SZSXT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

Link copied
Case Copied 29 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZSXT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCA 1440

Citation: SZSXT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCA 1440 
Parties: SZSXT v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and JUDGES OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

File number:

NSD 2572 of 2013

Judge: ROBERTSON J
Date of judgment: 24 December 2013
Legislation:

Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) ss 8,10
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 476, 477

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) reg 16.05
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 36.57

Cases cited:

Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Australian Industrial Relations Commission [2007] FCAFC 32; (2007) 157 FCR 260
Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163
Decor Corp Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397
Di Carlo v Dubois and Ors [2007] QCA 316
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Futuris Corporation Ltd (2008) 237 CLR 146
Hot Holdings Pty Ltd v Creasy (2002) 210 CLR 438
R v Wolverhampton Crown Court; ex parte Crofts [1983] 1 WLR 204

R (Burns) v County Court Judge of Tyrone [1961] NI 167

Spalla v St George Motor Finance Ltd (ACN 007 656 555) (No 5) [2004] FCA 1262

SZFDE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 232 CLR 189

SZRIQ v Federal Magistrates Court of Australia [2013] FCA 1284
SZSXT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCA 1394
SZSXT v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCCA 1293
Tang v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 139
Wentworth v Rogers (No 5) (1986) 6 NSWLR 534

Date of hearing: 20 December 2013
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: No catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 79
Counsel for the Applicant: Ms TT Baw

Solicitor for the Applicant:

Counsel for the First Respondent:

Auscorp Solicitors and Conveyancers

Mr T Reilly

Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper
Counsel for the Second Respondents: The Second Respondents did not appear

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 2572 of 2013
BETWEEN:

SZSXT
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

JUDGES OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Second Respondents

JUDGE:

ROBERTSON J

DATE OF ORDER:

24 DECEMBER 2013

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The requirement in r 36.57(2) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 for at least 21 days notice of an application for the Court to receive further evidence on appeal be dispensed with so as to permit the application to be filed and heard on 20 December 2013.

2.The application for leave to appeal from the judgment of Cowdroy J given on 17 December 2013 at Sydney dismissing the applicant’s interlocutory application to restrain the first respondent from taking any steps to remove the applicant from Australia be granted.

3.Costs be reserved.

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read SZSXT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2013] FCA 1440
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of SZSXT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved an appeal against the decision of Cowdroy J, who exercised jurisdiction under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). The applicant, an asylum seeker from Iraq, sought to challenge the Federal Circuit Court’s refusal to extend the time limit for his application, arguing that the judge had erred in various respects. Key grounds included the failure to give due weight to the Tribunal's omission to consider certain guidelines, taking into account an irrelevant consideration by suggesting the proper remedy was to approach the Minister rather than the Court, and alleging fraud by the representative who assisted in preparing the application to the Federal Circuit Court.

The legal issues centered on whether the judge of the Federal Circuit Court made a jurisdictional error in refusing to extend the time limit for the application. The court had to determine if the Federal Circuit Court judge erred in balancing the delay in the applicant’s application against the Tribunal’s lack of consideration of the UNHCR Guidelines and whether the judge's suggestion that the Minister retained a discretion to grant a protection visa amounted to jurisdictional error. Additionally, the court had to consider whether the new evidence presented, particularly the allegation of fraud by the representative, warranted reconsideration of the judgment.

