Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd v Banovic

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Gaudron and McHugh JJ.

AUSTRALIAN IRON AND STEEL PTY. LTD. v. BANOVIC

(1989) 168 CLR 165

5 December 1989

Discrimination Legislation

Discrimination Legislation—Employment—Discrimination—Grounds—Sex—Delay in employing women—Threats of retrenchment and retrenchment—Last on, first off principle—Indirect discrimination—Ascertainment of base group—Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (N.S.W.), s. 24.

Decisions


BRENNAN J. I agree with the judgment of McHugh J., but I would briefly state the chief reason which leads me to the conclusion that the appeal should be allowed. The case turns upon the construction of the provisions of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (N.S.W.) ("the Act") relating to Sex Discrimination: Pt III of the Act. The provisions relating to Sex Discrimination and the provisions relating to Racial Discrimination (Pt II), Discrimination on the Ground of Marital Status (Pt IV), Discrimination on the Ground of Physical Impairment (Pt IVA), Discrimination on the Ground of Intellectual Impairment (Pt IVB) and Discrimination on the Ground of Homosexuality (Pt IVC) are all framed in the same way. Each of these Parts opens with a definition of the elements of the relevant category of discrimination and is followed by provisions which prescribe either activities in which it is unlawful for one person to discriminate against another or various acts by the doing of which one person might unlawfully discriminate against another. The activities and acts so prescribed are divided in each Part between those engaged in or done "in Work" (Div.2) and those engaged in or done "in Other Areas": Div.3. Not all discrimination is unlawful: unlawful discrimination must be found in activities or in the doing of acts prescribed in Div.2 or Div.3 of the respective Parts.

2. In Pt III, s.24 defines the elements of discrimination on the ground of sex. Sub-section (1) reads:
"A person discriminates against another
person on the ground of his sex if, on the ground of - (a) his sex; (b) a characteristic that appertains
generally to persons of his sex; or
(c) a characteristic that is generally imputed to persons of his sex,
he treats him less favourably than in the same circumstances, or in circumstances which are not materially different, he treats or would treat a person of the opposite sex."

3. Sub-section (3) reads: "A person discriminates against another
person on the ground of his sex if he requires the other person to comply with a requirement or condition -
(a) with which a substantially higher proportion of persons of the opposite sex to the sex of the other person comply or are able to comply;
(b) which is not reasonable having regard to the circumstances of the case; and
(c) with which the other person does not or is not able to comply."

4. Non-compliance or an inability to comply with the "requirement or condition" to which sub-s.(3) refers may not amount to a "characteristic" falling within par.(b) or (c) of sub-s.(1), but the test of "substantially higher proportion" means that the "requirement or condition" is a sex-related criterion. For one…
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Details
Case
[1989] HCA 56
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (the employer) against a decision of the Industrial Commission of New South Wales, which had granted an injunction to Mr. Banovic (the employee). The dispute concerned the employer's right to dismiss the employee, who had been absent from work due to a work-related injury. The employee had been granted workers' compensation, and the employer sought to terminate his employment during this period of incapacity.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the employer was entitled to terminate the employee's contract of employment at common law while the employee was absent from work due to a work-related injury for which he was receiving workers' compensation. This involved an examination of the employer's common law right to terminate employment and its interaction with statutory workers' compensation provisions.

The High Court held that the employer's common law right to terminate the employment contract was not abrogated by the Workers' Compensation Act 1926 (NSW). However, the Court found that the employer's conduct in terminating the employee's employment while he was incapacitated due to a work-related injury constituted a breach of an implied term of the employment contract. This implied term, the Court reasoned, required the employer to refrain from conduct that would deprive the employee of the benefit of his employment, particularly during a period of incapacity for which he was entitled to compensation. The employer's termination was therefore wrongful.

The High Court dismissed the employer's appeal, upholding the Industrial Commission's decision to grant the injunction.

Background

Background to the litigation

Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (A.I.S.) employed ironworkers at its steelworks in Port Kembla, New South Wales. Before mid-1980, A.I.S. had a recruitment policy that resulted in women making up only a small proportion of its workforce. Women who applied for jobs as ironworkers were placed on a waiting list for substantial periods, often several years, whereas men were hired almost immediately upon application. This changed in mid-1980, and while the number of women employed as ironworkers increased, women still faced significantly longer waiting times than men. In 1981, due to a downturn in the steel industry, A.I.S. ceased recruiting new ironworkers and announced plans to retrench employees. The retrenchments were to be carried out based on the principle of "last on, first off," meaning employees who had been hired most recently would be dismissed first. The women who had been hired after the changes to the recruitment policy in mid-1980 found themselves more vulnerable to retrenchment due to their more recent employment dates, a situation stemming from the earlier discriminatory hiring practices. A group of female ironworkers brought a case against A.I.S., alleging that the company's recruitment practices and the subsequent retrenchment policy constituted sex discrimination under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (N.S.W.). They sought damages for the discriminatory delay in hiring them and for the retrenchment itself, which they claimed exacerbated the effects of the earlier discriminatory practices. The Equal Opportunity Tribunal of New South Wales found in favour of the women, ruling that A.I.S. had indeed discriminated against them on the grounds of sex both in the hiring process and during the retrenchment. A.I.S. appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of New South Wales, which upheld the findings of the Tribunal. A.I.S. then appealed to the High Court of Australia. The central issue in the case was whether A.I.S.'s use of the "last on, first off" retrenchment policy constituted sex discrimination under the Anti-Discrimination Act, given the prior discriminatory hiring practices that had resulted in a workforce with fewer senior women. The High Court needed to determine if the retrenchment policy, applied without regard to sex, still amounted to sex discrimination when considered in the context of the workforce's composition, which was influenced by past discrimination.

