Chetcuti v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Chetcuti v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 112

Appeal from: Chetcuti v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 477
File number: NSD 1114 of 2018
Judges: MURPHY, RANGIAH AND O'CALLAGHAN JJ
Date of judgment: 2 July 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from a decision of a single judge of this Court - decision of the Minister, made personally, to cancel a visa on character grounds– whether the Minister gave proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the materials provided by the Department - whether the appellant established on the balance of probabilities that the Minister’s consideration of the materials took only eleven minutes – whether the primary judge should have drawn a Jones v Dunkel from the failure of the Minister or a member of his staff to give evidence as to when the Minister’s consideration of the materials commenced - whether the primary judge failed to accord procedural fairness to the appellant, a self-represented litigant, by not informing him that he could seek further discovery from the Minister concerning how or when the decision was made; ask the Court to draw inferences from the Minister’s failure to put on evidence about what the Minister did to consider the decision; and ask the Court to issue subpoenas to the Minister and/or others to give evidence  
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Cases cited:

Blatch v Archer (1774) 1 Cowp 63

Burgess v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 69

Carrascalao v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 252 FCR 352

Citibank Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 83 ALR 144

Commonwealth v Fernando (2012) 200 FCR 1

G v H (1994) 181 CLR 387

Girlock (Sales) Pty Ltd v Hurrell (1982) 149 CLR 155

Hamod v New South Wales [2011] NSWCA 375

Hands v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 225

Haneef v Minister for Immigration (2007) 161 FCR 40

Henderson v Queensland (2014) 255 CLR 1

Jeray v Blue Mountain City Council (No 2) [2010] NSWCA 367

Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298

Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Ltd (2011) 243 CLR 361

Lebanese Moslem Association v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1986) 11 FCR 543

Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs v Western Australia (1996) 67 FCR 40

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Maioha [2018] FCAFC 216

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Sabharwal [2018] FCAFC 160

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR (2011) 241 CLR 594

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS (2010) 243 CLR 164

Minister for Immigration v Jia Legang (2001) 205 CLR 507

Plaintiff M64/2015 v Ministerfor Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 258 CLR 173

Plaintiff S157/2002 v The Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476

SZRUR v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2013) 216 FCR 445

SZVCP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 238 FCR 15

Trustees of the Property of Cummins (A Bankrupt) v Cummins

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Details
Case
[2019] FCAFC 112
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this case, the appellant, Chetcuti, sought judicial review of the Minister's decision to cancel his visa under s 501(2) of the Act on character grounds. The Minister contends that he gave proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the material before him, while Chetcuti argues that the Minister spent only 11 minutes considering the material, which was insufficient. The primary issue before the court was whether the Minister gave proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the materials provided by the Department. The appellant argued that the Minister’s consideration of the decision and the relevant material commenced no earlier than 10.14 am on 14 August 2017 and concluded at 10.25 am, and that was an insufficient time to allow an active intellectual process to be applied to the merits of the decision. The Minister accepted that eleven minutes would have been an insufficient time to engage in the required active intellectual consideration, but submitted that the appellant had failed to prove that his consideration did not begin at about 9.16 am.

The court found that the primary judge correctly found that the appellant had not proved that the Minister failed to give actual intellectual attention to the merits of the decision to cancel the appellant’s visa. The court held that it is likely that the Minister commenced his consideration of the relevant materials relevant to the new decision while awaiting notification that the order had been made, and that he gave "full consideration to all information before [him] in this case", as he said he did in his signed statement of reasons. The court found that the failure to delete the formulaic words from the Minister’s reasons does not bear one way or the other upon the issue of how much time the Minister spent considering all of the information. Therefore, the appellant has not proved that the Minister failed to give active intellectual attention to the merits of the decision to cancel the appellant’s Absorbed Person visa. The court held that no occasion therefore arises to consider the rule in Jones v Dunkel.

The appeal was dismissed, and the orders of the primary judge were set aside. The court quashed the decision of the Respondent dated 14 August 2017 to cancel the visa of the Appellant and ordered the Respondent to pay the Appellant's costs of the proceeding before the primary judge and the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders of the primary judge on 11 April 2018 be set aside, and in lieu thereof the Court makes the following orders:

(a) an order to quash the decision of the Respondent dated 14 August 2017 to cancel the visa of the Appellant;

(b) the Respondent pay the Appellant’s costs of the proceeding before the primary judge; and

