MIGRATION – appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court which dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision by the Immigration Assessment Authority – application for leave to allege ground of appeal not argued below – whether the Authority made findings which were unreasonable, irrational, illogical or not supported by evidence – whether the Authority failed to properly consider the risk of harm which the appellant would face – application dismissed
Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category:
Catchwords
Number of paragraphs:
65
Counsel for the Appellant:
Ms F Graham
Solicitor for the Appellant:
Hearn Legal
Counsel for the First Respondent:
Mr T Reilly
Solicitor for the First Respondent:
Minter Ellison Lawyers
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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The matter of BXZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved the appellant, a minor, appealing the Federal Circuit Court's dismissal of his application for judicial review of a decision by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) to refuse his application for a protection visa. The appellant's application was based on claims of persecution and fear of harm if returned to Sri Lanka. The legal issues before the court included whether the IAA made findings that were unreasonable, irrational, illogical, or not supported by evidence, and whether the IAA failed to properly consider the risk of harm the appellant would face upon return to Sri Lanka.
The court examined the IAA's decision and found that it was plausible the appellant was involved in a schoolyard accident, but the IAA did not accept the appellant's account of the claimed consequences. The IAA also did not accept that the appellant's family was targeted, threatened, and harassed by the other boy's family after the incident. The IAA considered the appellant's claims to fear persecution if returned to Sri Lanka were not credible and that he had no genuine fear of harm on account of the claimed threats. The IAA found that the appellant's claims to fear persecution by Sri Lankan authorities as a failed asylum seeker who had twice been returned to Sri Lanka were also not credible.
The court found that the IAA's findings were not unreasonable, irrational, illogical, or not supported by evidence. The IAA had considered the appellant's claims and evidence provided, and made findings based on the plausibility and credibility of the claims. The court also found that the IAA had properly considered the risk of harm the appellant would face upon return to Sri Lanka, and had found that the treatment he would face would not amount to significant harm as defined under the Act.
Accordingly, the court granted leave to the appellant to file an amended notice of appeal, but dismissed the appeal. The appellant was ordered to pay the first respondent's costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The Appellant be granted leave to file an Amended Notice of Appeal in the form annexed to the affidavit of Christian Hearn affirmed 11 February 2020.
2. The appeal be dismissed.
3. The Appellant pay the First Respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Pursuant to a proposed amended notice of appeal the appellant alleges that the IAA fell into jurisdictional error and that the Federal Circuit Court erred in not so finding. The ground in the proposed amended appeal was not raised before the Federal Circuit Court and the appellant requires leave before he may advance a ground raised for the first time on appeal. For the reasons I explain, it is appropriate to grant leave to advance the fresh ground but to dismiss the appeal. THE BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The appellant first arrived at the Cocos Islands as a twelve year old on 29 April 2013, by boat and without a visa, together with an uncle and aunt, their son and another cousin. Following the aunt and uncle being interviewed by the officers of the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (the Department) in an “enhanced screening process” the appellant and the rest of the family were returned to Sri Lanka. Less than two months later, the appellant returned to Australia by the same means, this time unaccompanied, arriving on 19 July 2013. On 12 August 2013 he was interviewed by an officer of the Department in an Irregular Maritime Arrival and Induction Interview at which time he said that he had when he returned to Sri Lanka he “was arrested and kept for one day for trying to come to Australia”. On 23 September 2015, by which time he was 14 years old, the appellant applied for a protection visa and provided a statement setting out the basis of his claim for protection. His initial claims for protection can be summarised as set out below. It should though be kept in mind that the proposed ground of appeal alleges that the IAA erred in its consideration of the nature and risk of the particular harm which the appellant would face upon return to Sri Lanka, and not on the events which the appellant claims led him to flee Sri Lanka in the first place:(a)In or about March 2011 the appellant was involved in an incident at school. While playing ‘tip and run’ the appellant tipped a Sinhalese boy on the shoulder and the other boy fell and hit his head on a stone. The appellant was blamed and was said to have pushed the other boy over, who was badly hurt and fell into a coma.