FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZSXT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCA 1394
Citation: SZSXT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCA 1394 Parties: SZSXT v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and JUDGES OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA File number: NSD 2557 of 2013 Judge: COWDROY J Date of judgment: 17 December 2013 Corrigendum: 19 December 2013 Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 198, 476A, 477 Cases cited: Australian Broadcasting Corp v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57
Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336
Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163
SZRIQ v Federal Magistrates Court of Australia [2013] FCA 1284
SZFDE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 232 CLR 189
SZSXT v Minister for Immigration [2013] FCCA 1293
Tang v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 139Date of hearing: 17 December 2013 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: No catchwords Number of paragraphs: 20 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr S Siva Solicitor for the Applicant: Auscorp Solicitors and Conveyancers Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms M Stone of DLA Piper Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent did not appear FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZSXT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCA 1394
CORRIGENDUM
1.In paragraph 8 of the Reasons for Judgment, delete the first sentence and insert the following sentence:
The primary judge concluded that the failure of the Tribunal to consider the 2012 UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines (‘the UNHCR Guidelines’) was outweighed by the applicant’s failure to adequately explain the delay in making the application to appeal the decision of the Tribunal.
I certify that the preceding one (1) numbered paragraph is a true copy of the Corrigendum to the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Cowdroy. Associate:
Dated: 19 December 2013
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 2557 of 2013
BETWEEN: SZSXT
ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentJUDGES OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
COWDROY J
DATE OF ORDER:
17 DECEMBER 2013
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The interlocutory application filed 17 December 2013 be dismissed.
2.The originating application filed 17 December 2013 be adjourned until 9.30 am on 20 December 2013 for directions.
3.Costs reserved.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 2557 of 2013
BETWEEN: SZSXT
ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentJUDGES OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
COWDROY J
DATE:
17 DECEMBER 2013
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
These reasons concern an urgent originating application and interlocutory application to, inter alia, restrain the first respondent (‘the Minister’) from removing the applicant from Australia. The urgency arises from the fact that the Applicant is scheduled to be removed from Australia under s 198(2) of the Migration…
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- Case
- [2013] FCA 1394
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether an interlocutory application for an injunction could effectively restrain the Minister from removing the applicant pending the resolution of the appeal. This required the court to consider the nature of jurisdictional errors in administrative decisions and whether such errors could justify the granting of an injunction. The court also needed to assess the appropriate circumstances under which an interlocutory injunction should be granted in such cases.
The court distinguished between jurisdictional errors made by administrative bodies and those made by courts. It emphasised that while administrative bodies might make jurisdictional errors, these do not necessarily equate to the kind of jurisdictional errors that would warrant an interlocutory injunction from a court. The court referenced the High Court’s decision in Craig v State of South Australia, highlighting the importance of understanding the distinction between different types of jurisdictional errors. The court determined that the application for an interlocutory injunction was essentially seeking to restrain the removal of the applicant on the basis of a potential jurisdictional error by the primary judge. However, the court found that such an error did not warrant the granting of an injunction to prevent removal pending the appeal.
The court held that the interlocutory application did not meet the necessary criteria to grant an injunction. The court concluded that the applicant had not demonstrated a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits of the appeal to justify the restraint of removal pending the outcome of the appeal. Consequently, the application for an interlocutory injunction was dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The interlocutory application simply sought, in effect, an injunction to restrain the removal of the applicant from Australia until such time as the application against the primary judge’s decision has been resolved.CONSIDERATION It is critical to understand the distinction between a jurisdictional error of an administrative body and a jurisdictional error of a Court. The distinction was explained by the High Court in Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 (‘Craig’), where it was stated per curiam at 176-178:Jurisdictional errorIn considering what constitutes “jurisdictional error”, it is necessary to distinguish between, on the one hand, the inferior courts which are amenable to certiorari and, on the other, those other tribunals exercising governmental powers which are also amenable to the writ. Putting to one side some anomalous exceptions, the inferior courts of this country are constituted by persons with either formal legal qualifications or practical legal training. They exercise jurisdiction as part of a hierarchical legal system entrusted with the administration of justice under the Commonwealth and State Constitutions. In contrast, the tribunals other than courts which are amenable to certiorari are commonly constituted, wholly or partly, by persons without formal legal qualifications or legal training. While normally subject to administrative review procedures and prima facie bound to observe the requirements of procedural fairness, they are not part of the ordinary hierarchical judicial structure. In what follows, the anomalous courts or tribunals which fall outside the above broad descriptions can be ignored. Since the District Court of South Australia is undoubtedly a court, the primary focus of discussion will be upon what constitutes jurisdictional error on the part of an inferior court.An inferior court falls into jurisdictional error if it mistakenly asserts or denies the existence of jurisdiction or if it misapprehends or disregards the nature or limits of its functions or powers in a case where it correctly recognises that jurisdiction does exist. Such jurisdictional error can infect either a positive act or a refusal or failure to act. Since certiorari goes only to quash a decision or order, an inferior court will fall into jurisdictional error for the purposes of the writ where it makes an order or decision (including an order or decision to the effect that it lacks, or refuses to exercise, jurisdiction) which is based upon a mistaken assumption or denial of jurisdiction or a misconception or disregard of the nature or limits of jurisdiction.Jurisdictional error is at its most obvious where the inferior court purports to act wholly or partly outside the general area of its jurisdiction in the sense of entertaining a matter or making a decision or order of a kind which wholly or partly lies outside the theoretical limits of its functions and powers. An inferior court would, for example, act wholly outside the general area of its jurisdiction in that sense if, having jurisdiction strictly limited to civil matters, it purported to hear and determine a criminal charge. Such a court would act partly outside the general area of its jurisdiction if, in a matter coming within the categories of civil cases which it had authority to hear and determine, it purported to make an order of a kind which it lacked power to make, such as an order for specific performance of a contract when its remedial powers were strictly limited to awarding damages for breach. Less obviously, an inferior court can, while acting wholly within the general area of its jurisdiction, fall into jurisdictional error by doing something which it lacks authority to do. If, for example, it is an essential condition of the existence of jurisdiction with respect to a particular matter that a certain event or requirement has in fact occurred or been satisfied, as distinct from the inferior court’s own conclusion that it has, there will be jurisdictional error if the court or tribunal purports to act in circumstances where that event has not in fact occurred or that requirement has not in fact been satisfied even though the matter is the kind of matter which the court has jurisdiction to entertain. Similarly, jurisdictional error will occur where an inferior court disregards or takes account of some matter in circumstances where the statute or other instrument establishing it and conferring its jurisdiction requires that that particular matter be taken into account or ignored as a pre-condition of the existence of any authority to make an order or decision in the circumstances of the particular case. Again, an inferior court will exceed its authority and fall into jurisdictional error if it misconstrues that statute or other instrument and thereby misconceives the nature of the function which it is performing or the extent of its powers in the circumstances of the particular case. In the last-mentioned category of case, the line between jurisdictional error and mere error in the exercise of jurisdiction may be particularly difficult to discern (See. eg, R v Dunphy; Ex parte Maynes (1978) 139 CLR 482; R v Gray; Ex parte Marsh (1985) 157 CLR 351 at 371; Public Service Association (SA) v Federated Clerks Union (1991) 173 CLR 132.).[Emphasis added]