FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Pandey v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1188
File number(s): MLG 2216 of 2019 Judgment of: JUDGE CORBETT Date of judgment: 30 July 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Student (Temporary) (Class TU) (Subclass 500) visa – Application for judicial review –Whether the applicant’s response pursuant to s 359(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) was received within the prescribed time limit – Whether Tribunal was entitled to make a decision on the review without a hearing – No jurisdictional error - Application dismissed. Legislation: Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth), s 14A
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 359, 359(2), 359C, 360(2), 360(3), 476(1), 499
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 4.17(6), cls 500.212, 500.212(a)Cases cited: Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 3
Hasran v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCAFC 40
LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Saba Bros Tiling Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 233
MZAIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392
Virk v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FCA 630Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 60 Date of last submission/s: 11 July 2025 Date of hearing: 13 June 2025 Solicitor for the applicant The applicant appeared in person, self-represented Counsel for the Respondents Mr J Lessing Solicitor for the Respondents Mills Oakley ORDERS
MLG 2216 of 2019 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: AMIT PANDEY
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICUTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE CORBETT
DATE OF ORDER:
30 JULY 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The name of the first respondent is amended to ‘Minister for Immigration and Citizenship’;
2.The application for judicial review filed 11 July 2019 be dismissed; and
3.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs and disbursements of and incidental to the application for judicial review fixed in the sum of $8,371.30.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE CORBETT
The applicant seeks judicial review pursuant to s 476(1) of the Migration Act1958 (Cth) (Act) of a decision of the second respondent (the Tribunal) made 19 June 2019 affirming a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) made on 4 August 2017 to refuse to grant the applicant a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) (Subclass 500) visa (visa).
References in these…
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- Case
- [2025] FedCFamC2G 1188
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the AAT was correct in finding that the applicant's response pursuant to s 359(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) was received outside the prescribed time limit and whether the AAT was entitled to make a decision on the review without a hearing. The court found that the applicant had not provided any evidence to contradict the evidence presented by the Tribunal that the response was not received until after the prescribed time period. The court also found that the AAT was entitled to make a decision without a hearing, as the applicant had failed to provide the requested information within the prescribed time period. The court dismissed the applicant's application for judicial review.
In dismissing the application, the court noted that there is no statutory right to legal representation in judicial review proceedings and that the court's duty is to ensure that the proceedings are fair to all parties. The court observed that while the applicant was unrepresented, he had been given a reasonable opportunity to present evidence and make submissions in support of his case. The court found no jurisdictional error in the AAT's decision and dismissed the application for judicial review. No further orders were made.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
There was no affidavit filed by the applicant to contradict the affidavit of Mr Gardner that the s 359 response was not received by the Tribunal until 1 February 2019 at 10.41am or to otherwise supplement or bolster the evidence given to the Tribunal.CONSIDERATION In a recent decision of Virk v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FCA 630, Justice Hill observed at [23]-[24] that:[23] Duties to unrepresented litigants: The fact that the Appellants are legally unrepresented is of more general relevance. The duties that courts owe to unrepresented litigants have been discussed in cases such as SZRUR v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 146; (2013) 216 FCR 445 at [37] (Robertson J, with Allsop CJ and Mortimer J agreeing), and NWQR v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCAFC 30 at [27] (the Court). The principles are conveniently summarised by Moshinsky J in Wahed v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 247 at [26] as follows (citations omitted):Courts have an overriding duty to ensure that a trial is fair to all parties. In the context of an unrepresented litigant, that duty requires the Court to take appropriate steps to ensure that the unrepresented litigant has sufficient information about the practice and procedure of the Court, so far as is reasonably practicable for the purpose of ensuring a fair trial. The application of that principle will vary depending upon the circumstances of the case … However, there is no statutory right to legal representation. Nor is there any absolute right to legal representation at common law … In civil proceedings, procedural fairness does not require that a party be provided with legal representation, no matter how serious the consequences of the proceedings might be… [24] The obligation to ensure that a trial is fair requires the judge to give a self-represented litigant a reasonable opportunity to present evidence and make submissions in support of his or her case. However, a judge is not required to give legal or tactical advice to a self-represented litigant that would compromise the judge’s impartiality and be unfair to the opposing party: Chetcuti v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 112; (2019) 270 FCR 335 at [106] (Murphy and Rangiah JJ). In MZAIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392 at [100] Justice Mortimer (as her Honour then was) said:[100] In a judicial review application (or an extension of time application in relation to judicial review) the absence of legal representation for an applicant will almost always mean an applicant will be unable to advance a case commensurate with the kind of arguments that are likely successfully to impugn the decision under review. Of course some self-represented people have the capacity to put some arguments - whether through previous court experience, study, outside assistance or simply natural talent. The vast majority do not, especially when additionally disadvantaged by issues of language and unfamiliar culture. In this context, what the descriptor “fair hearing“ encompasses is open to debate, even if the phrase is confined to procedural fairness. The disparity of resources and capacity is too great for a hearing to be “fair“ in the way a hearing can be “fair“ when the parties are legally represented. All the judge can do is to make the process as fair as possible and then, in my opinion, do her or his best to be astute and alert to the possibility of legal error in the tribunal’s decision when considering the material before her or him, and be prepared to raise any such possibilities with the Minister’s legal representatives.