Munday v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Munday v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2014] FCA 1123

Citation: Munday v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2014] FCA 1123
Parties: MICHEAL JOHN MUNDAY and CATHERINE ANNE DAY v COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
File number: ACD 12 of 2013
Judge: KATZMANN J
Date of judgment: 21 October 2014
Catchwords:

HUMAN RIGHTS – Discrimination – disability – discrimination alleged in conduct of Commonwealth program regarding early release of superannuation on compassionate grounds – early release of superannuation sought by second applicant to pay for in-vitro fertilisation (IVF) treatment overseas on the basis that it was necessary to alleviate acute or chronic depression – IVF treatment would involve paying for ova – first application rejected because decision-maker was not satisfied that IVF was necessary to alleviate second applicant’s depression or that she lacked the financial capacity to meet the expense arising from the proposed treatment by other means – second application rejected because decision-maker was not satisfied that IVF was necessary to alleviate second applicant’s depression and also because superannuation funds would be used for a purpose that was not permitted under Australian law – requirement of lawful purpose not specified in Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) or Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994 (Cth) – whether imposition of this requirement involved unlawful discrimination on the basis of second applicant’s disability (infertility) – whether failure to obtain independent legal advice before imposing this requirement involved a failure to make a reasonable adjustment – Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth), ss 5 and 6

WORDS AND PHRASES – “person aggrieved” – “reasonable adjustment”

Legislation: Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s 19A(3)
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)
Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) ss 3, 3(1), 46P, 46P(2)(c), 46PH(1)(c), 46PN, 46PO
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Act 1998 (Cth) s 13
Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) ss 4, 5, 6, 10, 29, 47(2),(5) 123(4), 124
Disability Discrimination Regulations 1996 (Cth), reg 2A, Sch 1
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 140
Human Services (Medicare) Act 1973 (Cth) s 4
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B
Public Service Act 1999 (Cth) s 7
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) s 22
Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) ss 3(1), 6(1)(b), 10
Superannuation Legislation Amendment (Early Release of Superannuation) Act 2011 (Cth), Sch 1 Pt 1 cl 10
Cases cited:

Access for all Alliance (Hervey Bay) Inc v Hervey Bay City Council (2007) 162 FCR 313
Attorney-General for the State of New South Wales v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1
Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd v Banovic (1989) 168 CLR 165
Australian Medical Council v Wilson (1996) 68 FCR 46
Bell IXL Investments Ltd v Life Therapeutics Ltd (2008) 68 ACSR 154; [2008] FCA 1457
Blatch v Archer (1774) 98 ER 969
Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336
Cameron v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1993) 46 FCR 509
Davie v Lord Provost, Magistrates and Councillors of the City of Edinburgh 1953 SC 34
Executive Council of Australian Jewry…

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Details
Case
[2014] FCA 1123
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicants, Ms Catherine Day and Mr Michael Munday, sought a judicial review of the Commonwealth's decision to deny Ms Day's applications for early release of her superannuation on compassionate grounds. The Federal Court was tasked with determining whether the Commonwealth's imposition of a lawful purpose requirement for the release of superannuation funds constituted unlawful discrimination against Ms Day on the basis of her disability (infertility). Additionally, the court had to consider whether the failure to obtain independent legal advice before imposing this requirement constituted a failure to make a reasonable adjustment under the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth).

The court found that the requirement of a lawful purpose for the release of superannuation funds was not specified in the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) or the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994 (Cth). Despite this, the court held that the decision-maker was entitled to conclude that the purpose for which Ms Day sought to use the funds was not lawful under Australian law, as it involved paying for ova, which is illegal. Consequently, the court ruled that the decision did not involve unlawful discrimination as it applied equally to all applicants, regardless of disability. Furthermore, the court found that there was no obligation to obtain independent legal advice before imposing the lawful purpose requirement, and thus, no failure to make a reasonable adjustment occurred.

