CXB20 v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CXB20 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 1667  

Appeal from: Federal Circuit Court of Australia
File number: QUD 190 of 2020
Judgment of: RANGIAH  J
Date of judgment: 18 November 2020
Catchwords: MIGRATION – judicial review of decision of Federal Circuit Court dismissing application for review of decision of Immigration Assessment Authority to affirm decision to refuse protection visas – where appellants provided new information after decision was made – whether Authority fell into jurisdictional error when determining if exceptional circumstances existed under s 473DD(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where first appellant claimed a well-founded fear of persecution – whether Authority misapplied s 5J of the Migration Act by failing to consider a clearly advanced argument – appeal allowed
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5H, 5J, 36, 473DC and 473DD

Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Act 2014 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 236 FCR 593

AQU17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 162 ALD 442

AUS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] HCA 37

BVZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 254 FCR 221

Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379

CHF16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 257 FCR 148

Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 197 ALR 389; [2003] HCA 26

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Khawar (2002) 210 CLR 1

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairsv Respondents S152/2003 (2004) 222 CLR 1

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Ibrahim (2000) 204 CLR 1

MZZJO v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 239 FCR 436

NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1

Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 217

PS (Sri Lanka) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 1213

R v Kelly [2000] 1 QB 198

SZTOR v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 349

Division: General Division
Registry: Queensland
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 96
Date of last submissions: 17 July 2020 (First Respondent)
31 July 2020 (Appellants)
Date of hearing: 3 July 2020
Counsel for the Appellants: Mr H Clift
Solicitor for the Appellants: Angus Francis Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr J Byrnes
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent did not appear

ORDERS

QUD 190 of 2020
BETWEEN:

CXB20

First Appellant

CXC20

Second Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

RANGIAH  J

DATE OF ORDER:

18 NOVEMBER 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is allowed. 

2.The orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 14 October 2019 are set aside.

3.A writ of certiorari issue quashing…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 1667
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case CXB20 v Minister for Home Affairs involved the appellants, a mother and her daughter, both of Tamil ethnicity and Hindu religion from the Northern Province of Sri Lanka. They sought judicial review of a decision by the Federal Circuit Court to dismiss their application for review of a decision by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) to affirm the refusal of protection visas. The appellants arrived in Australia in 2012 and claimed they had fled Sri Lanka due to threats from the Criminal Investigation Department, Sri Lankan Police, and the Sri Lankan Army. The mother claimed to have been raped by the army or police, and that her daughter had been sexually assaulted by the army or police. They sought protection visas on the basis of a well-founded fear of persecution if they were to return to Sri Lanka.

The legal issues before the court were whether the IAA fell into jurisdictional error when determining if exceptional circumstances existed under s 473DD(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to consider the new information provided by the mother regarding her daughter’s alleged sexual assault. The court was also required to decide whether the IAA misapplied s 5J of the Migration Act by failing to consider a clearly advanced argument. The court found that the IAA erred by not considering the new information provided by the mother against the criteria in s 473DD(b)(i) and s 473DD(b)(ii) before assessing whether exceptional circumstances existed under s 473DD(a). The court held that the IAA should have considered the new information against the criteria in s 473DD(b) before determining if exceptional circumstances existed under s 473DD(a).

The appeal was allowed, the orders of the Federal Circuit Court were set aside, and a writ of certiorari issued quashing the IAA's decision. A writ of mandamus was also issued requiring the IAA to decide the referral according to law. The Minister for Home Affairs was ordered to pay the appellants' costs of the appeal and the proceeding before the Federal Circuit Court.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is allowed.

2. The orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 14 October 2019 are set aside.

3. A writ of certiorari issue quashing the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority made on 19 February 2019.

4. A writ of mandamus issue requiring the Immigration Assessment Authority to decide the referral made in respect of the appellants’ visa application according to law.