The court found that the first ground of appeal, concerning the Tribunal's failure to consider the UNHCR Guidelines, did not disclose jurisdictional error as the Federal Circuit Court judge was required to balance competing considerations. The second ground, relating to the suggestion that the proper remedy was to approach the Minister, was also not found to be jurisdictional error as the judge was merely indicating the Minister's discretion. Regarding the fraud allegation, the court held that the new evidence did not establish arguable fraud affecting the outcome before the Federal Circuit Court judge. However, the court concluded that the judgment of Cowdroy J was attended by sufficient doubt due to the new evidence and granted the application for leave to appeal from the judgment of Cowdroy J, reserving costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Counsel for the applicant also relied on the fact that the application to the Federal Circuit Court, including the application for an extension of time, stated that it was prepared by the applicant rather than by Mr Sarkis and on the further fact that the applicant’s affidavit to the Federal Circuit Court affirmed on 10 June 2013 was said to have been prepared by the applicant.Procedural background The judge of this Court, Cowdroy J, was exercising jurisdiction under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth): see SZRIQ v Federal Magistrates Court of Australia [2013] FCA 1284 and Tang v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 139, there being no appeal from the judgment of the Federal Circuit Court refusing to extend time. The applicant submitted to Cowdroy J that the judge of the Federal Circuit Court fell into jurisdictional error due to, in summary:(a)unreasonably failing to give due weight to an error of the Tribunal, namely that the Tribunal failed to properly consider the UNHCR Guidelines;(b)taking into account an irrelevant consideration by finding that the proper remedy available to the applicant was to approach the Minister rather than the Court; and(c)a fraud being committed upon the Court by the representative for the applicant, who represented that he had expertise such as to properly conduct the applicant’s application.This last ground was amended before me, although not in any material way, so as to read, in full:That the person who assisted in preparing the application to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia committed fraud in that he held himself out to have expertise in the preparation and presentation of migration matters whereas in fact he had no such expertise and in fact conducted the applicant’s case such that he prevented the applicant’s case from being properly presented such that the fraud was perpetuated (sic) on the Court as well and the Court’s jurisdiction was in effect unexercised. Cowdroy J said that the first ground did not disclose jurisdictional error: it was not the case that the primary judge mistakenly asserted or denied the existence of jurisdiction or misapprehended or disregarded the nature or limits of his functions or powers. The judge of the Federal Circuit Court was required to balance competing considerations in light of whether it was necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to allow the application for an extension of time. The judge of the Federal Circuit Court weighed the applicant’s failure to explain the delay in bringing his application against the possible issue of the Tribunal’s lack of consideration of a part of the 2012 UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines. As to the second ground, Cowdroy J found it was not the case that the judge of the Federal Circuit Court suggested that approaching the Minister for reconsideration of the applicant’s refused application for a protection visa was a remedy arising out of any jurisdictional error of the Tribunal. Rather, having decided to reject the application for extension of time due to the applicant’s delay, his Honour was merely indicating that the Minister retained a discretion to grant a protection visa to the applicant. That observation on the part of the judge of the Federal Circuit Court did not amount to jurisdictional error.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The position of the Minister was that the new evidence did not prove arguable fraud affecting the outcome before the judge of the Federal Circuit Court and there was, in that respect and otherwise, no jurisdictional error on the part of the Federal Circuit Court or other reason to conclude that the judgment of Cowdroy J was attended by sufficient doubt.The new evidence I shall first summarise the affidavit affirmed by the applicant on 19 December 2013. The entirety of the affidavit was not new evidence but, as I have said, there was no objection to the new evidence being adduced before me or to the admissibility of the contents of the affidavit. Further, counsel for the Minister did not seek to cross-examine the applicant on his affidavit. No objection was taken by the Minister to the application to dispense with the 21 day requirement in r 36.57(2) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). I so order. The applicant states that he cannot speak or read or write English and that he relies upon an interpreter to translate and read his documents and to communicate with the government. On or about 12 April 2012 he arrived at Christmas Island as an asylum seeker from Iraq and stayed there for 22 days. He travelled to Australia without a passport or documents in 2012. On or about 19 July 2012, he applied for a protection visa. On or about 7 September 2012 he received a phone call from the government through an interpreter telling him that his application for a protection visa was refused. On or about 10 January 2013 he appeared at a hearing of an application for review of the decision of the Minister’s delegate before the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal). The government provided him with a representative to appear at the Tribunal hearing, a Mr Ford from Playfair Visa and Migration Services. On