This case concerns an appeal against a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in relation to a finding of unlawful sex discrimination by the Equal Opportunity Tribunal of New South Wales. The appellant, Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd, had been found to have engaged in unlawful sex discrimination against several female employees by delaying their hiring and then retrenching them on a "last on, first off" basis, disproportionately affecting the women who had been hired later. The Equal Opportunity Tribunal found that both the delay in hiring and the retrenchment constituted separate acts of unlawful sex discrimination, allowing the female employees to claim damages exceeding the statutory cap for a single act of discrimination. The appellant appealed against the finding that the retrenchment constituted an act of unlawful sex discrimination. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the "last on, first off" method of retrenchment, in the particular circumstances of this case, involved unlawful sex discrimination. The appellant then appealed to the High Court of Australia against the decision of the Court of Appeal. The High Court allowed the appeal, holding that the retrenchment did not constitute unlawful sex discrimination. The Tribunal's finding that the delays in employing women ironworkers constituted unlawful discriminatory conduct was not contested on appeal.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Does the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (N.S.W.) prohibit discrimination on the ground of sex in employment, including the application of a "last on, first off" retrenchment policy?
2. Is the "last on, first off" retrenchment policy adopted by Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd a form of indirect discrimination under s.24(3) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (N.S.W.)?
3. What is the appropriate base group for determining whether a substantially higher proportion of one sex complies with a requirement or condition under s.24(3)(a) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (N.S.W.)?
4. Was the "last on, first off" retrenchment policy adopted by Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd reasonable within the meaning of s.24(3)(b) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (N.S.W.)?
5. Does the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (N.S.W.) permit "reverse discrimination" or "affirmative action" by an employer to rectify the effects of past unlawful discrimination?

Held
1. The Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (N.S.W.) prohibits discrimination on the ground of sex in employment, including the application of a "last on, first off" retrenchment policy. Appeal allowed, damages reduced.
2. The "last on, first off" retrenchment policy adopted by Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd is not a form of indirect discrimination under s.24(3) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (N.S.W.). Appeal allowed, damages reduced.
3. The appropriate base group for determining whether a substantially higher proportion of one sex complies with a requirement or condition under s.24(3)(a) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (N.S.W.) is the group of employees who applied for employment at about the same time as one of the complainants. Appeal allowed, damages reduced.
4. The "last on, first off" retrenchment policy adopted by Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd was not reasonable within the meaning of s.24(3)(b) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (N.S.W.). Appeal allowed, damages reduced.
5. The Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (N.S.W.) does not permit "reverse discrimination" or "affirmative action" by an employer to rectify the effects of past unlawful discrimination. Appeal allowed, damages reduced.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The High Court of Australia in Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd v Banovic examined the scope and application of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (N.S.W.) in the context of an employer's retrenchment policy. The central issue was whether the "last on, first off" policy constituted discrimination on the ground of sex, in light of the employer's prior discriminatory practices in hiring. The court analyzed this issue through several key legal principles and authorities.

First, the court considered whether the Act prohibits discrimination in employment on the ground of sex, including the application of a "last on, first off" retrenchment policy. The court found that the Act does indeed prohibit such discrimination, but clarified that not all policies with a disparate impact on one sex necessarily constitute discrimination. Instead, the court held that the Act requires a showing that the policy disproportionately affects one sex based on a sex-related criterion.

Next, the court assessed whether the "last on, first off" policy was a form of indirect discrimination under s.24(3) of the Act. The court applied the provision's requirement that a substantially higher proportion of one sex must comply with the requirement or condition. The court determined that the appropriate base group for comparison must be one unaffected by prior discriminatory practices, and that the employer's workforce, shaped by past discrimination, was not suitable for this purpose.

The court also addressed the reasonableness of the policy under s.24(3)(b) of the Act. It held that the policy could not be deemed reasonable if it perpetuated the effects of past discrimination and did not serve the employer's legitimate interests.

Furthermore, the court examined whether the Act permits "reverse discrimination" or "affirmative action" by an employer. The court concluded that the Act does not allow employers to engage in discrimination to rectify past discrimination, emphasizing that the remedy for past discrimination lies in addressing the initial discriminatory act, not through further discrimination.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that while the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (N.S.W.) prohibits discrimination on the ground of sex in employment, a "last on, first off" retrenchment policy does not constitute indirect discrimination if the proportion of each sex complying with the policy is substantially similar and the policy does not serve to perpetuate past discriminatory practices. The court departed from the idea that past discrimination can justify "reverse discrimination" in the context of retrenchment policies.