5. The first respondent pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal and the proceeding before the Federal Circuit Court.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

I will describe the background and the decisions of the Authority and the primary judge before considering the merits of the appeal.Background The first appellant is the mother of the second appellant. I will refer to them as “the mother” and “the daughter” respectively. They are of Tamil ethnicity and Hindu religion and are from the Northern Province of Sri Lanka. They arrived in Australia as “unauthorised maritime arrivals” in November 2012. The mother was interviewed by an officer of the Department of Immigration and Citizenship on 21 January 2013, shortly after her arrival in Australia (the Entry interview). In the interview, the mother claimed she had fled Sri Lanka because the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the Sri Lankan Police would come to her house looking for her husband, who had disappeared, that they would tell her to come with them “for sexual reasons”, and they would abuse her daughter. The mother claimed she came to Australia to “protect [her] life”. The daughter was interviewed by the same officer, and claimed that her class mates were raped by the CID and that if she returned to Sri Lanka the same would happen to her. The appellants lodged a combined SHEV application on 10 May 2016. The mother made a claim for protection, and the daughter relied on her mother’s claims but did not make any claims for protection of her own. The mother claimed that she feared harm from the Sri Lankan Government, the CID and the Sri Lankan Army (SLA). In a statutory declaration sworn on 5 October 2015 and provided to the delegate on 13 October 2016, the mother claimed, amongst other things, that:(a)She had to place her daughter in a hostel for her safety while she was away in Lebanon, “as there was a lot of violence against girls and women occurring at this time, including rape by the Sri Lankan army”.(b)On one occasion, people who she believed to be members of the army or the police came looking for her at her house and wanted to take her away to ask her questions about her husband, who had disappeared. She claimed that when she refused, they started pushing her and touching her “inappropriately”, and that they only left after her neighbours intervened.(c)She was visited at her home by men from the SLA or the CID on at least five occasions, and on one occasion three men came to her house in plain clothes and two of them held her down while the third man raped her.(d)She could not seek help from the Sri Lankan Government, as the army and the CID were the ones inflicting harm on her.(e)She has been receiving counselling and has confided in her counsellor about the rape. She feels very ashamed of the rape and does not like talking about it, and has never told her daughter about it and does not want her to know that it happened. The mother was interviewed by an officer of the Department of Immigration and Border Protection as part of her protection visa application on 13 February 2018 (the SHEV interview). Legal submissions were made by the Refugee and Immigration Legal Service (RAILS) on her behalf. RAILS referred to country information discussing the prevalence of sexual assaults of Tamil women by Sri Lankan military and security personnel in the north and east of the country, and saying that such assaults were carried out with impunity.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 9 August 2018, further submissions were made to the Authority on behalf of the appellants, which included a statutory declaration of the mother dated 6 August 2018. The statutory declaration made reference, for the first time, to the daughter allegedly having been sexually assaulted in 2003 at a young age, and claimed that this was the reason she had been placed in a hostel while the mother was in Lebanon. The mother provided reasons for not previously disclosing this new information as follows:20. I have not disclosed this information previously, as I wanted to spare my daughter. I was scared that if I revealed this information I would somehow tarnish her name. I did not want my daughter to be questioned about what had happened to her. I did not want her to relive the traumatic events of the past. It is very difficult for me to speak about what happened to my daughter and I felt great shame over it. Even disclosing this information to my lawyer was very distressing to me.21. I cannot take my daughter back to Sri Lanka. I fear for her safety if we were to return and I fear for her mental wellbeing. I have been trying to protect my daughter by not disclosing this information in the past. I also ask that my daughter not be questioned about this event in the future.The decisions of the Authority and the Federal Circuit Court On 19 February 2019, the Authority decided to affirm the delegate’s decision. The Authority found that it was not permitted to consider the new information relating to the daughter’s sexual assault, as it was not satisfied that there were “exceptional circumstances” to do so pursuant to s 473DD(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act). The Tribunal gave the following reasons for its finding:The first applicant’s statutory declaration refers to a new claim, that her daughter was sexually assaulted in 2003 in [name redacted] Camp, and indicates that is the reason why her daughter had to live in the hostel. The first applicant states that she believes her daughter was assaulted by the men who were policing the camp, and whilst she was in Lebanon she received a call saying her daughter was taken by a child protection agency and placed in a hostel for her safety. She was not told the specific reasons and it was only later she realised it was in relation to a sexual assault. The first applicant provides no details about who called her, or exactly when they did so, or when and how she formed the belief that her daughter has been sexually assaulted. The first applicant states that she did not disclose this information previously as she