BNV18 v Minister for Home Affairs (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BNV18 v Minister for Home Affairs (No 2) [2019] FCA 378

Appeal from: BNV18 & Ors v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor [2018] FCCA 2061
File number: NSD 1376 of 2018
Judge: MURPHY J
Date of judgment: 21 March 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from orders of the Federal Circuit Court dismissing the appellants’ application for judicial review of a decision by the Immigration Assessment Authority under Part 7AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where IAA affirmed delegate’s decision refusing to grant the appellants a protection visa – whether Authority made a jurisdictional error by misunderstanding or misapplying s 473DD in relation to new information provided – whether Authority made a jurisdictional error by making an adverse credibility finding based on a misunderstanding of evidence
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Cases cited:

AVQ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 361 ALR 227; [2018] FCAFC 133

BTT16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 251

FKO17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 98

John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Rivkin (2003) 201 ALR 77; [2003] HCA 50

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CQW17 [2018] FCAFC 110

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v SGLB (2004) 207 ALR 12; [2004] HCA 32

NAJT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 147 FCR 51; [2005] FCAFC 134

Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 16

SZTQP v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection (2015) 232 FCR 452; [2015] FCAFC 121

Tickner v Chapman (1995) 57 FCR 451

WZAQU v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 233 FCR 534; [2013] FCA 327

Date of hearing: 12 February 2019
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 65
Counsel for the Appellants: Mr G Foster
Solicitor for the Appellants: Senthil Solicitor & Barrister
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T Reilly
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Minter Ellison Lawyers
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice

ORDERS

NSD 1376 of 2018
BETWEEN:

BNV18

First Appellant

BOG18

Second Appellant

BOH18 (and others named in the Schedule)

Third Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MURPHY J

DATE OF ORDER:

21 MARCH 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal by the First Appellant be allowed. 

2.Insofar as the orders of the Federal Circuit Court of 27 July 2018 relate to the first appellant they be set aside and, in lieu thereof, the following orders are substituted:

(a)an order in the nature of certiorari to quash the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority made 6 March 2018 insofar as the decision relates to the First Appellant;

(b)an order in the nature of mandamus requiring the Immigration Assessment Authority to re-determine according to law…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 378
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of BNV18 v Minister for Home Affairs (No 2), the applicants, who had arrived in Australia as unauthorised maritime arrivals from Sri Lanka, sought judicial review of decisions by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) to affirm the delegate's refusal to grant them protection visas. The applicants argued that the IAA erred in its interpretation and application of section 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), which governs the circumstances in which the IAA may consider new information put forward by a referred applicant. Specifically, the applicants contended that the IAA failed to properly consider whether there were exceptional circumstances to justify considering the new information and whether the new information was credible personal information which was not previously known and, had it been known, may have affected the consideration of the applicants' claims.

The court was required to determine whether the IAA made a jurisdictional error by misunderstanding or misapplying section 473DD in relation to the new information provided, and whether the IAA made a jurisdictional error by making an adverse credibility finding based on a misunderstanding of the evidence. The court examined the IAA's decision-making process and its interpretation of section 473DD, particularly in relation to the consideration of the arrest warrant as new information.

The court found that the IAA did not engage in an active intellectual process when determining whether the arrest warrant was credible information, as required by section 473DD(b)(ii). The IAA did not adopt a careful, fair and reasonable approach to assessing the credibility of the arrest warrant and failed to avoid engaging in a "quest to disbelieve" or irrationality or legal unreasonableness in approaching that assessment. The court concluded that the IAA's reasoning showed that it did not engage in an active intellectual process directed at the document and its contents.

As a result, the court allowed the appeal by the first appellant and set aside the orders of the Federal Circuit Court relating to the first appellant. The court ordered that the decision of the IAA be quashed insofar as it related to the first appellant, and that the IAA re-determine the application for review of the delegate's decision according to law. The court dismissed the appeal by the fifth appellant and granted leave to the parties to make further submissions in relation to the appeals by the second, third, and fourth appellants. The court made no order as to costs in the appeal or in the proceeding before the Federal Circuit Court.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal by the First Appellant be allowed.

2. Insofar as the orders of the Federal Circuit Court of 27 July 2018 relate to the first appellant they be set aside and, in lieu thereof, the following orders are substituted:

(a) an order in the nature of certiorari to quash the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority made 6 March 2018 insofar as the decision relates to the First Appellant;

(b) an order in the nature of mandamus requiring the Immigration Assessment Authority to re-determine according to law the application for review of the decision of the delegate of the First Respondent made 29 August 2017 to refuse to grant the First Appellant a protection visa; and

(c) there be no order as to costs of the proceeding before the Federal Circuit Court.

