FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BNV18 v Minister for Home Affairs (No 2) [2019] FCA 378
Appeal from: BNV18 & Ors v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor [2018] FCCA 2061 File number: NSD 1376 of 2018 Judge: MURPHY J Date of judgment: 21 March 2019 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from orders of the Federal Circuit Court dismissing the appellants’ application for judicial review of a decision by the Immigration Assessment Authority under Part 7AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where IAA affirmed delegate’s decision refusing to grant the appellants a protection visa – whether Authority made a jurisdictional error by misunderstanding or misapplying s 473DD in relation to new information provided – whether Authority made a jurisdictional error by making an adverse credibility finding based on a misunderstanding of evidence Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Cases cited: AVQ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 361 ALR 227; [2018] FCAFC 133
BTT16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 251
FKO17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 98
John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Rivkin (2003) 201 ALR 77; [2003] HCA 50
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CQW17 [2018] FCAFC 110
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v SGLB (2004) 207 ALR 12; [2004] HCA 32
NAJT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 147 FCR 51; [2005] FCAFC 134
Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 16
SZTQP v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection (2015) 232 FCR 452; [2015] FCAFC 121
Tickner v Chapman (1995) 57 FCR 451
WZAQU v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 233 FCR 534; [2013] FCA 327
Date of hearing: 12 February 2019 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 65 Counsel for the Appellants: Mr G Foster Solicitor for the Appellants: Senthil Solicitor & Barrister Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T Reilly Solicitor for the First Respondent: Minter Ellison Lawyers Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice ORDERS
NSD 1376 of 2018 BETWEEN: BNV18
First Appellant
BOG18
Second Appellant
BOH18 (and others named in the Schedule)
Third Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
MURPHY J
DATE OF ORDER:
21 MARCH 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal by the First Appellant be allowed.
2.Insofar as the orders of the Federal Circuit Court of 27 July 2018 relate to the first appellant they be set aside and, in lieu thereof, the following orders are substituted:
(a)an order in the nature of certiorari to quash the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority made 6 March 2018 insofar as the decision relates to the First Appellant;
(b)an order in the nature of mandamus requiring the Immigration Assessment Authority to re-determine according to law…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 378
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine whether the IAA made a jurisdictional error by misunderstanding or misapplying section 473DD in relation to the new information provided, and whether the IAA made a jurisdictional error by making an adverse credibility finding based on a misunderstanding of the evidence. The court examined the IAA's decision-making process and its interpretation of section 473DD, particularly in relation to the consideration of the arrest warrant as new information.
The court found that the IAA did not engage in an active intellectual process when determining whether the arrest warrant was credible information, as required by section 473DD(b)(ii). The IAA did not adopt a careful, fair and reasonable approach to assessing the credibility of the arrest warrant and failed to avoid engaging in a "quest to disbelieve" or irrationality or legal unreasonableness in approaching that assessment. The court concluded that the IAA's reasoning showed that it did not engage in an active intellectual process directed at the document and its contents.
As a result, the court allowed the appeal by the first appellant and set aside the orders of the Federal Circuit Court relating to the first appellant. The court ordered that the decision of the IAA be quashed insofar as it related to the first appellant, and that the IAA re-determine the application for review of the delegate's decision according to law. The court dismissed the appeal by the fifth appellant and granted leave to the parties to make further submissions in relation to the appeals by the second, third, and fourth appellants. The court made no order as to costs in the appeal or in the proceeding before the Federal Circuit Court.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal by the First Appellant be allowed.
2. Insofar as the orders of the Federal Circuit Court of 27 July 2018 relate to the first appellant they be set aside and, in lieu thereof, the following orders are substituted:
(a) an order in the nature of certiorari to quash the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority made 6 March 2018 insofar as the decision relates to the First Appellant;
(b) an order in the nature of mandamus requiring the Immigration Assessment Authority to re-determine according to law the application for review of the decision of the delegate of the First Respondent made 29 August 2017 to refuse to grant the First Appellant a protection visa; and
(c) there be no order as to costs of the proceeding before the Federal Circuit Court.
3. The appeal by the Fifth Appellant be dismissed.
4. The parties have leave to make further submissions in relation to the appeals by the Second, Third and Fourth Appellants.
5. There be no order as to costs in the appeal.
6. The parties have liberty to apply in relation to costs, within seven days.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Authority concluded by stating:The applicant has not satisfied me as to either of the matters in s 473DD(b). I cannot consider this new information.The Authority’s consideration of s 473DD(b(ii) - whether credible personal information The first question raised by the appeal is whether, in deciding that the Arrest Warrant was not credible personal information which was not previously known and, had it been known, may have affected the consideration of the first appellant’s claims, the Authority misapplied or misconstrued s 473DD(b)(ii). Some parts of that question are not in contest. It is plain that the Arrest Warrant was “not previously known” to the Authority; the first time the warrant was provided was under cover of the first appellant’s submission to the Authority. There is no real question that consideration of the warrant may have affected consideration of the first appellant’s claims. The Minister did not seek to argue that the Arrest Warrant, if accepted as genuine, could not have done so. Nor, in circumstances where the Arrest Warrant relates to the first appellant alone, can there be any question that it is “personal” information. In deciding whether it was satisfied that the Arrest Warrant is credible information the Authority was required to engage in an “active intellectual process”: Tickner v Chapman (1995) 57 FCR 451 at 462-3 (Black CJ); WZAQU v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 233 FCR 534; [2013] FCA 327 at [12] (Flick J); see also NAJT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 147 FCR 51; [2005] FCAFC 134 at [46] (Hill J) and [212] (Madgwick J, Conti J agreeing). It was obliged to adopt a careful, fair and reasonable approach to assessing the credibility of the Arrest Warrant so as to avoid engaging in a “quest to disbelieve”, and to avoid irrationality or legal unreasonableness in approaching that assessment: AVQ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 361 ALR 227; [2018] FCAFC 133 at [24] (Kenny, Griffiths and Mortimer JJ). The Minister argues that, on a fair reading of its decision, there is no proper basis to suggest that the Authority did not engage in an active intellectual process when determining whether the Arrest Warrant was credible information. The Minister argues that the Authority did not need to make an express finding as to whether the Arrest Warrant was genuine and that it was enough for the Authority to note its doubt about the document’s reliability before finding that subs (b)(ii) was not satisfied. In the Minister’s submission the first appellant’s explanations regarding the deficiencies on the face of the Arrest Warrant do not indicate that the Authority failed to engage in an active intellectual process or reveal any other jurisdictional error; they simply argue with the Authority’s reasons and seek merits review. I do not accept the Minister’s submissions. The Authority’s reasons, read fairly and without an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error, show that in concluding that subs (b)(ii) was not satisfied, the Authority did not adopt a careful, fair and reasonable approach and did not engage in an active intellectual process directed at the document and its contents.