AJZ17 v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AJZ17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1485

Appeal from: AJZ17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 3081
File number: VID 1446 of 2018
Judge: MOSHINSKY J
Date of judgment: 11 September 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – protection visa – where appellant was from Kenya and made claims based on (among other things) membership of a particular social group, namely mentally ill persons in Kenya – where Tribunal reasoned that the appellant would not be subject to discrimination because the Kenyan authorities do not recognise mental illness –
whether the Tribunal erred in its consideration of the concept of discrimination – consideration of the nature of the causal link required by the words “for reasons of” in the Refugees Convention and s 5J(1)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether the Tribunal erred by focussing on the intention of the perpetrator rather than the predicament of the visa applicant – whether the Tribunal erred by failing to evaluate an integer of the appellant’s claims under the refugee criteria (as distinct from under the complementary protection criteria)
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5, 5J, 36, 36(2B)

Mental Health Act 2014 (Vic)

Cases cited:

ADS15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 233

Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225

Applicant S v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2004) 217 CLR 387

Applicant VEAZ of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1033

BRF038 v Republic of Nauru (2017) 349 ALR 67

Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia (1990) 169 CLR 436

Chen Shi Hai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 201 CLR 293

Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 197 ALR 389

Erduran v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2002) 122 FCR 150

K v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] 1 AC 412

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZAPN (2015) 254 CLR 610

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Ibrahim (2000) 204 CLR 1

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Israelian (2001) 206 CLR 323

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Khawar (2002) 210 CLR 1

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Sarrazola (No 2) (2001) 107 FCR 184

MZZXF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 158

NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1

NACM of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 134 FCR 550

NAEU of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 259

Plaintiff M61/2010E v Commonwealth (2010) 243 CLR 319

Ram v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1995) 57 FCR 565

SDAQ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 129 FCR 137

SZLPH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 145

SZTAL v Minister for…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 1485
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter of AJZ17 v Minister for Home Affairs involved an appeal by the appellant, a Kenyan citizen diagnosed with schizophrenia, against the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia to dismiss his application for a protection visa. The appellant argued that he faced persecution in Kenya due to his mental illness, as members of his social group, mentally ill persons, were not recognised or treated appropriately by the Kenyan authorities. The central legal issues were whether the Tribunal had erred in its consideration of the concept of discrimination, the causal link required by the phrase "for reasons of" in the Refugees Convention and section 5J(1)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), and whether the Tribunal had incorrectly focused on the intention of the perpetrator rather than the predicament of the visa applicant. Additionally, the court needed to determine if the Tribunal had failed to evaluate an element of the appellant's claims under the refugee criteria.

The court found that the Tribunal had erred in its reasoning. The Tribunal concluded that because the Kenyan authorities did not recognise mental illness, the appellant would not be subject to discrimination. However, the court held that this reasoning overlooked the appellant's predicament and the potential harm he might face due to his symptoms, regardless of whether the authorities recognised his condition as mental illness. The court emphasised that persecution could occur due to the symptoms of mental illness, even if the authorities did not attribute those symptoms to a mental condition. The court also noted that the Tribunal's focus on the intention of the perpetrator rather than the actual harm faced by the appellant was misplaced. The court concluded that the Tribunal should have assessed the risk of harm based on the appellant's symptoms and their impact, irrespective of the authorities' recognition of mental illness.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the Federal Circuit Court, and remitted the matter back to the delegate for reconsideration. The court also ordered the Minister to pay the appellant's costs of the proceeding in the Federal Circuit Court and the costs of the appeal. The court directed the parties to file agreed proposed minutes of orders for the lump sum costs within 14 days, and if no agreement was reached, to follow a specific process for determining the appropriate lump sum figure for the appellant's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders of the Federal Circuit Court dated 1 November 2018 be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered that:

(a) the decision of the second respondent dated 18 January 2017 be set aside;

(b) the matter be remitted to the second respondent for determination according to law;

(c) the first respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the proceeding in the Federal Circuit Court, as agreed or assessed.

3. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal, to be fixed by way of a lump sum.

THE COURT DIRECTS THAT:

4. Within 14 days, the parties file any agreed proposed minutes of orders fixing a lump sum in relation to the appellant’s costs referred to in paragraph 3 above.

5. In the absence of any agreement:

(a) within 21 days, the appellant file and serve an affidavit constituting a Costs Summary in accordance with paragraphs 4.10 to 4.12 of the Court’s Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS);

(b) within a further 14 days, the first respondent file and serve any Costs Response in accordance with paragraphs 4.13 to 4.14 of the Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS); and