(b)Soon after the incident the appellant was sent to stay at his aunt’s place in Colombo, 140 km from where he lived, because his parents became worried for his safety and thought the family of the other boy would hurt him in revenge. It is common for people to take revenge in Sri Lanka. (c)Four or five times during 2011, including in July 2011, the boy’s parents went to the appellant’s parents’ house and threatened that “we will kill your son” or do the same thing to your son that he did to my son (i.e. put him in a coma). His mother told the boy’s parents that he was studying in India. (d)In August 2011 the boy’s parents threatened the appellant’s father. His mother told him the boy’s parents asked where the appellant was, demanded that the appellant’s parents “bring him here”, and threatened to “do something to your husband”. The appellant’s father was detained by the police from about August 2011 until December 2011 as he refused to take the appellant to the police station for questioning. The appellant’s mother then paid for some medical treatment for the boy and the appellant’s father was released. (e)The boys’ parents came to the appellant’s house a few times in 2012 and made further threats. They were about to strike his father and his parents called the police to help them negotiate with the other family. (f)One night in 2012 a Sinhalese man came to the appellant’s parents’ house and demanded his father’s motorbike. His mother refused to give him the motorbike and asked him to come back when her husband was home. The Sinhalese man broke a window in an unsuccessful attempt to gain access to the house, but then left. Later that evening, about 10-14 Sinhalese speaking people came to the house, some of whom were relatives of the boy in the coma. They broke down the front door and came inside and tried to hit his mother. His mother was there holding his hand, holding his sister’s hand in other hand and had a baby on her back. The intruders said they would bash the appellant, and that they would do something to him. The appellant understood that to mean that they were threatening to kill him. The appellant and his family escaped through the back door, and hid under a bed in the neighbour’s house. The appellant’s mother called the police and the Sinhalese men ran away when they heard sirens.(g)When the appellant and his family returned to their home the following day, they saw that everything was broken, and some items and money had been stolen. Later that day the appellant’s father arrived home from his work as a taxi driver some distance away. He was worried and wanted the appellant to have a safer life. He told the appellant he would try to organise for him to go to Australia. (h)The appellant’s grandfather was a witness to the attack at the house, and he gave a statement to the police. However, his grandfather died about six months later and the police would not continue the case without his evidence. (i)The appellant and his family moved to a house of a friend of his father and stayed there for about one month, and then moved to another house in a new town. When the appellant’s father went to their old home, the neighbours told him that the attackers had again returned looking for them. The appellant’s father was very worried about the appellant being attacked as a witness to the crime. (j)Shortly thereafter the appellant’s father sent the appellant to Colombo by bus with his uncle, who was to take him to Australia to be safe. They made it to Australia but they were sent back and the appellant then went to live with his family at a new house in a third town. (k)Upon the appellant’s return to Sri Lanka, his father told him he needed to try to go to Australia again as he would be safe in Australia. His father took him to Colombo and after staying in a hotel for some time his father took him to a boat. He and his father were both crying. (l)The other boy’s father and another person came to the appellant’s family’s house in February 2013 and June 2014 asking the whereabouts of the appellant. His mother told them he was in India. The other boy’s father and other people also came to the appellant’s family’s house twice in July 2014. In August 2014 the appellant’s father received a threatening telephone call and he was told: “You can be happy for a while, but soon we will find your son and kill him and your happiness will end”. (m)The appellant fears that if he is returned to Sri Lanka the family of the boy who was in a coma will kill him. (n)The appellant’s mother told the appellant that the other boy’s parents have money and influence, and because the appellant’s family is Tamil and Christian, they do not have influence. The police put pressure on his family because they are Tamil, including by not properly investigating the attacks on them, discriminating against them and detaining his father without charge for five months on a false allegation of his father possessing a bomb. He fears he will be targeted for these reasons as well, even though the incident which left the other boy in a coma was just an accident while playing.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
In relation to complementary protection, the IAA found (at [85]-[94]) that the treatment which the appellant would face upon return to Sri Lanka as a failed asylum seeker and a person who has committed an offence under the I&E Act, including a possible short period of detention in poor prison conditions while waiting to appear before a Magistrate, would not amount to significant harm as defined under the Act. Differently to the earlier assessment of the applicant’s status as a refugee, the IAA’s analysis proceeded on the basis that the appellant would be charged upon arrival in Sri Lanka, but said that the appellant would face a fine rather than a custodial sentence and that there was no risk that he would face any ‘significant harm’ for the purpose of s 36(2)(aa) of the Act. The Federal Circuit Court decision On 22 July 2016, the appellant filed an application for judicial review of the IAA decision in the Federal Circuit, setting out seven grounds. On 5 October 2018 the primary judge found none of the grounds established and dismissed the application. It is unnecessary to set out the grounds or the primary judge’s reasons for dismissing the application when there is no challenge to the primary judge’s reasons. The proposed amended appeal raises only a fresh ground of appeal, not raised below.THE APPEAL TO THIS COURTThe Notice of Appeal The appellant appealed from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court by a Notice of Appeal filed on 26 October 2018, which raised the following two grounds of appeal: 1.The Federal Circuit Court erred in failing to find that both respondents and their delegates acted irrationally or unreasonably and unlawfully by taking into account irrelevant considerations and failed to take into account relevant considerations without good cause and reason to the exclusion of others.2.The Federal Circuit Court erred in failing to find that both respondents and their delegates failed to consider the consequences of the data breach by the First respondent alerting the Sri Lanka authorities the appellant had managed to twice departed [sic] Sri Lanka illegally which is unprecedented, that he will be punished severely on his return to receiving country. The Second Respondent engaged in jurisdictional error at [71] by failing to consider and apply the High Court’s judgment in Minister for Immigration v SZSSJ at [91] concerning its assessment of the claims based on the illegal release of the appellant’s personal private information by the department and failed to consider those claims. On 13 February 2019, the appellant’s litigation guardian appointed a new solicitor to act for the appellant, who was at that point still a minor. The hearing of the appeal was delayed for reasons relating to the appellant’s legal incapacity, and while the parties awaited judgment in a potentially relevant proceeding before the High Court. Upon the High Court handing down decision in that proceeding the appeal was listed for hearing on 18 February 2020. The application for leave to amend