(c) the Respondent pay the Appellant’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant’s primary contention is that the Minister spent no more than 11 minutes considering the material before making his decision. The Minister contends that the evidence demonstrates that he could have taken up to 1 hour, 9 minutes. The issue devolves largely to a factual dispute as to the time at which the Minister commenced his consideration of the material. It requires that careful attention be given to the chronology of relevant events. Background The appellant is 73 years of age. He was born in Malta and arrived in Australia in 1948 at the age of two. He held an Absorbed Person visa. On 25 June 1993, the appellant was convicted of the murder of his wife and sentenced to 24 years imprisonment. On 6 April 2011, he was convicted of assault occasioning bodily harm upon his cell mate and was sentenced to two years imprisonment, to be served concurrently with the sentence for his murder conviction. The appellant was refused parole for reasons including his refusal to engage with the Community Corrections Service and his lack of remorse for his offending. He served the whole of his 24 year sentence. On 28 March 2017, shortly before the sentence expired, the Minister purported to cancel the appellant’s visa under s 501(2) of the Act. The appellant sought judicial review of that purported decision before this Court. The hearing was set down for 14 August 2017. In the days before the hearing, the Minister decided to consent to his decision being quashed. The basis for that decision has not been identified in the material before the Court. The Department of Immigration and Border Protection (the Department) put in place arrangements with the Minister’s office that would allow the Minister to make a fresh cancellation decision following the quashing of the March 2017 decision. A written submission attaching a draft decision, a draft statement of reasons and a bundle of documents relevant to the decision was placed on the Minister’s desk at about 9.16 am on 14 August 2017. On the same morning, a judge of this Court ordered that the Minister’s purported decision of 28 March 2017 be quashed. The Minister was notified no earlier than 10.14 am on 14 August 2017 that the order had been made. At 10.25 am on 14 August 2017, the Minister made a fresh decision to cancel the appellant’s visa. The decision was made no more than 11 minutes after he was notified of the order. The evidence concerning the timing of the Minister’s consideration of that decision will be discussed later in these reasons. The record of the decision made by the Minister was a one page document that commenced by stating:I have considered all information before me provided by, or on behalf of Mr Frederick CHETCUTI in connection with the possible cancellation of his Absorbed Person visa. The document then set out four options for the outcome of the decision. The Minister struck through the first three options and marked the fourth to indicate that he adopted it. That fourth option was as follows:I reasonably suspect that Mr CHETCUTI does not pass the character test and I am satisfied that the cancellation of Mr CHETCUTI’S Absorbed Person visa is in the national interest. I have decided to exercise my discretion under s 501(3) of the Act to cancel Mr CHETCUTI’S visa. I hereby cancel Mr CHETCUTI’S Absorbed Person visa. My reasons for this decision are set out in the attached Statement of Reasons.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In the appeal, the appellant does not allege that the Minister’s reasons themselves demonstrate any jurisdictional error. His allegation of jurisdictional error is confined to a failure by the Minister to give proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the merits of the decision.The evidence before the primary judge and the judgment The appellant represented himself before the primary judge. His Honour recorded the appellant as having argued that jurisdictional error was established on six grounds. His Honour rejected each of those grounds. For the purposes of this appeal, it is only necessary to focus upon his Honour’s reasons for rejecting a ground that the decision was made within such a short time of the order of the Court quashing the March 2017 decision that the Minister could not have considered the decision in accordance with the law. The evidence before the primary judge consisted of an application book, an affidavit annexing documents produced by the Minister in accordance with a notice to produce and a further affidavit explaining why the Minister had declined to produce other documents requested under the notice to produce. That material was admitted into evidence without objection. No oral evidence was given. The primary facts found by the primary judge can be summarised as follows. On Friday, 11 August 2017 at 5.55 pm, Ms Sarah Harris, the Acting Director of the Complex Cancellation Section of the Department of Immigration and Border Protection, had sent an email to Ms Kristin McGill, a Departmental liaison officer in the Minister’s office, attaching a submission, a draft decision and a draft statement of reasons prepared by the Department concerning the cancellation of the appellant’s visa. The email indicated that a hard copy would be sent to the Minister’s office on Monday, 14 August 2017. The heading of the Departmental submission stated that the parties to the existing Federal Court proceeding were discussing “withdrawal” from those proceedings. The email stated that “the Minister cannot make a decision on this case until the withdrawal is finalised”. At 9.16 am on 14 August 2017, Ms McGill sent an email to Ms Harris informing her that “[t]he submission is on the Minister’s desk for his consideration”. At 10.14 am on 14 August 2017, Ms Marian Kijirah, a Departmental legal officer, sent an email to Ms McGill advising her that the Court had made orders setting aside the Minister’s decision of 28 March 2017 and attaching a copy of the sealed orders. The email continued “[t]he Minister is now able to consider the submission”. At 10.25 am on 14 August 2017, the Minister signed, dated and recorded the time of his decision. The primary judge observed that the submission placed before the Minister consisted of seven pages. It was accompanied by a draft decision that consisted of a single page. There was then an index page followed by 65 pages of attachments from “A” to “S”, and a further 46 pages of attachment “XX”. The draft statement of reasons prepared for the Minister was 11 pages long. The material comprised of about 130 pages in total

