CKA15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CKA15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1327

File number: NSD 1066 of 2017
Judge: FLICK J
Date of judgment: 15 November 2017
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – judicial review – application for relief under s 39 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) – review of the decision of the Federal Circuit Court not to extend time – no appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court – need to establish jurisdictional error – grounds of review more directed to establishing appellable error than jurisdictional error – no jurisdictional error established

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – tribunals – where tribunal called witness not proposed to be called by applicants – where witness provided statement to the Tribunal – inquisitorial functions of administrative decision-makers – power of the Tribunal to “get any information” – tribunal not bound by evidence proposed to be called by parties

Legislation:

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 33(1)(c)

Judiciary Act1903 (Cth) s 39B

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 422B, 424, 424A, 424B, 427, 477

Medical Practice Act1994 (Vic)

Cases cited:

ATP15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 53, (2016) 241 FCR 92

Australian Postal Corp v Kember [2003] FCA 800

AVF15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1094

Byrne v Marles [2008] VSCA 78, (2008) 19 VR 612

CKA15 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2017] FCCA 1089

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18, (2013) 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZKJT [2009] FCA 984, (2009) 111 ALD 562

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZKTI [2009] HCA 30, (2009) 238 CLR 489

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB [2004] HCA 32, (2004) 207 ALR 12

NBMB v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 149, (2008) 100 ALD 118

R v Anderson; Ex parte Ipec-Air Pty Ltd (1965) 113 CLR 177

Re Ruddock in his Capacity as Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S154/2002 [2003] HCA 60, (2003) 201 ALR 437

Shrimpton v Commonwealth (1945) 69 CLR 613

Sudath v Health Care Complaints Commission [2012] NSWCA 171, (2012) 84 NSWLR 474

SZOFK v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2011] FCA 88

SZTES v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 719

SZTSU v Federal Circuit Court of Australia [2015] FCA 224

Twist v Council of the Municipality of Randwick (1976) 136 CLR 106

Weinstein v Medical Practitioners Board of Victoria [2008] VSCA 193, (2008) 21 VR 29

Date of hearing: 11 and 12 October 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 65
Counsel for the Applicants: Mr A Kumar
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms B Rayment of Sparke Helmore
Counsel for the Second and Third Respondents: The Second and…
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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 1327
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of CKA15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the applicants sought judicial review of a decision by the Federal Circuit Court not to extend the time within which to seek judicial review of a decision by an immigration tribunal. The applicants argued that the tribunal had erred in procedural fairness by calling a witness who had not been proposed to be called by the applicants, and that the tribunal's findings on key claims were irrational and illogical. The applicants also argued that the tribunal had failed to take into account relevant considerations, including the age of one of the witnesses at the time of the events in question. The court was required to decide whether the Federal Circuit Court had made a jurisdictional error in refusing to extend time, and whether the tribunal's decision had been affected by any errors of law or procedural unfairness.

The court found that the Federal Circuit Court had not made a jurisdictional error in refusing to extend time. The court found that the applicants had provided a satisfactory explanation for the delay in bringing the application for judicial review, and that the proposed grounds of review did not have sufficient merit to warrant an extension of time. The court also found that the tribunal's decision had not been affected by any errors of law or procedural unfairness. The court found that the tribunal had not erred in calling a witness who had not been proposed to be called by the applicants, as the tribunal had inquisitorial functions and was not bound by evidence proposed to be called by the parties. The court also found that the tribunal's findings on key claims were not irrational or illogical, and that the tribunal had not failed to take into account relevant considerations, including the age of one of the witnesses at the time of the events in question.

The proceeding was dismissed and the applicants were ordered to pay the costs of the First Respondent, either as agreed or taxed. The court found that the applicants' arguments did not identify any error in the identification of the principles to be applied when exercising the discretion to extend time, or any other error, be it jurisdictional or non-jurisdictional. The court found that the Further Amended Originating Application should be dismissed, and that there was no reason why costs should not follow the event. The court found that the costs should include the costs incurred by reason of the proceeding having to be stood over to the following day to enable the applicants to further amend the former Amended Originating Application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The proceeding is dismissed.

