ResMed Limited v Australian Manufacturing Workers' Union

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

ResMed Limited v Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union [2015] FCA 379

Citation: ResMed Limited v Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union [2015] FCA 379
Parties: RESMED LIMITED v “AUTOMOTIVE, FOOD, METALS, ENGINEERING, PRINTING AND KINDRED INDUSTRIES UNION” KNOWN AS THE AUSTRALIAN MANUFACTURING WORKERS’ UNION (AMWU) and FAIR WORK COMMISSION
File number: NSD 846 of 2014
Judge: PERRY J
Date of judgment: 22 April 2015
Catchwords:

INDUSTRIAL LAW –Where application for majority support determination made by employee organisation to Fair Work Commission – Where Full Bench of Fair Work Commission dismissed employer’s appeal against Commissioner’s decision that Commission had jurisdiction to entertain application for majority support determination – Where Full Bench upheld findings as to jurisdiction on basis that employee organisation was bargaining representative for a class of employees covered by proposed enterprise agreement – Where Full Bench later partially allowed appeal by employee organisation that employee organisation was not a bargaining representative for certain other classes of employees -  Where second decision of Full Bench partially allowing appeal by employee organisation was expression of opinion without apparent legal effect

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Where application for summary dismissal sought with respect to prayers for relief for orders in the nature of certiorari and mandamus - Where certiorari and mandamus not available where decision has no apparent legal effect - Where application summarily dismissed under s 31A(2)(b) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) in so far as constitutes application for judicial review of second decision of Full Bench of the Fair Work Commission

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE –Where applications by employer and employee organisations for declarations as to whether employee organisation is bargaining representative for certain classes of employees covered by proposed enterprise agreement – Where Court will authoritatively determine question of whether employee organisation is bargaining representative for those classes of employees in determining applications for declaratory relief  - Where no utility in entertaining application for judicial review of decision of Full Bench of Fair Work Commission constituting expression of opinion with no legal effect

Legislation: Constitution ss 71, 72
Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 176, 236, 237, 562, 563, 604
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 21, 22, 31A
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 26.01
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B
Cases cited: “Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union” known as the Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union (AMWU) v ResMed Limited [2013] FWC 9725
Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission [1992] HCA 10; (1992) 175 CLR 564
Butorac v WIN Corporation Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 1503
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Australian Industrial Relations Commission [2007] FCAFC 32; (2007) 157 FCR 260
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Wagstaff Piling Pty Ltd [2012] FCAFC 87; (2012) 203 FCR 371
Dey v Victorian Railway Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62
Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2006] HCA 44; (2006) 228 CLR 45
General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964)…
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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 379
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

ResMed Limited brought an application for judicial review against the Australian Manufacturing Workers' Union (AMWU) and the Fair Work Commission (FWC) concerning a majority support determination (MSD) application made by the AMWU to the FWC. The AMWU applied to the FWC for a MSD under section 236 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act) for a proposed single-enterprise agreement that would cover some, but not all, of ResMed's employees. The FWC initially found it had jurisdiction to entertain the MSD application, but later partially allowed an appeal by the AMWU that it was not a bargaining representative for certain classes of employees. ResMed sought a judicial review of the FWC's decisions, arguing that the second decision of the FWC Full Bench had apparent legal effect and that the Court should determine the question of whether identified employees fall within the AMWU's eligibility rule.

The legal issues before the Court were whether the second decision of the FWC Full Bench had apparent legal effect, and whether there was a reasonable prospect that ResMed would successfully prosecute the claim for judicial review of that decision. The Court held that the second decision of the FWC Full Bench did not have apparent legal effect, as it was an expression of opinion without any legal effect. Furthermore, the Court found that there was no reasonable prospect that ResMed would successfully prosecute the claim for judicial review of the second decision of the FWC Full Bench. Consequently, the Court dismissed the application for judicial review in so far as it sought orders in the nature of certiorari and mandamus. The Court held that there was no utility in entertaining an application for judicial review of a decision of the FWC Full Bench that constituted an expression of opinion with no legal effect.

In summary, the Court dismissed the amended originating application for relief filed by ResMed in so far as it sought orders in the nature of certiorari and mandamus. The question of costs of and incidental to the interlocutory application was reserved.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Pursuant to s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), the amended originating application for relief filed by the applicant on 15 September 2014 be dismissed in so far as it seeks the orders set out in paragraphs 2 and 3 of that application.

