ACM15 v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

ACM15 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 217

Appeal from: ACM15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 1194
File number: VID 610 of 2018
Judge: KENNY J
Date of judgment: 26 February 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether primary judge erred in failing to find Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error in failing to consider a claim made by the appellant – appeal dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5AA, 36
Cases cited:

Applicant WAEE v Minister forImmigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184; 236 FCR 59

NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263; 144 FCR 1

Date of hearing: 26 February 2019
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 38
Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter
Counsel for the First Respondent: B Petrie
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submitted to any order, save as to costs

ORDERS

VID 610 of 2018
BETWEEN:

ACM15

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

KENNY J

DATE OF ORDER:

26 FEBRUARY 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal, as agreed or assessed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

KENNY J:

  1. This is an appeal from a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia delivered on 14 May 2017, which dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the then Refugee Review Tribunal (now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal) dated 11 February 2015.  The Tribunal had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the respondent Minister to refuse the appellant’s application for a Protection (Class XA) visa (protection visa).  The Federal Circuit Court judgment has the citation ACM15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 1194.

  2. The appellant was not legally represented in this Court.  He did not file any written submissions.  The appellant appeared in person today. With the aid of an interpreter, he explained his position.

  3. The Minister relied on written submissions dated 23 January 2019.

    BACKGROUND

  4. The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka. He arrived in Australia on 16 July 2012 as an “unauthorised maritime arrival”, as defined in s 5AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

  5. On 8 November 2012, the appellant applied for a protection visa.  In a statutory declaration accompanying his application dated 26 October 2012 the appellant claimed to fear harm from Sri Lankan authorities because of his Tamil ethnicity and because he sought asylum in a Western country. 

  6. On 1 August 2013, a delegate of the Minister refused the appellant’s protection visa application. On…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 217
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, a citizen of Sri Lanka, appealed against the decision of the Minister for Home Affairs to refuse him a protection visa. The appellant had arrived in Australia as an unauthorised maritime arrival and subsequently applied for a protection visa. The delegate of the Minister refused his application, which was then reviewed by the Tribunal. The Tribunal affirmed the delegate's decision, finding that the appellant's fears of serious harm in Sri Lanka due to his imputed political opinion were not well-founded.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Tribunal had erred in failing to consider a specific claim made by the appellant. The appellant argued that the Tribunal did not adequately address his concern about potential harm due to his complaints to police about unlawful actions by Army personnel and a policeman. The court had to determine whether this constituted a jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.

The court found that the Tribunal had considered the appellant's claims and provided detailed reasons for its findings. The Tribunal had accepted certain facts about the appellant's complaints but ultimately concluded that there was no real chance of serious harm due to those complaints. The court held that the Tribunal's consideration of the claims was sufficient and that no jurisdictional error had occurred. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.

