Awan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Awan v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs
[2002] FCA 594

MIGRATION – Application for student visa – Migration Review Tribunal decision – breach of s 359A(1) Migration Act – Mistakes of fact concerning the applicant’s financial status - effect of privative clause in s 474 Migration Act – whether breach amounted to jurisdictional error – whether legislative intention that breach would lead to invalidity of a decision of the MRT.

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Unrepresented applicant – expedited hearing – access to justice.

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 65, 336A, 348, 353, 353A, 358, 359, 359A(1), 360, 362A, 365(1), 366C, 368(1), 368A, 474, 475A, 476.
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) schedule 2 cl 560.224(1)
Australian Constitution s 75(v)

Minogue v Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission (1999) 84 FCR 438 referred to
R v Hickman & Ors; Ex parte Fox and Anor (1945) 70 CLR 598 applied
Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 followed
R v the Commonwealth Rent Controller and Ors; Ex parte National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Limited (1947) 75 CLR 361 considered
R v Murray and Ors; Ex parte Proctor and Ors (1949) 77 CLR 387 considered
R v Metal Trades Employers’ Association and Ors; Ex parte Amalgamated Engineering Union Australian Section (1950) 82 CLR 208 considered
R v Coldham and Ors; Ex parte The Australian Workers’ Union (1982) 153 CLR 415 considered
O’Toole v Charles David Proprietary Limited (1991) 171 CLR 232 considered
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia v Richard Walter Pty Limited (1994) 183 CLR 168 considered
Wang v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 167 considered
Re Refugee Review Tribunal and Anor; Ex parte Aala (2000) 176 ALR 219 considered
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Miah [2001] HCA 22 considered
Vanmeld Pty Ltd v Fairfield City Council (1999) 46 NSWLR 78 considered
Greene v McElroy (1959) 360 US 474 considered
Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2002 SCC 1 considered
NAAX v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 263 considered
Carlos v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 301 followed
Turcan v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 397 considered
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj [2002] HCA 11 followed
Walton v Ruddock [2001] FCA 1839 referred to
NABE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 281 referred to
Ratumaiwai v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 311 referred to
Boakye-Danquah v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 438 followed

AHMED IRFAN AWAN v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

V 1223 OF 2001

NORTH J
9 MAY 2002
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 1223 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

AHMED IRFAN AWAN
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

NORTH J

DATE OF ORDER:

9 MAY…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCA 594
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, the case of Awan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs was brought by Mr Ahmed Awan against the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. The applicant, a Pakistani national, sought judicial review of a decision by the Migration Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) affirming a decision of the Minister to refuse his application for a student visa subclass 560. Mr Awan had previously held a student visa, completed a Diploma of Textile Manufacturing Technology and a Master of Information Systems degree in Australia, and wished to apply for a further student visa to pursue a Master of Business Administration at Central Queensland University.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether the Tribunal had breached s 359A(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) by failing to provide Mr Awan with access to the information upon which it may act in the review of the decision of the delegate to refuse the student visa. This statutory provision is significant because it ensures that applicants are afforded an opportunity to address and deal with information relevant to their claim. The Court also had to consider whether such a breach rendered the decision of the Tribunal invalid and whether the Court should remit the matter back to the Tribunal for reconsideration.

In delivering the judgment, Justice North focused on the Tribunal's failure to provide Mr Awan with the information upon which it acted, despite the clear statutory obligation to do so. The Court found that the Tribunal had indeed breached the statutory provision. However, the Court held that the breach did not render the decision of the Tribunal invalid. Instead, the Court ordered that the decision of the Tribunal be quashed and the matter be remitted back to the Tribunal for reconsideration in light of the breach. The Court also ordered that the respondent pay the costs of the applicant of and incidental to this application.

Orders

Orders of the court

2. the respondent pay the costs of the applicant of and incidental to this application.

