FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZSXT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCA 1440
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRYGENERAL DIVISION
NSD 2572 of 2013
BETWEEN: SZSXT
ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentJUDGES OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Second Respondents
JUDGE:
ROBERTSON J
DATE OF ORDER:
24 DECEMBER 2013
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The requirement in r 36.57(2) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 for at least 21 days notice of an application for the Court to receive further evidence on appeal be dispensed with so as to permit the application to be filed and heard on 20 December 2013.
2.The application for leave to appeal from the judgment of Cowdroy J given on 17 December 2013 at Sydney dismissing the applicant’s interlocutory application to restrain the first respondent from taking any steps to remove the applicant from Australia be granted.
3.Costs be reserved.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal…
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- Case
- [2013] FCA 1440
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues centered on whether the judge of the Federal Circuit Court made a jurisdictional error in refusing to extend the time limit for the application. The court had to determine if the Federal Circuit Court judge erred in balancing the delay in the applicant’s application against the Tribunal’s lack of consideration of the UNHCR Guidelines and whether the judge's suggestion that the Minister retained a discretion to grant a protection visa amounted to jurisdictional error. Additionally, the court had to consider whether the new evidence presented, particularly the allegation of fraud by the representative, warranted reconsideration of the judgment.
The court found that the first ground of appeal, concerning the Tribunal's failure to consider the UNHCR Guidelines, did not disclose jurisdictional error as the Federal Circuit Court judge was required to balance competing considerations. The second ground, relating to the suggestion that the proper remedy was to approach the Minister, was also not found to be jurisdictional error as the judge was merely indicating the Minister's discretion. Regarding the fraud allegation, the court held that the new evidence did not establish arguable fraud affecting the outcome before the Federal Circuit Court judge. However, the court concluded that the judgment of Cowdroy J was attended by sufficient doubt due to the new evidence and granted the application for leave to appeal from the judgment of Cowdroy J, reserving costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The judge of the Federal Circuit Court refused the application for an extension of time.Consideration By s 8 of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) the Federal Circuit Court of Australia is a court of record and is a court of law and equity. By s 10 of that Act it has such original jurisdiction as is vested in it by laws made by the Parliament by express provision. By s 476 of the Migration Act 1958, the Federal Circuit Court has, subject to that section, the same original jurisdiction in relation to migration decisions as the High Court has under paragraph 75(v) of the Constitution. By s 476(2) the Federal Circuit Court has no jurisdiction in relation to certain specified decisions. Apart from the reasons of the Federal Circuit Court judge and the applicant’s recent affidavit, which I have summarised above, there was no evidence before me of what occurred in the Federal Circuit Court, by way of transcript or otherwise. The circumstances in which in private law cases a judgment can be set aside for fraud were considered by the Court of Appeal in Wentworth v Rogers (No 5) (1986) 6 NSWLR 534 by Kirby P, with whom Hope JA and Samuels JA agreed. The Court of Appeal said that such proceedings were well-established in Australian law and were independent of an appeal and were equitable in origin and nature: see also Monroe Schneider Associates Inc v No 1 Raberem Pty Ltd (1992) 37 FCR 234. The Court of Appeal stated a number of principles to be established by law andwhich governed proceedings of that kind. See also Spalla v St George Motor Finance Ltd (ACN 007 656 555) (No 5) [2004] FCA 1262 per French J at [60] and Di Carlo v Dubois and Ors [2007] QCA 316 at [31]-[32]. So far as presently relevant those principles were as follows. First, the essence of the action is fraud. The allegations must be established by the strict proof which such a charge requires. Secondly, it must be shown, by the party asserting that a judgment was procured by fraud, that there has been a new discovery of something material, in the sense that fresh facts had been found which, by themselves or in combination with previously known facts, would provide a reason for setting aside the judgment. Thirdly, mere suspicion of fraud, raised by fresh facts later discovered, will not be sufficient to secure relief. The claimant must establish that the new facts are so evidenced and so material that it is reasonably probable that the action will succeed. Fourthly, although perjury by the successful party or a witness or witnesses may, if later discovered, warrant the setting aside of a judgment on the ground that it was procured by fraud, and although there may be exceptional cases where such proof of perjury could suffice, without more, to warrant relief of this kind, the mere allegation, or even the proof, of perjury will not normally be sufficient to attract such drastic and exceptional relief as the setting aside of a judgment. The other requirements must be fulfilled. Fifthly, it must be shown by admissible evidence that the successful party was responsible for the fraud which taints the judgment under challenge. The evidence in support of the charge ought to be extrinsic. It is not sufficient to show that an agent of the successful party was convicted of giving perjured evidence in the former proceeding, the result of which it is sought to impeach. It must be shown that the agent, in so acting, was in concert with the party who derived the benefit of the judgment. Sixthly, the burden of establishing the components necessary to warrant the drastic step of setting aside a judgment, allegedly affected by fraud or other relevant taint, lies on the party impugning the judgment. It is for that party to establish the fraud and to do so clearly. In summary, he or she must establish that the case is based on newly discovered facts; that the facts are material and such as to make it reasonably probable that the case will succeed; that they go beyond mere allegations of perjury on the part of witnesses at the trial; and that the opposing party who took advantage of the judgment is shown, by admissible evidence, to have been responsible for the fraud in such a way as to render it inequitable that such party should take the benefit of the judgment.