Decision

Reasons for decision

There is, in addition, a fundamental difficulty posed by the absence of a transcript of the hearing before the primary judge. There is an absence of evidence demonstrating that his Honour did not give the appellant information of the type it is asserted was not given. The appellant’s second ground of appeal cannot succeed.Conclusion The appeal should be allowed on the basis of the first ground of the notice of appeal. The Minister’s decision to cancel the appellant’s visa should be quashed. I am unable, with respect, to agree with the reasoning of the majority’s decision to allow the appeal on the basis of the first ground of the notice of appeal. I would dismiss the appeal. In the circumstances, it is sufficient that I only briefly explain the source of my disagreement. In my view, the primary judge correctly found that the appellant had not proved that the Minister failed to give actual intellectual attention to the merits of the decision to cancel the appellant’s visa, for the reasons the primary judge gave, and which are summarised in [32] and [33] of the reasons of the majority. It is, in my view, sufficiently clear from the matters set out at [21]-[24] of the reasons of the majority that the Minister intended to make a new decision shortly after the making of the consent order quashing the Minister’s March 2017 decision. Because the Minister had consented to an order quashing that decision, he can be assumed to have believed that the decision would indeed be quashed. In those circumstances, it seems to me, it is likely that the Minister commenced his consideration of the relevant materials relevant to the new decision while awaiting notification that the order had been made, and that he gave “full consideration to all information before [him] in this case”, as he said he did in his signed statement of reasons. I am unpersuaded by the factor which the majority regards as decisive (at [99]), namely the significance that they attribute to the words at the top of the first page of the Minister’s decision that he had “considered all information before me provided by, or on behalf of [the appellant]”. The majority’s proposition, it seems to me, amounts to saying that those words should have been deleted, because they were inapplicable in the context of the Minister’s new decision, and that the only reason the words were not deleted was that they must have gone unnoticed by the Minister because he did not devote sufficient time to considering the information before him. In my respectful view, the failure to delete the formulaic words from the Minister’s reasons does not bear one way or the other upon the issue of how much time the Minister spent considering all of the information. In those circumstances, the appellant has not, in my view, proved that the Minister failed to give active intellectual attention to the merits of the decision to cancel the appellant’s Absorbed Person visa. On the view that I take, no occasion therefore arises to consider the rule in Jones v Dunkel.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Minister submits that Burgess is distinguishable. He submits that a critical difference is that in this case, there is evidence going to when the Minister began his consideration, whereas in Burgess, there was no such evidence. He submits that the natural way to read Ms McGill’s email saying that the submission was on the Minister’s desk for consideration is that he was already considering the submission, or would be shortly. The Minister submits that the wording of the Department’s submission sheds light on the Department’s intentions, not the Minister’s. The Minister submits that a Jones v Dunkel inference is not available to act as a “tiebreaker”.Consideration The Minister’s decision was made under s 501(3) of the Act. The appellant’s application for judicial review of that decision was made under s 476A(1)(c) of the Act. The appellant is required to demonstrate jurisdictional error on the part of the Minister: Plaintiff S157/2002 v The Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476 at [76]. Section 501(3) of the Act provides, relevantly:501 Refusal or cancellation of visa on character groundsDecision of Minister or delegate—natural justice dos not apply(3) The Minister may:(a)refuse to grant a visa to a person; or(b)cancel a visa that has been granted to a person;if:(c)the Minister reasonably suspects that the person does not pass the character test; and(d)the Minister is satisfied that the refusal or cancellation is in the national interest. Section 501(4) of the Act provides that the power under s 501(3) may only be exercised by the Minister personally. Under s 501(5), the rules of natural justice, and the code of procedure set out in Subdivision AB of Division 3 of Part 2, do not apply to a decision under s 501(3).The first ground of appeal The appellant argues that the Minister committed jurisdictional error by failing to give proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the merits of his decision of 14 August 2017 to cancel the appellant’s visa. The appellant’s primary contention is that the Minister’s consideration of the decision and the relevant material commenced no earlier than 10.14 am on 14 August 2017 and concluded at 10.25 am, and that was an insufficient time to allow an active intellectual process to be applied to the merits of the decision. While the Minister accepts that eleven minutes would have been an insufficient time to engage in the required active intellectual consideration, he submits that the appellant has failed to prove that his consideration did not begin at about 9.16 am.The relevant principles The appellant relies heavily upon Carrascalao. The circumstances of that case have substantial factual and legal similarities to those of the present case. The Minister had decided under s 501(3) of the Act to cancel the visas of Mr Taulahi and Mr Carrascalao based upon their involvement with outlaw motorcycle gangs. On 14 September 2016, following a contested hearing and reservation of the judgment, a Full Court ordered that the Minister’s decisions be set aside. A little over four hours later, and less than an hour after being provided with a Departmental submission, the Minister made further decisions cancelling the visas. The Minister’s statements of reasons were found at [127] to be, “replete with statements to the effect that the Minister had noted, found, accepted, had regard to, considered and recognised particular matters.” There were 330 pages of material accompanying the submission in respect of Mr Taulahi and 370 pages in respect of Mr Carrascalao. The Full Court held at [128] that there was insufficient time for the Minister to have given proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the merits of the decisions.