Supreme Court of South Australia
(Civil)
THOMAS v EQUESTRIAN AUSTRALIA LTD
[2022] SASC 151
Judgment of the Honourable Justice Stanley
CORPORATIONS - MEMBERSHIP, RIGHTS AND REMEDIES - MEMBERS' REMEDIES AND INTERNAL DISPUTES - OPPRESSIVE OR UNFAIR CONDUCT - RELIEF
ASSOCIATIONS AND CLUBS - INCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS - MEMBERS
The applicant is a member the South Australian Branch of Equestrian Australia Ltd and, thereby, a member of the respondent company, Equestrian Australia Ltd. Equestrian Australia Ltd is a corporation limited by guarantee for the purposes of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).
Pursuant to Equestrian Australia Ltd’s rules, which are promulgated by the South Australian Branch, Equestrian Australia Ltd has the power to investigate charges laid against members and to impose disciplinary sanctions.
Throughout his membership, the applicant has been the subject of multiple complaints that have alleged misconduct in contravention of Equestrian Australia Ltd’s rules. Accordingly, Equestrian Australia Ltd has responded and acted upon these complaints. Arising from this exchange, in these proceedings, the applicant challenges two decisions and a notice of charge:
1) On 18 February 2022, Equestrian Australia Ltd informed the applicant of their intention to conduct an investigation, through an independent body, in response to three complainants. This investigation substantiated the complaints. Accordingly, the Chief Executive Officer of Equestrian Australia Ltd wrote to the applicant on 25 July 2022 informing him of the substantiation and imposed a three-month suspension on his membership (the first decision).
2) The applicant filed an appeal against the decision of the Chief Executive Officer of Equestrian Australia Ltd on 28 July 2022, which was heard on 25 August 2022. The applicant relied on 10 grounds which, fundamentally, contended that he was denied natural justice in the decision made by the Chief Executive Officer of Equestrian Australia Ltd to suspend his membership for three months. The Appeal Board ultimately confirmed the decision of the Chief Executive Officer of Equestrian Australia Ltd (the second decision).
3) Concurrently, a Notice of Charge was laid against the applicant on 28 July 2022 in relation to complaints alleging misconduct.
The applicant seeks declaratory remedies that the two decisions and notice of charge are in breach of contract and/or contrary to ss 140, 232 and 233 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).
Distilled from counsel’s submissions, there were three issues to be determined by the Court:
1) Whether the decision of the Chief Executive Officer of Equestrian Australia Ltd to suspend the applicant for three months was contrary to the applicable rules and by-laws of Equestrian Australia Ltd;
2) Whether any defect of the decision by the Chief Executive Officer of Equestrian Australia Ltd was cured by the appeal hearing; and
3) Whether Equestrian Australia Ltd’s Disciplinary By-Laws and rules limited Equestrian Australia Ltd’s power to investigate and sanction breaches of its rules to complaints that have been charged within 14 days of the conduct subject of the charge.
Held per Stanley J:
The decision of the Chief Executive Officer of Equestrian Australia Ltd to suspend the applicant for three…
Continue reading Thomas v Equestrian Australia Ltd
Sign in free to access the full text
- AGLC
- Thomas v Equestrian Australia Ltd [2022] SASC 151
- Case
- [2022] SASC 151
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the CEO's decision to suspend Mr. Thomas was invalid as it was not in accordance with EA's Disciplinary By-Laws. The CEO does not have the authority to impose penalties on members; this power is exclusively vested in the Disciplinary Tribunal. The court noted that the Disciplinary Tribunal did not conduct a hearing, thereby breaching the contract between EA and its members. The court also rejected EA's argument that Mr. Thomas's appeal to the court constituted acquiescence in the CEO's decision, stating that the appeal did not signify acceptance of the decision's validity. The court further held that the Disciplinary By-Laws impose obligations that must be observed, and section 125 of the Corporations Act does not validate any breach of these by-laws.
The final orders of the court were that the CEO's decision to suspend Mr. Thomas was invalid and that EA's Disciplinary By-Laws do not limit its power to investigate and sanction breaches of its rules to complaints charged within 14 days of the conduct.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
I do not accept this submission. Strictly speaking, acquiescence indicates the contemporaneous and informed “knowing” acceptance or standing by, which is treated by equity as “assent”, that is, consent to what would otherwise be an infringement of rights. The term is commonly used to refer to acceptance of a past wrongful act in circumstances which give rise to an active waiver of rights or a release of liability.[31] In this case, there has been no standing by on the part of the applicant. On the contrary, the applicant has swiftly invoked his appeal right. In no sense can he have been said to have acquiesced in the wrong involved in the first decision. In any event, that is irrelevant once he had appealed the first decision. Neither can it be said that he has acquiesced in the asserted errors of which he complains in relation to the second decision. The proceedings in this Court were brought promptly. In no sense can the exercise of the applicant’s appeal rights constitute acquiescence in the first or second decisions. Neither can the applicant be found to have acquiesced in the “right” of EA to investigate and punish complaints that are made outside the 14-day time limit prescribed by the Disciplinary By-Laws. The abandonment by the applicant of that ground of appeal is only relevant to the first and second decisions. It precludes him from complaining about disciplinary action taken in respect of those matters that are the subject of the complaint of 18 February 2022 and were brought outside the 14-day time limit. However, it does not preclude him from objecting to disciplinary action being taken against him in respect of complaints made outside the 14-day time limit as set out in the Notice of Charge of 28 July 2022. His conduct does not constitute acquiescence in any subsequent breach of the 14 day time limit rule. [31] Orr v Ford (1989) 167 CLR 316, 337, per Deane J.Section 125 of the Corporations Act Contrary to the submission of EA, I do not accept that the terms of s 125(1) of the Corporations Act validates any breach by EA of its Disciplinary By-Laws. Section 125(1) provides:If a company has a constitution, it may contain an express restriction on, or a prohibition of, the company’s exercise of any of its powers. The exercise of a power by the company is not invalid merely because it is contrary to an express restriction or prohibition in the company’s constitution. In this case the Disciplinary By-Laws are not part of EA’s constitution. Even if the by-laws are considered to be authorised by EA’s constitution, s 125(1) is concerned with the exercise of a power by the company which it is expressly prohibited from, or restricted in, exercising. That is not this case. The relevant by-laws do not impose restrictions or prohibitions but impose positive obligations that must be observed in exercising disciplinary powers over the company’s members. Section 125 is not to be construed as frustrating the Court’s remedial powers. That would be contrary to s 232(e) of the Corporations Act which empowers the Court to provide a remedy to a member who is the victim of oppressive or unfairly prejudicial conduct by a company. In any event, s 232(e) empowers the Court to intervene in the conduct of a company’s affairs where the result of that conduct is to oppress or unfairly prejudice an individual member or his or her interests as a member.[32] Relatedly, in this case, EA’s Disciplinary By-Laws exist to protect it from conduct of its members prejudicial to its interests and to protect its members from the oppressive or unfairly prejudicial exercise of those powers conferred by the by-laws. [32] Wayde & Anor v NSW Rugby League Ltd (1985) 180 CLR 459.