3. The appeal by the Fifth Appellant be dismissed.

4. The parties have leave to make further submissions in relation to the appeals by the Second, Third and Fourth Appellants.

5. There be no order as to costs in the appeal.

6. The parties have liberty to apply in relation to costs, within seven days.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

This appeal concerns the proper application of s 473DD of the Act, which governs the circumstances in which the Authority may consider new information put forward by a referred applicant. The factual and procedural background The first appellant is a 35-year old male citizen of Sri Lanka who illegally left that country by boat in November 2012 and arrived in Australia in December 2012, along with the fourth appellant, his almost 7-year-old son, and members of his extended family. As an “unauthorised maritime arrival” he was at that time precluded from making a valid visa application. Subsequently the Minister lifted the bar and invited him and his family to apply for either a Temporary Protection (subclass 785) visa or a Safe Haven Enterprise (subclass 790) visa (SHEV) (collectively, protection visas). On or about 10 May 2017 the first appellant applied for a SHEV. He claimed that in Sri Lanka he will face a real chance of serious or significant harm now or in the reasonably foreseeable future on the basis of an imputed political opinion as an LTTE sympathiser, his Tamil ethnicity, his Christian religion, his being a Tamil from the east, his having illegally departed from Sri Lanka twice and/or his being a failed asylum seeker. The first appellant claimed that his illegal departure from Sri Lanka in November 2012 was not the first time he had illegally departed the country. In his SHEV application he stated that he “was arrested and taken to court while attempting to leave Sri Lanka illegally”. He expanded on this at interview, recorded in the delegate’s reasons as follows:In September 2012 he attempted to leave Sri Lanka with his mother and sister in law... They were captured by the Navy with many other people. They were produced in Trincomalee court two days after being captured. He pleaded guilty to departing illegally. His brother in law acted as a guarantor and signed as a surety to secure his release. He [was] supposed to attend another court hearing 2-3 months later but he left the country for the second time in November 2012. According to his brother in law an arrest warrant was issued for him because he did not attend the second court hearing. However, he does not have [any] documentary evidence of the arrest warrant. On 29 August 2017 the delegate refused to grant the first appellant a protection visa. The delegate’s decision was a “fast track reviewable decision” under s 473BB in Pt 7AA of the Act. Under s 473CA the Minister was required to refer the decision to the Authority as soon reasonably practicable, and the Minister did so on 1 September 2017. Section 473DB(1) required the Authority to review the delegate’s decision by considering the review material provided to it under s 473CB, without accepting or requesting “new information” and without interviewing the referred applicant. Section 473DD provides:Considering new information in exceptional circumstancesFor the purposes of making a decision in relation to a fast track reviewable decision, the Immigration Assessment Authority must not consider any new information unless:(a)the Authority is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances to justify considering the new information; and(b)the referred applicant satisfies the Authority that, in relation to any new information given, or proposed to be given, to the Authority by the referred applicant, the new information:(i) was not, and could not have been, provided to the Minister before the Minister made the decision under section 65; or(ii) it is credible personal information which was not previously known and, had it been known, may have affected the consideration of the referred applicant’s claims.The Authority’s decision

