Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Australian Industrial Relations Commission

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union v Australian Industrial Relations Commission [2003] FCAFC 196

INDUSTRIAL LAW – application for consent to alterations in union’s eligibility rules – consent granted by designated Presidential Member but consent set aside on appeal to Full Bench of Australian Industrial Relations Commission – on application for prerogative relief decision of Full Bench set aside – on return to Full Bench application made by union to call further evidence and to obtain approval of a further modified form of rule – application refused – whether Full Bench misapprehended its powers and jurisdiction

Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) ss 45 and 204

Re Australian Workers’ Union; ex parte Construction, Forestry Mining and Energy Union [2002] FCAFC 150; (2002) 120 FCR 527 – cited
Re Coldham; Ex parte Brideson (1990) 170 CLR 267 – cited
Allesch v Maunz [2000] HCA 40; (2000) 203 CLR 172 - cited
Craig v The State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 - cited
Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia [1999] HCA 14; (1999) 197 CLR 510 - cited

CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MINING AND ENERGY UNION v FULL BENCH OF THE AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION CONSISTING OF THE HONOURABLE ANTHONY McINTYRE, VICE-PRESIDENT, THE HONOURABLE COLIN POLITES, SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT AND DOMINICA WHELAN, COMMISSIONER & ORS
N474 of 2003

WILCOX, MARSHALL and MERKEL JJ
22 AUGUST 2003
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N474 of 2003

ON REMITTAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

CONSTRUCTION, FORESTRY, MINING AND ENERGY UNION
APPLICANT

AND:

FULL BENCH OF THE AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION CONSISTING OF THE HONOURABLE ANTHONY McINTYRE, VICE-PRESIDENT, THE HONOURABLE COLIN POLITES, SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT AND DOMINICA WHELAN, COMMISSIONER
FIRST RESPONDENT

AUSTRALIAN WORKERS UNION
SECOND RESPONDENT

SAM WOOD
THIRD RESPONDENT

AUSTRALIAN MINES AND METALS ASSOCIATION (INC), AUSTRALIAN PETROLEUM PTY LTD, AMPOL REFINERIES (QUEENSLAND) LTD, AMPOL REFINERIES (NSW) PTY LTD, AMPOL LUBRICATING OIL REFINERIES PTY LTD, MOBIL OIL AUSTRALIA LTD, MOBIL REFINING AUSTRALIA PTY LTD, BP AUSTRALIA LTD, BP REFINERY (BULWER ISLAND) LTD, BP REFINERY (KWINANA) PTY LTD, SHELL COMPANY OF AUSTRALIA LTD, SHELL REFINING (AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD, SHELL DEVELOPMENT (AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD, WAG PIPELINE PTY LTD AND BITUPAVE LTD (TRADING AS BORAL ASPHALT)
FOURTH TO EIGHTEENTH RESPONDENTS

LEMINGTON COAL MINES LTD, KANDOS NO 3 COLLIERY, CORNWALL COAL NO LIABILITY, PEABODY RESOURCES LTD, IVANHOE COAL PTY LTD AND COAL OPERATIONS AUSTRALIA LTD
NINETEENTH TO TWENTY-FOURTH RESPONDENTS

EMPLOYERS FIRST
TWENTY-FIFTH RESPONDENT

AUSTRALIAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA, CHAMBER OF MANUFACTURES OF NEW SOUTH WALES, CONFEDERATION OF ACT INDUSTRY, ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY EMPLOYERS ASSOCIATION, THE NATIONAL ELECTRICAL CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION, QUEENSLAND CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, SOUTH AUSTRALIAN EMPLOYERS’ CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, TASMANIAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, VICTORIAN EMPLOYERS’ CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY

TWENTY SIXTH TO THIRTY-FIFTH RESPONDENTS

JUDGES:

WILCOX, MARSHALL and MERKEL JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

20 AUGUST 2003

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT the application be dismissed.

Note:    Settlement and entry…

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Details
Case
[2003] FCAFC 196
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Australian Industrial Relations Commission involves a dispute between the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU) and members of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC). The CFMEU had applied for consent to alter its eligibility rules, which was granted by a designated Presidential Member. However, the decision was later set aside by a Full Bench of the AIRC on appeal, and the CFMEU sought prerogative relief. The primary legal issue was whether the Full Bench misapprehended its powers and jurisdiction in setting aside the consent decision and in refusing the CFMEU's subsequent application to call further evidence and approve a modified form of the rule.

The court found that the Full Bench had indeed misapprehended its jurisdiction. The Full Bench had limited its consideration to the effect of the settlements between the CFMEU and certain objector organisations, and had refused to consider the CFMEU's proposed alternative rule change. This was an error of jurisdiction, as the Full Bench should have considered all relevant submissions and evidence when determining whether to grant consent and on what terms. The court emphasised that the Full Bench had the power to hear further evidence and to consider further modifications to the eligibility rule under section 45(6) of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth). The Full Bench's refusal to consider the CFMEU's submissions amounted to a fundamental misunderstanding of its jurisdiction and powers.

As a result of this finding, the court set aside the decision of the Full Bench and remitted the matter back to the Full Bench for reconsideration. The court did not make any final orders in the present case, as the matter was to be returned to the Full Bench for further consideration in light of the court's findings. The CFMEU was, however, invited to lodge a fresh application under section 204 of the Act if it wished to do so.

