FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Chetcuti v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 112
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- Case
- [2019] FCAFC 112
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the primary judge correctly found that the appellant had not proved that the Minister failed to give actual intellectual attention to the merits of the decision to cancel the appellant’s visa. The court held that it is likely that the Minister commenced his consideration of the relevant materials relevant to the new decision while awaiting notification that the order had been made, and that he gave "full consideration to all information before [him] in this case", as he said he did in his signed statement of reasons. The court found that the failure to delete the formulaic words from the Minister’s reasons does not bear one way or the other upon the issue of how much time the Minister spent considering all of the information. Therefore, the appellant has not proved that the Minister failed to give active intellectual attention to the merits of the decision to cancel the appellant’s Absorbed Person visa. The court held that no occasion therefore arises to consider the rule in Jones v Dunkel.
The appeal was dismissed, and the orders of the primary judge were set aside. The court quashed the decision of the Respondent dated 14 August 2017 to cancel the visa of the Appellant and ordered the Respondent to pay the Appellant's costs of the proceeding before the primary judge and the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The orders of the primary judge on 11 April 2018 be set aside, and in lieu thereof the Court makes the following orders:
(a) an order to quash the decision of the Respondent dated 14 August 2017 to cancel the visa of the Appellant;
(b) the Respondent pay the Appellant’s costs of the proceeding before the primary judge; and
(c) the Respondent pay the Appellant’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Minister submits that Burgess is distinguishable. He submits that a critical difference is that in this case, there is evidence going to when the Minister began his consideration, whereas in Burgess, there was no such evidence. He submits that the natural way to read Ms McGill’s email saying that the submission was on the Minister’s desk for consideration is that he was already considering the submission, or would be shortly. The Minister submits that the wording of the Department’s submission sheds light on the Department’s intentions, not the Minister’s. The Minister submits that a Jones v Dunkel inference is not available to act as a “tiebreaker”.Consideration The Minister’s decision was made under s 501(3) of the Act. The appellant’s application for judicial review of that decision was made under s 476A(1)(c) of the Act. The appellant is required to demonstrate jurisdictional error on the part of the Minister: Plaintiff S157/2002 v The Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476 at [76]. Section 501(3) of the Act provides, relevantly:501 Refusal or cancellation of visa on character groundsDecision of Minister or delegate—natural justice dos not apply(3) The Minister may:(a)refuse to grant a visa to a person; or(b)cancel a visa that has been granted to a person;if:(c)the Minister reasonably suspects that the person does not pass the character test; and(d)the Minister is satisfied that the refusal or cancellation is in the national interest. Section 501(4) of the Act provides that the power under s 501(3) may only be exercised by the Minister personally. Under s 501(5), the rules of natural justice, and the code of procedure set out in Subdivision AB of Division 3 of Part 2, do not apply to a decision under s 501(3).The first ground of appeal The appellant argues that the Minister committed jurisdictional error by failing to give proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the merits of his decision of 14 August 2017 to cancel the appellant’s visa. The appellant’s primary contention is that the Minister’s consideration of the decision and the relevant material commenced no earlier than 10.14 am on 14 August 2017 and concluded at 10.25 am, and that was an insufficient time to allow an active intellectual process to be applied to the merits of the decision. While the Minister accepts that eleven minutes would have been an insufficient time to engage in the required active intellectual consideration, he submits that the appellant has failed to prove that his consideration did not begin at about 9.16 am.The relevant principles The appellant relies heavily upon Carrascalao. The circumstances of that case have substantial factual and legal similarities to those of the present case. The Minister had decided under s 501(3) of the Act to cancel the visas of Mr Taulahi and Mr Carrascalao based upon their involvement with outlaw motorcycle gangs. On 14 September 2016, following a contested hearing and reservation of the judgment, a Full Court ordered that the Minister’s decisions be set aside. A little over four hours later, and less than an hour after being provided with a Departmental submission, the Minister made further decisions cancelling the visas. The Minister’s statements of reasons were found at [127] to be, “replete with statements to the effect that the Minister had noted, found, accepted, had regard to, considered and recognised particular matters.” There were 330 pages of material accompanying the submission in respect of Mr Taulahi and 370 pages in respect of Mr Carrascalao. The Full Court held at [128] that there was insufficient time for the Minister to have given proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the merits of the decisions.