Cot16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

COT16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 24

Appeal from: COT16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2017] FCCA 989
File number: NSD 767 of 2017
Judge: MARKOVIC J
Date of judgment: 31 January 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – where appellant sought judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) – where Tribunal found that it was reasonable for the appellant to relocate – whether primary judge erred in dismissing the appellant’s application for judicial review – appeal dismissed  
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa)
Cases cited:

SZATV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 233 CLR 18

SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152

Date of hearing: 23 November 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 28
Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms J Strugnell, MinterEllison
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 767 of 2017
BETWEEN:

COT16

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MARKOVIC J

DATE OF ORDER:

31 JANUARY 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MARKOVIC J:

  1. The appellant is a citizen of India.  He appeals from orders made and judgment given by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (Federal Circuit Court) on 15 May 2017 dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the second respondent (Tribunal) made on 22 August 2016.  The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) not to grant the appellant a Protection (Class XA) visa (Visa). 

    BACKGROUND

  2. The appellant arrived in Australia on 28 June 2009 as the holder of subclass TU 572 student visa as the dependent of his then spouse.  By application dated 28 May 2014 he applied for the Visa.

  3. In a statement accompanying his application for the Visa the appellant claimed that he had separated from his wife, an Indian national, and that she had filed for divorce.  He said that his in-laws were very angry with him for abandoning his wife and that friends told him that they were waiting to take revenge on him.  The appellant said that in India a breakdown of marriage is viewed as an insult to the family, that his former wife’s family was “conscious of family honour and pride” and that they had “spread vicious rumours that [he was] to be blamed for the marriage break up and that [he] should be punished”.  The appellant…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 24
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Cot16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellant, an Indian national, sought judicial review of a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal). The Tribunal had upheld a decision by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, which had refused the appellant a visa on the grounds that he did not meet the criteria for refugee status as outlined in section 36 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The appellant argued that he faced a real chance of serious harm upon return to India, primarily due to threats from his ex-wife's family and broader social unrest.

The legal issues at the heart of the appeal revolved around whether the Tribunal erred in finding that it was reasonable for the appellant to relocate within India and whether the Tribunal correctly applied the relevant provisions of the Migration Act. The appellant contended that the Tribunal failed to adequately consider his evidence and that there were procedural errors in the decision-making process. The court had to determine if the Tribunal's assessment of the appellant's claims and its conclusion regarding the reasonableness of relocation were justified and in accordance with the law.

The Federal Circuit Court of Australia, on appeal, found that the Tribunal had correctly interpreted and applied the statutory provisions. The court noted that the Tribunal had considered the appellant's evidence and made findings that were open to it based on the material presented. The Tribunal had also appropriately evaluated the reasonableness of relocation within India, taking into account the appellant's background and circumstances. The court found no merit in the appellant's claims that the Tribunal failed to address his evidence or made procedural errors in its decision-making. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the Minister's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 17 February 2015 a delegate of the Minister refused to grant the appellant the Visa. The appellant appeared at a hearing before the Tribunal on 8 July 2016. On 22 August 2016 the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the appellant the Visa. THE TRIBUNAL DECISION The Tribunal expressed concerns about inconsistencies in the appellant’s evidence presented in his written claims, to the delegate and to the Tribunal. The Tribunal also found aspects of the appellant’s claims to be vague and lacking in detail. Notwithstanding that, the Tribunal was prepared to extend to the appellant the benefit of the doubt and to accept that the appellant and his wife were divorced; that divorce is deemed traditionally unacceptable in parts of India and can lead to family violence; that the appellant and his family had been harassed, threatened and received death threats from his ex-wife’s family; and that the appellant changed his phone number and commenced living separately to his ex-wife to avoid being threatened. The Tribunal accepted that there was a real chance or risk that the appellant could face serious or significant physical harm or even death at the hands of his ex-wife’s family on return to his local area in Punjab. However, the Tribunal was not persuaded that the appellant’s in-laws had the connections he claimed, such that they would be in a position to make and uphold false allegations against him. Nor was it persuaded that the appellant’s in-laws were so influential that they could locate him in another part of India if he relocated. The Tribunal acknowledged that unrest was reported for various reasons in different parts of India but observed that any risk of harm the appellant might face in that respect would be the same as for the general population and therefore did not amount to persecution or significant harm. The Tribunal was not persuaded that the appellant faced a real chance or risk of serious or significant harm on the basis that there was no safety in India because anarchy and restlessness were on the rise and there were not enough resources to cope with the problems. The Tribunal was of the opinion that it was not unreasonable for the appellant to relocate to another part of India given his past work experience in agriculture and as a taxi driver, his language skills and his demonstrated ability to re-establish himself outside his local area. It was of the view that the general security situation in India did not prevent the appellant from relocating. The Tribunal concluded that it was not unreasonable or unsafe for the appellant to relocate to another area of India to avoid any harm he might encounter from his ex-wife’s family in his local area. Having considered the appellant’s claims individually and cumulatively the Tribunal found that there was not a real chance that the appellant would suffer serious harm for a Convention reason if he returned to India now or in the reasonably foreseeable future. It therefore found that the appellant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution and did not satisfy the criterion in s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

At the hearing the appellant noted that he was not legally represented. He submitted that he feared persecution in India because he had received several death threats from people who he thought were awaiting his return; that he feared he could be killed; and that there have been a lot of problems in the past and he does not know what to do. In relation to the issue of relocation the appellant submitted that 95% of people in India are clean-shaven and thus, because he has a beard, he will be easily recognisable and could be attacked.CONSIDERATION As noted above, the appellant’s grounds of appeal repeat the grounds raised in the appellant’s application filed in the Federal Circuit Court. They do not identify any error in the primary judge’s reasons but concern the Tribunal’s decision and the findings made by it. By the first ground of appeal the appellant alleges that the Tribunal did not correctly interpret ss 36(2)(a) and 36(2)(aa) of the Act. The appellant particularised this ground by alleging that the Tribunal did not appropriately consider whether there was a real chance that he would be persecuted if he returns to India and that it made its decision by suggesting that he would be able to relocate within India and thus did not address the evidence he presented. It is clear from the Tribunal’s decision record at [5]-[8] and [51]-[54] that it set out and applied the correct statutory tests. In relation to its application of s 36(2)(a) of the Act, it was open to the Tribunal to find that the appellant did not fear harm for a Convention reason. In relation to s 36(2)(aa) of the Act, it was open to the Tribunal to find that the appellant could relocate within India. In considering the question of relocation the Tribunal had regard to the question of whether it would be reasonable in the appellant’s circumstances for him to relocate, as set out in SZATV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 233 CLR 18 at [32]; had regard to the objections raised by the appellant about the reasonableness of relocation; made findings in relation to the matters raised by the appellant; and considered other aspects of the appellant’s circumstances which it found would make it reasonable for the appellant to relocate. The appellant’s allegation that the Tribunal failed to address or take into account his evidence is not made out. The appellant has not particularised the evidence that he alleges the Tribunal failed to address. The Tribunal considered the appellant’s evidence and made findings that were open to it on the material before it. While the primary judge only considered this ground briefly, there is no error in his Honour’s reasoning. By the second ground the appellant alleges that the Tribunal took into account irrelevant considerations and disregarded relevant considerations such that there was procedural unfairness in its decision-making process. The appellant has not particularised the irrelevant considerations that the Tribunal is alleged to have taken into account or the relevant considerations that it is alleged to have disregarded. It is not apparent that the Tribunal considered anything that it was not entitled to take into account, nor that it failed to consider anything it was obliged to take into account.