Background

Background to the litigation

Before the Court is an application by Mr Ahmed Awan in relation to a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) which was made on 7 November 2001. The Tribunal affirmed the decision of the delegate of the respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (as he was then titled), to refuse Mr Awan a student visa – subclass 560.BACKGROUND Mr Awan is a national of Pakistan. He was born on 8 January 1976. He holds a combined degree in arts and science from Punjab University in Lahore, Pakistan. On 29 June 1996 he came to Australia. At that time he held a student visa. He commenced study for a Diploma of Textile Manufacturing Technology at the Melbourne Institute of Textiles. It seems that the conditions attached to his student visa entitled Mr Awan to work for up to 20 hours per week while his course of study was in session. He worked part time as a taxi driver. Then, on 3 December 1996, he was severely assaulted whilst driving a taxi. Following this incident he consulted a psychologist who reported symptoms of Post-traumatic Stress Disorder. The psychologist expressed the view that Mr Awan was not fit psychologically to return to work until at least after 24 February 1997. Mr Awan described the incident in a submission faxed to the Tribunal on 24 May 2001, as follows:“But in December 1996 a drunken Guy attacked me. He had an argument with me and while I was driving he put a big knife on my throught [sic] and before actually he applied that to cut my throught [sic] I grabbed it with my fingers and he cut my fingers. He was sitting directly behind me. Then some how I managed to stop the car and got out of it. He chased me and then tried to [illegible] me with the same taxi he stole. That incident had a very bad impact on me. I was under phycological [sic] treatment for that life threatening assault for nearly one and half years. Still sometimes it comes in my dream and disturbs me. I consider myself very very lucky to be alive because that Guy besides drunk was also disabled.” In 1998 Mr Awan completed the Diploma of Textile Manufacturing Technology. He then undertook a Master of Information Systems degree at Central Queensland University. He completed this course and the degree was conferred on 6 April 2001. This course was undertaken during the currency of his student visa which had been renewed on several occasions. Mr Awan’s then current student visa was due to expire on 30 April 2001. On 19 April 2001, Mr Awan went to the Preston office of the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (the Department). He wanted to apply for a further student visa in order to study for a Master of Business Administration at Central Queensland University. This course was to commence on 16 July 2001. Mr Awan was advised at the Preston office that the Migration Regulations and Departmental policy did not allow a student visa to be issued to him unless the proposed course started no more than one month after the end of the previous course. He was told that, in the circumstances, it would be appropriate that he leave Australia and apply from offshore for a visa to allow him to pursue the Masters degree at Central Queensland University.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