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
On 5 May 2016 a delegate of the Minister decided to refuse the appellant’s claim for a protection visa. The delegate accepted that the appellant was involved in an incident with a Sinhalese boy at school, and that the boy was injured to some degree, but did not accept the appellant’s account that the boy was badly injured, or that the appellant and his family were targeted, threatened and harassed by the other boy’s family afterwards. The delegate found that the appellant’s claims to fear persecution if returned to Sri Lanka were not credible and that the appellant had no genuine fear of harm on account of the claimed threats. The delegate also rejected the appellant’s claim that he feared persecution by Sri Lankan authorities as a failed asylum seeker who had twice been returned to Sri Lanka. Thus the delegate found that the appellant was not a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under ss 36(2)(a) or (aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act). The Immigration Assessment Authority decision The delegate’s decision was referred to the IAA. On 8 June 2016 the appellant’s representative lodged submissions and a further statement by the appellant dated 8 June 2016 in support of the visa application which proffered various explanations aimed at addressing the delegate's findings as to the credibility of the appellant’s claims about the asserted incidents or events in Sri Lanka. It is unnecessary to set out those explanations when the proposed ground of appeal does not concern the IAA’s findings in relation to the credibility of those claims, and instead focuses on the IAA’s consideration of the risk of harm the appellant would face on return to Sri Lanka because he was a child and had twice illegally departed the country. On 17 June 2016 the IAA affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the appellant a protection visa. The IAA decision may be summarised as follows: (a)It was plausible that the appellant was involved in a schoolyard accident during a game of ‘tip’, but the IAA did not accept the claimed consequences which the appellant said occurred as a result. While the IAA accepted that the appellant may not have known the other boy’s name of the time of the accident he was expected to know his name now given the claimed seriousness of the incident and the fact that his mother had given him a considerable amount of information about the boy’s injury and his family’s response. (b)The IAA accepted that the appellant went to stay with his aunt in Colombo immediately after the incident, but did not accept that he would have been sent there without some explanation why he was going there so quickly and why he would not ever be returning to school. (c)A “promissory note” in evidence did not in fact demonstrate that payment was made by the appellant’s family to the parents of the other boy, but instead related to a loan made by the appellant’s father to another person who lived in the same street. The IAA did not accept that the injured boy’s parents who allegedly demanded a payment to settle a dispute would sign a promissory note to confirm that they were borrowing the money and were obliged to repay it in the future. (d)It was more likely that the accident at school was minor and did not result in the boy being in a coma, that the appellant was sent to Colombo to avoid the possibility of angry repercussions from the boy’s parents immediately after the incident and he returned to live with his family after a period of time because his mother deemed it safe for him to do so. (e)The IAA did not accept that the boy was in a coma, that his parents demanded money from the appellant’s parents, that the appellant’s parents paid money to the boy’s parents in December 2011 or in October 2015 or at all, that the boy’s family and friends had made threats against the appellant by visiting his family home, or by telephone to his father or mother, or when his mother was seen in the street. (f)Given that the IAA did not accept that the boy was in a coma or that his family visited the appellant’s home or made threats against the appellant for his involvement in that accident, it did not accept that false allegations were made by the boy’s family in 2011 against the appellant’s father. It did not accept that the appellant’s father was detained on false allegations and was released five months later without any charges being laid. (g)The IAA preferred the appellant’s “spontaneous” account at the entry interview of the claimed house “break in” incident in October 2012, to that made in his statements and in the protection visa interview. In particular, at the entry interview the appellant said he was not at home when the break-in occurred because he was at school and that the offenders injured his father’s head. In his first statement he said he was at home in the evening with his mother and siblings but his father was not at home because he was working in Colombo, and he did not know how many were involved. It was implausible that the appellant could not remember whether he was present on a night when his house was broken into by many people, he and his mother were threatened, which caused the family to flee by the backdoor. The IAA accepted that a break-in occurred at the appellant’s house but did not accept that he or his mother were threatened during the break-in or that the break-in was related to the schoolyard accident.