the adverse credibility finding, the Tribunal does not give weight to the document”. Although expressed in the most cryptic terms, this statement shows that the RRT made an assessment of the value of the witness statement and then considered its effect in the light of the view it had formed to that point about the credibility of the first respondent.