wanted to spare her daughter, was scared it would tarnish her name, did not want her daughter to be questioned about what had happened and relive past events, and because she felt great shame over it, and it is very difficult and distressing for her to speak about what happened to her daughter. The first applicant goes on to state that she has been trying to protect her daughter by not disclosing this information in the past, and asks that her daughter not be questioned about this event in the future. Of note, at her Entry interview, in January 2013, when asked why she left Sri Lanka the second applicant said the CID came to her house and asked her and her Mum to go to their camp, that some of her classmates were raped by the CID and fears that would happen to her if she went to their camp. When asked if she had ever gone to the CID camp she said ‘no’. Taking into account that the applicants were represented by RAILS throughout the Visa application process, who I consider as experienced practitioners would have advised them of the importance of putting forward all claims, that the first applicant received information prior to the SHEV interview stressing the importance of raising all of claims for protection, that despite the cultural shame associated with such assaults the first applicant disclosed her own sexual assault in her statement of claims and during the SHEV interview, and that the second applicant did not refer to being sexually assaulted during the Entry interview, or make her own claims for protection, and noting that the events took place several years ago, the first applicant has not satisfied me the information could not have been provided prior to the delegate’s decision, or that the claim is credible, as I consider it would have been made at an earlier time if the events had genuinely occurred. In all the circumstances, I am not satisfied there are exceptional circumstances to consider this new claim.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Pursuant to s 473DC(1), the claim that the daughter had been sexually assaulted contained in the mother’s statutory declaration was “new information”. Under s 473DD, the Authority was forbidden from considering the new information unless it was satisfied that the preconditions in subsections (a) and (b) were met.ConsiderationGrounds 1 and 2 Grounds 1 and 2 of the notice of appeal concern the provision of new information by the mother to the Authority regarding a sexual assault against the daughter. As these grounds were addressed together by the appellant in oral and written submissions, I will consider them together. In AUS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] HCA 37, the plurality of the High Court described the operation of s 473DD of the Act: 7The criteria that must be met if the Authority is to take new information that it has got into account in making its decision on the review vary according to the provenance of the new information that has been obtained by the Authority. All new information is required to meet the criterion specified in s 473DD(a) that the Authority is satisfied of the existence of “exceptional circumstances” justifying its consideration of that new information . 8New information obtained from the referred applicant is required to meet at least one of the additional criteria specified in s 473DD(b). The additional criterion specified in s 473DD(b)(i) is met if the referred applicant satisfies the Authority that the new information meets the bipartite description of information that was not before the Minister at the time of making the referred decision and that could not have been before the Minister at the time of making the referred decision. The additional criterion specified in s 473DD(b)(ii) is met if the referred applicant satisfies the Authority that the new information meets the tripartite description of “credible personal information”, that was not previously known, and that may have affected consideration of the referred applicant's claims to be a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations if it had been previously known.…11Logic and policy therefore demand that the Authority assess such new information as it might obtain from the referred applicant first against the criteria specified in both s 473DD(b)(i) and s 473DD(b)(ii) and only then against the criterion specified in s 473DD(a). If neither of the criteria specified in s 473DD(b)(i) and s 473DD(b)(ii) is met, the Authority is prohibited from taking the new information into account in making its decision on the review. Further assessment of the new information against the criterion specified in s 473DD(a) is redundant. If either the criterion specified in s 473DD(b)(i) or the criterion specified in s 473DD(b)(ii) is met, that is a circumstance which must be factored into the subsequent assessment of whether the new information meets the criterion specified in s 473DD(a). If both the criterion specified in s 473DD(b)(i) and the criterion specified in s 473DD(b)(ii) are met, that too is a circumstance which must be factored into the subsequent assessment of whether the new information meets the criterion specified in s 473DD(a) and which must heighten the prospect of that criterion being met.12The result, as has been recognised by the Federal Court in numerous other cases, is that the Authority does not perform the procedural duty imposed on it by s 473DD in its conduct of a review if it determines in the purported application of the criterion in s 473DD(a) that exceptional circumstances justifying consideration of new information obtained from the referred applicant do not exist without first assessing that information against the criteria specified in both s 473DD(b)(i) and s 473DD(b)(ii) and then taking the outcome of that assessment into account in its assessment against the criterion specified in s 473DD(a). The nature of the non-performance of the procedural duty in such a case is not inaccurately characterised as a failure to take account of a mandatory relevant consideration in the purported application of the criterion in s 473DD(a).(Citations omitted.)