FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SCAS v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 397
MIGRATION – allegation of bad faith and lack of bona fides – no lack of bona fides made out – role of lawyer in advancing an allegation of lack of bona fides.
SCAZ v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 1377 discussed
SAAG v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 547 distinguished
NAAV v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 228 referred toSCAS v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
S 140 of 2002
HEEREY, MOORE & KIEFEL JJ
6 DECEMBER 2002
SYDNEY (HEARD IN ADELAIDE)
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
S140 OF 2002
ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
SCAS OF 2002
APPELLANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENTJUDGE:
HEEREY, MOORE & KIEFEL JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
28 NOVEMBER 2002
WHERE MADE:
ADELAIDE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
S140 OF 2002
ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
SCAS OF 2002
APPELLANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
HEEREY, MOORE & KIEFEL JJ
DATE:
6 DECEMBER 2002
PLACE:
SYDNEY (HEARD IN ADELAIDE)
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
Introduction
This is an appeal from a judgment of a judge of this Court of 10 May 2002, dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) of 14 February 2002. The Tribunal had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (“the Minister”) to refuse to grant the appellant a protection visa. At the hearing of the appeal on 28 November 2002 we dismissed the appeal with costs. The following are our reasons for doing so.
Background
The appellant, who arrived in Australia in April 2001, claimed to be a citizen of Afghanistan. The appellant’s claim for a protection visa was based on an assertion that he was at risk of persecution by the Taliban due to his race (Hazara), religion (Shia Muslim) and membership of a particular social group (“the rich”). His initial application contained descriptions of incidents in which the appellant and his father suffered harassment and abuse at the hands of the Taliban.
The delegate found that the appellant’s claims were not credible, as they were inconsistent and some were implausible. The delegate also noted that a linguistic analysis obtained by the Minister’s delegate from Eqvato Stockholm did not support the appellant’s claims that he had lived his whole life in Afghanistan. The linguistic examiner concluded that the appellant’s dialect originated from Quetta, in Pakistan.
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- Case
- [2002] FCAFC 397
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found the Tribunal had bona fide exercised their power to hear and determine the review, and had acted appropriately in considering the evidence. The Tribunal explained why it formed an adverse view about the credibility of the appellant and noted the difficulties the appellant confronted in giving evidence. The court noted that the Tribunal had sought a second linguistic analysis, which contradicted the appellant’s claims and raised doubts about his credibility. The court found the Tribunal had acted appropriately in considering the evidence, including the letter from Mr Hussaini, and had provided sufficient reasons for its decision. The court found the Tribunal’s decision was not flawed by any procedural error or failure to consider relevant evidence.
The appeal was dismissed with costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The fifth issue was whether the Tribunal failed to comply with s 424A of the Act when it informed the appellant of Dr Mousavi’s report. His Honour found that the letter forwarded by the Tribunal did sufficiently identify the relevance of Dr Mousavi’s report, particularly as the letter had resulted in a response addressing the relevant issues. The final issue was whether there had been a bona fide exercise of power. The primary judge concluded this contention had “no basis whatsoever to support it”. Issues in the appeal and their consideration The appellant filed an amended notice of appeal on 29 July 2002, appealing from the whole of the judgment of the primary judge. The grounds of the appeal are as follows:GROUNDS2.The Learned reviewing judge erred in finding that “…the Tribunal did not fall into procedural error by not arranging for Mr Hussaini to give additional evidence”.3.The Learned reviewing judge erred in finding that the evidence of the witness Mr Hussaini did not assist in resolving the linguistic inconsistency raised by Dr Mousavi’s opinion. At the hearing of the appeal, counsel for the appellant developed the argument this way. First, it was submitted that the Tribunal had not bona fide exercised their power to hear and determine the review. This submission was plainly intended to avoid the consequences of s 474. Secondly it was submitted that the Tribunal had not consciously acted in bad faith but nonetheless there had been some form of unconscious or unwitting conduct amounting to bad faith. In this respect reliance was placed on the judgment of von Doussa J in SCAZ v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 1377 at [37]. Thirdly, the conduct concerned the way in which the Tribunal evaluated the evidence of the appellant about his life in Afghanistan having regard to the difficulties he experienced in giving the account. It also concerned the way in which the Tribunal evaluated the evidence of the linguistic analyst and failed to act on the letter from Mr Hussaini which was potentially corroborative of the account given by the appellant. The approach adopted by the Tribunal in this matter was said to be similar to the approach adopted by the Tribunal, which was subsequently criticised by Mansfield J, in SAAG v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 547. This submission is untenable. Even if it is appropriate to adopt the method of analysis undertaken in SAAG v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (we put it this way because we did not call on counsel for the Minister who had may have challenged that approach), the conclusion in that matter that the Tribunal had not acted in good faith was based, in part, on the fact that the Tribunal had expressed firm and strong conclusions about the credibility of the applicant on at least one matter of apparent significance without explaining why. In the present case the Tribunal explained why it formed an adverse view about the credibility of the appellant. It acknowledged the difficulties the appellant confronted in giving evidence and adverted to evidence from a psychologist about the appellant’s condition. It noted, however, that the appellant was only able to provide general and vague details of his circumstances in Afghanistan. The Tribunal then moved to the language analyses and, having accepted the analysis of Dr Mousavi, pointed to the obvious tension between the appellant’s account of having lived in Afghanistan throughout his life and a language profile suggesting, at best for the appellant, that he might have been born in Afghanistan but lived most of his life in Quetta, Pakistan. It also called in aid the analysis of Dr Mousavi to reject the facts asserted by Mr Hussaini. This approach, in our opinion is unexceptionable. Indeed, by seeking the second language analysis, the Tribunal was creating a circumstance where the earlier and unfavourable language analysis might be contradicted to the benefit of the appellant. Far from showing a closed mind, it suggests the Tribunal was seeking to investigate the appellant’s claims. While it is true that it could have called Mr Hussaini to give evidence but did not, that was of course open to it, as was the rejection of his evidence for the reasons just discussed.