2. The question of costs of and incidental to the interlocutory application filed 8 October 2014 and amended on 10 December 2014 is reserved.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The second respondent, the Fair Work Commission, has entered a submitting appearance for these proceedings, save as to costs.2. BACKGROUND The relevant facts can be summarised shortly.2.1 The application for a majority support determination ResMed is a corporation established under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and is engaged in manufacturing products for people with sleep disordered breathing and other respiratory disorders. It has a product development and manufacturing facility at Bella Vista, north-west of Sydney, New South Wales. On 25 March 2013, the AMWU filed a MSD application under s 236 of the FW Act. The MSD application related to a single-enterprise agreement proposed by the AMWU which would cover some, but not all, of ResMed’s employees. Section 236 provides in relation to a proposed single–enterprise agreement that:(1)A bargaining representative of an employee who will be covered by a proposed single–enterprise agreement may apply to the FWC for a determination (a majority support determination) that a majority of the employees who will be covered by the agreement want to bargain with the employer, or employers, that will be covered by the agreement.(2)The application must specify:(a) the employer, or employers, that will be covered by the agreement; and(b) the employees who will be covered by the agreement. The bargaining representatives for a proposed enterprise agreement that is not a greenfields agreement include (relevantly) the employee organisation for those employees who it may legitimately represent under its eligibility rules and who are covered by the proposed agreement in relation to the work that will be performed under the agreement (save for employees who have revoked its status as such or appointed another bargaining representative) (s 176(1)(b) and (3), FW Act). It is not in dispute that the AMWU is an employee organisation for the purposes of the Act. Section 237(1) provides that the Commission must make a majority support determination in relation to a proposed single-enterprise agreement if an application for the determination has been made and the Commission is satisfied of the matters set out in subsection (2) in relation to the agreement including that a majority of the employees who will be covered by the agreement want to bargain. The purpose of ss 236 and 237 is to create a mechanism whereby an unwilling employer might be brought to the bargaining table without industrial action and subjected to a requirement to bargain in good faith: JJ Richards & Sons Pty Ltd v Fair Work Australia [2012] FCAFC 53; (2012) 201 FCR 297 at 306 [28] (Jessup J); the ResMed Jurisdictional decision at [54] (Perry J). In paragraph 2.2 of the MSD application, the AMWU identified the following categories of employees as those who would be covered by the proposed agreement:Employees of ResMed Limited who work at the Bella Vista site, who are covered by the Manufacturing and Associated Industries and Occupations Award 2010 and who are engaged as:a)Production Operators, Line Leaders or Line Coordinators in the Patient Interface work group; orb)Production Operators, Line Leaders or Line Coordinators in the Ventilation work group; orc)Production Operators, Line Leaders or Line Coordinators in the Machines work group; ord)Warehouse Operators, Line Leaders or Line Coordinators in the Warehouse work group; ore)an employee in the Manufacturing Equipment and Tooling Support (METS) work group who holds a trade certificate or equivalent, or who is undertaking an apprenticeship or traineeship, other than any team leader(s) and/or any employee who is engaged as a supervisor, manager or equivalent.For the avoidance of doubt, any employee engaged as a team leader, supervisor, manager or equivalent will not be covered by the proposed enterprise agreement.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