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 6 March 2018 the Authority decided that it was precluded by operation of s 473DD from considering the Arrest Warrant. The Authority affirmed the delegate’s decision to refuse to grant the first appellant a protection visa (the Authority’s decision). The application to the Federal Circuit Court On 27 March 2018 the appellants filed an originating application in the Federal Circuit Court seeking judicial review of the Authority’s decision. By an amended application filed on 22 June 2018 the appellants advanced 14 grounds of review, but only Ground 9 is relevant to the appeal. Ground 9 was in the following terms:IAA erred in declining to consider the arrest warrant being new information on the basis that ‘the applicant had not satisfied’ IAA ‘as to either of the matters in s 473DD(b)’ [paragraph 6] when IAA had not actually considered s 473DD(b)(i), nor had considered s 473DD(a), and accordingly the decision declining to consider the arrest warrant was not based on a proper consideration of the relevant law. Ground 9 challenged the Authority’s application of subs (a) and (b)(i) of s 473DD but did not, in terms, raise any claim in relation to subs (b)(ii). The primary judgment however shows that the argument under Ground 9 was not limited to arguments in relation to only s 473DD(a) and (b)(i). Following a show cause hearing on 27 July 2018 the primary judge handed down reasons for judgment, dealing with Ground 9 at [10]-[15]. His Honour concluded at [13]-[17], as follows:[13]It is apparent that the Authority declined to receive the new information in reliance on both elements of s.473DD(b) of the Migration Act. The Authority did not consider whether there were exceptional circumstances for the purposes of s.473DD(a). As the Full Federal Court made clear in CQW17, the Authority does not fall into jurisdictional error simply by failing to consider subparagraph (a) when reliance is placed on subparagraph (b).[14]Section 473DD of the Migration Act imposes a statutory prohibition on the Authority considering new information. That prohibition applies unless there are exceptional circumstances that justify considering the new information and the new information meets one of the requirements of either s.473DD(b)(i) or (ii) of the Migration Act; ss.473DD(a) and (b) impose cumulative requirements. [15]The Authority’s reasoning above at [6] discloses that it engaged in substance with both ss.473DD(b)(i) and (ii) and that the applicant husband had not satisfied it of either matter, as required. [16]However, as the Full Court also made clear at [71]-[72] of its judgment in CQW17, there may be circumstances in which exceptional circumstances bear upon the consideration of subparagraph (b)(i) or (b)(ii). In the present case there were no exceptional circumstances for the Authority to consider. The arrest warrant was proffered to the Authority without comment. The warrant had been referred to at the interview with the Minister’s delegate but not provided at that time.[17]The Authority considered that circumstance. The Authority also took into account its difficulties with the document on its face. I perceive in this case no arguable case of jurisdictional error by the Authority in the manner in which it approached the question of the new information. Thus, no arguable case of jurisdictional error is disclosed by Ground 9.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Authority concluded by stating:The applicant has not satisfied me as to either of the matters in s 473DD(b). I cannot consider this new information.The Authority’s consideration of s 473DD(b(ii) - whether credible personal information The first question raised by the appeal is whether, in deciding that the Arrest Warrant was not credible personal information which was not previously known and, had it been known, may have affected the consideration of the first appellant’s claims, the Authority misapplied or misconstrued s 473DD(b)(ii). Some parts of that question are not in contest. It is plain that the Arrest Warrant was “not previously known” to the Authority; the first time the warrant was provided was under cover of the first appellant’s submission to the Authority. There is no real question that consideration of the warrant may have affected consideration of the first appellant’s claims. The Minister did not seek to argue that the Arrest Warrant, if accepted as genuine, could not have done so. Nor, in circumstances where the Arrest Warrant relates to the first appellant alone, can there be any question that it is “personal” information. In deciding whether it was satisfied that the Arrest Warrant is credible information the Authority was required to engage in an “active intellectual process”: Tickner v Chapman (1995) 57 FCR 451 at 462-3 (Black CJ); WZAQU v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 233 FCR 534; [2013] FCA 327 at [12] (Flick J); see also NAJT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 147 FCR 51; [2005] FCAFC 134 at [46] (Hill J) and [212] (Madgwick J, Conti J agreeing). It was obliged to adopt a careful, fair and reasonable approach to assessing the credibility of the Arrest Warrant so as to avoid engaging in a “quest to disbelieve”, and to avoid irrationality or legal unreasonableness in approaching that assessment: AVQ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 361 ALR 227; [2018] FCAFC 133 at [24] (Kenny, Griffiths and Mortimer JJ). The Minister argues that, on a fair reading of its decision, there is no proper basis to suggest that the Authority did not engage in an active intellectual process when determining whether the Arrest Warrant was credible information. The Minister argues that the Authority did not need to make an express finding as to whether the Arrest Warrant was genuine and that it was enough for the Authority to note its doubt about the document’s reliability before finding that subs (b)(ii) was not satisfied. In the Minister’s submission the first appellant’s explanations regarding the deficiencies on the face of the Arrest Warrant do not indicate that the Authority failed to engage in an active intellectual process or reveal any other jurisdictional error; they simply argue with the Authority’s reasons and seek merits review. I do not accept the Minister’s submissions. The Authority’s reasons, read fairly and without an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error, show that in concluding that subs (b)(ii) was not satisfied, the Authority did not adopt a careful, fair and reasonable approach and did not engage in an active intellectual process directed at the document and its contents.