NORTH J
Schedule 2 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations) sets out the criteria that a visa applicant must satisfy in relation to particular subclasses of visa before the Minister can grant the visa pursuant to s 65. The relevant criteria considered by the Tribunal were set out in subclauses 560.224(1)(a) and (d) of Schedule 2 of the Regulations as follows:“(1) … the Minister is satisfied that the applicant is a genuine applicant for entry and stay as a student, having regard:(a)to the financial ability of the applicant to undertake the course without contravening any conditions of the visa relating to work; and…(d)to any other relevant matter.”THE DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL The decision of the Tribunal is divided into sections. The two sections of significance to this proceeding are headed “Evidence” (pars 7 – 29) and “Findings” (pars 30 – 37). The Tribunal outlined (pars 8 – 25) the background, including the visas previously held by Mr Awan, the studies he had completed, the visit to the Department offices on 19 April 2001, the events of 20 April 2001, the cancellation of the visa on 21 April 2001, the Windsor interview (wrongly recorded as having occurred on 23 April – in fact, it was held on 20 April 2001), the phone enquiries notes, and the delegate’s decision refusing the student visa. Then the Tribunal recorded (pars 19 – 23) the evidence given by Mr Awan to the MRT in the cancellation review hearing on 7 May 2001. The passage comprises about 25 per cent of the “Evidence” section of the Tribunal’s decision. This emphasis immediately strikes one as an unduly detailed reference to a prior proceeding before another Tribunal member. Indeed, the account of the evidence of Mr Awan given to the previous Tribunal is taken, without acknowledgment, directly, and without alteration, from the decision of the MRT constituted by Mr Friedman which considered the decision to cancel the then existing student visa. The transposition of the evidence includes the mistake in the reference to the date of the interview held by Mr Windsor on 20 April 2001. Further, the recitation of the background facts set out in pars 8 – 18 are also taken directly, without acknowledgment, and without alteration from the decision of the previous Tribunal. The remaining paragraphs of the evidence section (pars 24 – 29) are new, that is to say, not taken from the previous decision. Paragraph 24 is a further, apparently repeated, reference to the Windsor interview. Then, in par 25, there is a six line reference to the decision of the delegate under review. Paragraphs 26 – 28 summarise the evidence given at the hearing on 1 October 2001. In the context, this seems a surprisingly brief record of the evidence, because, one would imagine, the hearing in relation to the review would be the primary source of evidence for the determination of the review. Because of this paucity in the description of what occurred at the hearing before the Tribunal, the reliance by the Tribunal on an adverse assessment of the credibility of Mr Awan, and the assertion by Mr Awan, before me, that the hearing before the Tribunal had taken about ten minutes, I was concerned to have the transcript of that hearing as part of the evidence before the Court. After the hearing before me, the respondent produced the transcript of the proceedings before the Tribunal in response to my concerns.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: NORTH J

In Carlos v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 301 Merkel J described the significance of s 359A(1) at par 35 as follows:“The statutory entitlement of an applicant under ss 359A and 362A to have access to the information upon which the MRT may act in any particular case is the means by which the legislature has ensured that an applicant is afforded an opportunity to address and deal with information that is relevant to that applicant’s claim. In the absence of those statutory provisions an applicant would have no statutory entitlement to be informed of the material upon which the MRT may act. The extent of the protection afforded by ss 359A and 362A to an applicant therefore assumes fundamental importance to the fair operation of the statutory scheme of review by the MRT.” [emphasis added] Although the Full Court disagreed with Merkel J’s conclusion that there had been a breach of the section, it did not take issue with the above description of the function of the provision. Finally, it is relevant to the consequences flowing from a breach of the duty provided for in s 359A(1) to note that the hearing to which the duty attaches is the final merits review provided for by the statute. The applicant has no other opportunity to answer adverse material. That contextual factor again supports the conclusion that the legislature did not intend that the decision maker had power to make a valid decision without observing the requirements of s 359A(1). In Turcan v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 397 Heerey J may have expressed the opposite view. He said at par 41: “There seems to me significance in the fact that s 474 was introduced by way of amendment. It was inserted into an existing legislative scheme containing an extremely complex and highly structured decision making apparatus. The Act and the Regulations provide for hundreds, if not thousands, of discrete migration decisions. Many of these decisions have detailed substantive criteria and procedural requirements. It would be obvious to Parliament that, decision makers being human, errors of fact and law, whether or not capable of being characterised as ‘jurisdictional’, are likely to be made in such a setting. Where complaint is made of error, the Act provides for recourse to merits review by the Migration Review Tribunal, the Refugee Review Tribunal or the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. It seems, therefore, difficult to impute to Parliament an intention to limit the protection of s 474 so that it permits judicial review beyond the Hickman grounds. In particular, it is unlikely that Parliament intended that a defect in some element of a decision-making process would render the decision one not made ‘under the Act’ and therefore outside s 474, or that some particular features of this detailed legislative scheme were intended to be ‘inviolable’ by the application of some (unstated) test.” [emphasis added] This statement is general in its terms. It does not refer to the particular statutory provisions in question in this case, or to the other provisions which use contrasting language and to which I refer in the next section of these reasons. In my view, the mere fact that s 474 was introduced by way of amendment does not change the nature of the provisions or the consequences for their breach.