2. The Applicants are to pay the costs of the First Respondent, either as agreed or taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Further Amended Originating Application is to be dismissed with costs. THE DECISION OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT The application to the Federal Circuit Court was an application to extend the time within which judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision could be sought. That application was not a mere formality. In resolving that application the Federal Circuit Court Judge had to consider (inter alia):·the reasons advanced for not bringing the application for judicial review within time; and ·the merits of the proposed Grounds of Review in the event that time was extended. The Federal Circuit Court Judge directed attention to each of these broadly defined considerations. In exercising the statutory power to extend time, the Federal Circuit Court Judge was correct in identifying the general principles to be applied and correct in stating that the “issue for the Court … is whether it is in the interests of the administration of justice to extend time”: [2017] FCCA 1089 at [7]. That Judge was also correct in rejecting a submission advanced on behalf of the Applicants that the delay was “relatively minimal” or “relatively short” and in characterising the delay as “significant”: [2017] FCCA 1089 at [5] to [13]. In considering the reasons relied upon for not bringing the application for review within time, the Federal Circuit Court Judge came down in favour of the Applicants concluding (in relevant part) as follows (without alteration): [29] In all therefore, in the circumstances of this case, I accept that the applicants have provided a satisfactory explanation for the lengthy delay in coming to this Court. The applicants, following advice, in circumstances where they were unaware of the possibility of coming to Court, pursued Ministerial intervention and when notified of the adverse result, on the evidence, acted as soon as reasonably practicable in making an application to this Court to extend time.[30] I agree with the Minister, that given the significant delay, granting the extension of time may undermine the general public interest in the finality of administrative decisions (Re Commonwealth of Australia; Ex parte Marks [2000] HCA 67; (2000) 177 ALR 491 at [15] – [17] per McHugh J). However, in the current case, given that the delay is albeit, significant, has been satisfactorily explained, this factor is not weighed in favour of the Minister.Although a different Judge may have reached a different conclusion, the conclusion in fact reached was one open to be reached and does not expose any error of principle such as that explained in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504 to 505 per Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ. It was the resolution of the second matter which caused the refusal of the extension of time. The Federal Circuit Court Judge was of the view that ultimately none of the proposed Grounds of Review had sufficient merit to warrant an extension of time being granted: [2017] FCCA 1089 at [77]. In reaching this ultimate conclusion, the Federal Circuit Court Judge noted that of the three Grounds “of the amended proposed substantive application”, the third Ground was not pressed. The two remaining Grounds were expressed (without alteration) as follows: Ground 11.The Tribunal denied the Applicants procedural fairness and fair hearing in the circumstances where it was clearly indicated that certain persons would not be witnesses.Particulars(i)The Tribunal considered that it was entitled to examine unprepared witness (although the witnesses also part of the application) ...(ii)It was clearly indicated that certain persons would not be witnesses.(iii)The witnesses were unprepared and were not present to give evidence …(iv)The Tribunal was procedurally unfair to question unprepared witnesses to engage with unprepared witnesses.(v)The Tribunal has misdirected itself whether it was required to afford the witnesses procedural fairness.(vi)The Tribunal did not carry out substantial justice as required by the Act.(vii)The Tribunal committed jurisdictional error.Ground 22.The Tribunal’s findings on key claims as fear from Lucy’s husband and his supporters (and kidnapping and marriage) … is irrational and / or illogical and failed to ask the correct questions.Particulars(a)The Tribunal invited the Applicants to the hearing.(b)Lucy is not in Australia and not an Applicant.(c)The Applicants witnesses were narrated events rather than being participants in the events (witness Aline being the only other person at school at the time of claimed kidnapping of Lucy but not first hand witness).(d)The Tribunal presumed that had the events claimed occurred the Applicants would have discussed the events and described the events in exact details and not differently.(e)No reasonable Tribunal would presume there would be discussion amongst the Applicants of details.(f)No reasonable Tribunal would presume the details of claims amongst the Applicants where the incidents giving rise to the claims of details.(g)The Tribunal failed to ask correct question and has incorrect question – that all witness should describe events similarly.(h)The Tribunal committed jurisdictional error.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Irrespective of any argument founded upon procedural fairness and assuming s 424 and s 424A is an exhaustive statement of the procedural fairness to which the Applicants are entitled, this final argument was also recast as an argument founded upon legal unreasonableness: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18, (2013) 249 CLR 332.But, even as recast, the argument has no merit.The failure to take into account relevant considerations The second Ground of Review has been abandoned. But it should nevertheless be noted that the Particulars formerly provided in respect to that Ground were in substance very much a repetition of the first Ground. At the time of the kidnapping of her sister in 2005 Aline was 17 years old. To the extent that the second Ground previously sought to advance an argument that the Tribunal failed to take into account “Aline’s age at the time of accident and the fact that she was a young person”, this does not appear to have been an argument raised for resolution before the Federal Circuit Court. Moreover, and perhaps more fundamentally, it was an argument which did not appear to have been raised for consideration by the Tribunal. Although other objections were voiced in respect to the manner in which the Tribunal obtained evidence from Aline, no submission was advanced to the Tribunal that inconsistencies between the father’s evidence and that of Aline may have been attributable (at least in part) to her age at the time of the kidnapping. In the absence of such a submission being advanced before the Tribunal, it could hardly be an error for the Tribunal to not take into account a submission not made. The second Ground, accordingly, was properly abandoned. It either added nothing to the first Ground or was an argument not available to be relied upon in the present proceeding. CONCLUSIONS No jurisdictional error has been made out in respect to the decision of the Federal Circuit Court Judge in the exercise of the discretion to extend time. The submissions advanced on behalf of the Applicant, with respect, failed to:·identify any error in the identification of the principles to applied when exercising the discretion conferred by s 477(2)or, alternatively:·identify any other error, be it jurisdictional or non-jurisdictional. The Further Amended Originating Application, accordingly, should be dismissed. There is no reason why costs should not follow the event. Those costs should include the costs incurred by reason of the proceeding having to be stood over to the following day to enable the Applicants to further amend the former Amended Originating Application. THE ORDERS OF THE COURT ARE: 1.The proceeding is dismissed.2.The Applicants are to pay the costs of the First Respondent, either as agreed or taxed.