FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Mendis v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 114
MIGRATION – Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – application for protection visa – whether error of law – gender based harm – whether capable of amounting to persecution – whether harm at hands of individuals capable of amounting to persecution – need for identification of particular social group – identification of reason for persecution
Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225, followed
Khawar v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1529, referred to
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Sarrazola [1999] FCA 1134; (1999) 166 ALR 641, followedNIROSHA RAJINI MENDIS v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
N 1381 of 1999BRANSON J
SYDNEY
18 FEBRUARY 2000
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N1381 of 1999
BETWEEN:
NIROSHA RAJINI MENDIS
ApplicantAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RespondentJUDGE:
BRANSON J
DATE OF ORDER:
18 FEBRUARY 2000
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal be set aside.
2.The matter be remitted to the Refugee Review Tribunal for further consideration according to law.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N1381 of 1999
BETWEEN:
NIROSHA RAJINI MENDIS
ApplicantAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent
JUDGE:
BRANSON J
DATE:
18 FEBRUARY 2000
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
This is an application under s 476(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) for review by the Court of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”). By its decision the Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the respondent not to grant the applicant, Nirosha Rajini Mendis (“Ms Mendis”), a protection visa (s 36 of the Act).
Although Ms Mendis was legally represented before this Court, she appeared without assistance before the Tribunal.
A criterion for a protection visa is that the decision maker is satisfied that the applicant is a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (hereafter together referred to as “the Convention”) (Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations cl 866.221). Australia has protection obligations to Ms Mendis under the Convention if she is a person who:
“… owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of [her] nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail [herself] of the protection of that country ….” (Article 1A(2) of the Convention)
FACTS
The Tribunal summarised the applicant’s claims as follows:
“The applicant claims that her husband came to Australia in March 1996. She remained…
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- Case
- [2000] FCA 114
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Tribunal had correctly determined that Ms Mendis's experiences of harassment and fear upon returning to Sri Lanka did not constitute persecution as defined by the Convention. Specifically, the court had to consider whether the Tribunal's findings that the harassment was not of a Convention reason and did not amount to persecution were legally sound.
In its reasoning, the court noted that the Tribunal's decision seemed to hinge on two key findings: that the harm Ms Mendis feared was not persecution because it was inflicted by individuals, and that the harm was not for a Convention reason but rather due to her being seen as an opportunity for sexual gratification. The court held that both of these findings were erroneous. Firstly, persecution under the Convention does not necessarily need to be state-inflicted; it can also be perpetrated by individuals. Secondly, the Tribunal had incorrectly concluded that Ms Mendis's fear of harassment was not for a Convention reason, as the Convention covers a range of reasons including membership of a particular social group. Consequently, the court found that the Tribunal had made an error of law in its interpretation and application of the Convention.
As a result, the court set aside the Tribunal's decision and remitted the matter back to the Tribunal for further consideration in accordance with the law. This decision underscores the importance of correctly interpreting and applying the criteria set out in the Convention when determining refugee status claims.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal be set aside.
2. The matter be remitted to the Refugee Review Tribunal for further consideration according to law.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: BRANSON J
The Tribunal set out its findings of fact and its reasons in the following paragraphs from its written reasons for decision.“The Tribunal accepts that the applicant has told the truth in her claims. It also accepts that after her husband left she was harassed by various people and was followed by men and approached by others. The Tribunal accepts that if the applicant returns to Sri Lanka she may again be subjected to this treatment and this will be very unfortunate for her.However, although the situation is a difficult one for the applicant the Tribunal finds that her claims do not bring her situation within the ambit of the Convention. The Tribunal finds that the fears which the applicant holds on her return to Sri Lanka are of harassment by individuals. The[y] are not fears of persecution as it is defined in the Convention. Moreover the fears which the applicant holds are mistreatment because she is seen as an opportunity for the sexual gratification of various individual males. This is not for any of the reasons stated in the Convention.In summary the Tribunal finds that there is not a real chance that the applicant will be persecuted should she return to Sri Lanka. The Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant holds a well founded fear of persecution for any Convention reason.”CONSIDERATION The principal ground of review relied upon by the applicant was that the decision of the Tribunal involved an error of law, being an error involving an incorrect interpretation of the applicable law or an incorrect application of the law to the facts as found by the Tribunal (see s 476(1)(e) of the Act). In my view, this ground of review has been made out. I have reached this view for the following reasons. The Tribunal’s decision appears to be based on two findings. First, that the harm which the applicant fears does not amount to persecution within the meaning of the Convention because it is harm at the hands of individuals. Secondly, that the harm that the applicant fears is not harm for a Convention reason but harm that will arise because she will be seen “as an opportunity for the sexual gratification of various individual males.” As to the first of the Tribunal’s findings, it is regrettably common for persecution to be inflicted by individuals. It is not a necessary characteristic of persecution within the meaning of the Convention that it be State inflicted. However, as McHugh J pointed out in Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225 at 258:“The object of the Convention is to provide refuge for those groups who, having lost the de jure or de facto protection of their governments, are unwilling to return to the countries of their nationality.” This object may be identified, in my view, not from the use of the term “persecuted” in Article 1A(2) of the Convention, but from the reference in the article to a refugee being “unable or, owing to such fear, … unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country” [ie his or her country of nationality].