FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
ResMed Limited v Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union [2015] FCA 379
Citation: ResMed Limited v Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union [2015] FCA 379 Parties: RESMED LIMITED v “AUTOMOTIVE, FOOD, METALS, ENGINEERING, PRINTING AND KINDRED INDUSTRIES UNION” KNOWN AS THE AUSTRALIAN MANUFACTURING WORKERS’ UNION (AMWU) and FAIR WORK COMMISSION File number: NSD 846 of 2014 Judge: PERRY J Date of judgment: 22 April 2015 Catchwords: INDUSTRIAL LAW –Where application for majority support determination made by employee organisation to Fair Work Commission – Where Full Bench of Fair Work Commission dismissed employer’s appeal against Commissioner’s decision that Commission had jurisdiction to entertain application for majority support determination – Where Full Bench upheld findings as to jurisdiction on basis that employee organisation was bargaining representative for a class of employees covered by proposed enterprise agreement – Where Full Bench later partially allowed appeal by employee organisation that employee organisation was not a bargaining representative for certain other classes of employees - Where second decision of Full Bench partially allowing appeal by employee organisation was expression of opinion without apparent legal effect
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Where application for summary dismissal sought with respect to prayers for relief for orders in the nature of certiorari and mandamus - Where certiorari and mandamus not available where decision has no apparent legal effect - Where application summarily dismissed under s 31A(2)(b) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) in so far as constitutes application for judicial review of second decision of Full Bench of the Fair Work Commission
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE –Where applications by employer and employee organisations for declarations as to whether employee organisation is bargaining representative for certain classes of employees covered by proposed enterprise agreement – Where Court will authoritatively determine question of whether employee organisation is bargaining representative for those classes of employees in determining applications for declaratory relief - Where no utility in entertaining application for judicial review of decision of Full Bench of Fair Work Commission constituting expression of opinion with no legal effect
Legislation: Constitution ss 71, 72
Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 176, 236, 237, 562, 563, 604
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 21, 22, 31A
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 26.01
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39BCases cited: “Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union” known as the Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union (AMWU) v ResMed Limited [2013] FWC 9725
Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission [1992] HCA 10; (1992) 175 CLR 564
Butorac v WIN Corporation Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 1503
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Australian Industrial Relations Commission [2007] FCAFC 32; (2007) 157 FCR 260
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Wagstaff Piling Pty Ltd [2012] FCAFC 87; (2012) 203 FCR 371
Dey v Victorian Railway Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62
Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2006] HCA 44; (2006) 228 CLR 45
General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964)…
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- Case
- [2015] FCA 379
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the Court were whether the second decision of the FWC Full Bench had apparent legal effect, and whether there was a reasonable prospect that ResMed would successfully prosecute the claim for judicial review of that decision. The Court held that the second decision of the FWC Full Bench did not have apparent legal effect, as it was an expression of opinion without any legal effect. Furthermore, the Court found that there was no reasonable prospect that ResMed would successfully prosecute the claim for judicial review of the second decision of the FWC Full Bench. Consequently, the Court dismissed the application for judicial review in so far as it sought orders in the nature of certiorari and mandamus. The Court held that there was no utility in entertaining an application for judicial review of a decision of the FWC Full Bench that constituted an expression of opinion with no legal effect.
In summary, the Court dismissed the amended originating application for relief filed by ResMed in so far as it sought orders in the nature of certiorari and mandamus. The question of costs of and incidental to the interlocutory application was reserved.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Pursuant to s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), the amended originating application for relief filed by the applicant on 15 September 2014 be dismissed in so far as it seeks the orders set out in paragraphs 2 and 3 of that application.
2. The question of costs of and incidental to the interlocutory application filed 8 October 2014 and amended on 10 December 2014 is reserved.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Importantly for reasons that will become apparent, it remains the case that ResMed does not challenge the Commissioner’s finding as to category (e) of paragraph 2.2 in the MSD application. This finding provided the basis on which the Court found that the FWC correctly considered that it had jurisdiction to entertain the MSD application in the ResMed Jurisdictional Decision. That being so, the outcome of these proceedings can have no bearing on the question of whether the FWC has jurisdiction to entertain that application.3. CONSIDERATION3.1 Relevant principles governing a summary judgment application Section 31A of the FCA Act relevantly provides that: (2) The Court may give judgment for one party against another in relation to the whole or any part of a proceeding if:(a) the first party is defending the proceeding or that part of the proceeding; and (b) the Court is satisfied that the other party has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or that part of the proceeding.(3) For the purposes of this section, a defence or a proceeding or part of a proceeding need not be:(a) hopeless; or(b) bound to fail;for it to have no reasonable prospect of success. The intention behind the enactment of s 31A is “to lower the bar for obtaining summary judgment (including summary dismissal) below the level that had been fixed by such authorities as Dey v Victorian Railway Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62 at 91-92, and General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125 at 129–130…”: White Industries Aust Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2007] FCA 511; (2007) 160 FCR 298 (White Industries) at 310 [54] (Lindgren J).In the cases to which Lindgren J referred, the requirement had been expressed in terms of “manifestly groundless” or “obviously untenable”. As Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ held in Spencer v The Commonwealth [2010] HCA 28; (2010) 241 CLR 118 (Spencer) at 139 [52]-[53]:…effect must be given to the negative admonition in sub-s (3) that a defence, a proceeding, or a part of a proceeding may be found to have no reasonable prospect of successful prosecution even if it cannot be said that it is “hopeless” or “bound to fail”. … it is important to begin by recognising that the combined effect of sub-ss (2) and (3) is that the inquiry required in this case is whether there is a “reasonable” prospect of prosecuting the proceeding, not an inquiry directed to whether a certain and concluded determination could be made that the proceeding would necessarily fail. In this respect, s 31A departs radically from the basis upon which earlier forms of provision permitting the entry of summary judgment have been understood and administered. Nonetheless, the discretion must be exercised with caution (Spencer at [24] (French CJ and Gummow J) and [60] (Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ)) and is concerned “with the bringing and defending of proceedings, not just with pleadings; with substance, not just with form”: White Industries at [50] (approved in Kowalski v MMAL Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd [2009] FCAFC 117; (2009) 178 FCR 401 (Kowalski) at [30] (the Court); see also Spencer at [23] (French CJ and Gummow J)).