Gordon v St Vincent's Hospital Sydney Limited

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Gordon v St Vincent’s Hospital Sydney Limited [2023] FCA 1188

File number(s): NSD 834 of 2021
Judgment of: ABRAHAM J
Date of judgment: 6 October 2023
Catchwords:

HUMAN RIGHTS – Disability discrimination in employment – where employment terminated – where pleadings deficient – whether respondent failed to make reasonable adjustments for employee – whether any failure to make reasonable adjustments had the effect that the applicant was treated less favourably constituting direct disability discrimination.

HELD – claims not established – application dismissed.

Legislation:

Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) s 4, 5(2), 11, 15(2)(a), 15(2)(c), 21A, 21B

Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (NSW)

Cases cited:

Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v Delor Vue Apartments CTS 39788 [2021] FCAFC 121; (2021) 287 FCR 388

Banque Commerciale SA, En Liquidation v Akhil Holdings Ltd [1990] HCA 11; (1990) 169 CLR 279

Berry v State of South Australia [2017] FCA 702

Chircop v Technical and Further Education Commission [2022] FCA 1015

Deam v Starlight Children’s Foundation Australia [2023] FCA 259

Izzo v State of Victoria (Department of Education and Training) [2020] FCA 770

Forbes v Australian Federal Police [2004] FCAFC 95

Munday v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2014] FCA 1123; (2014) 226 FCR 199

Ponraj v Wycombe Services Pty Ltd [2023] FCA 118

Purvis v State of New South Wales (Department of Education and Training) [2003] HCA 62; (2003) 217 CLR 92

Sievwright v State of Victoria [2012] FCA 118

Sklavos v Australasian College of Dermatologists [2017] FCAFC 128; (2017) 256 FCR 247

State of New South Wales (Department of Justice - Corrective Services) v Huntley [2017] FCA 581

Varasdi v State of Victoria [2018] FCA 1655

Watts v Australian Postal Corporation [2014] FCA 370; (2014) 222 FCR 220

Walker v State of Victoria [2011] FCA 258; (2011) 279 ALR 284

Wilson v Britten-Jones (No 2) [2020] FCA 1290

Winters v Fogarty [2017] FCA 51

Zhang v University of Tasmania [2009] FCAFC 35; (2009) 174 FCR 366

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 270
Date of hearing: 11-14 April 2023, 25 May 2023
Counsel for the Applicant: Ms L Andelman
Solicitor for the Applicant: Australian Nursing and Midwifery Federation – NSW Branch
Counsel for the Respondent:  Mr M Seck
Solicitor for the Respondent: Bartier Perry Lawyers

ORDERS

NSD 834 of 2021
BETWEEN:

ROSEMARY GORDON

Applicant

AND:

ST VINCENT'S HOSPITAL SYDNEY LIMITED

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

ABRAHAM J

DATE OF ORDER:

6 OCTOBER 2023

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application is dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the costs of the respondent to be agreed or assessed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

ABRAHAM J:

  1. The applicant, Ms Rosemary Gordon, is a registered nurse (RN) whose employment was terminated by St Vincent’s Hospital Sydney Limited (St Vincent’s) on 13 July 2021.

  2. On 24 June 2021, the…

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Details
Case
[2023] FCA 1188
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Gordon v St Vincent's Hospital Sydney Limited, the applicant, Rosemary Gordon, sought to establish disability discrimination claims against her former employer, St Vincent's Hospital Sydney Limited. The core dispute centred around whether the hospital failed to make reasonable adjustments for Gordon, leading to direct disability discrimination under the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth). The case was adjudicated in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia.

The primary legal issues the court had to decide were whether the hospital had indeed failed to make reasonable adjustments for Gordon, and if such failure constituted direct discrimination. The court also needed to examine the burden of proof in relation to these claims, considering the provisions of the Disability Discrimination Act. Additionally, the court had to determine whether the hospital's failure to make adjustments had the effect of treating Gordon less favourably, thereby fulfilling the criteria for direct discrimination.

The court's reasoning centred on the statutory obligations under the Disability Discrimination Act. It was determined that the onus lay with Gordon to sufficiently identify the reasonable adjustments required, enabling the hospital to determine if these adjustments fell under the Act's requirements and to present evidence accordingly. The court found that Gordon's claims were not established because she failed to identify reasonable adjustments with sufficient particularity, and even if she had, the hospital demonstrated that implementing these adjustments would have imposed unjustifiable hardship. The court also found that Gordon's requests at the time did not specifically include the adjustments she later claimed were necessary. The court concluded that the hospital's failure to make the adjustments did not result in less favourable treatment as required by the Act.

The court dismissed Gordon's application, highlighting that her claims were not substantiated by the evidence presented. It ordered that Gordon pay the costs of the respondent, to be agreed upon or assessed.

