MZZXF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

MZZXF v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCA 158

Citation: MZZXF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 158
Appeal from: MZZXF v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2014] FCCA 2138
Parties: MZZXF v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File number: VID 602 of 2014
Judge: GILMOUR J
Date of judgment: 4 March 2015
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – fear of persecution by reason of being a member of a particular social group – whether Tribunal considered appellant’s membership of each claimed social group – whether Tribunal considered whether membership of each social group grounded a well-founded fear of persecution – whether typographical error in Tribunal’s reasons amounted to failure to accord the appellant procedural fairness or failure to properly record its reasons under s 430 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – appeal dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2)(aa), 430
Cases cited: Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225
Applicant S v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2004) 217 CLR 387
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559
MZZXF v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2014] FCCA 2138
Ram v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs ((1995) 57 FCR 565
Date of hearing: 27 February 2015
Place: Melbourne
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 78
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr TC Smyth
Solicitor for the Appellant: Asylum Seeker Resource Centre
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr D Brown
Solicitor for the Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 602 of 2014

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

MZZXF
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

GILMOUR J

DATE OF ORDER:

4 MARCH 2015

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Ground 1 of the Notice of Appeal be amended by inserting the words “law to the” immediately before the words “social group”.

2.The appeal be dismissed.

3.The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 602 of 2014

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

MZZXF
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

GILMOUR J

DATE:

4 MARCH 2015

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Background

  1. This is an appeal from orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA) dismissing the appellant’s application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (Tribunal): MZZXF v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2014] FCCA 2138 (FCCA reasons).

  2. The following background and procedural history, which is uncontroversial, is largely taken from the written submissions of the first respondent.

  3. The appellant is a…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 158
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of MZZXF v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved the appellant, a Nigerian national, appealing against the Federal Circuit Court of Australia’s decision that affirmed the Tribunal's denial of her application for a visa. The appellant argued that she had a well-founded fear of persecution based on her membership in several particular social groups, including women in Nigeria, young single women in Nigeria, young single women without male protection in Nigeria, and rape victims. The central issues before the court were whether the Tribunal properly considered the appellant's membership in each claimed social group and whether it appropriately assessed whether such membership grounded a well-founded fear of persecution. Additionally, the court examined if the typographical errors in the Tribunal's reasons constituted a failure to provide procedural fairness or a proper record of its reasons.

The court found that the Tribunal had indeed considered the appellant's membership in the claimed social groups and had set out the relevant criteria for determining such membership. The court held that the Tribunal's reasoning, despite some errors, did not establish jurisdictional error and did not violate the appellant's procedural fairness. The court further concluded that the typographical errors did not impact the Tribunal's decision-making process or its compliance with statutory obligations. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the respondent.

The court allowed the amendment to the first ground of appeal to include the words "law to the" before "social group," clarifying that the appeal's substance remained unchanged. However, the court maintained that the grounds presented did not establish a jurisdictional error warranting the appeal's success. The final orders of the court included the amendment of the appeal grounds, dismissal of the appeal, and an order for the appellant to pay the costs of the respondent.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Ground 1 of the Notice of Appeal be amended by inserting the words “law to the” immediately before the words “social group”.

