FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Awan v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs
[2002] FCA 594MIGRATION – Application for student visa – Migration Review Tribunal decision – breach of s 359A(1) Migration Act – Mistakes of fact concerning the applicant’s financial status - effect of privative clause in s 474 Migration Act – whether breach amounted to jurisdictional error – whether legislative intention that breach would lead to invalidity of a decision of the MRT.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Unrepresented applicant – expedited hearing – access to justice.
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 65, 336A, 348, 353, 353A, 358, 359, 359A(1), 360, 362A, 365(1), 366C, 368(1), 368A, 474, 475A, 476.
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) schedule 2 cl 560.224(1)
Australian Constitution s 75(v)Minogue v Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission (1999) 84 FCR 438 referred to
R v Hickman & Ors; Ex parte Fox and Anor (1945) 70 CLR 598 applied
Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 followed
R v the Commonwealth Rent Controller and Ors; Ex parte National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Limited (1947) 75 CLR 361 considered
R v Murray and Ors; Ex parte Proctor and Ors (1949) 77 CLR 387 considered
R v Metal Trades Employers’ Association and Ors; Ex parte Amalgamated Engineering Union Australian Section (1950) 82 CLR 208 considered
R v Coldham and Ors; Ex parte The Australian Workers’ Union (1982) 153 CLR 415 considered
O’Toole v Charles David Proprietary Limited (1991) 171 CLR 232 considered
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia v Richard Walter Pty Limited (1994) 183 CLR 168 considered
Wang v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 167 considered
Re Refugee Review Tribunal and Anor; Ex parte Aala (2000) 176 ALR 219 considered
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Miah [2001] HCA 22 considered
Vanmeld Pty Ltd v Fairfield City Council (1999) 46 NSWLR 78 considered
Greene v McElroy (1959) 360 US 474 considered
Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2002 SCC 1 considered
NAAX v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 263 considered
Carlos v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 301 followed
Turcan v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 397 considered
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj [2002] HCA 11 followed
Walton v Ruddock [2001] FCA 1839 referred to
NABE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 281 referred to
Ratumaiwai v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 311 referred to
Boakye-Danquah v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 438 followedAHMED IRFAN AWAN v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
V 1223 OF 2001
NORTH J
9 MAY 2002
MELBOURNE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
V 1223 OF 2001
BETWEEN:
AHMED IRFAN AWAN
APPLICANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENTJUDGE:
NORTH J
DATE OF ORDER:
9 MAY…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Awan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indige... and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2002] FCA 594
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Court was whether the Tribunal had breached s 359A(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) by failing to provide Mr Awan with access to the information upon which it may act in the review of the decision of the delegate to refuse the student visa. This statutory provision is significant because it ensures that applicants are afforded an opportunity to address and deal with information relevant to their claim. The Court also had to consider whether such a breach rendered the decision of the Tribunal invalid and whether the Court should remit the matter back to the Tribunal for reconsideration.
In delivering the judgment, Justice North focused on the Tribunal's failure to provide Mr Awan with the information upon which it acted, despite the clear statutory obligation to do so. The Court found that the Tribunal had indeed breached the statutory provision. However, the Court held that the breach did not render the decision of the Tribunal invalid. Instead, the Court ordered that the decision of the Tribunal be quashed and the matter be remitted back to the Tribunal for reconsideration in light of the breach. The Court also ordered that the respondent pay the costs of the applicant of and incidental to this application.
Orders
Orders of the court
2. the respondent pay the costs of the applicant of and incidental to this application.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: NORTH J
In Carlos v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 301 Merkel J described the significance of s 359A(1) at par 35 as follows:“The statutory entitlement of an applicant under ss 359A and 362A to have access to the information upon which the MRT may act in any particular case is the means by which the legislature has ensured that an applicant is afforded an opportunity to address and deal with information that is relevant to that applicant’s claim. In the absence of those statutory provisions an applicant would have no statutory entitlement to be informed of the material upon which the MRT may act. The extent of the protection afforded by ss 359A and 362A to an applicant therefore assumes fundamental importance to the fair operation of the statutory scheme of review by the MRT.” [emphasis added] Although the Full Court disagreed with Merkel J’s conclusion that there had been a breach of the section, it did not take issue with the above description of the function of the provision. Finally, it is relevant to the consequences flowing from a breach of the duty provided for in s 359A(1) to note that the hearing to which the duty attaches is the final merits review provided for by the statute. The applicant has no other opportunity to answer adverse material. That contextual factor again supports the conclusion that the legislature did not intend that the decision maker had power to make a valid decision without observing the requirements of s 359A(1). In Turcan v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 397 Heerey J may have expressed the opposite view. He said at par 41: “There seems to me significance in the fact that s 474 was introduced by way of amendment. It was inserted into an existing legislative scheme containing an extremely complex and highly structured decision making apparatus. The Act and the Regulations provide for hundreds, if not thousands, of discrete migration decisions. Many of these decisions have detailed substantive criteria and procedural requirements. It would be obvious to Parliament that, decision makers being human, errors of fact and law, whether or not capable of being characterised as ‘jurisdictional’, are likely to be made in such a setting. Where complaint is made of error, the Act provides for recourse to merits review by the Migration Review Tribunal, the Refugee Review Tribunal or the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. It seems, therefore, difficult to impute to Parliament an intention to limit the protection of s 474 so that it permits judicial review beyond the Hickman grounds. In particular, it is unlikely that Parliament intended that a defect in some element of a decision-making process would render the decision one not made ‘under the Act’ and therefore outside s 474, or that some particular features of this detailed legislative scheme were intended to be ‘inviolable’ by the application of some (unstated) test.” [emphasis added] This statement is general in its terms. It does not refer to the particular statutory provisions in question in this case, or to the other provisions which use contrasting language and to which I refer in the next section of these reasons. In my view, the mere fact that s 474 was introduced by way of amendment does not change the nature of the provisions or the consequences for their breach.