It does not assist to seek to explain the precondition to the exercise of the power in s 31A by paraphrasing its terms or drawing analogies with other statutory provisions (Spencer at [22] and [58]-[59]). Rather, “full weight must be given to the expression as a whole. The Federal Court may exercise power under s 31A if, and only if, satisfied that there is ‘no reasonable prospect’ of success” (Spencer at [60]). The application of that pre-condition requires the making of value judgments in the absence of a full and complete factual matrix and argument, with the result that the provision vests a discretion in the Court: Kowalski at [28] (the Court). As ResMed contends, that discretion includes whether to deal with the motion at once or at some later stage in the proceedings when the legal and factual issues have been more clearly defined: Butorac v WIN Corporation Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 1503 at [19] (Buchanan J).3.2 Is there a reasonable prospect that ResMed will successfully prosecute the claim for judicial review of the second decision of the Full Bench of the FWC?3.2.1The parties’ contentions As mentioned, the AMWU submitted that the application should be summarily dismissed on two primary grounds.(1)First, the AMWU contends that the constitutional writs will “only issue where a Tribunal has taken a step which involves, or impacts directly upon, some determination of the legal rights or obligations of the parties. In the present case there is no decision with legal effect upon which an order for certiorari could operate and no duty which the FWC could be required, by way of an order for mandamus, to undertake.”(2)Secondly and in the alternative, the AMWU contends that “in circumstances where the Court is asked by both parties to determine the question of whether identified employees fall within the AMWU’s eligibility rule, there is no reasonable prospect of the Court, as a matter of discretion, granting prerogative relief which requires the FWC to determine, on an advisory basis, the same issue (on the same material that was originally before the FWC).” On the other hand, ResMed submits that certiorari will lie against the second Full Bench decision because it has “apparent legal effect” on the grounds (in summary) that: (i) the First Respondent pressed an appeal from the First Instance Decision, on the basis that the First Instance Decision had apparent legal effect which the First Respondent wished to overturn. The Second Respondent decided the question of the ability of the First Respondent to represent “the industrial interests” of the relevant employees of the Applicant, upon this application of the First Respondent, which application was pressed by it. The First Respondent cannot now resile from this position;(ii) upon the application for appeal of the First Respondent, the Second Respondent determined whether the First Respondent was “entitled to represent the industrial interests” of employees of the Applicant, which was necessary to determine the status of the First Respondent as a “bargaining representative” under section 176(3) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act), and whether it could validly make an application under section 236 for a majority support determination. This determination will be followed by other members of the Second Respondent in relation to other applications under the FW Act which rely upon section 176 or the words “entitled to represent the industrial interests of employees” (or variations of that phrase), giving the decision an apparent legal effect; (paragraph cross-references omitted)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Importantly for reasons that will become apparent, it remains the case that ResMed does not challenge the Commissioner’s finding as to category (e) of paragraph 2.2 in the MSD application. This finding provided the basis on which the Court found that the FWC correctly considered that it had jurisdiction to entertain the MSD application in the ResMed Jurisdictional Decision. That being so, the outcome of these proceedings can have no bearing on the question of whether the FWC has jurisdiction to entertain that application.3. CONSIDERATION3.1 Relevant principles governing a summary judgment application Section 31A of the FCA Act relevantly provides that: (2) The Court may give judgment for one party against another in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding if:(a) the first party is defending the proceeding or that part of the proceeding; and (b) the Court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or that part of the proceeding.(3) For the purposes of this section, a defence or a proceeding or part of a proceeding need not be:(a) hopeless; or(b) bound to fail;for it to have no reasonable prospect of success. The intention behind the enactment of s 31A is “to lower the bar for obtaining summary judgment (including summary dismissal) below the level that had been fixed by such authorities as Dey v Victorian Railway Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62 at 91-92, and General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125 at 129–130…”: White Industries Aust Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2007] FCA 511; (2007) 160 FCR 298 (White Industries) at 310 [54] (Lindgren J).In the cases to which Lindgren J referred, the requirement had been expressed in terms of “manifestly groundless” or “obviously untenable”. As Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ held in Spencer v The Commonwealth [2010] HCA 28; (2010) 241 CLR 118 (Spencer) at 139 [52]-[53]:…effect must be given to the negative admonition in sub-s (3) that a defence, a proceeding, or a part of a proceeding may be found to have no reasonable prospect of successful prosecution even if it cannot be said that it is “hopeless” or “bound to fail”. … it is important to begin by recognising that the combined effect of sub-ss (2) and (3) is that the inquiry required in this case is whether there is a “reasonable” prospect of prosecuting the proceeding, not an inquiry directed to whether a certain and concluded determination could be made that the proceeding would necessarily fail. In this respect, s 31A departs radically from the basis upon which earlier forms of provision permitting the entry of summary judgment have been understood and administered. Nonetheless, the discretion must be exercised with caution (Spencer at [24] (French CJ and Gummow J) and [60] (Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ)) and is concerned “with the bringing and defending of proceedings, not just with pleadings; with substance, not just with form”: White Industries at [50] (approved in Kowalski v MMAL Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd [2009] FCAFC 117; (2009) 178 FCR 401 (Kowalski) at [30] (the Court); see also Spencer at [23] (French CJ and Gummow J)).