CKA15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CKA15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 839

Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal:  CKA15 & Ors v Minster for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCA 1327
File number(s): NSD 8 of 2018
Judge(s): DERRINGTON J
Date of judgment: 8 June 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for extension of time to appeal from the decision to refuse relief under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) in respect of a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia not to extend the time within which the applicants might apply for judicial review of a decision of the AAT – Where it was alleged that the AAT improperly considered evidence given orally at a hearing notwithstanding the AAT’s inquisitorial role – Ability of AAT to acquire information relevant to its decision
Legislation:

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Baig v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 855

CKA15 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2017] FCCA 1089

Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344

Minister for Immigration and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 207 ALR 12

Singh v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 813

SZLPO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 177 FCR 1

SZNYE v Minister for immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 500

SZTES v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 719

SZTSU v Federal Circuit Court of Australia [2015] FCA 224

Date of hearing: 18 May 2018
Registry: Queensland
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 50
Counsel for the Applicants: The First Applicant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter on behalf of all the Applicants
Solicitor for the Respondents: Mr A Keevers from Sparke Helmore

ORDERS

NSD 8 of 2018
BETWEEN:

CKA15

First Applicant

CKB15

Second Applicant

CKC15 (and another named in the Schedule)

Third Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINSTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

DERRINGTON J

DATE OF ORDER:

8 JUNE 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for an extension of time to appeal from the decision of Flick J be dismissed.

2.The Applicants pay the Respondents’ costs of the appeal to be taxed or agreed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

DERRINGTON J:

  1. The applicants seeks an extension of time in which to appeal a decision of this Court dated 15 November 2017. In that decision, Flick J dismissed an application for relief under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) in respect of a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (the FCC). The FCC had been required to consider an application to extend the time within which the applicants might seek judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’). The…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 839
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicants, a family of four, sought an extension of time to appeal a decision of Flick J of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, which had dismissed their application for an extension of time to appeal a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). The applicants had appealed against the refusal of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to grant them protection visas. The AAT had affirmed the delegate’s decision, and Flick J had dismissed the applicants’ appeal on the basis that they had not established any ground for an extension of time. The applicants now sought an extension of time to appeal from Flick J’s decision.

The applicants argued that the AAT had improperly considered evidence given orally at a hearing, notwithstanding the AAT’s inquisitorial role. They contended that the AAT had breached the rules of natural justice by asking the mother and daughter to give evidence without reasonable notice. The applicants argued that the AAT’s consideration of this evidence had led to a finding that there were significant inconsistencies in their claims, which had resulted in the AAT affirming the delegate’s decision.

The Court rejected the applicants’ arguments. It held that the AAT had an implied general power to invite someone to produce information to it, and that it was not bound by the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) in the manner in which it obtained information. The Court found that the AAT had explained why it wished to take evidence from the mother and daughter, and that no objection was raised at the start of the hearing or later that day by any person present including the Migration Agent representing the parties. The Court held that the AAT was satisfied that it was reasonable to take oral evidence from the mother and daughter. The Court also held that the AAT had properly considered the evidence and had made findings that were supported by the evidence.

The Court dismissed the application for an extension of time to appeal from the decision of Flick J. The applicants were ordered to pay the respondents’ costs of the appeal to be taxed or agreed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for an extension of time to appeal from the decision of Flick J be dismissed.