The court dismissed the application and ordered that the applicants pay the respondent's costs. The decision underscores the importance of adherence to legislative and regulatory frameworks in the administration of superannuation programs, while also highlighting the need for consistent application of rules to all applicants to avoid claims of unlawful discrimination.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicants pay the respondent’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The evidence is largely uncontroversial. Neither Ms Day nor Mr Munday was required for cross-examination. The following account is derived from their affidavits and the documents tendered without objection by the Commonwealth. Background Ms Day began fertility treatment in the United States in early 2009. She was then 39 years old. She was fertilised with donor eggs. Eleven embryos were produced, two of which were transferred. The remaining nine were frozen. Ms Day returned from the US pregnant, but she miscarried. Although arrangements were made for four of the frozen embryos to be transported to Australia and for the transfers to take place locally, on no occasion did transfer resulted in a pregnancy. The treatment was funded by the applicants and cost them around $200,000 (including donor fees and compensation, medical and transport costs). In early 2010 Ms Day began new treatment with a local fertility specialist, Dr Nicole Sides, in preparation for a return trip to the US to access the frozen embryos there. It was Dr Sides who suggested that Ms Day might be able to meet the additional costs by obtaining access to her superannuation. Dr Sides told Ms Day that she had helped other patients to do the same. There is, however, no evidence about the situations in which these patients were placed to enable any useful comparison to be made, assuming it to be relevant. In August 2010 the applicants returned to the US for the procedure, only to learn that the remaining five embryos had been lost during the thawing process. The first application On 3 November 2010 Ms Day applied to APRA for the early release of $60,000 from her superannuation fund. In the application she indicated that her purpose was to help pay for medical treatment (past and future) which was needed “to alleviate acute or chronic mental condition”. She also indicated that she wanted the money to help pay for transport to the treatment. She described her experience of not having children and undergoing unsuccessful fertility treatment as “the most devastating thing [she has] ever been faced with” and said that she was “constantly … obsessing about it”. She said that she had become “completely desperate, distressed and irrational”. The application was accompanied by information from an IVF clinic about the costs of the treatment and letters from Dr Sides and Ms Day’s general practitioner, Dr Kumari Fonseka. Dr Sides wrote:Catherine Day has been a patient of mine since March 2010. She has previously been undertaking treatment for her current medical condition for several years before this with her partner Michael Munday.They are unfortunately needing to seek treatment in the United States of America as Australia does not provide the treatment that is required here. They are obtaining donor egg with her partner's sperm to create embryos, and have them placed. IVF treatment is expensive anyway even with Australian subsidies. It is expensive without Australian subsidies, and even more expensive in the United States. As there is no way they can obtain a donor in Australia, they therefore have to access the United States system and donors must be paid there. This has added to·their expenses.As they must travel to the United States of America by plane, both members of the couple need to go, they need to have accommodation, need to attend Doctors, Speciality Clinics and undergo testing, this is likely to be a very expensive exercise. In fact it has depleted all of their savings, all the equity on their home, all their credit cards.They only have a limited time frame in which to undergo this treatment. They therefore need urgent access to superannuation to fund this required medical treatment.Although it is unusual that I make this request, I certainly support their bid to have release of funds for the purpose of becoming parents.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ms Day was once again advised of her review rights, but on this occasion she did not seek review. Attempts to have the decision reversed On 29 November 2011 Ms Day complained to the Commonwealth Ombudsman. The Ombudsman advised her that she could seek judicial review of the regulator’s decision under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (“ADJR Act”) and suggested she seek legal advice if she were considering that option. On 27 February 2012 Mr Munday contacted the relevant Minister with responsibility for the administration of the early release of superannuation benefits program. The matter was then referred to a departmental officer and Craig Boyd, the national manager responsible for the program, telephoned Mr Munday and undertook to review the matter. On 14 March 2012 Mr Boyd advised Mr Munday that, after reviewing the matter, “the outcome remained unchanged”. The next day Mr Munday contacted the Minister again but was told that the decision would not be overturned. Once again, however, Mr Munday was advised that he could seek judicial review of APRA’s decision under the ADJR Act. The applicants elected not to apply for judicial review. Rather, on 28 March 2012 Mr Munday lodged a complaint with the Human Rights Commission claiming that the Commonwealth (more specifically, the Department of Human Services) had unlawfully discriminated against Ms Day on the ground of her disability. The response to, and disposition of, the complaint to the Human Rights Commission On 29 May 2012 Glyn Fiveash of the Department wrote to the Commission responding to the complaint. He denied that the Department had unlawfully discriminated against Ms Day. At the outset Mr Fiveash pointed out that Ms Day’s applications for early release were initially considered and reviewed by APRA and that it was not until 1 November 2011 that the Department took responsibility for administering these claims. He said that, in undertaking its review, the Department agreed with the position taken by APRA. He also said that, in making its decision not to approve the early release of Ms Day’s superannuation funds, APRA did not take into account Ms Day’s disability. Rather, he submitted, APRA made its decision in accordance with the legislation and the relevant guidelines and properly took into account the purpose for which the funds were to be used. He submitted that APRA denied Ms Day’s request because it had concluded that she intended to use the money for a purpose that was contrary to Australian law. He contended that, if any other person made a request to APRA for early release of his or her superannuation in order to spend the money for a purpose which was illegal under Australian law, the Department’s position would be no different. Consequently, he submitted that Ms Day had not been treated less favourably than another person without her disability in similar circumstances and so it could not be said that she had been subjected to unlawful discrimination. He contended that it was the Department’s view that the allegation of unlawful discrimination was misguided.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established