2. The appeal be dismissed.

3. The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The notice of appeal was filed on 14 October 2014, appealing from the whole of the judgment and Orders of the primary judge.Factual background The appellant made the following claims in support of her visa application which were detailed in a Statutory Declaration made on 17 April 2012. The appellant was the youngest of a large family. Her father died when she was 9 or 10, and her mother was treated badly by her father's family. The appellant lived in Lagos with her mother, who ran her own business, before commencing her University studies at Awka in Anambra State. Her mother died in 2005, and the appellant struggled to subsist, resorting at times in 2005 to prostitution to earn enough money to survive, and to complete her University studies. The appellant was kidnapped in the rural area of Umudhioha in August 2007, held for two weeks, repeatedly raped, and only released after her brother paid a ransom demanded by her kidnappers. As a consequence of the rape she fell pregnant, and her son was born in April or May 2008 while she was living with her sister's family in Lagos. She remained very frightened of these men, who knew about her family members and might find her again. In March 2009 she was travelling with other passengers in a minibus, which was hijacked by three men. All the passengers were taken to an isolated compound and tied up; the appellant lost consciousness, and when she regained her senses she found herself by the side of the road, bleeding from her vagina and suffering with a sore anus. She was treated at a local hospital, and reported the incident to the police, but was unaware of what investigations the police had undertaken thereafter, as she had left the area. The appellant secured a job working as an office administrator for her brother-in-law, who had been elected as a Local Government Chairman in Otoko Obowo, Imo State. An opposition party subsequently won the election for State Governor, and dismissed all the Local Government Chairmen . The appellant was forced to return to Lagos after her brother-in-law was ousted and went into hiding; she began to receive threatening telephone calls in Lagos from people who were trying to trace her brother-in-law.Claims made on the appellant's behalf The appellant's legal representatives lodged a submission with the Department of Immigration and Citizenship dated 1 May 2012, which claimed that the appellant feared persecution because of:(a)her membership of a particular social group, either as(i)a woman in Nigeria;(ii)a young single woman in Nigeria; (iii)a young single woman in Nigeria without male protection; or(iv)a combination thereof.(b)her imputed political opinion as a consequence of having worked for her brother-in-law in the Obowo Local Government. The foundation of her fear was said to be sound because of certain past incidents, and its consistency with country information. She also contended that State protection against the persecution she claimed to fear would be ineffective, and that relocation within Nigeria would not be reasonable.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Tribunal found that the appellant had suffered with mental illness before she left Nigeria, but she had been able to secure employment, had enjoyed a good source of income, and had made no claim about having been stigmatised. There was not a real chance of the appellant being persecuted on account of her mental illness. Federal Circuit Court judgment The primary judge noted that one of the applicant's claims before the Tribunal was that she had a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of her membership of the particular social groups: •women in Nigeria, •young single women in Nigeria, •young single women in Nigeria without male protection, and •rape victims. His Honour found that the Tribunal had considered the appellant's membership of all the claimed particular social groups, and noted that the Tribunal had found that the risk of harm claimed by the appellant in Nigeria was not by reason of her membership of a particular social group, but rather because of her individual attributes. The Court found that this finding of fact was open to the Tribunal. The Court concluded that the Tribunal had considered the particular social group claims; it had set them out and had gone on to consider those claims. His Honour rejected the appellant's contention that the Tribunal had failed to address integers of the appellant's claims. The Court went on to find that the errors made by the Tribunal, referring on one occasion to the appellant as "he" and mistakenly referring to the appellant being removed to "Nepal" rather than Nigeria, when seen in the overall context of the decision did not establish jurisdictional error. The two errors neither amounted to a failure to comply with s 430 of the Act nor amounted to a failure to accord the appellant procedural fairness.Application for leave to amend The appellant seeks leave to amend her first ground of appeal. The first respondent does not oppose the application for leave to amend the first ground so as to add the words “law to the” immediately before the term “social group”, but submits that the judgment below cannot be impugned for failing to uphold a ground that was not actually before the Court. I will allow the amendment. It does no more than reflect what in substance was argued before the primary judge. Ground 1 Ground 1 of this appeal, as amended, contains a complaint that the primary judge erred in failing to find jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s application of the law to the “social group” claim to refugee status which the appellant made. In support of this ground the appellant relies upon the submissions she put to the Court below. The relevant paragraphs were as follows (with court book references omitted):Ground 1 – Misapplication of “social group” test[13]A Convention nexus is established, relevantly to this case, by membership of a “particular social group”.[14] In Australia, authority is to the effect that a “particular social group” must:(i) be identifiable by a common characteristic or attribute which(ii) cannot be the shared fear of persecution, and(iii) must distinguish the group from society at large.Applicant S v [Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs] (2004) 217 CLR 387 (Applicant S) at [36].[15]Membership of a social group so identified is necessary to evince a Convention nexus, but not sufficient. The applicant must also be “unable to, or owing to such fear, [be] unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that [nationality] country or return there because there is a fear of persecution”: see Dranichinikov v [Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs] (2003) 197 ALR 389 (Dranichinikov) at [26] and Applicant A v [Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs] (1997) 190 CLR 225 (Applicant A) at 240.[16]The Tribunal reasons on the particular social group point as follows. [17]First, it refers to the social groups of which the applicant claimed to be a member (women in Nigeria, young single women in Nigeria, young single women in Nigeria without male protection, and rape victims); see [87]-[93].[18]Second, it says that:There is no reason in principle why such a group or groups cannot constitute a particular group in the Nigerian context, satisfying the requirements of Applicant S. [19]The Tribunal then, however, fails to consider, as it should have done, each of the social group claims in turn. This is despite the Tribunal having continued, at [95]:Firstly, the group members’ gender constitutes a common attribute or characteristic, and secondly, it is distinct from the shared fear of persecution. The country information indicates that in Nigeria, there is no gender equality, and the authorities do no effectively protect women from violence including sexual violence. The country information indicates in the Tribunal’s view that women in Nigeria generally continue to be second class citizens, and there are discriminatory laws. Consequently, the third component of the Applicant S test is satisfied, in that the attributes in question set the members apart from Nigerian society at large.[20]At [104], the Tribunal rejected the applicant’s claim of a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of her status as a victim of rape.[21]Even on a benevolent reading of the Tribunal’s reasons, however, it makes no specific finding about whether the applicant is a member of any of the three other groups she identified: women in Nigeria, young single women in Nigeria, and young single women in Nigeria without male protection.[22] Rather, the Tribunal:•Expresses itself, at [96], to be applying an erroneous test (risk of serious harm, rather than fear of persecution);•Makes certain findings of fact about the applicant’s family situation: at [97]; then•Reasons, at [98], that the particular persecution or harm pointed to would:in the view of the Tribunal, be motivated by criminal intent or exploitative opportunism directed at the applicant in her individual capacity rather than for reason of her membership of any particular group.[23]There are at least two problems with this mode of reasoning. The first is that it is logically fallacious. Accepting it requires acceptance of two conflicting propositions: that the social groups pointed to are generically at greater risk of the persecution or harm contended for (see [96]-[97]), but that, nonetheless, were any of that mistreatment to be visited upon the applicant, it would be not because of membership of any of the particular social groups pointed to, but because of personal factors (at [98]) – those personal factors being the same as those conferring on her membership of the social groups identified.[24]It may be – as suggested by the Tribunal’s citation of the passage of Applicant A set out at [96] – that a more orthodox record of the Tribunal’s sequence of reasoning would reveal that it did not in fact fall into error in its application of the social group test to the applicant’s claims. Given the elliptical nature of the reasoning actually expressed, however, the relevant finding is at best to be found in the wrap-up “cumulative consideration” paragraph [123], which in the applicant’s submission does not cure the defect identified. [25]Accordingly, in the applicant’s submission, the Tribunal’s reasoning on the social group point reveals the Tribunal having committed an error of law by failing properly to appreciate or to apply the correct test to determine the applicant’s status as a refugee by reference to a Convention nexus said to arise by her membership of a particular social group or groups.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established