2. The Applicants pay the Respondents’ costs of the appeal to be taxed or agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the purposes of this matter r 36.03 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) provides that any notice of appeal must be filed within 21 days of the day on which the judgment appealed from was pronounced. Here, the last day on which the applicants were entitled to file a notice appeal was 6 December 2017. The applicants filed the present application on 5 January 2018 which was 30 days later.Background The four applicants are a husband and wife and two of their children, two sons. I adopt Flick J’s summary of the factual background of this case:2 Each of the Applicants is a citizen of Lebanon. The father claims to fear persecution by reason of his being a Maronite Christian. One of the daughters … is said to have been kidnapped by members of an Islamic group called Fateh Al Islam and forced to marry and convert to Islam. She was, however, rescued. She later remarried and moved to Canada. The other daughter … is married, has a child of the marriage and resides in Australia. The other family members fled to a different area and only returned to their home village after those involved in the kidnapping had been arrested. 3 The father and mother and one of the two sons entered Australia in 2013. The other son arrived in 2010. 4 The father claims to fear retribution if he returns to Lebanon, particularly as the terms of imprisonment imposed upon those who kidnapped his daughter have or are about to come to an end. He separately claims that his sons will be given weapons and forced to fight in sectarian wars and that the family will be subject to extortion. On 6 March 2014, a delegate of the Minister refused to grant the protection visas sought by the applicants. The applicants applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision. They were invited to appear before it on 28 October 2014 to give evidence and present their arguments. The father and mother attended the hearing, but the sons did not. One of the couple’s daughters, an Australian-resident who was not an applicant, also attended as did a registered migration agent, who represented the applicants. At the hearing the father gave evidence as did his wife and their Australian-resident daughter. There was no objection to this course – that is the wife and daughter giving evidence to the Tribunal – by either the applicants, the daughter or the Migration Agent who represented them. Subsequently, pursuant to s 424A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act), by letter dated 3 November 2014 the Tribunal invited the applicants to comment on certain issues which had arisen as a result of the hearing. That letter invited the applicants to comment upon certain inconsistencies in the applicants’ claim which became obvious, or more obvious, as a result of the oral evidence which had been received in the course of the Tribunal hearing and, in particular, from the mother and daughter. The applicants’ representative responded via email dated 17 November 2014. The thrust of that response was that the applicants objected to the Tribunal having regard to the oral evidence which had been given by the mother and daughter. The basis of that objection appears to be that when they attended at the hearing they did not do so intending to give evidence. It was initially asserted that the request by the Tribunal that the mother and daughter give evidence and their acceding to that request amounted to a breach of the rules of natural justice and, in particular, that it was procedurally unfair.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The arguments advanced by the applicants were rejected and, on 25 November 2014, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision.The Tribunal’s decision One of the applicants’ main arguments advanced to the Tribunal concerned the conduct of the review in the manner identified above. Specifically, they asserted that in response to the hearing invitation they had indicated that only the father would give evidence. They complained that, notwithstanding that indication, the Tribunal asked the mother and daughter to give evidence which they did. In the letter which was sent after the hearing in response to the Tribunal’s 424A letter, the applicants alleged that the mother and daughter had been ‘entrapped’ into giving evidence and that they were not provided with reasonable notice to prepare for examination. In respect of that objections the Tribunal decided at [11] of its reasons:The Tribunal has carefully considered the father applicant’s objection. However, the Tribunal notes that it is well established that the Tribunal follow an inquisitorial process of review, which enables it to actively investigate and obtain relevant information. In this context, the Tribunal has been found to have an implied general power to get or invite someone to produce a document or non-documentary information subject to any constraints found in the Act. … The Tribunal accepts that the mother applicant stated in the response to hearing invitation that she would not take part in the Tribunal hearing. However, she nevertheless attended …. The Tribunal explained at the start of hearing why it wished to take evidence from the mother applicant and daughter which was because credibility issues had been raised by the delegate and because of the late provision on the day of the hearing of a submission by the daughter. In support of the general proposition that the Tribunal had a general implied power to invite someone to produce information to it, the Tribunal referred to the decision of this Court in SZLPO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 177 FCR 1. It also considered that it was not bound by the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) in the manner in which it obtains information. As appears in the above cited paragraph from the Tribunal’s reasons, it observed that at the commencement of the hearing it had explained why it wished to take evidence from the mother and daughter. It subsequently noted that no objection was raised at the start of the hearing or later that day by any person present including the Migration Agent representing the parties. The mother and daughter were asked factual questions about which the Tribunal would have expected them to have knowledge if the evidence of the father was truthful. The Tribunal was satisfied that it was reasonable to take oral evidence from the mother and daughter. In relation to the substance of the applicants’ claim for protection visas, the Tribunal found that there were ‘such significant inconsistencies’ in the applicants’ evidence that it could not be satisfied they were being truthful. It had serious concerns in relation to the credibility of the father and mother applicants as well as that of their daughter. It did not accept any of the applicants’ claims in relation to an allegation that another daughter had been abducted. Further, it did not accept that the applicants were of adverse interest to Fateh Al Islam. There was no credible evidence to suggest that the applicants would be extorted upon their return to Lebanon. Additionally, on the basis of country information, the Tribunal rejected the claim that the applicants would face harm because of their religion or from generalised violence. The Tribunal also rejected the claim that the applicant sons would be forcibly recruited to fight in any armed conflict in Lebanon.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court found that the AAT's inquisitorial role allowed it to actively investigate and obtain relevant information, including inviting individuals to give oral evidence. This was supported by the decision in SZLPO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 177 FCR 1, which established that the AAT has an implied general power to invite someone to produce information to it. The court noted that the mother and daughter were asked factual questions that they would have been expected to know if the father's evidence was truthful. Furthermore, no objections were raised at the start of the hearing or later that day by any person present, including the Migration Agent representing the parties. The court found that the AAT's consideration of the oral evidence was reasonable and did not breach natural justice. Regarding the AAT's decision on the merits, the court found that the Tribunal had serious concerns in relation to the credibility of the father and mother applicants as well as that of their daughter. It did not accept any of the applicants' claims in relation to an allegation that another daughter had been abducted. The Tribunal also rejected the claim that the applicants were of adverse interest to Fateh Al Islam and that they would be extorted upon their return to Lebanon. Based on country information, the Tribunal rejected the claim that the applicants would face harm because of their religion or from generalised violence. Additionally, the Tribunal rejected the claim that the applicant sons would be forcibly recruited to fight in any armed conflict in Lebanon. The court concluded that the AAT's decision to affirm the delegate's decision refusing protection visas was correct. The ratio decidendi of this case is that the AAT has the authority to invite individuals to give oral evidence during a hearing as part of its inquisitorial role, and this does not necessarily breach natural justice if done reasonably and without objection.