The court ordered that the appeal be dismissed and that the appellant pay the Minister's costs of the appeal, as agreed or assessed. This decision reinforces the importance of providing clear and reasoned findings in visa review proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal, as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The Minister relied on written submissions dated 23 January 2019.BACKGROUND The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka. He arrived in Australia on 16 July 2012 as an “unauthorised maritime arrival”, as defined in s 5AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). On 8 November 2012, the appellant applied for a protection visa. In a statutory declaration accompanying his application dated 26 October 2012 the appellant claimed to fear harm from Sri Lankan authorities because of his Tamil ethnicity and because he sought asylum in a Western country. On 1 August 2013, a delegate of the Minister refused the appellant’s protection visa application. On 7 August 2013, the appellant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision. The appellant was assisted by a registered migration agent in the Tribunal proceeding. His representative filed detailed written submissions dated 12 January 2015 in support of his claims. The appellant attended a hearing before the Tribunal on 14 January 2015, which was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter. By a letter dated 3 February 2015, further written submissions were made on his behalf, which, among other things, provided additional country information. On 11 February 2015, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision. TRIBUNAL’S DECISION Relevantly for the present appeal, the Tribunal considered the appellant’s claims relating to his complaints to police under the following subheadings:·“Is there a real chance that the [appellant] would suffer serious harm in Sri Lanka now or in the reasonably foreseeable future because of his imputed political opinion because he complained about army and police men taking goods from his shop?”; and·“Is there a real chance that the [appellant] would suffer serious harm in Sri Lanka now or in the reasonably foreseeable future because of his imputed political opinion because he complained about a policeman fining a man on a motorbike?” Under the first subheading, the Tribunal set out the appellant’s claims regarding his complaints about Army personnel and police taking goods from his shop without paying. The Tribunal also noted that:[54]The [appellant] said that if he went back to Sri Lanka he could not stand by and watch the police behave as they do. He said the Government and the Army and the police would find out and he would have no protection.It is convenient to note that [54] is identical to [74] (extracted below) and also [10] of the Tribunal’s reasons. It is unclear why the Tribunal repeated itself in these paragraphs. The Tribunal went on to make findings, including that:[68]I did not find the [appellant] credible when he was asked why he thought he would be harmed because of this incident and his subsequent joint approach with other shopkeepers. … [69]I accept that the [appellant] owned a shop in his village. I accept that from time to time Army personnel would come to his shop and the shops owned by others and take goods without paying. I accept that the shopkeepers involved, including the [appellant], approached the local police. I accept that following that approach the problem stopped for a few months.[70]I accept that the [appellant], together with other shopkeepers, had also complained to their Member of Parliament. I accept that nothing adverse happened to the [appellant] because of his part in the joint approach to the police and to the Member of Parliament before the [appellant] left Sri Lanka. I accept that the other shopkeepers did not suffer any harm as a result of the joint complaint they made to the Police.…[72]I find that there is not a real chance that the [appellant] would suffer serious harm in Sri Lanka now or in the reasonably foreseeable future because of his imputed political opinion because he complained about Army and Police men taking goods from his shop, and I find that his fear is not well-founded.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 11 February 2015, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision. TRIBUNAL’S DECISION Relevantly for the present appeal, the Tribunal considered the appellant’s claims relating to his complaints to police under the following subheadings:·“Is there a real chance that the [appellant] would suffer serious harm in Sri Lanka now or in the reasonably foreseeable future because of his imputed political opinion because he complained about army and police men taking goods from his shop?”; and·“Is there a real chance that the [appellant] would suffer serious harm in Sri Lanka now or in the reasonably foreseeable future because of his imputed political opinion because he complained about a policeman fining a man on a motorbike?” Under the first subheading, the Tribunal set out the appellant’s claims regarding his complaints about Army personnel and police taking goods from his shop without paying. The Tribunal also noted that:[54]The [appellant] said that if he went back to Sri Lanka he could not stand by and watch the police behave as they do. He said the Government and the Army and the police would find out and he would have no protection.It is convenient to note that [54] is identical to [74] (extracted below) and also [10] of the Tribunal’s reasons. It is unclear why the Tribunal repeated itself in these paragraphs. The Tribunal went on to make findings, including that:[68]I did not find the [appellant] credible when he was asked why he thought he would be harmed because of this incident and his subsequent joint approach with other shopkeepers. … [69]I accept that the [appellant] owned a shop in his village. I accept that from time to time Army personnel would come to his shop and the shops owned by others and take goods without paying. I accept that the shopkeepers involved, including the [appellant], approached the local police. I accept that following that approach the problem stopped for a few months.[70]I accept that the [appellant], together with other shopkeepers, had also complained to their Member of Parliament. I accept that nothing adverse happened to the [appellant] because of his part in the joint approach to the police and to the Member of Parliament before the [appellant] left Sri Lanka. I accept that the other shopkeepers did not suffer any harm as a result of the joint complaint they made to the Police.…[72]I find that there is not a real chance that the [appellant] would suffer serious harm in Sri Lanka now or in the reasonably foreseeable future because of his imputed political opinion because he complained about Army and Police men taking goods from his shop, and I find that his fear is not well-founded. Under the second subheading, the Tribunal outlined the nature of the appellant’s claims relating to his complaint about a policeman fining a man on a motorbike, and again noted that:[74]The [appellant] said that if he went back to Sri Lanka he could not stand by and watch the police behave as they do. He said the Government and the Army and the police would find out and he would have no protection.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka. He arrived in Australia on 16 July 2012 as an “unauthorised maritime arrival”, as defined in s 5AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). On 8 November 2012, the appellant applied for a protection visa. In a statutory declaration accompanying his application dated 26 October 2012 the appellant claimed to fear harm from Sri Lankan authorities because of his Tamil ethnicity and because he sought asylum in a Western country. On 1 August 2013, a delegate of the Minister refused the appellant’s protection visa application. On 7 August 2013, the appellant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision. The appellant was assisted by a registered migration agent in the Tribunal proceeding. His representative filed detailed written submissions dated 12 January 2015 in support of his claims. The appellant attended a hearing before the Tribunal on 14 January 2015, which was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter. By a letter dated 3 February 2015, further written submissions were made on his behalf, which, among other things, provided additional country information. On 11 February 2015, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision. TRIBUNAL’S DECISION Relevantly for the present appeal, the Tribunal considered the appellant’s claims relating to his complaints to police under the following subheadings:·“Is there a real chance that the [appellant] would suffer serious harm in Sri Lanka now or in the reasonably foreseeable future because of his imputed political opinion because he complained about army and police men taking goods from his shop?”; and·“Is there a real chance that the [appellant] would suffer serious harm in Sri Lanka now or in the reasonably foreseeable future because of his imputed political opinion because he complained about a policeman fining a man on a motorbike?” Under the first subheading, the Tribunal set out the appellant’s claims regarding his complaints about Army personnel and police taking goods from his shop without paying. The Tribunal also noted that:[54]The [appellant] said that if he went back to Sri Lanka he could not stand by and watch the police behave as they do. He said the Government and the Army and the police would find out and he would have no protection.It is convenient to note that [54] is identical to [74] (extracted below) and also [10] of the Tribunal’s reasons. It is unclear why the Tribunal repeated itself in these paragraphs. The Tribunal went on to make findings, including that:[68]I did not find the [appellant] credible when he was asked why he thought he would be harmed because of this incident and his subsequent joint approach with other shopkeepers. … [69]I accept that the [appellant] owned a shop in his village. I accept that from time to time Army personnel would come to his shop and the shops owned by others and take goods without paying. I accept that the shopkeepers involved, including the [appellant], approached the local police. I accept that following that approach the problem stopped for a few months.[70]I accept that the [appellant], together with other shopkeepers, had also complained to their Member of Parliament. I accept that nothing adverse happened to the [appellant] because of his part in the joint approach to the police and to the Member of Parliament before the [appellant] left Sri Lanka. I accept that the other shopkeepers did not suffer any harm as a result of the joint complaint they made to the Police.…[72]I find that there is not a real chance that the [appellant] would suffer serious harm in Sri Lanka now or in the reasonably foreseeable future because of his imputed political opinion because he complained about Army and Police men taking goods from his shop, and I find that his fear is not well-founded.