FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BEC17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1884
Appeal from: BEC17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCCA 1711 File number: NSD 1279 of 2018 Judge: GRIFFITHS J Date of judgment: 30 November 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from orders and a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA) – whether leave should be granted for the appellant to raise two grounds of appeal which were not raised in the FCCA below – whether there is a sufficient explanation as to why the proposed grounds of appeal were not raised in the FCCA below – whether the proposed grounds of appeal have sufficient merit to justify leave being granted – Held: leave refused for the appellant to rely upon two proposed grounds of appeal. Leave granted for the appellant to rely upon a third proposed ground of appeal, but the appeal be dismissed with costs Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5J, 5LA, 473DC, 473DD, 473GB Cases cited: BVZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 958; 254 FCR 221
CHF16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 192; 257 FCR 148
CIH16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1317
Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 26; 77 ALJR 1088
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 [2017] FCAFC 176; 257 FCR 111
Minster for Immigration and Border Protection v CQW17 [2018] FCAFC 110
MZXDQ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCA 1632
Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration Border Protection [2018] HCA 16; 92 ALJR 481
VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158; 238 FCR 588
Date of hearing: 27 November 2018 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 55 Counsel for the Appellant: Ms U Okereke-Fisher Solicitor for the Appellant: Westside Legal Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr B D Kaplan Solicitor for the First Respondent: MinterEllison Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs ORDERS
NSD 1279 of 2018 BETWEEN: BEC17
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
GRIFFITHS J
DATE OF ORDER:
30 NOVEMBER 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Leave is refused for the appellant to rely upon proposed grounds 1 and 6 of the amended notice of appeal.
2.The appellant have leave to rely upon proposed ground 7 of the amended notice of appeal.
3.The appeal be dismissed.
4.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
GRIFFITHS J:
This is an appeal from orders and a judgment dated 29 June 2018 of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA).…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 1884
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the appellant should be granted leave to raise the two new grounds of appeal, and if so, whether these grounds had sufficient merit to warrant the appeal being heard. Additionally, the court needed to decide on the third proposed ground of appeal that the appellant wished to rely upon.
The court held that leave should not be granted for the appellant to raise the two grounds of appeal that were not initially presented in the FCCA, as there was no sufficient explanation as to why these grounds were not raised previously. The affidavits submitted by the appellant and his solicitor did not provide a satisfactory explanation for the omission. Regarding the third proposed ground of appeal, the court allowed the appellant to rely on it but dismissed it as it lacked merit. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed with costs.
In summary, the court refused leave for the appellant to raise two grounds of appeal, granted leave for the appellant to raise a third ground, and dismissed the appeal with costs. The reasons for the court's decision were based on the lack of a sufficient explanation for not raising the initial two grounds and the absence of merit in the third ground.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Leave is refused for the appellant to rely upon proposed grounds 1 and 6 of the amended notice of appeal.
2. The appellant have leave to rely upon proposed ground 7 of the amended notice of appeal.
3. The appeal be dismissed.
4. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter originated in the FCCA, where the appellant's application for review of the IAA's decision was dismissed. The appellant subsequently filed an amended notice of appeal, seeking to raise additional grounds of appeal that were not presented in the FCCA. The appellant's appeal was heard in the Federal Court of Australia, which was required to determine whether the appellant should be granted leave to rely on the new grounds of appeal. The court also needed to decide whether the proposed grounds of appeal had sufficient merit to warrant a favourable outcome for the appellant.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
As noted above, the Minister did not oppose the appellant relying upon ground 7. The Minister submitted that ground 7 should be dismissed. Consideration and disposition of the appeal It is appropriate first to address the question whether the appellant should have leave to raise proposed grounds 1 and 6. Leave is required because, as noted above, the appellant accepted that they were raised for the first time. The Minister did not contend that he would suffer any real prejudice if the grounds were now run. It is significant to recall that the appellant had legal representation below. This has a bearing on whether matters which were not put below should now be raised for the first time on appeal. In the particular circumstances of this matter, whether it is expedient in the interests of justice to grant leave includes consideration of the sufficiency of the explanation as to why these matters were not pressed in the amended application below and whether the proposed grounds have sufficient merit (see generally VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158; 238 FCR 588 at [46] to [48] per Kiefel, Weinberg and Stone JJ). These matters will now be addressed. On the first of those matters, the appellant’s current counsel said from the Bar table that she had taken a different view to the appellant’s previous legal representative as to the merits of proposed grounds 1 and 6. With the Court’s leave, the appellant filed two affidavits which purported to explain why these grounds had not been raised below. The first affidavit, which was affirmed by the appellant’s solicitor, simply stated that when he received the appellant’s submissions which had been prepared by his current counsel, that counsel had taken a different view to the grounds in the original notice of appeal. He explained that he subsequently prepared an amended notice of appeal. The affidavit contained no explanation as to why the grounds were not run below. The second affidavit, which was affirmed by the appellant, simply stated that after he lodged an appeal from the FCCA judgment, the appellant’s solicitor “made it clear to me that he would do his best to get a barrister to assist with my case”. The appellant deposed that he was informed by his solicitor (through an interpreter) that his solicitor had found a barrister to represent him at the hearing before this Court. Curiously, the appellant’s affidavit also annexed correspondence between the appellant’s solicitor and other barristers, whom the solicitor attempted to brief, but which attempts were described as “futile”. The appellant’s affidavit contained no explanation as to why grounds 1 and 6 were not run in the FCCA below. The lack of any sufficient explanation in either the appellant’s or his solicitor’s affidavit as to why the grounds were not run below weighs against any leave to appeal. Turning now to consider the merits of the proposed grounds, it is convenient to deal first with proposed ground 1. This ground has no merit for several reasons. First, the IAA plainly did address the appellant’s claim relating to extortion. It considered and rejected that claim for reasons which are set out in [14] of its reasons for decision. There, the IAA stated that the appellant had provided “no evidence to indicate why his household would be perceived as a high value target, such that it would be of particular interest to criminals or militia” (emphasis added). The appellant himself had stated in his statutory declaration that it was not possible to distinguish gang members from the militia members.