Shammas v Canberra Institute of Technology

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BAN SHAMMAS v CANBERRA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
[2013] ACTCA 50 (2 December 2013)

APPEAL – Interlocutory Appeal – application for leave to appeal from refusal of application for leave to appeal from ACAT – whether decision interlocutory or final

APPEAL – Interlocutory Appeal – application for leave to appeal from refusal of application for leave to appeal from ACAT – whether decision attended with sufficient doubt and substantial injustice would be done by leaving decision unreversed – where self-represented non-native English-speaking appellant – whether appellant received a fair hearing ­– whether judge biased or acted in bad faith

ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), s 83(2)
Human Rights Commission Act 2005 (ACT), s 53A
Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT), s 37E(4)

Arrow International Australia Ltd v Group Konstrukt Pty Ltd [2012] ACTCA 37

Capital Property Projects (ACT) Pty Limited v Australian Capital Territory Planning and Land Authority [2008] ACTCA 9

Ebner v The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337
Hall v The Nominal Defendant (1966) 117 CLR 423

Heller Financial Services Ltd v Solczaniuk (1989) 99 FLR 304

Licul v Corney (1976) 180 CLR 213
Niemann v Electronic Industries Ltd (1978) VR 431
Perry v Smith (1901) 27 VLR 66
Preston v Dukes [2012] ACTCA 29
SBAN v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 591
SBAP v Refugee Review Tribunal [2002] FCA 590

SCAS vMinister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 397

Sharp v Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 88 ATC 4184

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

No. ACTCA 1 of 2013
No. SCA 76 of 2012

Judge:             Nield AJ
Supreme Court of the ACT

Date:              2 December 2013

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE        )       
  )       No. ACTCA 1 of 2013
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY   )       No. SCC 76 of 2012
  )       

COURT OF APPEAL  )

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

BETWEEN:BAN SHAMMAS

Appellant

AND:              CANBERRA INSTITUTE OF      TECHNOLOGY

Respondent

ORDER

Judge:  Nield AJ
Date:  2 December 2013
Place:  Canberra

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

  1. Leave is granted to the appellant to prosecute her out of time application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal from the decision of Penfold J.

  1. Leave is refused to the appellant to appeal to the Court of Appeal from the decision of Penfold J.

  1. The appellant’s application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal from the decision of Penfold J is dismissed.

  1. The appellant is to pay the respondent’s costs of the application for leave to appeal.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE        )       
  )       No. ACTCA 1 of 2013
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY   )       No. SCC 76 of 2012
  )       

COURT OF APPEAL  )

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

BETWEEN:BAN SHAMMAS

Appellant

AND:              CANBERRA INSTITUTE OF      TECHNOLOGY

Respondent

Judge:  Nield AJ
Date:  2 December 2013
Place:…

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Details
Case
[2013] ACTCA 50
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Shammas (the appellant) sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal from a decision of Penfold J, which itself had refused the appellant leave to appeal from a decision of the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal (ACAT). The Canberra Institute of Technology was the respondent. The core of the dispute concerned whether the decision of Penfold J was interlocutory or final, and whether the appellant, who was self-represented and a non-native English speaker, had received a fair hearing before Penfold J, or if Penfold J had acted with bias or in bad faith.

The Court of Appeal was required to determine two primary legal issues. Firstly, it had to consider whether Penfold J's refusal of leave to appeal from the ACAT decision was an interlocutory or final order for the purposes of an appeal to the Court of Appeal. Secondly, if the decision was considered interlocutory, the Court had to assess whether leave to appeal should be granted, considering whether the decision was attended with sufficient doubt and whether substantial injustice would be done by leaving the decision unreversed, particularly in light of the appellant's circumstances and her allegations of unfairness and bias.

Nield AJ determined that the decision of Penfold J was interlocutory. In considering the application for leave to appeal, Nield AJ found that while the appellant's circumstances as a self-represented, non-native English speaker were noted, and the question of a fair hearing was a serious one, these factors did not, in this instance, meet the threshold for granting leave to appeal. The Court concluded that the decision of Penfold J was not attended with sufficient doubt, nor was there a demonstrable risk of substantial injustice that would warrant interfering with the refusal of leave to appeal.

Consequently, leave was granted to the appellant to prosecute her out of time application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal from the decision of Penfold J. However, leave to appeal from Penfold J's decision was refused, and the appellant's application for leave to appeal was dismissed. The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the application for leave to appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave is granted to the appellant to prosecute her out of time application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal from the decision of Penfold J.

2. Leave is refused to the appellant to appeal to the Court of Appeal from the decision of Penfold J.

3. The appellant’s application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal from the decision of Penfold J is dismissed.

4. The appellant is to pay the respondent’s costs of the application for leave to appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established