ORDERS:
1. The application is dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the costs of the respondent to be agreed or assessed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application is dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the costs of the respondent to be agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

That submission places too much work on the observation in Berry. The respondent accepted that Charlesworth J did not use the language of onus of proof. In Berry, there appears to have been no discussion or consideration of the issue of who bore the onus in relation to s 21A. Indeed, Charlesworth J also makes reference at [26] to the fact that “circumstances would not constitute unlawful discrimination if the requirements of s 21A of the DD Act are satisfied”. Given the terms of s 21A, that statement could only be referring to a discriminator establishing the requirements. That the DD Act does not refer to onus in s 21A is not decisive. I note also s 21B is in the same terms, yet s 11(2) makes clear the onus is on the respondent. Considering the text of s 21A in context, given its purpose, I am satisfied that the onus is as Mortimer J opined. That said, this only serves to highlight the importance of the obligation on an applicant to identify the reasonable adjustments with sufficient particularity to enable a respondent to determine whether s 21A applies, and if so, to enable it to lead necessary evidence to establish the requirements.Evidence A significant body of the evidence compromised contemporaneous business records and correspondence. In addition, the documentary evidence included medical records and reports. Those documents were admitted without objection. The applicant read affidavits (subject to objections) of the following witnesses:(a)Ms Rosemary Gordon (affidavits affirmed 2 June 2022, 31 October 2022, 24 March 2023);(b)Dr Christopher Canaris (affidavit dated 28 October 2022);(c)Ms Joanne Purdue (affidavits affirmed 1 June 2022 and 31 October 2022); and Each of those witnesses was cross-examined. The applicant also read the affidavit of Ms Nicola Maher Boyle, affirmed 2 June 2022. A number of documents were also tendered, including a bundle of documents that had been produced by St Vincent’s in response to a subpoena. The respondent read affidavits (subject to objections) of the following witnesses: (a)Mr Rio Pun (affidavit affirmed 21 July 2022);(b)Dr Andrew Keller (affidavit affirmed 22 August 2022);(c)Mr Kenneth Peter Denton Webb (affidavit affirmed 21 June 2022);(d)Ms Cassandra Amy Brown (affidavit affirmed 15 July 2022); and (e)Ms Ji-Su Paik (affidavit affirmed 25 August 2022). Each of these witnesses was cross-examined. Records of St Vincent’s were exhibited to various of these affidavits. Business records of St Vincent’s formed a significant body of the evidence. The records contain, inter alia, a number of file notes recording discussions between Ms Gordon and various employees of St Vincent’s. I accept the respondent’s submission that there is no reason to doubt the reliability of the contents of the records and that in relation to the file notes of discussions, they are generally supported by contemporaneous emails or letters which followed the conversations. The applicant addressed in her reply affidavit limited aspects of the file notes in respect to conversations she had with Ms Dyer, Mr Yates, Ms Smith and Ms Ode. Although the applicant takes issue with some limited aspects, in large part, that evidence was directed to explanations for why she said what she did, and her understanding of what was occurring.

Decision

Reasons for decision

It appears that Ms Gordon’s contention is that she should not be required to participate in a competitive recruitment process because, unless she was given preference to the exclusion of other candidates, she could not have been, or would not be, successfully appointed to a role. Ms Gordon’s claim is in effect, that a reasonable adjustment would be to waive or ignore merit selection principles and processes and appoint her to the vacant role of her preference. This is not, properly understood, a reasonable adjustment for the reasons set out earlier in the reasons dealing with reasonable adjustments.Conclusion The only remaining claims allege conduct contrary to s 15(2)(a) and (c) of the DD Act. As addressed above, the applicant failed to establish those claims as pleaded. The failure by St Vincent’s to provide reasonable adjustments was a necessary part of the applicant’s claims in relation to s 15(2)(a) and (c). Even if the items identified by the applicant in closing submissions had been pleaded, the claims are not established. Having considered those items identified by the applicant, for the reasons above, the applicant has not established that items 1 to 8 were adjustments within the meaning of s 5(2) of the DD Act, and/or if they were adjustments, St Vincent’s have established they were not reasonable adjustments as they would have imposed on St Vincent’s an unjustifiable hardship pursuant to ss 4 and 11 of the DD Act. I note also that, with the exception of seeking a rehabilitation assessment or that St Vincent’s provide employment in another position, the applicant (and the ANMF) did not, at the relevant time, specifically request any of the other matters now relied upon. Moreover, on the applicant’s case, none of items 1-5 of the purported reasonable adjustments were sufficient by themselves to enable her to return to work at X8N. Indeed, the applicant accepts that the necessary adjustment to enable her to return to work at X8N is working in pairs with another person, as described by Dr Shahzad and Dr Keller, which for the reasons above, is not an adjustment. It is not suggested there are any other alleged adjustments sufficiently identified in the evidence which were required to be undertaken. Accordingly, it has not been established that St Vincent’s failed to make reasonable adjustments that would have enabled her to return to the work for which she was engaged. This is noting that it is accepted that the applicant cannot perform the inherent requirements of her position without adjustments. The applicant also has not established the term or condition of her employment the basis of her s 15(2)(a) claim. The applicant has not established her claims under s 15(2)(a) and (c) of the DD Act. The application is dismissed, with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established