Morgan v Rylands Brothers (Australia) Limited

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39 CLR 517

MORGAN AND OTHERS

APPELLANTS; DEFENDANTS,

RYLANDS BROTHERS (AUSTRALIA) LIMITED RESPONDENT.

THE AUSTRALIAN WORKERS' UNION.

APPELLANTS; DEFENDANTS,

RYLANDS BROTHERS (AUSTRALIA) LIMITED RESPONDENT.

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF Industrial Arbitration (N.S.W.)-Conciliation Committee-Validity of proceeding-

Suit to impeach validity-Jurisdiction of Supreme Court-De facto award of CommitteeChairman voting as member of Committee-Industrial Arbitration (Amendment) Act 1926 (N.S.W.) (No. 14 of 1926), secs. 8, 9 (5).

Sec. 8 of the Industrial Arbitration (Amendment) Act 1926 (N.S.W.) provides by sub-sec. 1 for the establishment of conciliation committees for any industries or callings; by sub-sec. 3 that each committee shall consist of an equal number of representatives of employers and employees respectively and a chairman; and Starke JJ. and by sub-sec. 14 that 'the validity of any proceeding or decision of a committee or of a chairman of a committee shall not be challenged except as provided by this Act." Sec. 9 (5) provides that " from any order, determina- tion, or award of a committee

an appeal shall lie in the prescribed manner, to the commission," that is, the Industrial Commission established

39 CLR 518

Where upon an application for the variation of an industrial agreement the two employers' representatives voted against an award allowing the variation and the two employees' representatives voted in favour of such award and the chairman thereupon gave his vote in favour of such award and thereafter duly promulgated the award as being the award of the committee,

Held, that the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to entertain a suit for a declaration that the award was a nullity, even if the chairman had no legal (AUSTRALIA)

R. v. Hibble; Ex parte Broken Hill Pty. Co., (1920) 28 C.L.R. 456, distinguished.

Decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Full Court): Rylands Brothers (Australia) Ltd. v. Morgan, (1927) 27 S.R. (N.S.W.) 161, reversed.

APPEAL from the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

Rylands Brothers (Australia) Ltd. carried on business at Newcastle as wire manufacturers and merchants and employed about 1,200 employees, almost all of whom were members of the Australian Workers' Union and of whom about 312 were engaged on piece-work. On 23rd December 1925 the Company and the Union entered into an industrial agreement, within the meaning of the Industrial Arbitration Act 1912 (N.S.W.) as amended, which fixed the rates of wages and piece-work rates for all employees of the Company on the basis of a week of 48 hours until 20th December 1927. On 11th February 1926 the Company and the Union entered into a further industrial agreement, which varied the earlier agreement by reducing the hours of work from 48 to 44 per week and by providing that the daily and hourly rates of pay should be increased propor- tionately SO as to enable employees of the Company paid at daily or hourly rates to receive for 44 hours work the same remuneration as was prescribed by the earlier agreement for 48 hours work. No provision, however, was made for a proportionate…

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Details
Case
[1927] HCA 33
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case involved an appeal to the High Court of Australia concerning the validity of an award made by a Conciliation Committee under the *Industrial Arbitration (Amendment) Act 1926* (N.S.W.). Rylands Brothers (Australia) Limited, the respondent, had sought a declaration in the Supreme Court of New South Wales that an award increasing piece-work rates was a nullity. The dispute arose after the two employer representatives on the committee voted against the variation, the two employee representatives voted for it, and the chairman cast a deciding vote in favour of the variation, subsequently promulgating the award.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the Supreme Court possessed jurisdiction to entertain a suit challenging the validity of the award. This question hinged on the interpretation of section 8(14) of the *Industrial Arbitration (Amendment) Act 1926*, which stipulated that "The validity of any proceeding or decision of a committee or of a chairman of a committee shall not be challenged except as provided by this Act." The respondent argued that the award was a nullity because the chairman lacked the legal authority to vote in the circumstances, rendering the proceeding invalid and thus outside the scope of section 8(14).

The High Court, by a majority, held that the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the suit. The Court reasoned that section 8(14) was intended to prevent challenges to the validity of any proceeding or decision of a committee, regardless of its legal status, except through the prescribed appeal process to the Industrial Commission. The Court found that the proceeding in question, though potentially flawed in its legal execution due to the chairman's vote, was nonetheless a *de facto* proceeding of the committee. Therefore, its validity could not be challenged in the Supreme Court, distinguishing the matter from cases where there was no proceeding of the committee at all. The appeals were allowed, the order of the Supreme Court was discharged, and the judgment of the primary judge dismissing the suit was restored.

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