Background

Background to the litigation

We heard the application last Wednesday, 20 August 2003. At the conclusion of argument, we ordered that the application be dismissed and indicated we would publish our reasons today. These are our reasons.Background The applicant for prerogative relief is the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (‘CFMEU’). The first respondents are three members of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (‘the Commission’) who constituted a Full Bench for the purposes of hearing an appeal against a decision of Senior Deputy President Williams consenting to changes to CFMEU’s eligibility rules. The other respondents to the present application comprise the Australian Workers Union (‘AWU’), the Assistant National Secretary of AWU and various employer organisations and individual employers. On 25 July 1997, CFMEU lodged in the Commission an application under s 204 of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) (‘the Act’) for the consent of a designated Presidential Member to alterations of its eligibility rules. The proposed alterations were designed to expand the categories of persons who would be eligible to join the organisation. Notice of the application was gazetted. Numerous objections were received, both from other unions and various employers and employer organisations. The application came before Senior Deputy President Williams. He took extensive evidence. During the course of the hearing by the Senior Deputy President, CFMEU reached agreements with all the union objectors except AWU. The agreements envisaged modifications of the terms of the proposed altered eligibility rule so as to avoid or diminish competition for members with those unions. The modifications were to take the form of further provisos to the proposed rule. On 28 January 2000, Senior Deputy Williams published a decision consenting to the proposed alterations, the alteration being in a form that included the further provisos. AWU and the employer objectors sought leave to appeal to the Full Bench of the Commission against the decision of Senior Deputy President Williams. The application for leave was made under s 45 of the Act. Section 45(2) provides that a Full Bench of the Commission shall grant leave to appeal under subs (1) ‘if, in its opinion, the matter is of such importance that, in the public interest, leave should be granted’. Subsection (6) of s 45 provides that, for the purpose of an appeal under s 45, ‘a Full Bench … may admit further evidence’. Subsection (7) empowers the Full Bench, on the hearing of the appeal, inter alia to:‘(a) confirm, quash or vary the decision or act concerned;(b)make an award, order or decision dealing with the subject-matter of the decision or act concerned’ The Full Bench conducted a hearing in May and August 2000. It was not asked at that time to admit further evidence and did not do so. On 28 February 2001, the Full Bench published a decision in which it held that Senior Deputy President Williams erred in certain respects and leave to appeal ought to be given. However, the Full Bench did not immediately make orders disposing of the appeal. The Full Bench deferred that task pending further submissions by the parties.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Counsel said:‘In its decision of 31 July 2003, it is clear that the Full Bench limited its consideration to the effect of the settlements between the CFMEU and certain objector organisations of employees.…In considering itself bound to take into account only the effect of the settlements and refusing to consider the submissions advanced by the CFMEU, particularly the proposed alternative rule change, the Full Bench fundamentally misunderstood its jurisdiction and the nature of its powers upon the matter returning for redetermination. The decision as to whether to grant consent and on what terms had to be made again.’Consideration We accept CFMEU’s submission that the effect of the previous Full Court’s order was to require the Full Bench to reconsider what was the proper order for it to make, by way of disposal of the appeal from the decision of Senior Deputy President Williams. The Full Bench was put back into the position in which it stood between 28 February 2001 and 13 June 2001. By virtue of s 45(6) of the Act, it was open to the Full Bench to accede to CFMEU’s application that it hear further evidence. It was also open to the Full Bench to consider a further modification of the eligibility rule. Section 204(2) of the Act permitted a designated Presidential Member (and therefore the Full Bench exercising the powers of the designated Presidential Member) to ‘consent to a change or alteration [of the eligibility rules] in whole or in part’. If the Full Bench had acted upon the basis that it did not have power or jurisdiction to do either of these things, it would have fallen into jurisdictional error: see Craig v The State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 177-178, Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia [1999] HCA 14; (1999) 197 CLR 510 at 552 [107]-[108]. However, we do not think the Full Bench acted on the basis that it lacked power or jurisdiction to receive new evidence or to consider further modification of the eligibility rule. The statement made by Vice-President McIntyre, on behalf of the Full Bench ([16] above), included the observation that what Mr Crawshaw had submitted went ‘beyond the scope of the issues raised by the Full Court decision and order’. The statement was true. However, if nothing more had been said, it might have amounted to an indication that the Full Bench was minded to reject Mr Crawshaw’s submission only because of that fact. In fact more was said. The Vice-President added:‘At this late stage in the present proceedings, we do not think it is appropriate to embark on a hearing of the type foreshadowed by the CFMEU this morning. We, of course, note that it is open to the CFMEU to lodge a fresh application under section 204 if it so wishes. We therefore invite submissions now on the basis of what I have just said.’ The reference to what is ‘appropriate’, ‘at this late stage of the proceeding’, suggests the Full Bench had in mind discretionary considerations. We place a similar construction upon the Full Bench’s written reasons of 31 July 2002. In para 9, the Full Bench indicated that, if it had not fallen into the first error identified by the Full Court, it would nonetheless have decided to quash the decision of Senior Deputy President Williams. After explaining why that was so, the Full Bench repeated the point in para 22. Importantly, in para 23, it went on to deal with the appropriateness, in the particular proceeding, of considering CFMEU’s alternative submission and to observe (correctly) that it was open to CFMEU to lodge a fresh application under s 204. This paragraph is couched in terms of the exercise of discretion. If the Full Bench had thought it had no power to accede to CFMEU’s wishes, it surely would have said so; rather than speaking of what was ‘appropriate’ and pointing out the available alternative course.