SZTOR v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZTOR v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 349

Appeal from: Application for extension of time: SZTOR & Ors v Minister For Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 690
File number: NSD 915 of 2016
Judge: RANGIAH J
Date of judgment: 15 March 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for extension of time within which to file a notice of appeal against a judgement of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – evidence of religious conversion – whether adverse findings on credit illogical or lacked adequate evidentiary foundation – whether children should be regarded as making their own refugee and complementary protection claims – certificate of non-disclosure of evidence – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed
Legislation:

Constitution s 116

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B

Migration Act1958 (Cth) ss 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 36(2)(b), 36(2)(c), 48A, 91R, 91R(3), 424A and 438

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 36(2)(c), 36.03 and 36.05

Cases cited:

Dranichnokov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 197 ALR 389

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJGV (2009) 238 CLR 642

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZLSP (2010) 187 FCR 362

MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 152 ALD 478

NABE v Minister for Immigration (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1

S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 216 CLR 473

SDAQ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 129 FCR 137

SZGME v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 168 FCR 487

SZNCT & SZNCU v Minister for Immigration [2009] FMCA 233

SZTRY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86

VUAX v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2004) 238 FCR 588

Date of hearing: 8 May 2018
Date of last submissions: 23 May 2018 (First Respondent)
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 56
Counsel for the Applicants: Mr J Williams
Solicitor for the Applicants: Halas Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr G Johnson
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice

ORDERS

NSD 915 of 2016
BETWEEN:

SZTOR

First Applicant

SZTOS

Second Applicant

SZTOT (and another named in the Schedule)

Third Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

RANGIAH J

DATE OF ORDER:

15 MARCH 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for an extension of time within which to file a notice of appeal is dismissed.

2.The applicants pay the first respondent’s costs of the application.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

RANGIAH J:

  1. This is an application under r 36.05 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (the Rules) for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 349
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case involved the second applicant who sought an extension of time to appeal against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The applicants, a family of four, sought protection in Australia claiming they would be harmed in Iran due to their conversion from Islam to Christianity. The Federal Circuit Court found that the applicants' claims were not credible and dismissed their application for protection visas. The applicants sought an extension of time to lodge an appeal against this decision, arguing that the Tribunal had erred in finding their religious conversion was not genuine and that the Court should have considered their children's claims separately. The court held that the Tribunal's decision was not based on jurisdictional error. The court found that the Tribunal was entitled to question the credibility of the applicants' claims and that there was no misunderstanding of the applicants' evidence. The court also found that the children's claims were properly considered as part of the family's application. The application for an extension of time was dismissed, and the applicants were ordered to pay the costs of the application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for an extension of time within which to file a notice of appeal is dismissed.

2. The applicants pay the first respondent’s costs of the application.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The second applicant claimed to fear harm because of his wife’s “persistent religious activities”.The Tribunal’s decision The first applicant attended a hearing before the Tribunal on 21 October 2013 and gave evidence at the hearing. The applicants were represented by a migration agent. The second applicant did not attend the hearing because he had to look after a sick child, but did not seek any adjournment to allow him to give evidence. The first applicant said that the second applicant had no claim separate to hers. The Tribunal gave detailed reasons dated 8 November 2013, finding that the first applicant’s evidence lacked credibility. The Tribunal found that many of her claims were vague, inconsistent or implausible. The applicants called a witness who gave corroborative evidence, but the Tribunal found that her evidence suggested a degree of collusion. Significantly, for the purposes of this application, the Tribunal found:30.Asked what steps she had taken in Australia to explore other religions or other branches of Christianity, she claimed that she did not need to look for anything else as she had found what she wanted. She knew she had been baptised into the Pentecostal Protestant branch. Asked why she chose this branch, she said differences were minor and the atmosphere was very welcoming in this church. It was put to her that she had been constrained previously and yet had come to Australia and explored no other branches and just fallen into one church. She was aware there were differences between Protestant and Catholic but she didn't care about the different paths and didn't have the time for research as she was a mother.…56.Her actions once in Australia are also not indicative of someone who has undertaken any significant spiritual examination. She had not explored any other religions or other branches of Christianity, and didn't display any significant knowledge of the other branches of Christianity. While the Tribunal acknowledges that there is no specific test as to what is a sufficient degree of research, the complete absence of any suggests a deliberate and targeted approach. She had gone to a single church on the recommendation her friend [name removed], but was vague on the differences between the different Christian denominations saying that she didn't care about the different paths and that she didn't have time for research as she was a mother. It should be emphasised, that these passages do not represent the sole basis upon which the Tribunal found that the first applicant’s evidence was not credible. The Tribunal found that the first and second applicants’ claimed conversion was not genuine. It found that their Church attendance in Australia was done with the sole purpose of strengthening their refugee claims. The Tribunal was not satisfied that there were any substantial grounds for believing that there was a real risk that the applicants would suffer harm in Iran. It also found that there were no substantial grounds for believing that as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed to Iran, there was a real risk that they would suffer significant harm.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The primary judge held that jurisdictional error had not been demonstrated. His Honour dismissed the application with costs. Consideration of the merits The notice of appeal describes the grounds of appeal as follows:(1)There was an insufficient logical or evidentiary basis for the Tribunal to impugn the credibility of the first applicant regarding her knowledge of the Christian denominations or her reasons for preferring the Protestant Pentecostal branch of Christianity. (2)Failure to consider the claims of the third and fourth applicants.(3)There was an insufficient logical or evidentiary basis for the Tribunal to find that the applicants were not “genuine” Christians after finding that the applicants were baptised, attend Bible classes and church services. (4)Misapplication of law or failure to ask the correct question regarding the applicants’ conversion from Islam to Christianity under s 91R(3) of the Act and the refugee criterion. (5)Misapplication of law or failure to ask the correct question regarding the applicants’ conversion from Islam to Christianity under the complementary criterion.(6)Jurisdictional error concerning the certificate notification regarding the non-disclosure of information under s 438 of the Act. The notice of appeal is a lengthy document that sets out a great deal of evidence and argument, but the extracts set out above serve to describe the substance of the grounds. In support of the first ground, the applicants rely upon Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZLSP (2010) 187 FCR 362, where Kenny and Rares JJ observed at [39] that:Where the Tribunal rejects an applicant’s claim based on perceived deficiencies and the applicant’s knowledge of religious doctrine, there must be a basis for concluding that the particular elements of doctrine in question are elements that an adherent to the religion in the applicant’s position might reasonably be expected to know. The applicants contend that the primary judge erred by finding:…I am not persuaded that the Tribunal’s paraphrasing and abbreviation of the first applicant’s evidence bespoke a misunderstanding of it. It seems to me to be a reasonable, if shorthand, reflection of what she said. In any event, the applicants did not seek to identify in what way any misunderstanding of the sort they sought to identify might have had a bearing on the outcome of the review. The applicants refer to the Tribunal’s findings at [30] and [56] of its decision record. They also refer to passages from the transcript of the hearing before the Tribunal which they say:…clearly demonstrates that the Tribunal misinterpreted, misconstrued or misunderstood the testimony of the first applicant as summarised at [30] of the decision record and therefore wrongly concluded at [56] that the first appellant “had not explored any other religions” or did not display any significant knowledge of the other branches of Christianity. After setting out passages from the transcript, the applicants merely assert that the primary judge “therefore” erred by finding that the Tribunal did not fail to have proper regard to, or did not fail to consider, the first applicant’s claims and evidence after misunderstanding her testimony. The applicants’ submissions do not explain precisely what misunderstanding the Tribunal had of the first applicant’s testimony, or why such misunderstanding would amount to jurisdictional error.