(c) in the absence of any agreement having been reached within a further 14 days, the matter of an appropriate lump sum figure for the appellant’s costs be referred to a Registrar for determination.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow, I have concluded that ground 1 (set out in (a) above) should be upheld. In light of this conclusion, it is not strictly necessary to consider the appellant’s other grounds. Nevertheless, I make some observations about these grounds.Background facts The following summary of the background facts is substantially based on the reasons of the primary judge (the Reasons). The appellant is a citizen of Kenya. He belongs to the Kikuyu tribe and comes from a village in the Rift Valley, Kenya. He identifies as a Christian. He has a wife in Kenya who lives with their young child in Nairobi. On 10 October 2014, the appellant was granted a student (Class TU) (subclass 573) visa with an expiry date of 30 August 2018. On 17 October 2014 the appellant arrived in Melbourne. In February 2016, the appellant was admitted to the mental health department of St Vincent’s Hospital in Melbourne for a two-week stay. In May 2016, following a further deterioration of his mental health, the appellant was admitted to the Goulburn Valley Mental Health Service and placed on a compulsory community treatment order. It was at this time that the appellant was diagnosed with schizophrenia. His symptoms included auditory hallucinations, paranoid delusions and erratic behaviour. On 30 May 2016, the appellant’s student visa was cancelled. On 2 June 2016, the appellant was granted a bridging visa, which was cancelled on 29 July 2016. The appellant’s bridging visa was cancelled due to criminal charges in Australia, those being:(a)carry controlled weapon without excuse;(b)drunk in a public place;(c)place thing on a railway track;in relation to which the appellant was found guilty and released on an undertaking to be of good behaviour for a 12-month period. The appellant was also to comply with any conditions or directions under the Mental Health Act 2014 (Vic). On 29 July 2016, the appellant entered immigration detention. He lodged his application for a protection visa from immigration detention on 24 August 2016. In his application, the appellant included a statement outlining his claims to engage Australia’s protection obligations. The appellant attended a protection visa interview at the Maribyrnong Immigration Detention Centre on 21 December 2016 where he made additions and amendments to his earlier written claims. The appellant’s protection claims were primarily concerned with a risk of harm from the Mungiki, a violent and lawless militia sect in Kenya. He claimed that because he had come to Australia, the Mungiki believe that he has been a witness against them in the International Criminal Court. The appellant claimed that, if he returns to Kenya, the Mungiki will kill him. According to the material submitted to the delegate, the appellant was taking the medication Risperidone. Risperidone belongs to a group of medicines called anti-psychotic agents which improve the symptoms of certain types of mental illness. Risperidone is used for treatment of sudden (acute) and long-term (chronic) schizophrenia and other types of related psychosis. Risperidone has been found to be effective in the management of schizophrenia. In a 2014 study, a statistically significant improvement on various psycho-social parameters was noticed with Risperidone therapy at the end of a study period of one year. Risperidone features on the World Health Organisation (WHO) Model List of Essential Medicines which are the most important medications needed in a basic health system.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

The following summary of the Tribunal’s statement of decision and reasons (the Decision Record) is largely based on the summary contained in the Reasons. A substantial part of the Decision Record was concerned with the appellant’s claims based on imputed political opinion (being anti-Mungiki). That part of the Decision Record is not relevant for present purposes and can be put to one side. For present purposes, the focus is on the appellant’s claims based on membership of a particular social group, namely mentally ill persons in Kenya. Unlike the delegate’s decision record, the Tribunal’s decision concerned the risks posed to the appellant by his removal to the country of his citizenship, namely Kenya. In its Decision Record, the Tribunal made the following findings:(a)the appellant had been diagnosed with schizophrenia;(b)the Kenyan Government was not discriminating against mentally ill persons in Kenya in its resource allocation decisions apropos mental health services. Upon return to Kenya, the appellant would not face a real chance of being refused medical treatment, and he would not be discriminated against by the Kenyan Government in relation to medical treatment by reason of his membership of the particular social group of mentally ill persons in Kenya (referred to in these reasons as “the group”) (or for any other Convention reason);(c)having considered the submissions that the appellant was at increased risk of harm from the Kenyan authorities and community members because of his membership of the group, the Tribunal made the following finding at [83] of the Decision Record:At the hearing before me [the appellant] said that the public, the police and the authorities in Kenya did not recognise about [sic] mental health. He referred to the fact that in Australia he had been taken to court four times but he had not been convicted because they had observed his mental illness. He said that if he were in Kenya he would be in prison right now. However, as I put to him, I consider that this is because, as he himself said, the authorities in Kenya do not recognise mental illness: it is not because they discriminate against people who have mental illness. As I put to him, if he were to behave in Kenya in the way he has behaved in Australia and people were to react to this, they would not be reacting because he was mentally ill but because of his behaviour as an individual. I do not accept that it is correct that, as [the appellant’s] representatives submitted, the authorities and members of the community would be treating [the appellant] differently in this context because he was exhibiting symptoms of mental illness. I consider on the basis of the evidence to which they referred that people in Kenya would not see his behaviour as the result or a symptom of mental illness but rather, as [the appellant] himself suggested, as criminal behaviour. I do not accept on the evidence before me that, if [the appellant] returns to Kenya now or in the reasonably foreseeable future, there is a real chance that he will be singled out or treated differently from other people who behave in the way in which he may behave (if he does not remain compliant with his medication or if he is unable to obtain his medication) for reasons of his membership of the particular social group of mentally ill persons in Kenya or for any one of the other reasons referred to in paragraph 5J(1)(a) of the Migration Act.(d)the Tribunal made a similar finding in relation to the appellant’s inability to obtain employment by reason of his mental illness – that is, people’s reactions to his behaviour would not be because he is perceived as mentally ill, but would be a reaction to his behaviour without understanding its causes (at [84] of the Decision Record). The Tribunal found that any difficulty the appellant would have in obtaining employment would be “because of the way in which he may behave (without medication) as an individual rather than for reasons of his membership of the particular social group” or for any other Convention reason (a similar finding was made under the rubric of ‘complementary protection’ at [94] of the Decision Record). The Tribunal went on to state at [84] of the Decision Record:…As Burchett J (with whom O’Loughlin and R D Nicholson JJ agreed) said in Ram v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1995) 57 FCR 565 at 568: ‘People are persecuted for something perceived about them or attributed to them by their persecutors.’ [Fn: What Burchett J said was quoted with approval by McHugh J in Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225 at 284. While these cases relate to the definition of a refugee under the Refugees Convention, I consider that they remain applicable to the interpretation of paragraph 5J(1)(a) of the Migration Act.] To the extent that, as has been submitted, the authorities and the community more generally in Kenya do not recognise mental illness, it follows in my view that their treatment of someone like [the appellant] cannot be said to be ‘for reasons of’ his membership of the particular social group of mentally ill persons in Kenya because the authorities and members of the community will not perceive him as mentally ill.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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