or around 12 April 2013 he received a telephone call from Mr Ford’s office that his case was finished and was told: “You have 32 days to do something with the federal (sic).” The applicant was given a copy of the Tribunal decision. He did not know how to do anything further with his case. In or around May 2013 the applicant was referred by friends to a Mr Laba Sarkis. The applicant rang Mr Sarkis who said “Come to my address, I am professional at this”. At some point, the applicant gave the Tribunal decision to Mr Sarkis who did not read to the applicant the letter from the Tribunal to the applicant. Mr Sarkis just said “I will give this to the immigration or the High Court”. In or about early May 2013 the applicant went to the address that Mr Sarkis had provided. Mr Sarkis said: “I understand your situation and I have helped many people before you and I have got them permanent citizenship. I am professional and I will get you residency, you let me do all paperwork and you just sign.” Soon after that meeting, in or about the first week of May 2013, the applicant gave Mr Sarkis $500 cash and was handed a receipt. The applicant understood Mr Sarkis was representing him for his appeal. The applicant signed documents that Mr Sarkis asked him to sign. Mr Sarkis did not tell him what he was signing and the applicant trusted him to get his permanent visa. At a later time the applicant also paid Mr Sarkis $1,000 in cash.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In my opinion therefore, on the basis of the new evidence, the judgment of the judge of this Court is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered by the Full Court. Conclusion For these reasons I grant the application for leave to appeal from the judgment of Cowdroy J. I shall reserve costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The judge of the Federal Circuit Court refused the application for an extension of time.Consideration By s 8 of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) the Federal Circuit Court of Australia is a court of record and is a court of law and equity. By s 10 of that Act it has such original jurisdiction as is vested in it by laws made by the Parliament by express provision. By s 476 of the Migration Act 1958, the Federal Circuit Court has, subject to that section, the same original jurisdiction in relation to migration decisions as the High Court has under paragraph 75(v) of the Constitution. By s 476(2) the Federal Circuit Court has no jurisdiction in relation to certain specified decisions. Apart from the reasons of the Federal Circuit Court judge and the applicant’s recent affidavit, which I have summarised above, there was no evidence before me of what occurred in the Federal Circuit Court, by way of transcript or otherwise. The circumstances in which in private law cases a judgment can be set aside for fraud were considered by the Court of Appeal in Wentworth v Rogers (No 5) (1986) 6 NSWLR 534 by Kirby P, with whom Hope JA and Samuels JA agreed. The Court of Appeal said that such proceedings were well-established in Australian law and were independent of an appeal and were equitable in origin and nature: see also Monroe Schneider Associates Inc v No 1 Raberem Pty Ltd (1992) 37 FCR 234. The Court of Appeal stated a number of principles to be established by law andwhich governed proceedings of that kind. See also Spalla v St George Motor Finance Ltd (ACN 007 656 555) (No 5) [2004] FCA 1262 per French J at [60] and Di Carlo v Dubois and Ors [2007] QCA 316 at [31]-[32]. So far as presently relevant those principles were as follows. First, the essence of the action is fraud. The allegations must be established by the strict proof which such a charge requires. Secondly, it must be shown, by the party asserting that a judgment was procured by fraud, that there has been a new discovery of something material, in the sense that fresh facts had been found which, by themselves or in combination with previously known facts, would provide a reason for setting aside the judgment. Thirdly, mere suspicion of fraud, raised by fresh facts later discovered, will not be sufficient to secure relief. The claimant must establish that the new facts are so evidenced and so material that it is reasonably probable that the action will succeed. Fourthly, although perjury by the successful party or a witness or witnesses may, if later discovered, warrant the setting aside of a judgment on the ground that it was procured by fraud, and although there may be exceptional cases where such proof of perjury could suffice, without more, to warrant relief of this kind, the mere allegation, or even the proof, of perjury will not normally be sufficient to attract such drastic and exceptional relief as the setting aside of a judgment. The other requirements must be fulfilled. Fifthly, it must be shown by admissible evidence that the successful party was responsible for the fraud which taints the judgment under challenge. The evidence in support of the charge ought to be extrinsic. It is not sufficient to show that an agent of the successful party was convicted of giving perjured evidence in the former proceeding, the result of which it is sought to impeach. It must be shown that the agent, in so acting, was in concert with the party who derived the benefit of the judgment. Sixthly, the burden of establishing the components necessary to warrant the drastic step of setting aside a judgment, allegedly affected by fraud or other relevant taint, lies on the party impugning the judgment. It is for that party to establish the fraud and to do so clearly. In summary, he or she must establish that the case is based on newly discovered facts; that the facts are material and such as to make it reasonably probable that the case will succeed; that they go beyond mere allegations of perjury on the part of witnesses at the trial; and that the opposing party who took advantage of the judgment is shown, by admissible evidence, to have been responsible for the fraud in such a way as to render it inequitable that such party should take the benefit of the judgment.